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PERSIAN GULF

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Editorial Note.

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) POSITION AND EXTENT

THE area here described includes the Persian Gulf proper together with the Gulf of Oman and the adjacent coastal regions.

The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman lie between $22^{\circ} 30'$ and $30^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude and 48° and 62° east longitude, and are bounded on the south and south-west by the coastal districts of Arabia, at the head of the Gulf by those of Irak, and on the north-east by the coastal regions of south-west Persia.

The Persian Gulf proper extends in a south-easterly direction for 460 miles from the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab to the coast of the promontory of Oman.¹ Here a projection of the Arabian coast turns north-east as far as Ras Musandim, and narrows the entrance of the gulf through the Straits of Hormuz to a width of 29 miles. The Gulf itself has an average width of about 120 miles.

The Gulf of Oman is an arm of the Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea which forms the approach to the Persian Gulf proper. The outer limit may be taken as a line joining Gwattar in Persian Makran to Ras el-Hadd on the Arabian coast.

(2) COASTS, ISLANDS, AND RIVER SYSTEMS

The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman occupy the southern part of a great depression lying between the plateau of Arabia and the plateau of Iran, of which

¹ The term "promontory of Oman" is here used to describe that projection of the Arabian coast whose point nearly blocks the entrance of the Persian Gulf, and of which the base is a line running from the town of Abu Dhabi to the Baraimi oasis and thence to the town of Sohar.

Mesopotamia forms the northern part. The Euphrates and Tigris have, within historical times, silted up their mouths to an extent that has materially altered the coast-line of the Gulf, and these rivers seem destined in the future to unite Hasa to Fars, just as in the past they produced the fertile plain of Mesopotamia. The great depression is bounded for about two-thirds of its length, along the Persian littoral and the coast of Oman, by mountain ranges which have in places elevations of as much as 10,000 ft. These ranges run on the Persian side in an extraordinarily uniform direction from north-west to south-east as far as the Straits of Hormuz, where they bear eastwards, thence running along the coast of Baluchistan and Sind. The south-western side of the depression is similarly bounded by the mountains of Oman. In places the mountains run steeply down to the sea, but there is usually a narrow coastal plain or flat tract intervening.

The bottom of the Persian Gulf proper, outside the areas affected by recent coral reefs, is flat and gently undulating, and the depth exceeds 60 fathoms over only a small part of the area. On the Persian side, where the coast is mountainous, the water is naturally deeper than on the flatter Arabian side, where reefs and shoals extend into the Gulf for a distance of from 30 to 50 miles along almost its entire length. The sea-floor of the Gulf of Oman lies very much lower than that of the Persian Gulf proper, this being especially the case in the neighbourhood of the Musandim peninsula, where the depth of the water is about 60 fathoms. About 50 miles from Musandim the depth increases to 150 fathoms.

Of the numerous islands that dot the Gulf, many are partly at least of volcanic origin. The two largest of these are Kishm, which lies off the Persian coast just within the entrance to the Gulf, and Bahrein, off the Arabian coast.

The Persian Gulf is lacking in good harbours, the anchorages being for the most part shallow and exposed.

The coastal regions of the Gulf fall naturally into three groups.

The *Arabian Coastal Region*, which adjoins the south and south-west shores of the Persian Gulf proper, from the Khor Zobeir on the north as far as the entrance at Ras Musandim, and thence along the projecting butt of the Arabian continent as far as Ras el-Hadd, contains a group of sheikhdoms and emirates, the boundaries of which are not usually clearly defined, and includes Koweit, Hasa, El-Katr (Gattar), Trucial Oman, and a considerable part of the Sultanate of Oman, all of which maintain special relations with the British Government (see *Arabia*, No. 61 of this series, p. 22).

At the *Head of the Gulf* proper, the coast of the alluvial plains of Mesopotamia and Arabistan and a part of Behbahan, from the Khor Zobeir in the west to a point near Bandar Dilam in the east, including the districts inland as far as Basra and Ahwaz, comprises Turkish territory, now in British occupation, along the lower Shatt el-Arab, and the Persian province of South Arabistan, which is under the hereditary government of the Sheikh of Mohammera.

The *Persian Littoral*, the narrow coastal plain which lies between the shores of the Gulf and the main maritime range of the mountains, from Bandar Dilam on the north to the frontier of Baluchistan at Gwattar, together with the mountainous interior forming the southern side of the Iranian plateau, comprises the maritime districts of the Persian province of Fars and of Laristan, and includes the administrative districts which are under the governor of the Persian coast and islands, and the coastal district of the province of Persian Makran.

The importance of the Persian Gulf lies principally in its relation to international communications. The head of the Gulf affords the natural outlet to the shortest route from central and southern Europe to India, while at the same time the whole of the Gulf region lies adjacent to the flank of an advance through

Persia in a similar direction. Through the Persian Gulf lie the main trade routes to southern, central, and western Persia from India and from Great Britain, *via* the Gulf ports, Mohammera, Basra, and Baghdad, while with the development of Mesopotamia and the oilfields near the Gulf its importance will be still further increased.

ARABIAN COASTAL REGION

Surface

The Arabian coastal region occupies the lowest portion of the long and gradual decline between the central Arabian plateau and the shores of the Persian Gulf, the general slope being broken only by the mountainous district of Oman, which lies in the extreme south-east. The region is bordered on the east by the Dahana, a hard, gravelly plain, crossed at intervals by sand belts of varying width, which runs in a south-easterly direction in a continuous belt and joins east of Oman the enormous block of Arabian desert known as the Ruba el-Khali. For purposes of description the coastal region may be divided into two parts:—

(i) The district in the north-west which extends along the shores of the Gulf proper from Irak in the north to the foot of the promontory of Oman at Abu Dhabi.

(ii) The district in the south-east which includes the promontory of Oman and thence a part of the sultanate as far as the Ras el-Hadd.

(i) This region, which contains the Sultanate of Koweit, the province of Hasa, the promontory of El-Katr, and part of Trucial Oman, is composed of flat or slightly undulating plains, whose surface is broken only by low outcrops of sandstone or occasional isolated hills. In the interior, west of Hasa, there is a certain amount of continuous high ground, stony ridges running parallel to the coast here intervening between Hasa and the desert. With the exception of certain fertile tracts (see below, p. 6), the region consists for the most part of

steppe or desert land, parts of which support a scanty vegetation and yield a certain amount of grazing.

The *Sultanate of Koweit* extends along the coast for 190 miles from the frontier of Irak as far as the boundaries of the province of Hasa; its maximum breadth is about 160 miles, but the effective rule of the Sultan only extends for about a day's journey from the coast. The soil north of Koweit Bay is gravelly, but further south it is partly sand and partly clay, and there is only a small patch of fertile soil. There is no running water in the principality with the exception of one small stream.

Next to Koweit and adjoining its southern frontier, the *Province of Hasa* runs along the coast for 300 miles as far as the promontory of El-Katr, with an average breadth of about 50 miles. With the exception of the two fertile oases of Hasa and Katif, the province is a region of sandy or earthy steppe broken by many low white sandhills. It contains numerous shallow wells of drinkable water, and water is obtainable as a rule a few feet below the surface. There is a fair amount of grazing, and in places much scrub, with occasional depressions in which date palms and various bushes show the presence of water. In the north there are deposits of nitrate and common salt.

The *Promontory of El-Katr* is little known, but it is described as a rocky and pebbly desert, with a poor soil, consisting in the better districts of gravel and marl mixed with sand; the only vegetation is coarse grass mixed with a certain amount of low brushwood, although water is found below the surface without much difficulty.

Trucial Oman consists of a group of sultanates which extend along the coast for 300 miles from the foot of the promontory of El-Katr to the Ras el-Jebel district at the north of the Oman promontory. It is a low and sandy maritime plain, unsuited for tillage, but not without natural vegetation and even some wood; inland plains contain tracts with occasional cultivation. There are enough wells and water holes to support a

scanty Beduin population, and certain fertile districts are found in the neighbourhood of springs and wadi mouths.

The principal fertile districts in (i) are :—

(a) A small district of cultivated soil in the neighbourhood of Jahra, close to the foot of the Bay of Koweit and about 20 miles from Koweit town. This contains most of the cultivation in the sultanate.

(b) The two important oases of Hasa and Katif, which form the settled part of the province of Hasa.

The oasis of Hasa is a district which contains some cultivated areas of great fertility. It extends for about 30 miles north and south and 20 miles east and west, and is separated from the Gulf at Okwair by 16 miles of desolate sand ridges. There are extensive date groves in the fertile parts of the district; and in some parts a number of springs saturate the land and permit an elaborate system of irrigation for rice. The important town of Hofuf, capital of the province of Hasa, is situated in this district in the south-eastern corner of the cultivated area.

The Katif oasis is situated on the coast north-east of the oasis of Hasa. Its length from north to south is 18 miles, with an average breadth of 3 miles, the town of Katif lying in the middle. Most of the area consists of a sandy plain saturated by spring water. The cultivated tract ends 6 miles south of the town, but, as in Hasa, there are detached areas of cultivated ground.

(c) The Wadi el-Miya is a long valley or depression in the extreme north of the province of Hasa, containing numerous wells and springs. It has a dark brown cultivable soil, and in spring grass is abundant.

(d) Further south, in Trucial Oman, there are small spots of fertility at occasional wadi mouths.

(ii) The district in the south-east of the Arabian coastal region contains the most important part of the Sultanate of Oman, as well as a part of Trucial Oman,

with independent Oman in the interior. The most important physical feature is the hilly tract which, commencing at Ras Musandim (the entrance of the Persian Gulf proper), sweeps round in a curve parallel to the coast as far as Ras el-Hadd. The range whose northernmost part is the mountainous district of Ras el-Jebel is known as the Hajar of Oman. It is cut into two parts by the great cleft known as the Wadi Semail, and in the lofty Jebel Akhdar reaches heights approaching 10,000 ft. The rocks are mainly of limestone, but around Muscat there is an outcrop of volcanic serpentine which extends for about 10 miles along the coast. Igneous rocks are also found on the coast in the neighbourhood of Sur, and in a few places inland.

Along the Trucial coast of the promontory of Oman there is a wide and sandy maritime plain, but further north, in the Ras el-Jebel district, the mountains fall steeply into the sea. On the eastern side of the promontory the long and narrow coastal plain of Batina intervenes between the mountains and the coast for a distance of 150 miles, but in the neighbourhood of Muscat the coast is again mountainous and steep, and east of this the hilly district of east Hajar comes close to the sea. Inland the Dhahira district extends to the north-west for a distance of about 100 miles. It is a plain of uneven surface which slopes down from the foothills of Hajar to the Ruba el-Khali, in which its drainage is lost. South-east of this, Oman proper consists of a central plateau shut in on the north by Jebel Akhdar and on the south by the desert; its surface, outside the oasis, is rough and broken, and the central portion is a stony plain thickly dotted with small volcanic hills. The district in the south, however, has a wide and level surface sprinkled with dwarf mimosa and bunches of desert grass. Inland, in east Hajar, are sandy plains and a network of small valleys, with occasional patches of cultivation. Fertile districts in this south-eastern coastal region are:—

(a) Parts of the *Batina* coastal plain, which are

very fertile, with many date groves. The Batina plain is crossed by many watercourses, but irrigation is entirely from wells.

(b) South-west of Muscat in the *Wadi Semail* district, where there are a number of date groves.

(c) In addition to these there are many rich tracts in the inland districts which are situated under the main chain of Jebel Akhdar and its coastal continuation towards Ras el-Hadd, also in the Dhahira country.

Coast and Islands

The Arabian coast, with which is included the Trucial and Pirate coasts, and in the Gulf of Oman the Batina coast, runs in a south-easterly direction from the Turkish frontier at the head of the Gulf as far as Ras el-Hadd. The general trend of the land is interrupted by the promontory of El-Katr, which projects northwards from the coast about midway between the head of the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, forming the eastern side of the Gulf of Bahrein; and also by the promontory of Oman, where the coast runs north-eastwards from Abu Dhabi to Ras Musandim before turning south-eastwards again to Ras el-Hadd.

(i) The coast-line of the Persian Gulf proper as far as the foot of the promontory of Oman is indented with a number of bays. This part of the coast is low, and reefs and shoals extend from 30 to 50 miles off it, making it difficult and dangerous of approach. Koweit and Bahrein are the only good harbours in this part. The shore is barren and desolate, and a great part of it has the appearance of a desert of white sand with occasional rocky hills of moderate height on which grow tufts of coarse grass. There are date trees near the few towns. The great reef, which commences about 70 miles south of Koweit, extends along the south-eastern and southern shore to the extreme south of the Gulf proper, and forms a labyrinth of reefs and shoals these being especially dangerous in the Gulf of

Bahrein, and between El-Katr and Abu Dhabi. The only island of importance is Bahrein, which forms the centre of the archipelago that constitutes the Principality of Bahrein. The island has an extreme length of 30 miles and a maximum breadth of 10 miles, and consists mainly of a stony plateau from 100 to 150 ft. high. Its coast is low; along the northern shore there is a belt of fertile land from two to three miles wide which is covered with date plantations; the remainder of the island is uncultivated owing to want of water.

Ports.—The bay of *Koweit* affords the only good anchorage for large vessels on this coast, with the exception of Bahrein. The bay itself is a large inlet leading out of the north-west corner of the Persian Gulf; it is 20 miles long from east to west, and 10 miles wide; in the greater part of the bay there is anchorage with good holding ground. The depths in the harbour are from 16 fathoms to $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms, shoaling to 4 fathoms in the narrows at its head; vessels drawing over 20 ft. have to anchor two miles from the town. Although Koweit is connected by caravan routes with the interior of Arabia, the principal stream of trade in that direction passes through Manama, the port of Bahrein, whence it flows to minor ports of the Arabian coast, notably Okwair (Ojair) and Katif. From these ports there are caravan routes to Hofuf, the principal town of the Hasa oasis, and thence to Nejd.

Manama or *Bahrein* is situated at the extreme north of the island of Bahrein. The harbour is scarcely more than an open roadstead, but is sheltered by the island of Muharrak on the south and east respectively, and by the Fasht el-Yarim to the northward. The latter island does not prevent a considerable sea getting up in the outer harbour during a strong *shamal* (north-west wind), but vessels ride easily at anchor. The inner harbour, which is really a bight in the reefs, is about a square mile in extent; it is chiefly used by *bagala* (dhows), and vessels drawing more than 15 ft. should not enter it. Vessels drawing over 20 ft. lie just over 3 miles from the shore.

The port of *Okwair* (*Ojair*) is situated on the Arabian coast about 24 miles west-south-west of the southern extremity of Bahrein island. The harbour, which seems capable of improvement, has an entrance 200 to 300 yds. wide; the channel and a part of the bay has a depth of 3 to 4 fathoms; the sea without is shallower in places and dangerous for ships.

El-Katif, situated in the oasis of Katif, is an important coast town which is 36 miles north-west by west from the nearest part of Bahrein island, and 64 miles north-west of Okwair, and shares with Okwair a considerable part of the trade with the interior of Arabia. It has great defects as a port, and vessels of over 7 ft. draught cannot reach the town. Larger vessels anchor 10 miles north-east of El-Katif, just within Ras Tanura.

The port of *El-Bidaa* (*Bida*), sometimes known as *Doha*, is situated on the eastern side of the promontory of El-Katr, and is connected by caravan route with Hofuf and the interior. There is a natural harbour $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles long by 2 miles broad, whose approach is obstructed by reefs and shoals. The greater part of the harbour has a depth of $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 fathoms, with anchorage in mud and clay.

(ii) With the exception of the Ras el-Jebel district (see below, p. 11), the coast of the promontory of Oman and of the sultanate as far as Ras el-Hadd has few bays or indentations; a great part of it is mountainous and bold. The coast round Muscat is rugged and steep in places, and east of this the foothills of the mountains run down to the coast. The coast to the south-west of the promontory of Oman, which forms part of Trucial Oman, is a low and sandy desert, while the coast of Batina is also sandy, and is fringed for many miles with date groves. On this part of the Trucial coast the water is shallow though free from reefs, but the coast is open and exposed to the *shamal*, while there is, as a rule, a heavy surf along the coast on both sides of the promontory. There is deep water along the shores of the Gulf of Oman, but

the coast is deficient in good harbours; there are anchorages in the bays of Muscat and Matra, but both are imperfectly sheltered, the former from the north-west, the latter from the north-east winds; there is, however, a good shelter in the Khor Fakan. The importance of Muscat as a distributing centre is affected by the development of Sur, which lies 94 miles south-east of it on the same coast, and of Dibai, on the coast of Trucial Oman. Sur is an important coastal town, second only to Matra on this part of the coast; it has an open anchorage in from 8 to 11 fathoms. Dibai is a small but growing port, which supplies goods to the interior of the Oman promontory and to the Baraimi oasis district; there is anchorage in 5 fathoms, but no shelter from the north-west wind.

The mountainous district of Ras el-Jebel is indented on both sides of the promontory with numerous deep inlets; of these, two, which are known as Malcolm and Elphinstone inlets, form fine natural harbours with 14 to 20 fathoms depth; the winds in these are baffling, and the heat in summer is almost intolerable.

River System

There are no rivers in this or any region of Arabia which flow perennially from source to mouth. There are, however, in Hasa and Oman, as in other parts of the country, watercourses (*wadis*), which carry floods after rainstorms. Those which originate east of the western watershed of Arabia, many of which pass through the region under consideration, are mostly long and shallow, their beds being depressed very little below the general level. These wadis carry water beneath their beds, which can be reached by wells at varying depths; they also provide a possible means of communication, and, where the ground moisture rises near or into their surface, they create chains of oases.

The numerous streams, springs, and ponds which water the oases of Hasa and Katif are said to form a part of the drainage of central Arabia which has passed underneath the Dahana (see p. 4).

HEAD OF THE GULF

Surface

The coastal region at the head of the Persian Gulf lies between the north-eastern corner of the Arabian desert and the south-western edge of the Persian plateau, and consists of the alluvial plains of Turkish Irak and of south Arabistan, although the coast of the former touches the sea on a narrow front only, between the mouth of the Khor Zobeir and the Shatt el-Arab. The district extends along the coast from the Khor Zobeir, which is the boundary between the sultanate of Koweit and Turkish Irak, to a point between the mouth of the Hindian river and Bandar Dilam, a distance of about 130 miles. The plains are featureless, and the surface is broken only in Arabistan, in the east and north of the Hindian district, where there is a considerable hilly tract, and in Ahwaz district, where a range of hills about 30 miles in length rises to a height of 200 ft.; this range is pierced at Ahwaz by the Karun river. With the exception of certain highly cultivated areas enumerated below, the plains are barren or thinly covered with desert scrub; in some parts there are saline tracts, but a considerable part of the plains is in spring covered with grass, and the soil is probably fertile when the water can be brought to it. Large areas of the country are completely covered with swamp, especially in the Felahieh and Hawiza districts of Arabistan and on the Turkish side of the Khor Zobeir.

Fertile areas are:--

(a) The *banks of the Shatt el-Arab*, where between Basra and Mohammera the date groves are practically continuous on both sides of the river, and have a depth inland of from $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to 2 miles. On the right bank below Mohammera there is generally a fine palm belt.

(b) Considerable tracts of irrigated land in the *Felahieh (Fellahia) and Hawiza districts*, which are watered by the lower courses of the Jarrahi and the Karka rivers.

(c) There is a certain amount of land irrigated by the Hindian river.

The Karun is at present used for irrigation purposes on only a very small scale; belts of tamarisk and willow and other bushes fringe the banks of the rivers, but, as a rule, there are no large trees.

Coast and Islands

The coast of the alluvial plain at the head of the Gulf is low and marshy, liable to flood, and fringed with flat mudbanks, which have been formed by silt brought down by the Shatt el-Arab and other rivers. The head of the Gulf seems to be gradually silting up, and the delta is being extended into the sea more rapidly than any known delta; according to one authority it now advances a mile in seventy years. The shallows and mudflats make the coast difficult of approach. The two large banks, Marakat Abadan and Marakat Abdullah, between which passes the channel to the Shatt el-Arab, may be said to be underwater prolongations of the mainland. The most important indentation on the coast is the entrance to the Shatt el-Arab; but, besides the river mouth, there are numerous deep creeks, of which the most important are the Khor Musa, a large inlet of which the mouth is about 36 miles east of the Shatt el-Arab, and the Khor Zobeir. In the Khor Musa there is a good natural anchorage, but the bar would require dredging to admit vessels of a large size. The Khor Zobeir, which runs up into the desert towards Basra, has fairly deep water, but its approaches make it unsuitable for use as a harbour. With these exceptions there are no natural harbours in this district, although there is an anchorage for small vessels at Bandar Dilam.

Bubian is a large low island about 26 miles in length by 12 in breadth, situated at the north-western corner of the Persian Gulf, which is divided from the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab by the Khor Abdullah, and from the possessions of the Sheikh of Koweit by the Khor as-Sabiya. The island is barren, and is destitute

of fresh water; parts of it are at times submerged by the sea. The other islands at the head of the Gulf are little more than mudbanks, and the strip of land which lies between the Shatt el-Arab and the Haffar and Balmanshir channels of the Karun, which is sometimes called Abadan island, may be considered as part of the mainland.

Ports.—The two ports of the district, Basra and Mohammera, are both situated on the Shatt el-Arab.

Basra is situated on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab, 70 miles from the outer bar at the river mouth, and 539 miles by river from Baghdad. It is the chief port of extensive districts of which Baghdad in Mesopotamia and Kirmanshah in Persia are the trade centres, and is also the port of shipment for the date and grain trades of Mesopotamia. There is anchorage in mid-channel in Basra reach for a considerable number of ships in from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 8 fathoms. At Margil, 5 miles above Basra, there is a long strip of foreshore with deep water close to the bank, and here some 2 miles of deep-water wharves have been constructed. If improvement to the navigation of the Shatt el-Arab were effected Basra would quickly take its place as a first-rate port, and as the terminus of the Baghdad railway it seems likely to play a most important part in the future economic development of the Persian Gulf region.

Mohammera is situated about 16 miles below Basra, close to the junction of the Karun river (through the Haffar channel) with the Shatt el-Arab. Large steamers which cannot swing in the Haffar channel anchor near the left bank of the Shatt el-Arab. The port of Mohammera owes its importance partly to its position at the mouth of the Karun, through which a considerable trade to Persia at present passes, and partly to the fact that the refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are situated close by. If land transit from Persia *via* Ahwaz to Basra should take the place of river transit, it seems unlikely that the port will develop further to any great extent.

River System

The most important feature of the district at the head of the Persian Gulf is the river *Shatt el-Arab*, which forms a main line of communication along which passes a large section of the trade of Mesopotamia and central and western Persia. The *Shatt el-Arab* is formed by the confluence of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, which unite at Kurna, about 125 miles from the bar at the mouth of the river; it is joined at Mohammera, 48 miles from the river mouth, by the greater part of the waters of the Karun. The width of the river at its mouth is $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and the land is very low on both sides of the entrance. Below Mohammera the river is rich in silt contributed largely by the Karun. The waters of the river serve to irrigate through numerous channels and distributaries the extensive date groves which line its banks to a depth of from $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to 2 miles inland.

The chief obstacle to the navigation of the *Shatt el-Arab* is the outer bar at the mouth of the river, which is formed by flats composed of mud and silt of a width of nearly five miles; a smaller bar forms in the river at certain seasons in the neighbourhood of Mohammera. Above these two bars, however, the river can be ascended as far as Basra by any vessels able to cross the bar, which at spring tides admits ships up to 20 ft. draught, at other times those up to 17 to 18 ft. The *Shatt el-Arab* is wide, with a depth at low-water spring tides of 30 to 40 ft., and there are no very awkward bends in the river, which is navigable as far as Kurna by vessels of 15 ft. draught. In order to give satisfactory access to the port of Basra the bars at the mouth of the *Shatt el-Arab* and below Mohammera should be removed and the channel kept clear; it is said that this work would not present any great engineering difficulties.

The *Tigris* has so far deteriorated through systematic abstraction of its waters for canals and irrigation ditches that its usefulness for purposes of navigation has been seriously impaired; it forms, however, an

important avenue of commerce to Baghdad and thence to Persia. The river between Basra and Baghdad is practicable throughout the year for steamers drawing 4 ft., but there are numerous *bunds* and shoal patches which interfere seriously with navigation when the water is low. The volume of water in the Tigris varies considerably during the year; the low-water season lasts from July to November, the high-water from December to June.

The *Karun* is the largest and only navigable river in Persia; it rises in the mountains in the Bakhtiari country about 100 miles west of Isfahan. After winding through deep valleys and mountain gorges it emerges from the hills above Shustar and then flows south by west; it breaks through the line of sandstone hills at Ahwaz in a series of rapids, and from that point it winds through the alluvial flats of south Arabistan for a further distance of 115 miles. The main volume of the water of the *Karun* flows through the Haffar channel into the Shatt el-Arab at Mohammera, the remainder through the Balmanshir channel, reaching the sea about 12 miles east of the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab. The river is navigable as far as Ahwaz by river steamers of 2 ft. draught at any time, and of 5 ft. draught when the river is high. The *Karun*, which when full carries a brown silt, is not at present much utilised for irrigation purposes. The seasonal variations in the volume of water follow the same general course as those of the Tigris, but the *Karun* is more subject than the Tigris to sudden irregular rises. The rapids near Ahwaz are practically unnavigable, but above them navigation is again possible to within a few miles of Shustar. The Balmanshir channel can be navigated by vessels of 7 ft. draught up to 30 miles from the sea. It is said that the *Karun* is not capable of material improvement for navigation purposes except at prohibitive cost.

There are other smaller rivers in this region, and of these the chief are the following:—

The *Jarrahi* rises in the Ramuz district of Arabistan; it flows into the Felahieh district, where it is mostly carried off by canals for irrigation purposes, the lands watered by the Jarrahi being among the most fertile and productive in Arabistan. The remnants of the stream become the Felahieh—Marid canal.

The *Hindian* is formed by the junction of the two streams which rise in the Persian hills between Behbahan and Shiraz. The river reaches the Gulf through mudflats about 30 miles east of the Khor Musa; there is a bar of soft clay at the river mouth. The Hindian in its upper reaches flows through several channels, and is made use of to a considerable extent for irrigation. The depth of water at the bar is not less than 3 ft., and above it 6 ft.; the river can be ascended by native craft as far as the town of Hindian, which is 16 miles north-west of the river mouth.

The *Karka* (Kharkah, Kharkeh) river, which rises in the district north-west of Dizful, enters the plains of Arabistan about 15 miles further west than the Diz river, and waters large areas here and in the Hawiza district. Its waters are dissipated in streams and marshes which have submerged and ruined the district, but a certain amount of the water eventually finds its way through the marshes to the Tigris and the Shatt el-Arab.

PERSIAN LITTORAL

Surface

The narrow coastal plain of south-western and southern Persia consists of belts of low land of varying width, situated between the sea and a great maritime range of limestone, which forms the southern rim of the Persian plateau. The plain extends along the whole length of the coast from Bandar Dilam to the frontier of Baluchistan at Gwattar, with the exception of that part between Kangun and Asalu, where the maritime range may be said to fall directly into the sea. The

width of the plain varies as a rule from 15 to 30 miles, but in some places, e.g., at Bushire, and again between Bandar Abbas and Minab, the hills retreat, thus widening the maritime plain, which at Bushire attains a width of 45 miles, while further north it reaches a breadth of 60 miles. The surface of the plain is broken by a series of subsidiary coastal ridges and hills, which are from 1,000 to 3,000 ft. high; in places these skirt the coast and give the plain the character of a trough parallel to the sea; in other parts they divide the plain into three parts: inland valley, coastal ridge, and maritime strip; in such cases the inland valley is usually fertile. These coastal ridges contain large quantities of gypsum, and in places, as at Bustaneh and Khamir, there are deposits of sulphur. The soil of the plain is largely a light loam of great fertility, with specially fertile alluvial districts at the foot of the hills, in the deltas of the Rud-Hilleh and the Minab rivers, on which Bushire and Bandar Abbas are respectively situated, and of the Mund river, and also in the tracts along the course of the rivers. Large quantities of cereals are grown, and there is good natural grazing in the hills between May and October. Above the fore-shore there are numerous date groves. Along the coast there are extensive mudflats, and there is a certain amount of saline desert or swamp, bearing only coarse grass and tamarisk bushes. Mangroves are found in the swamps beyond Jask.

In *Persian Makran* the greater part of the coastal plain is a sandy waste impregnated with salt and seamed with lines of drainage, but in places there are patches of alluvial soil; the plain is here wider than on the coast of south-western Persia, and the formation of the coastal ridge and maritime plain less regular.

Adjoining the coastal plain and in places actually abutting on the coast is the south-western portion of the great Persian plateau, the ascent to which from sea-level is almost everywhere accomplished by a series of sudden steps indicated by rugged and precipitous mountain ranges. These ranges, which as a rule run

parallel to the coast, overlook the littoral district in its entire length; they increase in height as they recede inland. The general north-west to south-east trend of the ranges suggests easy communications between the Mesopotamian depression and the interior of the Iranian plateau, but this method of approaching the plateau is, as a matter of fact, extremely difficult. The part of the main range which adjoins the coastal plain rises in places to a height of 5,000 ft.; inside the range and co-extensive with it is a large trough divided into two parts by a watershed. Between the ranges are a series of alluvial plains, in places fertile, which vary in length from 15 to 150 miles and increase in altitude until the central plateau is reached. Further inland, more especially in the province of Fars, the southern slopes of the mountains are generally fertile; they provide very good grazing, or are terraced for vines or other cultivation. In some parts large trees and wild almonds grow above the 3,000 ft. line, and there are forests of dwarf oak. Elsewhere the mountain districts are bare and rocky.

Coast

The coast of the Persian littoral from Bandar Dilam to Gwattar includes the Dashtistan, Tangistan, and Shibkuh coasts in the Gulf proper, the Biaban coast in the Straits of Hormuz, and the coast of Persian Makran. The general trend of the coast is in a southeasterly direction from the head of the Gulf to the Straits of Hormuz, and thence due east along the shore of Persian Makran. It is comparatively free from bays or indentations, and is generally deficient in good harbours, while the seaward face of the various sandstone ridges which occur in the coastal plain is rugged, precipitous, and absolutely barren. There is deep water as a rule fairly close to the shore, which is usually clear of outlying shoals, the only considerable one being the Ras ul-Mutaf, which lies off the Tangistan coast.

The coast-line is either low, rising about 15 ft. above sea-level, or else there are precipitous ranges rising about a mile inland, and occasionally there is much swampy ground.

Ports.—There are three principal ports on the Persian littoral from which the caravan routes ascend the plateau and penetrate into the interior, viz., Bushire (leading to Shiraz and Isfahan), Bandar Abbas (for Yezd and Kirman), and Lingeh.¹ All of these are more or less inadequate and ill-protected from prevailing winds. There are also a number of anchorages close in shore which afford shelter to small boats only.

Bushire, which may be called the principal seaport of Persia, is situated at the northern point of the Bushire peninsula, about 140 miles south-east of the mouth of the Shatt el-Arab. The peninsula projects from the south into a large bay, the greater part of which is very shallow. The outer anchorage (about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the shore) is from 4 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms deep, and is open and exposed. The inner anchorage, situated in what may be called the entrance of the bay, lies north-north-west of Bushire town, and has good holding ground; it can be entered at any time, except when a *shamal* is blowing, by vessels from 15 to 17 ft. draught. It is said by some that to deepen this approach would be a costly operation, but this is disputed. It is open to question, however, whether Bushire could be converted into a convenient port except at disproportionate cost, and should alternative routes to the interior be developed its importance would be likely to be diminished.

Bandar Abbas is situated on the bare and sandy plain which borders on the Straits of Hormuz; the town is fronted by a flat about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles broad with less than 3 fathoms of water. There is anchorage in $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms about 3 miles off shore. The chief drawback to Bandar Abbas as a port is the slight slope of the shore, and there is also a lack of facilities for

¹ The natural port of entry for Isfahan is Ahwaz.

handling merchandise. The holding ground, however, is good, and the roadstead, which is well sheltered, except from the south-east, affords anchorage to a fair number of vessels. Bandar Abbas is the natural port of south-eastern Persia, and also provides the outlet for trade routes from the central tract between Herat and Yezd, Meshed, and Bampur, although the last two are also reached from Charbar and Gwattar. From it there are possible routes to the interior which may prove of considerable importance in the future. In the event of improved port facilities being required, it is open to question whether they can be provided at Bandar Abbas, but there are said to be possibilities of a good commercial port at Bustaneh, about 18 miles to the west. The Clarence Straits, which lie to the west of Bandar Abbas, narrow to a width of 3 miles, and contain good anchorage in deep water.

Lingeh is situated about 296 miles south-east of Bushire; there is good anchorage in 5 fathoms of water at three-quarters of a mile from the beach, with good holding on a clay bottom; it is exposed, however, to south and south-east winds, which sometimes make communication with the shore impossible. From *Lingeh* caravan routes run to Bastak, Lar, and Jahrum; but although the roadstead has some advantages over those of Bushire and Bandar Abbas its development is checked by the mountainous and arid nature of the interior. The trade formerly carried on from *Lingeh* with the Arabian coast, and especially with Trucial Oman, has now been largely diverted to Dibai.

Of the harbours in Persian Makran, the most important is *Charbar* (*Chahbar*). The bay of Charbar is $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide at the entrance and 10 miles in length. It has the makings of a deep-water port, but the anchorage is exposed to the monsoon and is dangerous during that season. There is a depth of 4 fathoms at a distance of 1 mile off shore at Charbar town; the 5-fathom line is 2 miles from the beach.

There is an important station of the Indo-European

Telegraph Department at *Jask*; it is situated on a promontory, about 140 miles south-east of Bandar Abbas, and about 130 miles north-north-west of Muscat. There are anchorages suitable for steam vessels on both sides of the Jask promontory, in which shelter can be found from all but southerly winds. Ships generally anchor $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the shore in the west bay; there is usually a very heavy surf on the beach. The 5-fathom line is nearly 3 miles from the shore in the west bay, and two-thirds of a mile from the shore in the east bay.

Gwattar (*Guattar*) bay is a great indentation on the Makran coast, at the meeting-point of Persian and British territory; the width at the entrance is 19 miles, the depth about 11 miles. The whole of the bay is entirely open to the south; a considerable swell runs straight in during the monsoon, and the sea breaks in 6 fathoms, rendering it unsafe to enter. From Gwattar there is a caravan route to Bampur, which forms an easy line of approach to the plateau.

The relation between the ports on the Persian coast and their corresponding trade centres on the Persian plateau is closely concerned with the nature of the back-country through which the routes which connect them must pass. The general trend of the mountain chains, which from the Turkish frontier to the Straits of Hormuz run parallel to the coast, from north-west to south-east, makes a direct ascent to the plateau from any point between Bushire and Lingeh very difficult. Between Bushire and Shiraz are four ranges of mountains, and the post road between these points, which constitutes the shortest means of access to the plateau (to Shiraz and thence to Isfahan), is one of the steepest and most arduous routes in Persia. For the first 50 miles the route traverses a level plain which is liable to become heavy or impassable after rain. Between that and Shiraz four difficult passes have to be crossed through rough and rocky defiles; of these the highest is the Kutal-i-pir Zan, which is 7,400 ft. high. The principal alternative route, which is that *via* Firuzabad, crosses a series of passes, of which the

highest is the Muk (6,600 ft.); none of these are as formidable as those on the post road, although the Ahram and other rivers are difficult to cross in times of flood; these, however, occur but seldom. This approach to the plateau, which is to some extent in a transverse direction, is less difficult than the post road, and the same may be said of a possible line of communication between Bushire and Jahrum and thence to Shiraz. Between Shiraz and Isfahan the altitude of the central plateau varies only from 5,000 to 8,000 ft., and there are no difficult obstacles to be surmounted.

Towards Bandar Abbas the valleys between the ranges which form the outer rim of the plateau open out towards the coast, and there is a line of approach to the plateau towards the north-west in a direction parallel to the ranges, from Bandar Abbas to Shiraz *via* Lar and Jahrum. This route, which traverses a succession of fertile plains as well as mountain passes of no great difficulty, is usually made use of as a means of approach to Lar from the coast, in preference to that from Lingeh, which traverses country presenting numerous obstacles in the shape of passes and ravines, and is also deficient in water. The country to the north of Bandar Abbas, through which pass the caravan routes to Kirman and Yezd, comprises a considerable area of the central plateau as well as the ranges which form its outer boundary. The ascent is considerably less arduous than that between Bushire and Shiraz, although the routes are considerably longer. Most of the routes use either the Tang-i-Zagh or Tang-i-Zindan passes, which constitute fairly formidable obstacles, and are situated in the southern part of the routes at a distance of about 80 to 60 miles respectively from Bandar Abbas. Considerable areas of the country are sterile and stony desert, with desolate ranges of hills and numerous ravines; some of the valleys, however, contain fertile soil. There are numerous rivers and fords to be crossed, some of which are at times impassable. The high mountain passes are blocked with

snow in winter, but there is usually an alternative route available. North-east of Bandar Abbas there is a depression in the outer rim of the plateau where the boundary range begins to turn east instead of south-east; in this direction is easier country, through which passes the longer route to Kirman by way of Rigan. Only two passes present any difficulty on this route, which provides a fairly easy way for a cart road or railway to the Persian plateau.

The route from Gwattar to Bampur by way of Sarbaz is said by an authority to be the best one from the sea coast on to the plateau. There are no high passes with steep gradients; but, on the contrary, a considerable part of this road runs along stony river beds, and three times a year, when the Sarbaz river is in flood, would be impassable.

Islands

There are several islands strewn along the Persian littoral, usually at a few miles' distance from the coast. Between Bandar Dilam and the outlet through the Straits of Hormuz are the islands of Kharak, Sheikh Shuaib, and Kais, which are all small, low, rocky, and fringed by reefs. Large quantities of valuable building stone are now being transported from Kharak to Basra. Kharak and Kais have both at different times been in British occupation.

The principal island on the Persian littoral, however, is Kishm; this is situated in the Straits of Hormuz, and stretches along the Persian coast from Lingeh almost to Bandar Abbas; it is separated from the mainland by a channel known as Clarence Straits. The island of Kishm is 60 miles long and 90 miles broad, and is nearly covered with precipitous table-topped hills; at one point a low plain extends for several miles across the island. The highest point reaches an elevation of 1,300 ft. The coast is generally rocky. There is an anchorage at the foot of Kishm in 5 fathoms about three-quarters of a mile from the shore; larger vessels anchor 2 miles off in 6 fathoms.

The islands of Henjam and Larak, to the south and east of Kishm, are barren and hilly; they may be regarded as being physically appendages of the larger island. On the island of Henjam there is a British coaling station and also a telegraph station. On the small island of Hormuz, which lies a few miles south-east of Bandar Abbas, was situated the once-celebrated city of Ormuz, which has now disappeared. The island is barren, and contains large quantities of rock-salt and red oxide of iron.

River System

Although the coastal plain is seamed by numerous lines of drainage, rivers in this region are few and unimportant, dwindling at certain seasons of the year to a mere trickle; at other times, especially at the season of the melting of the snows, they increase considerably in volume, and at times become impassable. Many of the rivers and streams are brackish and of no use for irrigation purposes. The river systems which have their origin in the back-country of the Gulf proper run in a north-west and south-east direction, following the natural trend of the mountain districts, and find their way to the coast with difficulty; those of Persian Makran, where the mountain ranges are more interrupted, flow as a rule from north to south into the Arabian Sea.

The only rivers in the district worthy of mention are the Mund, the Rud-Hilleh, and the Minab.

The *Mund*, which rises in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, emerges from the hills in the Dashti district, about 60 miles south of Bushire; at times it is not more than 3½ ft. deep, but after rain discharges a large volume of water into the sea; the water is brackish. The river is navigable for a short distance by small native craft. The *Rud-Hilleh*, which reaches the sea just north of Bushire, is formed by the junction of two other streams, one sweet and the other brackish, about 30 miles inland. The *Minab*, which enters the Straits of Hormuz a few miles east of Bandar Abbas, has at

Minab town a width of 400 to 600 yds.; it usually carries a fair volume of water. It is one of the few rivers of which the water can be used for irrigation, and in summer is drained almost dry by numerous channels taken off for this purpose.

In Persian Makran there is no river of importance.

(3) CLIMATE

In the Persian Gulf region weather is a subject of great commercial importance, for, apart from the pearl fisheries, the prosperity of the country depends chiefly on agriculture, which in its turn is to a great extent dependent on rainfall.

The Persian Gulf lies almost outside the region of the south-west monsoon, and its effect on the climate is for the most part indirect. On the Arabian side, within Ras el-Hadd, the monsoon is not felt at all, while on the opposite or Makran coast the monsoon rains do not extend further than Ormara in Baluchistan. The monsoon reaches Jask only in the form of a light south-easterly breeze.

In the Persian Gulf region the summer is very hot and practically rainless; in the winter there is cold and stormy weather with a certain amount of rain. The hot season may be said to extend from the beginning of May to the end of October, and the cold from the middle of November to the middle of March, the remaining periods being transitional. From the middle of May till the middle of July the heat is intense, but is moderated at the upper end of the Gulf by a constantly-blowing *shamal* or north-west wind. From the middle of July to the middle of August the heat is very oppressive owing to the stillness of the atmosphere and the excessive moisture. Bad weather generally begins after the middle of December, and January and February are cold and boisterous.

Winds.—The prevailing north-west wind, known as the *shamal*, blows in the northern half of the Persian Gulf for about nine months in the year, being very strong in April and almost incessant in June. In

summer *shamals* are rarely more than moderate; in winter they are often fresh and hard gales. The next most prevalent and distinctive wind is the *kaus* or south-east wind, which in winter alternates with the *shamal*. Other winds are the *nashi*, or north-easter, which blows strongly in the Gulf of Oman, especially in winter; during this period the Batina coast is dangerous. The *suhaili*, or south-west wind, is much dreaded by native mariners, as it strikes nearly all the sheltered anchorages on the Persian coast.

Temperature.—The difference in temperature between the northern and southern ends of the Persian Gulf is considerable. At the southern end it never freezes, and snow is not seen except on distant mountains, but in Turkish Irak there are hard frosts at times, and snow has been known to fall at Bushire. The highest absolute temperatures are probably experienced in Irak, but the heat is most felt in the lower part of the Gulf, on account of the humidity; it is, perhaps, more unbearable at Bandar Abbas than elsewhere. Mean daily maximum temperatures in July and August average:—

—				July.	August.
Muscat	92° F. (33° C.)	88° F. (31° C.)
Bahrein	98° F. (36½° C.)	100° F. (37½° C.)
Bushire	95° F. (35° C.)	95° F. (35° C.)

Irak is the hottest of the districts and also the coldest; a reading of less than 19° F. (−7° C.) has been obtained at Baghdad.

Rainfall.—Rainfall in the Persian Gulf region is extremely light; the following table shows the annual average in inches at the places where observations have been recorded:—

Arabian side.	Head of Gulf.	Persian side.
Bahrein 3½ in. (80 mm.) Muscat 3-6 in. (75-150 mm.)	Baghdad 9 in. (230 mm.) Basra 6 in. (150 mm.) Fao 2-4 in. (50-100 mm.)	Bushire 12 in. (300 mm.) Jask 4½ in. (110 mm.) Charbar 5-6 (130-150 mm.)

Rain is almost confined to the winter months, and hardly ever falls before the middle of October or after the end of May. The principal rainy months are December, January, and February.

The humidity is considerable. At Baghdad, which is a long distance from the Gulf, the average humidity is only 56 per cent., but in Bahrein it is over 79 per cent.

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

The climate of the Persian Gulf region is, during several months of the year, very trying to Europeans, but it is not altogether unhealthy. The cold weather, though less unpleasant, appears to be more unhealthy than the hot; sickness is most prevalent in the transitional seasons, spring and autumn. Malarial fever is the principal disease of the region, and prickly heat and boils are very prevalent. Plague has shown itself at intervals in the Persian Gulf since 1899, especially in the Gulf ports; but there is little plague in Mesopotamia. Epidemics of cholera are frequent, and at times severe, but they have almost entirely confined themselves to the river towns of the Shatt el-Arab. Small-pox is prevalent in the Persian Gulf region, and at times assumes an active epidemic form.

There was no general organization of quarantine before the war; local systems were under the management of Turkey and Great Britain. Turkish quarantine, which was prescribed by the Constantinople Board of Health, by excessive stringency and constant variation of rules proved a serious impediment to commerce in Irak, while its protective value was slight.

On the Persian coast arrangements as to sanitation were entrusted by the Persian Government to the British authorities in 1897. In 1903 an attempt was made to transfer the control from the British authorities to the Imperial Persian customs; in 1904 the Persian Sanitary Council was founded, but there has

not been much evidence of its activities in the Persian Gulf. The Government of India dispensary was opened at Bandar Abbas in 1906, and has been the means of relieving much suffering.

The chief quarantine officer in the Persian Gulf is the Residency Surgeon at Bushire, an officer of the Indian Medical Service, who represents the Persian Government.

ARABIAN COASTAL REGION

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

The population of the Arabian coastal region of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman is almost exclusively Arab, although alien elements occur in many of the coastal towns, especially in Oman.

A large number of the population of the oases of Hasa and Katif and the island of Bahrein belong to a race or class known as Baharina; these may number 100,000. Their origin is doubtful, and they are regarded either as an aboriginal tribe conquered and absorbed by the Arabs, or as a class formed by the conversion of certain Arab tribes to Shiism about 300 years ago. The term as now employed on the west coast of the Persian Gulf is practically a synonym for Arab-speaking Shiah Mohammedans.

The Arabs of Oman belong traditionally to two supposed racial groups: (1) Yamani, said to have been the first Arab settlers in Oman; (2) Nasiri (Nizari), less purely Arab, who were for the most part later immigrants. Each of these groups is divided into a large number of tribes, sections, and sub-sections.

The nomads are exclusively Arab or quasi-Arab. Among the non-Arab elements are included the following elements:—

- (i) On the shores of the Gulf proper there are about 1,000 Persians in Koweit, and 2,500 in Abu Dhabi and Dibai.
- (ii) At Dibai there are about 1,400 Baluchis.
- (iii) Along the coast of Oman there are colonies of Persians, in part relics of Persian occupation.

(iv) In the neighbourhood of Sohar and elsewhere there are Baluchis and Jadjals, of whom the former, now very numerous, were originally introduced as mercenary troops. There are also considerable Indian communities in Muscat and Matra. (v) Negroes, both emancipated and slaves, are found in considerable numbers in the coastal towns of the Gulf proper, and along the coast of Oman, the outcome of several centuries of slave trade.

Arabic is spoken almost exclusively in this region; but Persian, Hindustani, and Baluchi are also spoken in certain of the coast towns.

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(6) POPULATION

Distribution

Owing to the barren and waterless nature of the region the inhabitants are found mostly in the coastal towns; villages are numerous only where there are oases or springs and cultivation is possible. There are many villages in the oases of Hasa and Katif, in the island of Bahrein, along the Batina coast, in the Wadi Semail, and in the mountains of Oman.

In the larger towns, and especially in Hofuf, where contact with the outside world is maintained through Indian and other merchants, buildings and architecture are more elaborate, and a higher standard of life prevails. Village life is primitive, and the inhabitants of villages are engaged almost exclusively in agriculture.

(i) The total population, settled and nomadic, of the districts adjoining the Gulf proper is said to be in the neighbourhood of 300,000. This is made up as follows:—

				Settled.	Nomadic.
Koweit	37,000	13,000
Hasa..	100,000	50,000
El-Katr	25,000	Unknown
Trucial Oman	72,000	8,000

The islands of Bahrein have about 100,000 inhabitants. The population of the district as a whole is extremely scanty, and vast tracts are either uninhabited or inhabited only at certain times of the year by a few nomads.

The chief centres of population are:—

(a) Certain *coastal towns and ports* connected with the interior by caravan routes. The great majority of the inhabitants of these towns take part in the pearl fisheries and in the small industries connected with them, such as boat-building, sail-making, &c. There are also considerable sea fisheries, in which some of the pearl fishers take part during the winter.

The numbers of the inhabitants of these towns are as follow:—

Koweit	35,000
El-Katif	5,000
Bida	12,000
Abu Dhabi	6,000
Dibai	20,000
Sharga	15,000
Manama, on the island of Bahrein	25,000
Muharrak, on the island of Bahrein	20,000

(b) The *oases of Hasa and Katif*; these include extensive districts of considerable fertility, and the inhabitants are mainly occupied in agriculture. Hasa oasis has a population of 67,000, of whom 25,000 are included in the capital, Hofuf. The population of Katif oasis is 26,000.

(ii) Of the districts which adjoin the Gulf of Oman, the Sultanate of Oman has about 500,000 inhabitants, of whom 30,000 are nomads, in the interior. Oman proper is said to have a population of 34,300. Beduins are numerous in Oman proper and on the verge of the desert generally, but their numbers cannot be estimated.

The most populous districts of Oman are:—

(a) The *coastal plain of Batina*, which has a settled

population of 105,000, engaged for the most part in agriculture and the cultivation of dates, and in the fisheries.

(b) The *Wadi Semail*, which is a most populous valley with a settled population of 2,800, engaged largely in date cultivation.

(c) The *coastal towns*, of which Muscat has a population of 10,000, and Matra one of 11,000. Matra is the starting-point of a caravan route to the interior, as are also Sur, with a population of 12,000, and Sohar, with 7,500. Kabura has 8,000 inhabitants.

The inhabitants of the coastal towns are engaged in the fisheries and local maritime trade, and also in trade with India and the east coast of Africa.

Movement

Increase and decrease in population are due in the Arabian coastal region chiefly to local causes. In the months between May and September there is a considerable influx of population for the pearl diving, and boats come to this coast from the Persian shore and all parts of the Gulf. In autumn there are local movements of the population for the purposes of the date harvest.

The population also varies according to the movements of the Beduin. These are engaged in the rearing of flocks of sheep and in camel breeding. During the winter and spring they wander far and wide over the plains in search of pasture, but in the hot weather they come in to the wells and oases. They also visit the towns in order to make purchases and to sell live stock and *ghi*.

HEAD OF THE GULF

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

The population at the head of the Persian Gulf is principally Arab. In the town of Basra there are, in addition, a few Europeans and Indians, together with about 3,000 Persians and 1,000 Jews.

In *south Arabistan* the population is mostly Arab, with probably in places an admixture of Persian blood. The following non-Arab elements, however, occur :—

(i) In the town of Mohammera there are, besides Arabs,¹ a considerable number of Persians and a few Jews, Sabians, and Oriental Christians. (ii) In Hindian and other districts there are some Persians. (iii) In the eastern part of the country there are a certain number of Lurs. (iv) In Mohammera district there are some negroes and a few Baluchis.

In the province of Behbahan Kuhgiluya the population is Lur; and in Behbahan town and plain there is a population of mixed Persian (or possibly Lur) descent, who are known as Behbehanis.

The language of the region at the head of the Gulf is Arabic, which is spoken in south Arabistan with an admixture of Persian words, while Lur dialects are used in the eastern districts.

(6) POPULATION

The population of the districts of Irak at the head of the Gulf probably approaches 120,000; of these about 40,000 inhabit the town of Basra, and most of the remainder are found in the numerous villages which are situated in the date groves that line the banks of the river. These are engaged in agriculture, principally date culture. The population in the interior is scanty.

The population of south Arabistan is probably rather over 200,000. The town of Mohammera has about 15,000 inhabitants, Hawiza has 5,000, Felahieh 2,000, and Hindian about 4,000. Large parts of the country are uninhabited or only sparsely populated. The numbers of settled inhabitants and nomads are probably about equal. The former, with the exception of the comparatively small numbers who live in towns,

¹ Arabs in Mohammera town are chiefly local Arabs with some descendants of Arab refugees from Bahrein.

are found in the villages which are numerous in certain parts of the country, e.g., on the left bank of the Shatt el-Arab, on the banks of the Karun in the Mohammera district, and on the Hindian. In the Felahieh district most of the villages are agricultural settlements, situated on canals taken from the Jarrahi river.

The great bulk of the nomads inhabit the districts of Ahwaz and Hawiza; in summer and autumn they camp in the marshes, in winter and spring they roam over the desert with their flocks and herds. A proportion migrate between the Persian and Irak sides of the frontier. The Muhaisin, who are looked upon as a settled tribe, leave Mohammera at certain times of the year in order to cultivate their grain lands on the Karun.

The population of the town of Behbahan is said to be from 12,000 to 15,000.

PERSIAN LITTORAL

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

The population of the littoral of the Persian Gulf proper from Bandar Dilam to the Straits of Hormuz is composed of a medley of races and racial blends. Among the inhabitants of the coastal region of the Gulf proper the most important elements are Persians and Persian Arabs, the latter of whom may be described as Arabs under Persian rule who have become denationalised by settlement, subjection, or intermarriage; considerable numbers of them now adhere to the Shiah sect of Mohammedans, and they speak as a rule the Persian language. The settled population of the region probably consisted originally of Persians or Persian-speaking tribes, and the numerous Arab settlements seem to have come partly from the mainland, from south Arabistan and the Kaab tribe, partly from the opposite side of the Gulf, from among the Dawasir at Bahrein, and from the Ajman, Al Ali, and

Shammar tribes in the mainland of Arabia. In some parts the two races seem to have blended, in others they are more clearly differentiated, as in the case of Dashistan, where there is an important group of Arab settlements, of which Chakuta is the largest. There are Arab tribes in the Lingeh district and a considerable semi-Arab population in the Shibkuh district.

Besides these races there is in the north a strong Lur element, while in the south-east, in the neighbourhood of Hormuz, a Baluchi strain appears, this being stronger further east, the inhabitants of Biaban being described as all Baluchi.

In Persian Makran there are a number of tribes, mostly claiming to be descended from Arabs, who either originally settled in Makran or moved there later from Sind or Kach. Some of the inhabitants are of Indian origin, and there are many Baluchis. There are also a number of negro slaves.

In the coastal towns the population is also very mixed. The inhabitants of Bushire are principally Persians, but include about 600 Jews and a few Armenians, Goanese, Baghdad Mohammedans, and Europeans. In Bandar Abbas most of the population belong to a hybrid race of mixed Persian, Baluchi, Arab, and negro descent, and are known as Abbasis. There are a number of immigrants, including Persians from Lar, Avaz, and Bastak, also Hindus, Khojahs, and Arabs. Lingeh also has a very composite population, of which the basis is Arab, chiefly immigrants from Trucial Oman and Bahrein. There are some negroes.

Behind the coastal belt the population is extremely scanty. It is composed of tribes of mixed origin, partly settled and partly nomadic, in which Irani, Turki, and, to a small extent, Arab strains are present. Among the chief tribes are the Kashkai, a nomad tribe of Turki origin, a large number of whom descend to the *garmsir*, or warm pastures, from the mountain districts of the Persian plateau for the winter and spring months, and the Mamassani, a group of five tribes of Lur descent.

The Persian language, or a dialect of it, is almost universally spoken in the districts of the Persian coast, both among Persians and Arabs, although a certain amount of Arabic is spoken in places, and in some parts Arabic, Lur, or Baluchi modifications are introduced into the Persian dialect. In Bandar Abbas a dialect known as Abbasi is spoken by a section of the population. In Persian Makran the language of the country is a dialect of Baluchi called Makrani, which contains a number of Persian and Arabic words.

(6) POPULATION

The number of inhabitants is probably over 300,000; this includes the population of coastal towns, of which Bushire has 12,000–20,000, Lingeh about 12,000, and Bandar Abbas about 8,000. The population of Persian Makran is estimated at about 114,000. Except in the towns mentioned above, the population is scattered in numerous small villages along the sea coast, or in the coastal plain at the foot of the mountains. The inhabitants are engaged principally in agriculture or in seafaring occupations, pearl-diving, sea-fishing, and the local carrying trade. There is a considerable amount of coastal trade between the seaports of the Persian littoral; also between these ports (notably Lingeh) and the Arabian coast, and especially Bahrein and Trucial Oman. Dwellings in the villages are for the most part primitive, and consist largely of huts made of date leaves plastered with mud; in the towns buildings are more substantial, and are made of stone and plaster of Paris, or sun-dried bricks and mud.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- c. 1602 Portuguese expelled from Bahrein.
- 1622 Expulsion of Portuguese from Hormuz.
- 1652 Expulsion of Portuguese from Muscat.
- 1763 British Residency established at Bushire.
- 1766 Utubi Arabs settled in El-Katr.
- 1783 Conquest of Bahrein by the Utubis.
- 1792 Guadar and Charbar annexed to Oman.
- 1794 Sultan of Muscat obtained control of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies.
- 1795 Wahabi conquest of Hasa.
- 1798 Agreement between Great Britain and Sultan of Muscat.
- 1805 First British expedition against Kawasim.
- 1806 Agreement by Kawasim to respect the flag and property of the British.
- 1809 Second British expedition against Kawasim.
- 1812 Mohammera rebuilt by Muhaisin tribe.
- 1814 Anglo-Persian Treaty.
- 1818 First Egyptian occupation of Hasa.
- 1819 Third British expedition against Kawasim.
- 1820 General Treaty of Peace signed by Arab chiefs.
- 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Muscat.
- 1835 First Maritime Truce.
- 1837 Capture of Mohammera by the Turks.
- 1838 Second Egyptian occupation of Hasa.
- 1839 Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and Muscat.
- 1844 Treaty of Commerce between France and Muscat.
- 1853 Perpetual Treaty of Peace signed by Arab chiefs.
- 1854 Cession of Kuria Muria Islands to Great Britain by Sultan of Muscat.
- 1856-57 Anglo-Persian war.
- 1857 Treaty of Paris between Great Britain and Persia.
- 1861 Convention between Sheikh of Bahrein and Great Britain.
Award of Lord Canning separating Muscat and Zanzibar.
- 1862 Declaration by Great Britain and France respecting the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar.
- 1868 Agreement between Sheikh of El-Katr and Great Britain.
Lease of Bandar Abbas to Oman cancelled.
Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention.
- 1871 Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha.
- 1872 Charbar captured by Persia.
- 1880 Agreement by Sheikh of Bahrein with Great Britain.
- 1888 Karun opened to foreign shipping and trade.
- 1891 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and Muscat.

- 1891 Agreement with Great Britain regarding cession of territory by Sultan of Muscat.
- 1892 Exclusive Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikhs of Trucial Oman and Bahrein.
- 1898 Grant by Sultan of Muscat of lease of coaling station to the French.
- 1899 Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikh of Koweit.
- 1900 Question of French coaling station settled.
- 1901 D'Arcy concession for oil exploitation in Arabistan.
- 1903 Baghdad Railway Convention.
- 1905 Muscat Dhows Arbitration.
- 1907 Second Agreement between Great Britain and Sheikh of Koweit.
- 1913 Expulsion of Turks from Hasa by Ibn Saud.
Convention between Great Britain and Turkey respecting the Persian Gulf and adjacent territories.
- 1914 Treaty between Ibn Saud and Turkish Government.
Collective assurance from Great Britain to Gulf Chiefs.
- 1915 Treaty between Ibn Saud and Great Britain.
- 1916 Treaty between Sheikh of El-Katr and Great Britain.
- 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement.

(1) INTRODUCTION

THE Persian Gulf is from its geographical position one of the highways of the world, an important link in a chain of communication between East and West. For some centuries the Powers that border the Gulf have been incapable of exercising control over its waters; and the region had become a backwater in the stream of civilisation when Great Britain set her hand to the task of establishing peace and security. That it is now possible for all nations to enjoy free access to peaceful markets in this region is due to Great Britain alone; and the *de facto* predominance of this Power in the Gulf has been achieved, as will be shown, by many years of unselfish toil. The historical position of Great Britain in the Gulf has been thus described:—¹

“If England has become, in any sense, the arbiter and guardian of the Gulf, it has not been through a

¹ T. J. Bennett, *The Past and Present Connection of England with the Persian Gulf* (Journal of the Society of Arts, June 18, 1902).

restless ambition urging her on to the control of the waste places of the earth, but in obedience to the calls that have been made upon her in the past to enforce peace between warring tribes, to give a free course to trade, to hold back the arm of the marauder and the oppressor, to stand between the slave-dealer and his victim

"In the case of England and the Persian Gulf the position is unique; for, although England has at no time enjoyed or even asked for territorial acquisitions in those regions, she has for generations borne burdens there which no other nation has ever undertaken anywhere, except in the capacity of sovereign; she has had duty thrust upon her without dominion; she has kept the peace amongst people who are not her subjects; has patrolled, at intervals, waters over which she has enjoyed no formal lordship; has kept, in strange ports, an open door through which the traders of every nation might have as free access to distant markets as her own."

(2) HISTORY OF THE GULF STATES TO 1914

The southern and western littoral of the Persian Gulf is in the occupation of Arab tribes, while the northern and eastern shores are included in the dominions of Persia. To realise the nature of the *status quo*, the maintenance of which has been a cardinal feature of British policy, it is necessary to have an acquaintance with the history of each of the States bordering the Gulf.

Muscat.—The greater part of the Sultanate of Oman, the dominion of the Sultan of Muscat, lies to the south of the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but is included in the same political system. The boundaries of the State have never been precisely defined. Great Britain¹ has declared the southern limit on the coast of Arabia to be near Ras Sakar; from this point to Khor Kelbeh the coast-line is continuously under the

¹ British counter-case, presented to The Hague Tribunal in the Muscat Dhows Arbitration in 1905.

sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat, whose claim to the Musandim peninsula from Ras Dibba to Tibba was also recognised in 1905 by His Majesty's Government. The Sheikh of Sharga rules the coast from Khor Kelbeh to Ras Dibba.¹

From 1784 to 1856 Muscat and Zanzibar were under the same ruler; after 1794 the Sultan of Muscat governed the islands of Kishm and Hormuz and territory on the Persian coast from Bandar Abbas to Lingeh, but in 1868 his lease was cancelled by the Shah. Guadar,² an enclave on the confines of Persia and Baluchistan, has since 1792 been a dependency of Oman, in spite of various attempts at seizure on the part of Persia. Charbar was annexed to Oman in 1792, but was captured by Persia eighty years later.

From A.D. 751 until 1783 Oman was governed by an elective Imam, possessing supreme religious, military, and political authority. After 1783 the ruler of Muscat ceased to be elected, and is styled Seyyid or Sultan more correctly than Imam. Muscat had become finally independent of the Baghdad Caliphate by the tenth century, and from the expulsion (1652) of the Portuguese, who for a short period held the coast, has maintained its position as an independent State, except for an interval of Persian sovereignty (1737-44). The Persians were driven out by Ahmed bin Said (otherwise Sultan bin Ahmed), the founder of the existing Al Bu Said dynasty.

British treaty relations with Muscat date from 1798, when a Deed of Agreement was executed between the East India Company and the Sultan for the exclusion from his territory of the French and Dutch so long as they should be at war with England. This agreement was confirmed in 1800 by a second, which in addition granted permission for an agent of the East India Company to reside permanently at Muscat. Under treaties concluded with Seyyid Said (Said bin Sultan) by France in 1807 and 1808 a French Consular Agent

¹ This was admitted by the French Government in 1905.

² Not to be confused with the port of Gwattar.

came to Muscat, until the capture of Mauritius by the British in 1810 destroyed for a time the power and prestige of the French in East African and Arabian waters.

A Treaty of Commerce was concluded between Great Britain and Muscat in 1839, on the model of a similar treaty signed in 1833 between the Sultan and the United States of America. The Sultan entered into various other engagements with the British for the suppression of the slave trade and for the regulation of customs duties; and in 1854 he ceded to the British Government the Kuria Muria Islands, which the French had previously made several efforts to obtain.

On the death of Seyyid Said in 1856 a dispute between two of his sons as to the division of his Arabian and African dominions was submitted to the arbitration of the Viceroy of India, Lord Canning. By his award in 1861 it was decided that Zanzibar should be independent, but should pay an annual subsidy to Muscat. In 1873, in return for agreements concerning the suppression of the slave trade, Great Britain undertook the payment of this subsidy to the Sultan of Muscat "so long as he continued faithfully to fulfil his treaty engagements and manifest his friendship towards the British Government." Payment has been made almost without intermission to the reigning Sultan by the Government of India, without whose recognition no Sultan has since been able effectively to establish his position.

The intervention of the Government of India in the dynastic disputes of the Muscat State, the deportation to India of claimants or pretenders, and the diplomatic and armed assistance lent to the Sultan in various crises, particularly against the Kawasim¹ (Joasmee) and the Wahabis, and for the suppression of piracy in the Gulfs of Oman and Persia, have resulted in the political predominance of Great Britain in the affairs of Muscat. By a Declaration signed at Paris on March 10, 1862, the British and French Governments

¹ See below, p. 44.

bound themselves reciprocally to respect the independence of the Sultan of Muscat. This agreement precluded the establishment of a British protectorate over Oman. In 1891, however, after the signature of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and Muscat, the Sultan voluntarily entered into an agreement binding "himself, his heirs and successors, never to cede, to sell, to mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, the dominions of Muscat and Oman or any of their dependencies." This agreement covers the Musandim peninsula, to which considerable importance is attached on account of its natural harbours and commanding position at the entrance of the Gulf.

In 1894 a French Vice-Consul was appointed at Muscat, and French influence succeeded in 1898 in obtaining from the Sultan a grant for the lease of a coaling station at Bandar Jissa, in his territory. In consequence of the presentation of a British ultimatum the Sultan cancelled this lease; and in 1900 the question of a French coaling station was settled by the French acceptance of the British offer of half of the site already occupied by British coal-sheds in the Makalla cove.¹

The practice followed by French Consuls at Muscat and elsewhere of granting French ship's papers and flags to Muscat dhows has occasioned much difficulty in the past. Many of these flagholders engaged in the slave and arms traffic; and their claim that the Sultan was not entitled to board or search their vessels or to exercise any jurisdiction over them opposed serious obstacles to the maintenance of law and order. The Sultan appealed for assistance to His Majesty's Government, who on several occasions made representations on the matter to the French Government. A crisis arose in 1903, and the whole question was

¹ In 1916 the French Government agreed to lend these sheds to His Majesty's Government, and they were duly taken over at the beginning of 1917.

submitted in 1905 to the arbitration of The Hague Tribunal. By the award France was permitted to renew licences granted to owners of dhows before January 2, 1892; no licences given since that date were to be valid unless the grantee was a *bonâ fide* French *protégé* before 1863; licences were not to be transmitted or transferred to any other person or vessel. By these enactments the number of French flagholders was greatly reduced, and will soon reach vanishing point.¹

The reigning Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Taimur bin Feisal, succeeded his father on October 4, 1913, and was recognised by the British and French Governments on November 15 of that year. He had to face a serious rebellion of the tribesmen of the southern interior, who formulated their independence under an elective Imam. Since July 1913 the rebels have been held back from Muscat by a contingent of the Indian Army. The forces of the Sultan are few in number and are not to be depended upon for aggressive action.

Trucial Oman.—The region known as Trucial Oman extends from Shuam (Sha'am), just within the entrance to the Persian Gulf, to El-Odeid, on the border of El-Katr; it also includes about 50 miles of territory from Ras Dibba to Kelbeh on the coast-line of the Gulf of Oman. The number of independent rulers within these limits has varied at different times; eight chiefs, excluding the Sheikhs of Bahrein, signed the General Treaty of Peace in 1820, but in 1914 the Sheikhs of Ajman, Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Umm al-Kawein, and Sharga alone were considered independent, although the Sheikh of Ras al-Kheima was only nominally subject to Sharga.

Until the signature by the Sheikhs of the Maritime Truce the region in question was commonly known as the Pirate Coast. The chief power was exercised by the Sheikh of the Kawasim, whose capital at this time was Ras al-Kheima. His subjects succeeded in the

¹ In 1917 only twelve Oman dhows were entitled to fly the French flag.

eighteenth century in establishing themselves on the Persian coast and islands, and his fleet scoured the seas, plundering indiscriminately. The Bombay Government joined the Sultan of Muscat in 1805 in a punitive expedition against the Kawasim, whose chief signed in 1806 an Agreement binding himself and his subjects to respect the flag and property of the British. This treaty appears to have been concluded without reference to the Wahabis, who at this time were said to dominate the eastern coast of Arabia, and to be responsible for the increase of piracy. From 1806-8 there was a temporary cessation of piracy, which may be attributed to the presence of a large British fleet in the Gulf. The spread of Wahabi domination led, however, to a revival of trouble, and strong measures were taken by the British authorities, who stated expressly in 1809 that the Kawasim were to be treated as an independent power.

Effective action was taken by the British against the pirates in 1819, which resulted, in 1820, in the signature of a General Treaty of Peace¹ by eight Sheikhs of the coast. This Treaty, which provided for the cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea, proved insufficient, since regular maritime warfare was not prohibited, and normally degenerated among the Arabs into indiscriminate piracy. In 1835 the first Maritime Truce was signed; it was constantly renewed and extended until 1853, when it was succeeded by a Perpetual Treaty of Peace,² which still prevails. After 1835 the Pirate Coast came to be known as Trucial Oman. Treaties for the suppression of the slave trade were signed by the Maritime Chiefs in 1838, 1839, 1847, 1856, and 1873. In consequence of the Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha in 1871, and of Turkish and other foreign intrigues in Trucial Oman, an Exclusive Agreement was concluded separately by the British Government with each of the Trucial Sheikhs—at this time six in number—in

¹ See Appendix I, p. 78.

² See Appendix II, p. 80.

March 1892. By this treaty they bound themselves, their heirs and successors, (1) on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government; (2) without the assent of the British Government not to consent to the residence within their territories of the agent of any other Government; (3) on no account to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, any part of their territory, save to the British Government. In the following year the Porte was informed of this Agreement; and in 1903 it was made known to the French and Persian Governments. In that year the principle was affirmed that the representation of the Trucial Sheikhs in dealings with other Powers should be undertaken by Great Britain. In 1902 an Agreement was signed by all the Trucial Sheikhs for the suppression of the arms traffic in their territories. At the same time it was reported that new chiefs, on their accession, generally sought British official recognition, and that the advice of the British Resident in the Gulf was obeyed and even welcomed in internal affairs.

Since the suppression of piracy, pearl-diving has been the principal and almost the sole occupation of the maritime population. The increased security in the Gulf, achieved by British efforts, has resulted in a marked development of the pearl industry, and consequent prosperity for the Arabs of the coast.

El-Katr.—The El-Katr peninsula lies south of Okwair (Ojair) in the district of El-Katif, and north of El-Odeid, which forms the western limit of the territories of the Trucial Chiefs. It is believed that before A.D. 1766 the peninsula was included in the dominions of the Beni Khalid Sheikhs, whose headquarters were at that time at Hasa. In 1766 the Utubis from Koweit settled at Zabara, from which they conquered Bahrein in 1783. As a dependency of Bahrein, El-Katr became subject to the provisions of the General Treaty of Peace in 1820 and of the Maritime Truce of 1835. The prevalence of piracy, however, occasioned much anxiety to the British authorities in the Gulf, who adopted

strong measures for the maintenance of order and security. Serious disturbances in 1867, following an attack upon El-Katr by the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Abu Dhabi, necessitated British intervention, and on the restoration of peace in 1868 the British Resident concluded an Agreement with the Sheikh of El-Katr binding him never to put to sea with hostile intent, to refer all disputes to the British Resident, and to maintain the relations which had formerly existed with the Sheikhs of Bahrein. The claim of the Sheikh of Bahrein to sovereignty over El-Katr was, however, disallowed by the Government of India. Efforts were made by the Wahabis during the nineteenth century to bring El-Katr under their rule, and the tribute which they exacted from the Sheikh of Bahrein was probably contributed in part by the inhabitants of El-Katr as a security against aggression.

The Turkish expedition to Hasa under Midhat Pasha in 1871 considerably affected the situation in El-Katr. In spite of repeated assurances by the Porte that "not the slightest idea was entertained of making new conquests or subduing independent tribes," a Turkish garrison was established at Doha (El-Bidaa); and in 1874 the Ottoman Ambassador in London put forward a claim to Turkish sovereignty over the whole of Arabia as the inheritance of the Caliphate. The Turkish garrison remained at Doha until 1914, but the Porte was on several occasions informed that Great Britain would not admit Turkish claims to sovereignty over El-Katr.

The advent of the Turks enabled Sheikh Jasim to evade direct responsibility to the British Government for maritime disturbances, and there was a marked increase in piracy. In 1882 Sheikh Jasim declared that the agreement of 1868 with Great Britain was still valid; and more than once subsequently he expressed a desire to enter into the same relations with the British Government as were maintained by the Sheikhs of Trucial Oman. In consequence, however, of his anomalous position in regard to the Turkish Govern-

ment, no action was taken on his requests. In the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at London on July 29, 1913, the Ottoman Government renounced all their claims to the El-Katr peninsula, and His Majesty's Government declared that they would not permit its annexation or the infringement of its autonomy by the Sheikh of Bahrein (see below, p. 75).

Bahrein.—The original inhabitants of Bahrein are held by some authorities to be of Persian and by others of Arab descent. From the eleventh to the sixteenth century they appear to have been subject only to native chiefs. During the sixteenth century the island was held by the Portuguese, who were eventually expelled by the Persians about 1602. Persian domination was maintained, with interruptions, until 1783, when the Utubi Arabs from the mainland conquered the island. In 1800 and 1802 Bahrein was invaded and occupied for a short period by the Sultan of Muscat, by whose aid Wahabi garrisons were expelled in 1811. Since that date the Utubis have remained the chief power in the island, in spite of aggressions by Wahabis, Omanis, Egyptians, and Turks, who have at various times exacted tribute or attempted to assert authority over Bahrein.

The Bombay Government were unable to grant a request made by the Sheikh of Bahrein in 1805 to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf for the assistance of one or two vessels of war. The increase of piracy, however, made the establishment of treaty relations desirable; and in 1820 the Sheikh of Bahrein signed the General Treaty of Peace for the cessation of piracy by land and sea. From this time Great Britain has refused to tolerate the pretensions of other Powers to Bahrein.

British efforts for the establishment of security on the pearl banks have resulted in a series of treaties concluded with various Sheikhs of Bahrein in 1820, 1847, 1856, 1861, 1868, 1880, and 1890. By the Convention of 1861 the Sheikh of Bahrein bound himself to abstain from maritime aggressions of every description,

and from the prosecution of war, piracy, and the slave trade by sea so long as he received the support of the British Government in maintaining the security of his own possessions against similar aggressions. In consequence of Turkish schemes against Bahrein, and of rumours in 1879 that the Turks proposed to establish a coal depot to be converted gradually into a political agency, the British Government in 1880 executed an Agreement with the Sheikh binding him to abstain from entering into negotiations or making treaties with Governments other than the British, and to refuse permission to any other Government than the British to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in Bahrein territory, unless with the consent of the British Government. In 1892 the Sheikh signed a further Exclusive Agreement identical with that signed by the Trucial Chiefs in the same year.

The capture and destruction by British naval forces of a hostile fleet at Zabara in 1905 saved Bahrein from attack by Arab tribes under Turkish instigation. British influence became increasingly strong, and was directed towards the regulation of the succession to the sheikship and the improvement of internal administration. In 1905 a British Political Agent was appointed at Bahrein, and has exercised wide judicial powers there. British consular protection has for over fifty years been habitually extended to Bahreinis in foreign countries. The protection of the British Government has converted the island from a scene of chronic external aggression and intestine feud into a relatively peaceful and flourishing centre of industry and commerce.

Hasa.—The Sheikhs of the Beni Khalid tribe ruled Hasa until about 1795, when their power was broken by the Wahabi Emir, who used Hasa as a base for the extension of his influence in Arabia. From this time until the arrival of the Turks in 1871 the Wahabis continued to dominate this region, except for two short intervals of Egyptian occupation.

Wahabism dates from about the year 1742, when

Abdul Wahab (or his son) founded the sect which was destined to become the chief power in Central Arabia. The movement was at first purely religious, and took the form of a puritanical Moslem revival. It later acquired a political and military significance not unlike that displayed in the early history of Mohammedan expansion. The first secular chief to adopt Wahabi principles was Mohammed Ibn Saud, Sheikh of Deraya, and ancestor of the present Emir of Nejd. The Wahabis reduced the province of Hasa for the first time in 1792, and conquered it finally in 1795. Five years later they took El-Katif by storm. Meanwhile Wahabi aggressions in Western Arabia and Mesopotamia had aroused considerable alarm, and involved the Emir in hostilities with the Ottoman Government. Hasa was occupied by the Egyptians, under Ibrahim Pasha, in 1818, but was evacuated in the following year. About 1824 the Wahabis again began to assert themselves in this district; and by 1833 the whole Arabian coast of the Gulf of Oman and that of the Persian Gulf, as far north as El-Katif, owned the sovereignty, or at least the suzerainty, of the Emir of Nejd.

The designs of Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, embraced Eastern Arabia; and in 1838 the Egyptians for the second time occupied Hasa, in violation of assurances given by Mehemet Ali in that year to the British political representative at Cairo. Egyptian encroachments met with consistent opposition on the part of the British Government, and early in 1840 the Egyptians found themselves obliged to withdraw from Hasa. - A pro-Egyptian Emir, who had been appointed Turkish Vali of Central Arabia, was speedily overthrown, and Wahabi influence again predominated.

From the time of the arrival of the Wahabis upon the coast of Arabia their activities became a matter of concern to the British Government. Wahabi influence effected an increase of piracy and maritime disorders: but, by the instructions of the Government of India, the offending tribes were held directly responsible by

the naval authorities in the Gulf, and conflict between the British and the Wahabis was avoided. Friction between the Wahabis and the Sheikhs of Bahrein, and an attempted invasion of the island in 1859 from El-Katif and Damaun necessitated strong British counter-measures. These elicited a protest in the following year from the Turkish governor of Baghdad, on the ground that Damaun formed "part of the hereditary dominions of the Sultan." The British resident, in his reply, denied the claim of Turkey, and asserted the right of Great Britain to deal directly with the Wahabi Emir. After an open breach with the British authorities, a Wahabi envoy, authorised by the Emir, signed on April 21, 1866, a declaration binding the Emir not to oppose or injure British subjects residing in territories under his authority, and not to injure or attack the territories of the Arab tribes in alliance with the British Government.

A conflict between rival candidates for the Emirate was the direct occasion of Midhat Pasha's expedition to Arabia in 1871 and of the Turkish occupation of Hasa. General disorder and piracy resulted, for the suppression of which British intervention was necessary. In consequence of the continued insecurity of the Gulf, the incapacity of the Turkish authorities, and the failure of all efforts to effect an arrangement with the Porte by conciliatory action, Her Majesty's Government decided in 1881 to authorise the commanders of British cruisers in the Gulf to act as might be necessary to prevent or punish disturbance of the peace of the seas.

From 1888 onwards there was intermittent warfare between Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd, and the Emir of the Jebel Shammar, Ibn Rashid, who was favoured by the Turks. An alliance was formed between the Sheikh of Koweit and Ibn Saud, who in 1902 requested that "the eyes of the benevolent British Government might be fixed on him." His Majesty's Government were, however, reluctant to become involved in the quarrels of the Wahabi Emir, and contented themselves with remon-

stances at Constantinople against the despatch of Turkish assistance to Ibn Rashid. In 1906 peace was declared between the two Emirs, each of whom received at this time a monthly subsidy from the Turkish Government. Renewed overtures were made by Ibn Saud to the British Government, who, however, again declined to interfere in the internal affairs of Arabia.

Meanwhile the condition of Hasa under Turkish rule was one of chronic insecurity. In 1905-6 the Turkish authorities attempted to take a census of the population in the Hasa and Katif oases, apparently with a view to the imposition of a poll tax. Serious riots, however, resulted, and the proceedings were stopped. A recrudescence of piracy interfered seriously with the trade of the Gulf; Turkish co-operation for the punishment of offenders could not be obtained, and continual obstacles were placed in the way of the British authorities. On land robberies were frequent, and communications constantly interrupted. In 1913 Ibn Saud descended on Hasa and expelled the Turkish garrisons from the province. In the Convention signed at London in July of the same year His Majesty's Government recognised Hasa as part of the Ottoman Sanjak of Nejd. Subsequent negotiations between the Turks and Ibn Saud resulted in the signature of a treaty by Ibn Saud and the Vali of Basra, on May 15, 1914. By this treaty Ibn Saud was appointed Turkish Vali of Nejd; and the succession of his descendants was guaranteed on condition of their loyalty to the Ottoman Government; Turkish control over the internal affairs and foreign relations of the vilayet was established; and the Vali was pledged to provide assistance for Turkey in case of internal disturbance or war with a foreign Power. In spite of this treaty, however, Ibn Saud replied to a letter from the Sheikh of Koweit in October 1914, that "in the event of war with Turkey he would stand by the Sheikh and the British Government" (see below, p. 76).

Koweit.—The town of Koweit seems to have been founded about the beginning of the eighteenth century

by the Utubi tribe, originating from Central Arabia. It grew rapidly in wealth and importance, and when in 1776 Basra was captured by the Persians, the Indian trade with Baghdad, Aleppo, Smyrna, and Constantinople was diverted to Koweit. In consequence of difficulties with the Turkish officials in 1793, the staff of the British factory at Basra established themselves for over two years at Koweit. In 1805 the Sheikh suggested that the British Government should guarantee him protection against the Wahabis, but his proposals were not entertained. The British Residency at Basra was removed in 1821 to Failaka, in the jurisdiction of the Sheikh of Koweit, again on account of trouble with the Turkish authorities. These circumstances appear to indicate that Koweit was practically independent of Ottoman rule, although in 1829 the Sheikh was said to pay an annual tribute to the Turks. Colonel Pelly, in his report of 1863, stated that the suzerainty of the Porte was merely nominal; and at that time there was no mention of tribute paid to Turkey.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, increased interest was directed by the Porte to the political situation in the Gulf. Koweit assumed a new importance as a possible terminus for the Baghdad Railway, and various attempts were made by Turkey to establish some degree of control over the Sheikh. In 1897 Sheikh Mubarak requested British protection. His overtures were then declined, but subsequent designs on the part of Russia and Turkey made the exclusion of foreign influence from Koweit appear desirable. On January 23, 1899, the Sheikh signed an Agreement with the British Government, binding himself and his successors to cede no territory and to receive no foreign representative without the sanction of the British Government. In return the Sheikh was assured of the good offices of the British Government and received a sum of money. The political situation remained somewhat unsatisfactory until September 1901, when the Porte undertook to maintain the *status quo* at Koweit, and not to send troops

thither, on condition that His Majesty's Government would not occupy that place or establish a British protectorate. The Marquess of Lansdowne gave the required assurance to the Ottoman Ambassador.

On several subsequent occasions, however, British naval and diplomatic support was considered necessary to protect the Sheikh against Turkish designs. In 1902 the Turks established military posts at Umm Kasr and Safwan, and also upon Bubian Island, territories which the Sheikh claimed as lying within his jurisdiction. The Government of India took a serious view of these aggressions; and the importance of asserting the Sheikh's claim to Bubian was emphasised by an Inter-Departmental Committee in 1907. British influence at Koweit was strengthened by the visit of the Viceroy of India in 1903, and the establishment in 1914 of a British Political Agency.

In view of the conflicting territorial claims of the Sheikh and the Turkish Government, and of the prevailing uncertainty as to the exact definition of the *status quo*, it was decided in 1913 to regularise the position. Accordingly articles 1-10 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of that year, respecting the Persian Gulf and adjacent territories, declared the territory of Koweit, as defined in articles 5 and 7,¹ to form an autonomous Kaza of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Ottoman Government recognised the validity of existing agreements² between the British Government and the Sheikh.

Irak.—The influence of Turkey in the Persian Gulf did not last long, nor was it ever securely established. The situation in Hasa and Koweit has already been described. Irak for nearly three centuries formed part of the Ottoman Empire, from which it has now been separated; but before the middle of the nineteenth century the authority of the Porte in the Basra pashalik was seldom more than nominal. After the administrative reforms of Midhat Pasha in 1869,

¹ The islands of Bubian and Warba were included.

² Besides that of 1899, there was an Agreement in 1900 prohibiting traffic in arms, and a Postal Agreement in 1904.

the district from the Khor Zobeir to the Shatt el-Arab formed the Kaza of Fao in the Basra sanjak. The Sheikh of Koweit has for many years possessed large private estates in this region, and has been subjected to many annoyances on their account by the Turkish authorities. The Sheikh of Mohammera is also a wealthy landed proprietor; and many of his subjects reside permanently, or for part of the year, on the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab.

Considerable importance has been attached to Fao, both from its commanding position, and, since 1864, as the point of connection between the British submarine cables from India and the Turkish telegraph lines. The construction of fortifications, begun there by the Turks in 1886, was opposed by Her Majesty's Government and by Persia as contrary to the decision arrived at between Turkey and Persia, through the mediation of Great Britain and Russia, previous to the ratification in 1848 of the Treaty of Erzerum. In consequence of remonstrances, the fort was left for some years without artillery, although a Turkish garrison was maintained.

The Shatt el-Arab from the year 1640 marked the boundary between Turkey and Persia. The policing, surveying, charting and buoying of this waterway, as elsewhere in the Gulf, has been for generations performed by Great Britain solely. Basra, which is accessible to ocean-going steamers, is the chief port in the Persian Gulf, and has had for many generations an organic connection with India.

South Arabistan.—The whole of the north-eastern littoral of the Persian Gulf, from the Shatt el-Arab, is included in the Persian Empire, but the degree of control exercised by the Shah and his Ministers varies considerably in different districts. South Arabistan, of whose population at least 95 per cent. are Arabs, although nominally a division of the Persian province of Arabistan, is actually under Arab administration, which has consistently resisted attempts on the part of the Persian Central Government to exert control.

The Kaab tribe of Arabs seems to have entered Arabistan at some time in the seventeenth century. Their power increased rapidly, and their Sheikh maintained virtual independence in his relations with both Persians and Turks. The Kaab were notorious pirates, and made frequent depredations on shipping in the Shatt el-Arab and Persian Gulf. Several Anglo-Turkish expeditions were undertaken against them in the eighteenth century, but the results were on the whole unsatisfactory.

In 1812 the town of Mohammera, which appears to have been six centuries ago a port of some renown, was rebuilt by the Sheikh of the Muhaisin tribe, between whom and the Kaab, whose capital was at this time Felahieh, considerable rivalry existed for some years. The chief power in the province belonged at this period to the Sheikh of the Kaab, who shortly after 1832 declared Mohammera a free port. In 1837 the town was seized and plundered by the Turks. They withdrew in the following year, but the rival claims of Turkey and Persia continued to cause disturbances until, by the Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, Mohammera was declared to be within the Persian Empire.

With the possible exception of Russia, Great Britain was the only European Power which at this time exhibited any interest in Arabistan. In 1841-42 the principal rivers were navigated by British agency; and continuous efforts were made to develop British commercial interests in the province. In consequence of pressure from Great Britain, the Karun below Ahwaz was opened in 1889 to foreign shipping and trade; and a service of steamships was instituted and maintained by Messrs. Lynch, in spite of constant obstruction from the Persian authorities. Outbreaks of piracy on the part of the Kaab occurred from time to time, and British efforts to obtain the punishment of the guilty frequently occasioned friction with the Turkish and Persian officials. Vigorous British action succeeded, however, in establishing some measure of security.

During the British occupation of Mohammera (1856-7) the Sheikhs of the Muhaisin and Kaab tribes sought from the British authorities some guarantee of protection, which, however, could not be granted in view of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards Persian integrity. It was reported that under the Muhaisin Sheikh Mizal (1881-97) the resources of Mohammera were potentially under British control for the extension of commerce and other purposes. A British Vice-Consulate was established at Mohammera in 1890.

In 1897 Sheikh Mizal Khan was assassinated; he was succeeded by his brother, Sheikh Khazal. Shortly afterwards the Kaab Sheikhdom of Felahieh was abolished, and the tribe passed under the direct rule of the Muhaisin Sheikh of Mohammera. Many of the Kaab Arabs cultivated large territories west of the Shatt el-Arab, though continuing to own allegiance to the Sheikh of Mohammera. The latter thus acquired much influence and wide interests in Turkish Irak, which were frequently a cause of friction between him and the Turkish authorities. Considerable distrust existed between the Sheikh and the Persian Central Government, which made various efforts to undermine his autonomy and semi-independence. In 1898 the Sheikh asked to be taken under British protection. The request was refused, but he was assured of the constant support of the British Minister at Teheran.

Until 1902 the Sheikh of Mohammera had complete control over the customs of Arabistan, but in that year the management was transferred to the Imperial Persian Customs Department, under Belgian administration. The Sheikh evinced great hostility to the transfer, and again asked for British protection, expressing a desire to have his position assimilated to that of the Sheikh of Koweit. In view of Russian designs against Mohammera, His Majesty's Minister at Teheran was authorized to give the Sheikh certain

assurances of British support,¹ which were renewed in 1903. British influence was employed to induce the Sheikh to submit to the customs innovations, and to obtain for him in 1903 the grant from the Persian Government of certain districts "as perpetual property," thus securing his title to the greater part of Southern Arabistan.

Meanwhile commercial development had continued under British auspices. In 1901 a British capitalist, Mr. d'Arcy, obtained from the Persian Government an important concession for oil exploitation in Arabistan. This concession was taken up in 1909 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, who made an agreement with the Sheikh in that year, and laid a pipe-line from the oilfields to Mohammera port. They also established a refinery on Abadan Island, in the territory of the Sheikh of Mohammera. Whatever progress was made in land communications in Arabistan was due entirely to British enterprise.

In 1908, and again in 1910, the general assurances already given by His Majesty's Government to the Sheikh of Mohammera were repeated and extended to his successors. The Persian Government were informed in 1910, in answer to an enquiry, that the Sheikh was not "protected" by Great Britain, but that His Majesty's Government had special relations with him, and would support him in the event of any encroachment on his rights. In May 1914 His Majesty's Government acquired a predominant interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Sheikh Khazal had in the previous December asked for further assurances from Great Britain for the strengthening of his position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government and the Bakhtiari. The matter was still under discussion at the outbreak of the recent war.

¹ Sir A. Hardinge's letter to the Sheikh, December 7, 1902, contained this statement: "We shall protect Muhamrah against naval attack by a foreign Power, whatever pretext of intervention may be alleged; and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, we will continue to give you our good offices and support."

Persian Coast and Islands.—The Persian littoral consists generally of a narrow strip of flat land, separated from the plateau of the interior by a maritime range running parallel to the coast. This region is ethnically as well as geographically distinct from the rest of Persia, for the coast strip is populated almost entirely by Arabs, and, with the exception of Bushire, there is not a single really Persian town or village from Mohammera to the border of Baluchistan. Maritime power is essential for the control of such a littoral; but the Persians have no liking for the sea, and the Shah has never possessed a navy worthy of the name.

With the aid of the fleet of the East India Company, whose position in Persia was established in 1617, Shah Abbas the Great expelled the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, and brought under his rule the coast and islands on the northern side of the Gulf. More than a century later, Nadir Shah entertained the ambition of possessing a navy in the Gulf, but on his death in 1747 the project was abandoned. Karim Khan, however, continued attempting to bring into subjection the Arab sheikhs of the coast, who did not as yet pay tribute to the Persian Government. To this end he offered in 1764 to subsidise one or two British cruisers for permanent police duty in the Gulf. He succeeded in obtaining the assistance of the Sheikh of Bushire, who at this time possessed a considerable fleet.

On the death of Karim Khan in 1779, Persia at once ceased to be the predominant State in the Gulf. In 1794 the Sultan of Muscat obtained the lease of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies, including Shamil, Minab, and the islands of Kishm and Hormuz. Wars with Russia between 1804 and 1828 absorbed the energies of the Persian Government, and the Gulf districts escaped from all control beyond that of their local chiefs. In 1808 the hereditary Arab Sheikh of Bushire was supplanted by a Persian governor, who reported in the following year that, in the event of hostilities between Great Britain and Persia, all the

Arab tribes of the coast south of Kanguen would join the British in the hope of shaking off the Persian yoke.

Representatives of the East India Company had settled at Bandar Abbas in 1623-24. *A British Residency was established in 1763 at Bushire. The Portuguese finally disappeared from the Gulf about the year 1720, and the Dutch about 1766. Between 1796 and 1809 France despatched several missions to Persia with a view to the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against Great Britain and Russia. A treaty, by which the island of Kharak was ceded to France, was negotiated in 1807, but apparently never ratified by the Shah. The situation had previously aroused the apprehension of the British Government, and treaties of friendship and alliance between Great Britain and Persia were concluded in 1801, 1809, 1812, and 1814. The treaty of 1814 bound the British sovereign not to interfere in any internal dispute in Persia, and to respect the integrity of the Persian kingdom. By the eleventh article the British Government undertook, "if convenient and practicable," to assist the Shah in the Persian Gulf with ships of war and troops.

The British expedition despatched against the Kawasim in 1809 found it necessary to extend operations to the Persian coast, as the pirates had many accomplices and settlements on that side of the Gulf. The Persian Government concurred in the measures adopted, and promised co-operation by land, which was not, however, forthcoming. The British destroyed the port of Lingeh, and visited and searched other places on the coast. On the occasion of Sir W. Grant Keir's expedition, a British garrison was in 1820 placed on the island of Kishm, under a grant from the Sultan of Muscat. The Persian Government protested against the British occupation and assumed full responsibility for the maintenance of order.¹ The

¹ A note addressed to the British Chargé d'Affaires in December 1820 contained this remark: "If any further steps are necessary to check piracy in the Persian Gulf, these can effectually be taken by the Prince of Fars, and no foreign aid is requisite."

Shah undertook to enforce on the Persian coast regulations similar to those imposed upon the Trucial Sheikhs by the treaty of 1820, but the engagement was never fulfilled. In 1822-23 the British garrison was withdrawn from Kishm, but a tract of land granted by the Sultan of Muscat to the British Government at Basidu has since remained a British station, and was until 1879 the headquarters of the Indian Marine in the Gulf.

In 1828 the Sheikh of Bushire secretly applied for British protection, and professed his willingness to enter into any engagements which the British Resident might consider expedient. His application was refused by the Bombay Government as inconsistent with the terms of the Anglo-Persian treaties. Constant friction between the Sheikh and the Persian Government resulted in disorder and unrest on the coast. Arab rule was finally overthrown at Bushire in 1850; and a Persian governor was installed, with the title of Lord High Admiral.

In consequence of Persian operations against Herat in 1837-38, a British expedition to the Persian Gulf was organised and a force maintained on the island of Kharak until the Persian Government had complied with the demands of Great Britain. In 1841 an Anglo-Persian commercial treaty was signed, which contained a most-favoured-nation clause and extended Persian recognition to the British Residency at Bushire. A treaty was concluded between Persia and Oman in 1856 with reference to Bandar Abbas and its dependencies, over which the Sultan of Muscat claimed independent sovereignty. It was now declared that the whole territory formed an integral part of the Persian province of Fars. A fresh lease was granted to Oman in 1868, but was terminated by the Shah in the same year; and the districts reverted to Persian rule.

When war broke out between Great Britain and Persia in 1856 Sir J. Outram was placed in command of the British expeditionary force, which, operating from the Gulf, captured Bushire in 1856 and

Mohammera in 1857. The British troops occupied Kharak from 1856 to 1858. The British Government had expressly stated that Persian subjects were not to be instigated to rebel against the Shah; and these instructions were most faithfully observed. A treaty was signed at Paris between Great Britain and Persia on March 4, 1857, establishing perpetual peace and friendship between the two nations. The British Government, its servants and subjects, were to receive most-favoured-nation treatment in Persia; and, on the ratification of the treaty, Great Britain undertook to withdraw her troops from all Persian territory. An Anglo-Persian Convention signed in 1851,¹ for the restraint of the slave trade, was the only previous agreement between Great Britain and Persia that was renewed by the Treaty of Paris (1857). The British Resident resumed his duties at Bushire on its evacuation by the troops in 1857. The prestige accruing to Great Britain from this campaign was further increased by the construction between 1868 and 1870 of telegraph lines in and across Persia.

After the lapse in 1868 of the lease of Bandar Abbas to the Sultan of Muscat, no Arab principality with any claim to independence existed on the Persian littoral. A degree of autonomy was for a time enjoyed by the Arab Sheikh of Lingeh, and by other petty sheikhs along the coast. The Persian Government, however, were quick to take advantage of local disturbances to secure the expulsion of the Arab rulers. In 1887 the seaboard towns, including Bushire, Lingeh, and Bandar Abbas, with their dependent districts and islands, were formed into a Gulf ports charge, independent of Fars. In the same year the Persian flag was hoisted on the island of Siri and maintained there in spite of a protest from the Sheikh of Sharga, who claimed the island as belonging to the Kawasim. The Persian occupation of Siri has never been recognised by His Majesty's Government.

¹ This treaty, which was for eleven years only, was replaced by a permanent convention in 1882.

The idea of a Persian navy in the Gulf, entertained by Nadir Shah in the eighteenth century, was revived by Nasir-ud-Din Shah. About the year 1865 he had proposed to acquire three or four armed steamers, to be commanded by British naval officers and manned by Arabs or Indians. The scheme was discountenanced by the British Government, who were aware that it concealed aggressive designs upon the islands and pearl fisheries of Bahrein. In 1883, however, the Persian Government gave a contract to a German firm for the construction of two steamers, the "Persepolis" and the "Susa," which arrived in the Gulf in 1885. Neither vessel proved satisfactory; and the policing of the Gulf continued as before to devolve upon Great Britain.

During the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Shah the Persian Government exercised on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf more authority than at any period since the time of Shah Abbas. On the death of Nasir-ud-Din Shah in 1896, however, Persian control of the coast at once declined. No fewer than nine Governors of the Gulf ports succeeded one another in the space of about fifteen months. Arab rule was re-established at Lingeh in 1898, and although the Persians returned in the following year, much unrest prevailed. The inclusion in 1900 of the Gulf districts in the sphere of operations of the Imperial Persian Customs Administration, under Belgian management aroused much local opposition. The activity of the Belgian officials resulted in the establishment of many new customs posts in the Persian Gulf, and tended towards increased centralisation of authority in the hands of the Persian Government. In 1909 the Nationalists seized the customs and assumed the government at Bandar Abbas, Lingeh, and Bushire: and a British force had to be landed at Bushire to restore order. The Persian Governor, without troops to enable him to assert his authority or to collect revenue, and harassed by instructions from Ministers at Teheran with no appreciation of the local situa-

tion, was powerless to stem the tide of disorder; and conditions down to 1914 remained most unsatisfactory.

Persian Makran.—Persian Makran, although outside the limits of the Persian Gulf, is, like Muscat, within the same political system. It is inhabited chiefly by tribes of Arab or Baluchi descent. Nadir Shah in 1739 attempted to extend his authority to this region, but for a century afterwards no further efforts were made to enforce the Persian claim to sovereignty. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the whole country was divided among local chiefs, who were in every respect independent. With the exception of a short interval in 1804, Charbar remained in the possession of the Sultan of Muscat from 1792 until it was captured by Persia in 1872. The Sultan also held Jask, which was included in 1794 in the lease of Bandar Abbas and its dependencies.

Persian efforts to control Makran were renewed in 1844, when the Governor-General of Kirman occupied Bampur and endeavoured to assert Persian authority east of Jask. The proposal of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in 1861 to lay a line of telegraph from Karachi to Jask afforded the Persian Government an opportunity to advance extravagant claims. Five years later, however, the Persian Vazir of Kirman declared that Persian control on the Makran coast was too slight for him to undertake to protect telegraph construction east of Guadar. The Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1868 granted an annual subsidy to Persia for operations in places under her sovereignty, but made no territorial definition. The British Government undertook in 1869 to make yearly payments to the principal chiefs of Persian Makran, who pledged themselves to protect the telegraph line. The frontier between Persia and Kelat was fixed by a British Commission in 1872 at a point 8 miles east of Gwattar. A British garrison was maintained at Jask for the protection of the telegraph station from 1878-87, when the district was

included in the jurisdiction of the Governor of the Gulf ports.

On the death of Nasir-ud-Din Shah in 1896 anarchy in Persian Makran reached the pitch of open rebellion against the Persian Central Government. In consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official severe punitive measures were adopted by the Persian authorities, under pressure from Great Britain. Political unrest, however, continued; and in 1898 British garrisons were established at Jask and Charbar. It was reported in 1905 that the Jask district continued to enjoy exemption from payment of any ordinary revenue to the Persian Government. Throughout this period British political interests in Persian Makran were in charge of the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, who was subordinate in political matters to the Resident at Bushire. A blockade of the coast for the suppression of the arms traffic was maintained by the ships of His Majesty's navy from 1910-14. It was reported about this time that the Persian Government had long ceased to exercise any authority in the coast districts of Persian Makran; and anarchy appears to have prevailed down to 1914.

* (3) EUROPEAN ACTIVITY IN THE GULF

Portugal.—The first European nation to establish a footing in the Persian Gulf was Portugal, whose influence was felt there for nearly two centuries after her initial occupation of Hormuz in 1508. Portuguese supremacy established by conquest on land and sea during the sixteenth century was challenged and finally overthrown in the seventeenth by the English and the Dutch. After the collapse of their naval power the Portuguese continued to maintain certain commercial interests in Persia and Irak, but their importance diminished, and about 1720 they finally disappeared from the Gulf.

Holland.—The Dutch, who co-operated with the English to secure the downfall of the Portuguese,

reaped much of the benefit of English achievements and pioneer work, and became dangerous rivals to the East India Company, both commercially and politically. For some years Dutch influence predominated in the Gulf, but towards the close of the seventeenth century English trade revived and the interests of the Dutch declined. The last of their factories, a fortified settlement on the island of Kharak, was captured by Arabs in 1766; and Dutch activity in this region was brought to an end.

France.—French enterprise in the Persian Gulf dates from the formation in 1664 of the French East India Company, which had for a time a factory at Bandar Abbas and later a small trade with Basra. The French position at Muscat rests upon the Franco-Muscat Commercial Treaty of 1844 and the joint Anglo-French Declaration of 1862. The former set up a "most-favoured-nation" relationship between the two States, and gave French subjects the right of complete freedom of trade at Muscat,¹ and permission to purchase, sell, or rent land, houses or warehouses in the dominions of the Sultan. By the Declaration of 1862 Great Britain and France jointly guaranteed the independence of Muscat. As interpreted in connection with the attempt of France to establish in 1896 a coaling station at Bandar Jissa,² this treaty precludes the acquisition or lease of territory belonging to Muscat.

From 1891 onwards close relations existed between France and Russia resulting in increased French activity in the Gulf. In 1895 French war vessels began to visit these waters; in the following year the Messageries Maritimes Company instituted a subsidized steamer service between Bombay and the Gulf ports, but the venture failed.

¹ Certain restrictions were placed on trading in ivory and gum copal. In 1914 the French Government renounced the right of invoking privileges conferred by this treaty where they conflicted with local regulations for the control of the arms traffic.

² See p. 42.

On the settlement in 1905 of the question of the grant of French flags to Muscat dhows Franco-British relations in the region of the Persian Gulf improved considerably. A certain amount of friction was engendered by the Muscat arms traffic, in which French merchants were actively engaged. The French interest was, however, finally bought out by the Indian Government in 1914 (*cf.* above, p. 42).

Russia.—Until comparatively recent years Russian influence and interests in Persia did not extend to the region of the Gulf. In 1881, however, Russia established a consulate at Baghdad, and for some years subsequently engaged in the prosecution of a policy hostile to British interests. Her influence was employed at Teheran to the same end. In 1888 Great Britain was assured of preferential rights in regard to railway construction in Southern Persia; but, by an Agreement with Russia in 1889, the Persian Government engaged that no railway should be constructed in Persia for ten years; the term was afterwards prolonged to 1910. Further evidence of Russian activity included a series of naval demonstrations in the Gulf, the despatch of plague missions to Southern Persia, and the foundation in 1900 of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, subsidised by the Russian Government to run a steamer service between Odessa and the Persian Gulf, and to establish commercial interests in that region. Persistent endeavours on the part of Russia to obtain a naval base in the Gulf of Persia or Oman at length evoked from Lord Lansdowne in 1903 a statement of British policy, which was reaffirmed by Sir E. Grey in the course of negotiations respecting the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The aversion of the Nationalist party in Persia to foreign control manifested itself in strong public feeling against Russia in the Persian coast districts.

Germany.—German interest in the Middle East became prominent in connection with the Baghdad Railway scheme. The Convention of 1903 envisaged an

extension of the railway to a point on the Persian Gulf, where for a few years previously Germany had made organised efforts to achieve political ascendancy by commercial penetration. Her relations with Turkey enabled Germany to place many obstacles in the way of British interests in Mesopotamia, and the northern end of the Gulf; her trade increased rapidly; and she made constant efforts to extend her influence in Persia. The visits of German warships to the Gulf began in 1899; and agents of the German firm of Messrs. Wonckhaus established themselves at various points about the same period. In 1906 the Hamburg-America line instituted a service of steamers between Europe and the Persian Gulf, and appointed as their agent the representative of Messrs. Wonckhaus at Bahrein. In the same year this firm entered into a contract with a native concessionnaire for a monopoly of the purchase of oxide of iron from the mines of Abu Musa. When the Sheikh of Sharga cancelled the concession, the German Government approached Great Britain on the matter. The question was still unsettled on the outbreak of war in 1914. German activity in the Persian Gulf, in conjunction with the policy, freely avowed in her press, of regarding the Middle East as a bridge to world-dominion, made of this region one of the principal theatres of British and German rivalry before the war. In 1913 and 1914 Germany made unprecedented efforts and spared no expense in importing arms and ammunition into the Persian Gulf area. *

Great Britain.—The political relations of Great Britain with the Persian Gulf date from the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, when, under an agreement with Shah Abbas, the Honourable East India Company undertook "to keep two fleets of war constantly to defend the Gulf." British commercial interests had been established in this region some years previously, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Great Britain extended and consolidated her influence in the face of keen competition from Portugal.

guese, Dutch, and French in succession. In the second half of the eighteenth century the commercial ascendancy of Great Britain became unquestioned, and she exercised a widespread political influence in the Gulf. In the early nineteenth century three expeditions were despatched from Bombay for the suppression of piracy and lawlessness on the part of the Arab tribes; additional responsibility was assumed as the situation demanded, and as the inability of any local authority to exercise control became increasingly apparent. The treaty relations entered into by Great Britain with the Arab States of the littoral have been dealt with above. By these treaties the British Resident at Bushire became the arbiter of all disputes among the Sheikhs. An enormous advance in general security and prosperity has been effected in the Gulf by the *Pax Britannica*, maintained with rare exceptions from that time.

At the beginning of the nineteenth-century there was no legal obstacle to the slave trade in any part of the Persian Gulf, and it was carried on extensively. In defiance of her commercial interests and her popularity with the Moslem population of the Gulf, Great Britain set herself to suppress the trade. Beginning with the General Treaty of 1820, and a treaty with the Sultan of Muscat two years later, a series of agreements was concluded with Muscat, Trucial Oman, Bahrein, El-Katr, Hasa, Koweit and the Turkish and Persian Governments in restraint of the traffic. The arduous task of enforcing the observance of these treaties fell upon the Indian Government, and involved great sacrifice of lives and money.

Great Britain alone has been responsible for the work of policing, surveying, charting, lighting, and buoying the Persian Gulf. Since at least 1864 she has undertaken sanitary control and quarantine administration in this area. Until the recent appearance of Russian and German vessels, she enjoyed a monopoly of the steam navigation; and her commercial interests have far exceeded those of any other nation. The maintenance by the Indian Government since 1864 of the sub-

marine cables from Fao to Jask, and of the line from that place to Karachi and Muscat, has tended to increase an already preponderating influence. The protection of the pearl fisheries, on which the existence of the maritime Arabs depends, has also devolved upon Great Britain, who has moreover, consistently warded off intruders, British subjects and foreigners alike, who sought to interfere with the time-honoured rights of the Arabs.

From 1900 onwards the traffic in arms assumed alarming proportions in the Gulf; it aroused all the piratical instincts latent in the character of the maritime inhabitants, and brought about a state of general demoralisation that constituted a serious menace to the maintenance of peace. Various efforts were made by the British Government to restrict the traffic; but French influence, based on the treaty of 1844 with Muscat, prevented effective action at that port, the chief emporium of the whole trade. In 1910, Great Britain established a naval blockade of the Makran coast. This measure was continued, at great expense, down to the outbreak of war, and achieved such a degree of success in the Gulf of Oman as to lead to a settlement with France (*cf.* above, pp. 42, 66). The traffic, checked in the southern, became, through German efforts, increasingly flourishing in the northern part of the Gulf, and during the first half of 1914 caused much anxiety to the British authorities.

The threatening activities and ambitions of other European Powers in the Gulf led Lord Lansdowne to declare, in the House of Lords in 1903, that "we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." This declaration was formally reaffirmed in 1907 by Sir E. Grey, in a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which further stated that "His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all their

efforts to the preservation of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the maintenance of British trade. In doing so they have no desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power." These declarations have never been openly challenged; but in the years immediately preceding the war Turkey, under German instigation, adopted a policy of encroachment which seriously threatened the *status quo* at the head of the Gulf. In 1912-14 His Majesty's Government entered into far-reaching negotiations with the Turkish and German Governments, with the object of regularising the position. The resulting agreements had not, however, been ratified before the declaration of war.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

* (1) RELIGIOUS

THE Mohammedan religion in one form or another prevails, almost to the exclusion of other creeds, in all the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf. Jews are few, except in the towns of Irak, and members of the Oriental Christian congregations are hardly found outside that province. The chief Mohammedan sects in the Persian Gulf region are Shiah, Sunni, Ibadhi, and Wahabi. On the western coast of the Persian Gulf proper, Sunnis, including nominal Wahabis, predominate in every territorial division, although there are strong Shiah communities in Hasa and Bahrein. On the eastern coast Shiahs are in the majority in most districts. The population of Arabistan is almost exclusively Shiah, and that sect predominates also in Irak. In the Gulf of Oman Shiahs are few in number; Persian Makran is entirely Sunni; while the Sultanate of Oman is Ibadhi and Sunni, with a small proportion of Wahabis.

Roman Catholic Missions have had a footing in the Persian Gulf since the seventeenth century, but latterly they have had only three permanent stations in Irak. The American Arabian Mission is established at Basra, Bahrein, Muscat, and Koweit. Schools are maintained by the Christian Missions, but there is on the whole very scanty provision for education in the Gulf.

(2) POLITICAL

The districts which adjoin the western coast of the Persian Gulf proper comprise a group of sheikhdoms and emirates under Arab rulers. Of these the Sheikh of Koweit is a mediatised ruler under British protection, and Hasa is ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd, who in June 1914 accepted the title of Vali of Nejd

and Hasa from the Turks, but has remained in close relation to the British and Indian Governments, and during the war threw in his lot with the British. The island of Bahrein is under the personal rule of Sheikh Isa, who has been supported by the British against other claimants of his family. El-Katr is now also under the control of Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd. In Trucial Oman the position of the five ruling sheikhs, which include Sharga, Dibai, Abu Dhabi, and Ras al-Kheima, is governed by agreements with the British Government.

The Government of Oman is a sultanate or absolute monarchy, the present hereditary sultanate having arisen out of an ancient elective imamate. The populations of both west and north Oman do not acknowledge his sway, and live in practical independence of him under their own chiefs, the Sultan's authority being limited to his capital and the coast. A rival Imam has been set up in the interior by the principal Ibadhi Sheikh.

Of the Arabs of the coastal region the large majority are settled and live in towns, as the Beduin nomads who wander over the plains and interior, and reach even as far as Nejd or Jebel Shammar in the interior, form a proportion of the population which is small, and varies from time to time according to the location of the tribes. The population of the towns includes many Arabs recently nomadic who have now become settled. Among the settled Arabs of this region the main distinctions are either religious or political; tribal feeling is weak.

In Oman, political differences divide the population into two opposing factions known as Hinawie and Ghafiria, the result of a general civil war in the eighteenth century. The Hinawi faction consists mostly of Yamani tribes, while the Ghafiri are for the most part Nasiri. They live intermingled in groups and villages, and the factions are equally marked among settled and among Beduin tribes. The great majority of Hinawi tribes belong to the Ibadhi sect

of Islam; of Ghafiri tribes a considerable proportion are orthodox Sunnis, and a few are Wahabis of Oman.

Tribal organisation in Oman is loose; some tribes are scattered, others, though compact, are broken up into sections headed by sheikhs who acknowledge no common authority, and in only a few cases is the tribe governed by a Tamima, a chief whose power extends over all its branches. This office, which is nominally elective, is in practice hereditary.

Among the nomads of the Arabian coastal region tribal feeling is strong. Important tribes are: (a) the Ajman, of whom the greater number have their headquarters in Hasa; (b) the Awazim and Rashaida, who are found for the most part in Koweit territory.

The districts of Irak at the head of the Gulf formed, before the war, a part of the Turkish vilayet of Basra. On the right bank of the Shatt el-Arab are Arabs belonging chiefly to the tribe of Idan, with a few Muhaisin from across the river. Power is in the hands of the landowners and village sheikhs; there is very little tribal feeling, except among the Muhaisin and the Kaab, who look to the Sheikh of Mohammera as their chief.

The government of south Arabistan is administered by the Sheikh of Mohammera as Governor of Mohammera and its dependencies, nominally under the Persian Government; he is head of the Muhaisin tribe, and also exercises control over the powerful Kaab tribe. The Sheikh has been virtually independent, but his position was weakened when in 1902 the control of the customs of the port was transferred to the new Belgian Administration in exchange for a subsidy (*cf.* p. 56).

In Arabistan the tribal system is more highly developed; it does not rest, however, upon a rigid basis of race, and the strength of the tribe or section is liable to be increased by addition to its numbers from without, or diminished by desertion from within. Sheikhs or headmen of the tribes or sections are generally chosen from a family in which the office is hereditary. Some of the tribes are settled, others are nomadic,

while a considerable number are in a transitional stage between the two. The settled and semi-settled tribes are mainly agricultural, and the nomadic mainly pastoral, but even the latter cultivate a certain amount of grain in winter.

In south Arabistan the principal tribes are the Muhaisin and the Kaab; the former are politically, the latter numerically the stronger. The Muhaisin have their centre at Mohammera and are a settled tribe. The Kaab, whose focus is Felahieh, should probably be regarded as settled. The principal nomad tribes are the Beni Turuf, Beni Saleh, and Beni Tamim. Beh-behan, although geographically belonging to Fars, has a government and administration of its own. A large number of the inhabitants belong to the Kuhgilu, a division of the Lur tribe; each division of the tribe has its own chief.

Local districts of the Persian coast are for the most part under the government of a local hereditary chief, khan, or sheikh, who collects the land-tax in his own domain on behalf of the Persian Government. Certain districts are in a very disturbed state, others are remarkably orderly, but the coastal inhabitants are for the most part much more civilized than the tribesmen of the interior. Blood feuds are common, and cattle raids sometimes lead to encounters between the different tribes and factions. There are no criminal courts beyond the personal administration of the Governor or local khan; civil justice of a sort is dispensed, but it is extremely venal.

Persian Makran is nominally administered by a Governor, who has his seat at Bampur, subject to the authority of the Persian Governor-General of Kirman; as a matter of fact, however, this official is rarely appointed, and the country is in a condition of anarchy. Makran is divided into five districts, each of which is ruled by a chief who is supposed to pay tribute to the Governor, but in the administration of his district is free from interference by the Persian executive. The

chiefs of districts are assisted by the religious authorities or *mullahs*, and by headmen of the villages. There is no organized system of law and order, and serious disturbances have been common in recent years. The blood feud remains customary, and slavery prevails in most parts of the country.

During the course of the recent war, treaty relationships were established between Great Britain and all the rulers of the Arab littoral from Muscat to Mohammera. A collective assurance was issued to the Gulf Chiefs and their subjects on November 3, 1914, to the effect that Great Britain would do her utmost to preserve for them their liberty and religion. In consideration of professions of loyalty from the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera on the outbreak of war with Germany, the Government of India undertook that Basra should never again be subject to Turkish authority; that Koweit should be recognised as an independent principality under British protection; that Great Britain would endeavour to maintain the Sheikh of Mohammera in his present state of local autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government, would support him against encroachment upon his rights or property by any Power, and would safeguard him to the best of her ability against any unprovoked attack by a foreign Power. The undertakings to the Sheikh of Mohammera also included a limited dynastic guarantee.

The expulsion of the Turks from the shores of the Gulf made it desirable for Great Britain to regularise the position of El-Katr. By a treaty signed on November 3, 1916, and ratified on March 23, 1918, Sheikh Abdullah of El-Katr assimilated his position to that of the Trucial Chiefs, and affixed his signature to all the treaties and engagements existing between them and Great Britain. The British Government, in addition, undertook to afford their good offices to the Sheikh in the event of unprovoked aggression by land. A proclamation prohibiting the arms traffic was issued by Sheikh Abdullah at the same time.

The friendly attitude of Ibn Saud on the outbreak

of war with Turkey made it imperative that His Majesty's Government should come to a definite understanding with him. As a result of negotiations a treaty was signed on December 26, 1915, and ratified on July 18, 1916, by which Great Britain recognised Ibn Saud as independent ruler of Nejd and Hasa (the boundaries to be determined hereafter), and gave him a limited dynastic guarantee. British arbitration and support were promised to Ibn Saud in the case of foreign aggression. Great Britain assumed control of the foreign relations of Ibn Saud, who, moreover, undertook not to alienate any territory to a foreign Power except with the consent of His Majesty's Government. Ibn Saud promised to refrain from aggression on Koweit, Bahrein, El-Katr, and Trucial Oman. Provision was made for the conclusion of a further detailed treaty between the two parties.

These agreements constitute no departure from the traditional policy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, but they strengthen her position for the continuance of her work of maintaining the *status quo* against internal disorder or foreign menace.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The situation in the Persian Gulf does not appear to offer any ground for disagreement between those nations who share in the benefits of British achievements in this region, and who are required only to acquiesce in established treaty relationships and in the principle of self-denial in regard to territorial acquisition to which Great Britain herself has adhered.

The peculiar interests—strategic, political, and commercial—of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf have never been denied; they are intimately connected with the welfare of India and the security of communication with the outposts of the Empire. For the safeguarding of these interests, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Gulf and the absence of competing foreign influences in the interior of Arabia are

essential. The freedom of the Arabs from foreign domination has been promised, and should in some form be assured. It is imperative that their relations with the British Government should be maintained unimpaired, and that Great Britain should continue, as hitherto, to perform her especial duties and to retain complete ascendancy in the Persian Gulf.

APPENDIX

I. GENERAL TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ARAB TRIBES OF THE PERSIAN GULF, 1820.

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Praise be to God, who hath ordained peace to be a blessing to His creatures. There is established a lasting peace between the British Government and the Arab tribes, who are parties to this contract, on the following conditions:—

Article 1. There shall be a cessation of plunder and piracy by land and sea on the part of the Arabs, who are parties to this contract, for ever.

Article 2. If any individual of the people of the Arabs contracting shall attack any that pass by land or sea of any nation whatsoever, in the way of plunder and piracy and not of acknowledged war, he shall be accounted an enemy of all mankind, and shall be held to have forfeited both life and goods. An acknowledged war is that which is proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government, and the killing of men and taking of goods without proclamation, avowal, and the order of a Government is plunder and piracy.

Article 3. The friendly (literally the pacificated) Arabs shall carry by land and sea a red flag, with or without letters in it, at their option, and this shall be in a border of white, the breadth of the white in the border being equal to the breadth of the red, as represented in the margin (the whole forming the flag known in the British Navy by the title of white pierced red); this shall be the flag of the friendly Arabs, and they shall use it and no other.

Article 4. The pacificated tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations, with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government, and shall not fight with each other, and the flag shall be a symbol of this only, and of nothing further.

Article 5. The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them

have in their possession a paper (register) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how many Karahs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (port clearance) signed with the signature of their Chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the nacodah, the number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a British or other vessel meet them they shall produce the register and the clearance.

Article 6. The friendly Arabs, if they choose, shall send an envoy to the British Residency in the Persian Gulf with the necessary accompaniments, and he shall remain there for the transaction of their business with the Residency; and the British Government, if it chooses, shall send an envoy also to them in like manner; and the envoy shall add his signature to the signature of the Chief in the paper (register) of their vessels, which contains the length of the vessel, its breadth, and tonnage; the signature of the envoy to be renewed every year. Also all such envoys shall be at the expense of their own party.

Article 7. If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and piracy shall occur.

Article 8. The putting men to death after they have given up their arms is an act of piracy, and not of acknowledged war; and if any tribe shall put to death any persons, either Muhammadans or others, after they have given up their arms, such tribe shall be held to have broken the peace; and the friendly Arabs shall act against them in conjunction with the British, and, God willing, the war against them shall not cease until the surrender of those who performed the act and of those who ordered it.

Article 9. The carrying-off of slaves, men, women, or children, from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do nothing of this nature.

Article 10. The vessels of the friendly Arabs, bearing their flag above described, shall enter into all the British ports and into the ports of the allies of the British so far as they shall be able to effect it; and they shall buy and sell therein; and, if any shall attack them, the British Government shall take notice of it.

Article 11. These conditions aforesaid shall be common to all tribes and persons, who shall hereafter adhere thereto in the same

manner as to those who adhere to them at the time present. End of the Articles.

- (Sd.) W. GRANT KEIR,
Major-General.
- „ HASSUN BIN RAHMAH,
Sheikh of Hatt and Fahleia, formerly
of Ras-ool-Kheimah.
- „ KAZIB BIN AHMED,
Sheikh of Jourat al Kamra.
- „ SHAKBOUT,
Sheikh of Abou Dhebbes.
- „ HASSUN BIN ALI,
Sheikh of Zyah.
- „ ZAID BIN SYF,
Uncle of Sheikh Muhammad of Debay.
- „ SULTAN BIN SUGGUR,
Chief of Shargah.
- „ SYUD ABDOOL JALIL BIN SYUD YAS,
Vakeel of Sheikh Suleman bin Ahmed
and Sheikh Abdoolla bin Ahmed, of
the family of Khalifa, Sheikhs of
Bahrein.
- „ SULEMAN BIN AHMED.
- „ ABDOOLLA BIN AHMED.
- „ RASHED BIN HAMID,
Chief of Ejman.
- „ ABDOOLLA BIN RASHID,
Chief of Umm-ool-Keiweyn.

II.—TREATY OF PEACE IN PERPETUITY AGREED UPON BY THE CHIEFS OF THE ARABIAN COAST IN BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, THEIR HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS, UNDER THE MEDIATION OF THE RESIDENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1853.

Article 1. That from this date, *vis.*, 25th Rujjub 1269, 4th May, 1853, and hereafter there shall be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependants, and a perfect maritime truce shall endure between ourselves and between our successors respectively for evermore.

Article 2. That in the event—which God forbid!—of any of our subjects or dependants committing an act of aggression at sea upon the lives or property of those of any of the parties to this agreement, we will immediately punish the assailants and proceed to afford full redress upon the same being brought to our notice:

Article 8. That in the event of an act of aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement upon any of our subjects or dependants, we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation for the injury inflicted, provided that its occurrence can be satisfactorily proved.

We further agree that the maintenance of the peace now concluded amongst us shall be watched over by the British Government, who will take steps to ensure at all times the due observance of the above Articles, and God of this is the best witness and guarantee.

(Sd.)	ABDOOLLA BIN RASHED, Chief of Ummool Keiwyn.
„	HAMED BIN RASHED, Chief of Ejman.
„	SAEED BIN BUTYE, Chief of Debay.
„	SAEED BIN TAHNOON, Chief of the Beniayas.
„	SULTAN BIN SUGGAR, Chief of the Joasmees.

Approved by the Governor-General in Council on August 24, 1853.

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- See also Handbooks of this series, No. 58, *Turkey in Asia*; and No. 61, *Arabia*.

MAPS

The Persian Gulf and adjacent countries are shown on the War Office Map (G.S.G.S. 2385), scale 1:4,055,040 (1908, additions 1919). Lower Mesopotamia between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf is shown on another map (G.S.G.S. 2563), scale 1:1,000,000. Corrected to 1916. Railways revised, 1919.

*HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 4*

A U S T R I A N S I L E S I A

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EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense ; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) POSITION AND FRONTIERS

THE Duchy of Austrian Silesia comprises the two Silesian districts of Troppau (Opawa) and Teschen (Cieszyn), which remained under Austrian sovereignty after the conquest of Silesia by Frederick the Great of Prussia in 1742. The two districts are separated by a wedge-shaped northward projection of Moravia, which lies between the Oder and the Ostrawitz. The Troppau district is known as Upper or Western Silesia, the Teschen district as Lower or Eastern Silesia. The two together, with an area of 2,026 square miles, form the smallest of the Crownlands of the Austrian Empire, and lie between $49^{\circ} 25'$ and $50^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude, and between $16^{\circ} 50'$ and $19^{\circ} 5'$ east longitude.

Both districts march on their northern side with Prussian Silesia. The boundary, from a point $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles due west of Freiwaldau, runs first north-west along the Reichenstein ridge of the Sudetes, and then in a south-easterly direction as far as the Oder, making on the way a pronounced salient of some twelve miles south of Neustadt (representing the former Moravian enclave of Hotzenplotz), and from Jägerndorf onwards following the course of the Oppa, except where it includes an enlarged bridge-head opposite Troppau. East of the Oder and the Moravian wedge, the boundary follows for the most part the line of the Olsa and the Vistula (Weichsel).

On the southern side the Troppau district is bounded by Moravia, the frontier being very irregular and largely artificial, though it follows in parts the Altvater range, the upper Mohra, and the Oder. The Teschen

district is bounded on the west by Moravia, the division being the Ostrawitz; on the south by Hungary (Slovakia), where the boundary follows the Jablunka ridge of the West Beskid range; and on the east by Galicia, the division being the course of the Biala in the north, and farther south the Barania spur of the Beskids.

(2) SURFACE AND RIVER SYSTEM

Surface

In both districts of the Duchy the surface slopes downwards from the southern or south-western mountain-ridges towards the north or north-east, and the ridges send out spurs at right angles to the line of their main direction. Communications between east and west are consequently easy only for routes close to the northern edge of the Duchy, where they follow the river-courses of the Oppa, Olsa, or Vistula. Routes running north and south follow the river valleys and end in passes, which are at a high level in the north-western parts of the Troppau district, where they have to cross the High Gesenke; and also in the Teschen district, where the only considerable pass is the Jablunka. In the eastern half of the Troppau district the surface takes the form of a plateau, and presents fewer hindrances to communications. In general, communications with Prussian Silesia are easy, while contact with the rest of Austria-Hungary is rendered difficult by the mountain ranges, except in the central part of the Duchy. In the Troppau district the north-western area and the High Gesenke are purely mountain regions, and consist of rugged peaks and forest-covered valleys. The main mountain ridge follows the western frontier, the chief peaks, from west to east, being the Fichtloch (3,637 ft.), the Hirschbadkamm (3,253 ft.), and the Altvater (4,887 ft.).

A strip of country running north and south on the line Zuckmantel-Würbenthal-Engelsberg separates the High Gesenke from the Benisch and Hrabín-Wigstadt plateaux. These plateaux consist of gently undulating

country of moderate fertility, intersected by river valleys of considerable depth, and their northern and eastern edges drop steeply for some 150 ft. to the level of the Oppa and Oder valleys. The Oppa valley is the district most favourable to agriculture, and sugar-beet is extensively grown there. The Kuhländchen, i.e. the country stretching along the left bank of the Oder, is famed for the breed of cattle which bears its name.

The Teschen district is more uniform in character. South of a line running east and west through Friedek, Teschen, and Bielitz (Bielsko), the country consists of the northern slopes of the West Beskids, which are known in this section as the Jablunka Mountains. The soil is mostly poor. Forest alternates with mountain pastures, known locally as the Salasch, and with the deep valleys of torrential streams. The chief mountain peaks are those of the Lyssa Hora (4,346 ft.), in the west, and, in succession from west to east, the Jaworowy (3,385 ft.), the Great and Little Pohlom (3,470 and 3,497 ft.), the Czantory (3,264 ft.), and the Barania group in the east (3,982 ft.).

North of the Friedek-Teschen-Bielitz line the country is an undulating plain sloping downwards towards the Prussian frontier. The soil here is mostly a heavy non-porous clay, which adds to the difficulties of agriculture in a damp and cold climate.

River System

The rivers of the Duchy, which are mainly tributaries of the Oder or Vistula, rise as mountain torrents on its southern and south-western borders, and flow north or north-east.

The Oder rises in Moravia, flows through the south-eastern corner of the Troppau district, and along its eastern border to the Prussian frontier. It is here joined by the Oppa, whose chief tributaries are the Gold Oppa, which flows from the north-west to join it at Jägerndorf, and the Mohra, which flows from the south to join it just below Troppau.

In the Teschen district the chief rivers are the Ostrawitza and the Olsa, which join the Oder at Ostrau and at Oderberg respectively; the Vistula, which rises in the Barania range, flows north to the Prussian frontier at Schwarzwasser, and then eastwards to the Galician border; and the Biata, which joins the Vistula ten miles north of Bielitz.

None of the rivers of the Duchy are navigable except for small local boats.

(3) CLIMATE

The position of the Duchy on the northern flanks of the Sudetes and Beskids gives it a cold wet climate which is more favourable to forest than to agriculture. The mean annual rainfall varies between 23 and 27 inches (600 and 700 mm.) in the districts of Troppau and Wagstadt, between 27 and 31 inches (700 and 800 mm.) in the northern part of Eastern Silesia, and between 31 and 47 inches (800–1,200 mm.) in the mountain districts, being over 47 inches (1,200 mm.) on the Altvater.

The mean annual temperature is between 46° and 48° F. (8° and 9° C.), except in the central district on either side of the Moravian wedge, where it is above 48° F. (9° C.). The mean annual range of temperature in Eastern Silesia is 36° F. (20° C.).

The prevalent winds are west, and especially north-west. Violent changes of temperature are frequent, as a consequence of change of wind, especially in spring. Harvest takes place a month later than in Moravia.

(4) RACE AND LANGUAGE

Racially the Duchy is made up of three distinct areas, comprising a section of German territory in the west, one of Czecho-Slovak territory in the centre, and one of Polish territory in the east. The German territory comprises the three western political districts (*politische Bezirke*) of Freiwaldau, Freudenthal, and

Jägerndorf, with the town of Troppau and the southern part of the rural district of Troppau. In this area, which forms the greater part of Western Silesia, the Germans, who speak the Silesian dialect, number everywhere over 89 per cent. of the population.

The Czecho-Slovak territory includes in Western Silesia the northern part of the rural district of Troppau, the district of Wagstadt, and in Eastern Silesia the rural district of Friedek. Here the inhabitants are of the same race, and speak approximately the same dialect, as the Slovaks of Hungary and the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia. According to the census of 1910 they then formed 64 per cent. of the population in the district of Wagstadt, 75 per cent. in the northern part of the rural district of Troppau, and 78 per cent. in the rural district of Friedek. The minority in Wagstadt and Troppau was almost wholly German, and in Friedek consisted of Poles (15 per cent.) and Germans (7 per cent.).

The Poles occupy the rural district of Bielitz and the districts of Teschen and Freistadt, forming 77, 76, and 63 per cent. of the population respectively. The minorities consist of Germans (21, 17, and 13 per cent.) and Czecho-Slovaks (1, 6, and 23 per cent.). The town and suburbs of Bielitz, with the adjoining town of Biała in Galicia, are a German colony in Polish territory, the Germans forming 84 per cent. of the inhabitants of Bielitz, the Poles 14 per cent. The Poles do not differ in race or language from those of the adjoining districts of Galicia and Prussian Silesia.

The distribution of the different nationalities of the Duchy is thus unusually simple. The west is solidly German, with virtually no admixture of other races. The centre, i.e. the area on either side of the Moravian tongue; roughly bounded by lines drawn north-north-west and south-south-east through Troppau and Oderberg, has a Czecho-Slovak majority of some 70 per cent., while the east is predominantly Polish. Mixed populations only exist in the mining district and in a few towns.

(5) POPULATION

Distribution -

According to the census of 1910 the population was composed as follows :

	<i>German.</i>	<i>Czecho-Slovak.</i>	<i>Polish.</i>	<i>Others.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Numbers	325,523	180,348	235,224	361	741,456
Per cent	43.90	24.33	31.72	.05	100

Eastern Silesia, which covers rather less than half the area of the Duchy, contains over 57 per cent. of the population, the density of population (in 1910) being, in Eastern Silesia 493 per square mile, and in Western Silesia 290 per square mile. The densest areas are the districts of Freistadt, with 995 per square mile, and Friedek, with 554. The parts of these districts in which the coal-field is situated have a still greater density. On the whole the German parts of the Duchy are the most thinly populated, with under 300 per square mile ; the Czecho-Slovak area has from 330 to 550 per square mile ; and the Polish from 280 to 995. The Duchy as a whole, with 380 to the square mile, is the second in density of the lands of the Austrian Monarchy, being exceeded in this respect by Lower Austria alone. The population increases in density from south to north with the fall in the altitude of the country.

Towns

There were six towns with over 10,000 inhabitants in 1910, namely : Troppau, the administrative capital of the Duchy (30,762), Polish-Ostrau (22,892), Teschen (22,489), Bielitz (18,563), Jägerndorf (16,121), and Karwin (15,761). Sixteen other towns have more than 5,000 inhabitants. Only three of these twenty-two towns are independent administrative districts, viz. Troppau, Bielitz, and Friedek. The absence of large towns makes the great density of population the more remarkable.

Movement

The population of the Duchy has increased at a slightly more rapid rate in the past few decades than that of the whole Monarchy. The greater rate of increase has not been due to immigration, but to the higher rate for the excess of births over deaths among the Polish and Czecho-Slovak populations. The increase in the period 1900-10 was 76,527 persons, a rate of 11.2 per thousand per annum (17.7 for Eastern and 3.5 for Western Silesia). The annual birth-rate during the period was 37.6 per thousand, the death-rate 24.5 per thousand. Thus the excess of births over deaths was 13.1 per thousand per annum. It was highest (26) in the industrial district, and in general three times as high in the Polish and Czecho-Slovak districts (19) as in the German districts, where it was only 6.

On the whole, the Duchy lost by migration in the decade to the extent of 17,003 persons. There was thus considerably more emigration than in the previous decade, when the loss only amounted to 548 persons.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1025. Bohemian conquest of Silesia from Poland.
- 1058-79. Polish revival under Boleslav II. Reconquest of Silesia.
- 1138. Partition of Polish Crown territories.
- 1146. Deposition of Wladislav.
- 1163. Intervention of Barbarossa. Restoration of Silesia to Wladislav's sons.
- 1241. Mongol invasion ; battle of Liegnitz.
- 1290-1331. Growth of Bohemian suzerainty.
- 1424. Hussite raids on Silesia begin.
- 1448. George of Poděbrad assumes the regency of Bohemia.
- 1458. George of Poděbrad elected King of Bohemia.
- 1466. Excommunication of George of Poděbrad.
- 1469. Matthias Corvinus proclaimed King of Bohemia.
- 1471. Death of George of Poděbrad.
- 1479. Treaty of Brünn. Silesia ceded to Matthias.
- 1490. Death of Matthias Corvinus. Silesia reverts to Wladislav of Bohemia. Constitutional concessions render Silesia autonomous.
- 1526. Ferdinand of Austria elected King of Bohemia.
- 1537. Covenant of Succession between Liegnitz and Brandenburg.
- 1546. Estates of Silesia declare Covenant invalid.
- 1550. Silesia brought directly under Habsburg dominion.
- 1618-20. Bohemian revolution.
- 1621. Terms granted to Silesia by Accord of Dresden.
- 1648. Treaty of Westphalia.
- 1675. Death of Duke of Liegnitz. Claim of Elector of Brandenburg under Covenant of Succession.
- 1686. Brandenburg commutes Silesian claims for cession of Schwiebus.
- 1694. Restoration of Schwiebus. Silesian claims raised but not pressed.
- 1740. Death of Emperor Charles VI. Frederick II invades Silesia.
- 1742. Treaty of Berlin. Cession of Prussian Silesia.
- 1745. Treaty of Dresden, confirming terms of 1742.

1763. Treaty of Hubertsburg, confirming terms of 1742.

1781. Abolition of serfdom in Austrian Silesia.

1848-68. Bohemians claim reconstitution of ancient kingdom, including Austrian Silesia.

(1) EARLY HISTORY

THE history of Silesia, before its occupation by a Slav race, is purely conjectural. In the latter half of the ninth century the people of Silesia recognized the rule of Svatoplak of Moravia, who established a temporary authority over the large district extending from the Theiss in Hungary to Bohemia and Bavaria. After the fall of the Moravian Empire, Silesia, in the course of the tenth century, came partly under Poland and partly under Bohemia. In the last years of the tenth century, when the power of Bohemia decreased, the whole of Silesia fell under the dominion of Boleslav the Great of Poland. The tenth century was a crucial period in the history of Silesia, for it decided that its future was not to be linked with that of the Eastern Slavs. The influence of Polish and Bohemian conquerors tended to force Silesia into the general current of Western European history by bringing it into contact alike with the organization of the Roman Church and with the feudal constitution of the Western kingdoms. The story of Silesia in the eleventh century is connected with the continuous struggles between Poland and Bohemia and with the first German intervention. Boleslav the Great of Poland died in 1025, and the Bohemians, under Bretislav, reconquered Silesia, but the Emperor Henry III, after an expedition to Prague, compelled Bretislav to do homage for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. In the middle and end of the century there was a Polish revival under Boleslav II (1058-79), in the course of which Silesia was again recovered. It was held by the Poles against a German invasion under the Emperor Henry V in 1109.

The separate history of Silesia begins with the death of Boleslav III of Poland in 1139. He had made, in

the preceding year, a partition of the Polish territories among his four sons, and this partition soon led to the independence of Silesia and to the Germanization of the greater part of it. The eldest of the four, Wladislav, who, by his father's settlement, retained a superiority over the possessions of his brothers, was deposed by his brother Boleslav in 1146, and took refuge in Germany, where he died in 1159. By the intervention, in 1163, of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, Boleslav IV of Poland was compelled to restore Silesia to the three sons of Wladislav. One of them died soon afterwards and his share passed to his eldest brother, and Silesia became divided into the two dukedoms of Lower and Upper Silesia, with Breslau and Ratibor as their respective capitals.

(2) GROWTH OF GERMAN INFLUENCE

Both the brothers set themselves to encourage the German influence to which they owed their possessions, invited German colonists to settle in Silesia, and introduced German methods of administration. Breslau, the capital of Lower Silesia, was made a German city. German immigration continued on a large scale throughout the succeeding century, and Silesia owed to German settlers the reclamation of much waste land and the beginnings of its mining and weaving industries; but a considerable proportion of the country remained Polish in nationality and in sympathy. Industrial and agricultural development was checked in the middle of the thirteenth century by the Mongol invasion under Batu, who attacked Poland in 1241. Marching into Silesia, he defeated at Liegnitz (April 9) a large army of Poles and Germans under Henry II, Duke of Lower Silesia, and forced his way into Hungary. The opposition offered by the Silesians is regarded as having broken the force of the invasion, and as having made Silesia a rampart of the Empire; but the immediate results of the battle were disastrous, for the Mongols burned the towns and ravaged the country.

By the end of the thirteenth century, the greater part of Silesia was becoming definitely German. The ruling houses were either German in origin or had accepted the German language and customs, and Duke Henry IV of Breslau (1266-90) is remembered as one of the Minnesinger. The characteristic features of its history in the fourteenth century are the constant subdivisions of territory on the death of a duke, and the establishment of intimate relations with the Luxemburg kings of Bohemia. In the course of the century, Lower Silesia came to be divided into nine principalities—Brieg, Breslau, Liegnitz, Schweidnitz, Jauer, Münsterberg, Glogau, Steinau, and Öls; and Upper Silesia into eight principalities—Kosel, Teschen, Beuthen, Falkenberg, Oppeln, Strehlitz, Ratibor, and Troppau. The last named was originally a Bohemian fief, united to Upper Silesia about 1340; the district of Jägerndorf was detached from it about twenty-five years later. To these lay principalities has to be added the episcopal principality of Neisse; and in 1428 an additional principality—Sagan—was created in Lower Silesia. These subdivisions brought about internal conflicts and disorder, and they explain, to some extent, the growing dependence of Silesia upon the German rulers of Bohemia; another part of the explanation is to be found in the differences between the German and the Polish populations of the province, and in the desire of the Germanized Dukes of Silesia to obtain German protection against the reviving power of Poland. In 1327 the princes of Upper Silesia and the Duke of Breslau took oaths of fealty to John of Bohemia; and within four years the large majority of the princes of Lower Silesia followed their example. From 1331 to 1742 Silesia was almost continuously a province of Bohemia, in feudal subjection to the Bohemian Crown. Under King John and the Emperor Charles IV, the Bohemian connexion was strengthened by the marriage of Charles IV to the heiress of Schweidnitz and Jauer, and by the transference or lapse of some of the small Silesian principalities to the Bohemian Crown. By the

end of the fourteenth century, Silesia, with Moravia and Lusatia, had become, constitutionally, Crown lands. Until the outbreak of the Hussite wars, the dependence of Silesia upon Bohemia was of great advantage to the country, both in the establishment of an ordered government and in the development of trade and industry.

(3) HUSSITE WARS

At the outbreak of the Hussite wars, German Silesia was faithful to the German Sigismund, and supplied him with troops; and, when the Hussite leader, Procopius, began, about 1424, his series of offensive operations, Silesia was frequently invaded and ravaged. After the death of Procopius in the course of the civil war which developed among the Hussites, the Bohemians in 1436 acknowledged Sigismund's authority; but the Emperor's death in 1437 again created a situation in which the interests of the ruling classes in Silesia were antagonistic to a national movement in Bohemia. Sigismund's son-in-law, Albert of Austria, was elected King by the Bohemian Estates, but he died within two years, leaving a posthumous son Ladislas.

(4) CZECH REVIVAL

The infant was, in turn, elected to the throne, but a strong national leader, George of Poděbrad, began to revive the national spirit of the Czechs. In 1448, George of Poděbrad led an army to Prague and assumed the regency, and, after the death of Ladislas, he was elected King in 1458. The province of Silesia was, therefore, under the rule of a Czech monarch. The position was not resented by the Silesian Poles; and, as the Papacy recognized the election and the Moravians offered no resistance, the German Silesians were unable to do more than make ineffectual protests, although Breslau obstinately declined to acknowledge the authority of George of Poděbrad. While George of Poděbrad succeeded in

maintaining peaceful relations with the Papacy and with Matthias Corvinus, the King of Hungary, the permanent submission of Silesia to Czech rule remained a possibility of the situation. But in 1466 George was excommunicated by Pope Paul II; and Matthias Corvinus gave his support to the party in Bohemia which wished to bring about a complete reunion with the Papacy. In the war which followed, the German Silesians rebelled against King George, who was supported by the non-German population. When Matthias invaded Moravia and was proclaimed King of Bohemia and Moravia at Olmütz in 1469, the German Silesians welcomed an opportunity of escaping from Czech rule and acknowledged the authority of Matthias. George died in 1471, and the national party in Bohemia elected Wladislav (Ladislaus), son of Casimir IV of Poland. The struggle which ensued lasted for some seven years, during which there was civil war between the Germans and the Poles in Silesia. The German party temporarily triumphed, for, in accordance with a compromise made at Olmütz in 1478 and confirmed by the Treaty of Brunn (1479), the provinces of Silesia, Moravia, and Lusatia were ceded for his lifetime to Matthias, who, in turn, recognized the authority of Wladislav in Bohemia.

The administration of Matthias Corvinus marks an era in the constitutional history of Silesia. He established a Diet of princes and instituted an efficient central government, confiscating, as Charles IV had done, the lands of rebellious feudatories. These measures, and the financial exactions which accompanied them, were productive of much discontent; and when, on the death of Matthias in 1490, Silesia passed again to the Bohemian Crown, the nobles obtained from Wladislav a number of concessions which made Silesia practically autonomous. The Estates received the right of regular session; and among the privileges conceded were exemption from compulsory military service outside Silesia and freedom from arbitrary taxation. These privileges were retained under Wladi-

slav's son and successor, Louis, King of Bohemia and Hungary (1516-26). The death of Louis, in a Turkish war in 1526, brought Silesia again under German rule, for the Bohemians elected as their sovereign the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria (afterwards the Emperor Ferdinand I), a brother-in-law of Louis. Silesia thus became part of the Habsburg dominions; but the events of the whole period from the outbreak of the Hussite wars had accentuated the differences between Poles, Czechs, and Germans in Silesia, and had given confidence and some unity to the non-German elements.

(5) SILESIA IN THE REFORMATION

At the date of the accession of Ferdinand to the Bohemian throne, the Reformation struggle had already begun. During the Hussite wars German Silesians had been the devoted upholders of the Papal cause and of the unity of the Church; but, when the reformed doctrines came to them from German sources and ceased to be associated with Czech nationalism, these doctrines made many converts, and, before the death of Louis II in 1526, the Reformed Church had obtained a strong hold in Silesia. Difficulties in Hungary and the Turkish menace prevented Ferdinand from taking any strong measures of repression at the time of his accession; and the growth of Protestantism continued undisturbed. At the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War in 1546, the Silesians, who had borne their share of the struggle against the Turks, declined Ferdinand's request to supply troops for the Imperialist army, and, in common with their Bohemian fellow Protestants, showed symptoms of insurrection. After the Imperial victory at Mühlberg, Ferdinand levied heavy fines on the Silesian duchies. Protestantism was protected by the general settlement made at Augsburg; but the Counter-Reformation began to influence Silesia, and Jesuit missions were encouraged by Ferdinand. Important constitutional changes were made after the war. The ancient ecclesiastical dependence upon the recently secularized

Archbishopric of Magdeburg, which from the fourteenth century had encouraged German influences in Silesia, was abolished and replaced by an appeal court at Prague. The privileges granted by Wladislaw to the Silesian Estates were so greatly restricted as practically to disappear; and the right of refusing to serve beyond the Silesian borders, which involved a claim to decide on questions of foreign policy, was withdrawn. A new financial organization brought the country directly under the Bohemian Crown, and from 1550 Silesia was actually governed by the Habsburgs. Under the mild rule of Maximilian II, Protestantism suffered more from internal dissensions than from persecution; but, with the accession of Rudolf II in 1576, a policy of repression began and led to considerable trouble in Silesia, in the course of which Troppau was placed under the ban of the Empire. The revolt of Rudolf's brother, Matthias, made it necessary for the Emperor to obtain the support of the Bohemians; and in 1609 he issued *Majestätsbriefe* for Bohemia and Silesia, permitting freedom of conscience. The common danger to Protestantism had united Bohemians and Silesians and removed the recollection of ancient jealousies; and in the final crisis of Rudolf's reign they acted together in deposing Rudolf and electing Matthias (1612).

(6) BOHEMIAN REVOLT

In the troubles of the short reign of Matthias, Silesia followed the fortunes of Bohemia; and the failure of the Bohemian Protestants in 1617 to resist the acknowledgement of the bigoted Ferdinand of Styria as the heir to the Bohemian Crown was followed by his recognition by the Estates of Silesia. In the following year the Bohemian Protestants rebelled, and the Silesian Estates threw in their lot with the revolutionaries. The attitude of Silesia was largely determined by John George, Duke of Jägerndorf, whose claim to the duchy, based on the will of George Frederick, son of Margrave George the Pious of Anspach (cf. *infra*, p. 17), was dis-

puted by the Emperor. The Bohemian revolution collapsed in 1620; and the Silesians appealed for terms to the Elector of Saxony, who had been entrusted with the reduction of the province. The conditions granted, which were by no means oppressive, were embodied in the Accord of Dresden (February 1621), an agreement to which, on account of its mildness, the consent of the Emperor was somewhat reluctantly given. John George was, however, excepted from the general amnesty, and his duchy was confiscated.

In spite of the agreement arrived at by the Accord of Dresden, Silesia was not destined to enjoy peace. The district remained a cockpit of contending forces till near the end of the Thirty Years' War. The sufferings of Silesia in the years 1618-48 can easily be understood from the descriptions given by German historians of the atrocities committed by the armies; and its industry, especially the mines, did not recover from the effects of the war for a very long period.

By the Treaty of Westphalia, Silesia passed, with Bohemia, under the rule of the Imperial House. The Emperor Ferdinand III granted, by the treaty, to the Duchies of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Öls, and to the city of Breslau, the religious liberties enjoyed before the war, and he also promised some measure of toleration to Protestantism throughout the province.

The promises made at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia were not generously interpreted, or even honourably observed; and Silesian Protestants suffered from repressive measures until 1707, when Charles XII of Sweden, in making the Treaty of Altranstadt with the Emperor Joseph I, intervened on their behalf.

(7) HOHENZOLLERN CLAIMS

But the only political importance of Silesian history during the years from 1648-1740 lies in the development of the Brandenburg claims upon portions of the province. At the date of the Treaty of Westphalia, the House of Brandenburg had a shadowy claim upon the

Duchies of Ratibor and Oppeln. To understand this it is necessary to go back to the reigns of Wladislav and Louis in the sixteenth century. George the Pious, Margrave of Anspach, was a favourite nephew of Wladislav, and acted as tutor to the future King Louis. Having certain pecuniary claims over some of his uncle's Hungarian possessions, he commuted these for a promise of the succession to the childless Dukes of Ratibor and Oppeln, whose goodwill he succeeded in obtaining to the arrangement, though Wladislav had no right to make it. Though Ferdinand, on his succession to Louis in 1526, seems to have given some sort of confirmation to the scheme, the Margrave's right to the duchies had never been fully admitted; and in 1546, after the Silesian disaffection at the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War, George Frederick, the successor of George the Pious, was deprived by Ferdinand of all authority over the duchies, which were held to have escheated to the Crown. In the course of the Thirty Years' War they had more than once been used as inducements to obtain assistance for the Imperial cause. The claim to these duchies by the House of Brandenburg, being based on the title of George Frederick, was accordingly very doubtful. George Frederick had, however, purported to leave these duchies, together with that of Jägerndorf, to the Elector of Brandenburg by will.

The claim to Jägerndorf, though certainly open to question, was more substantial. This duchy was purchased by George the Pious in 1524, but it was doubtful whether his enfeoffment could include persons who were not direct descendants; and on this ground the will of George Frederick, in so far as it dealt with Jägerndorf, had been disputed by the Emperor. The duchy was, however, actually held in conformity with the terms of the will until Duke John George was placed under the ban of the Empire for his share in the Bohemian Revolution (1622) and his duchy confiscated. Efforts to secure Jägerndorf for Brandenburg at Westphalia were fruitless; but the Great Elector had asserted his

right of succession on the death of Ernest, the only son of John George, in 1642, and he continued to maintain his claim to the duchy.

The death, in 1675, of George William, Duke of Liegnitz, Wohlau, and Brieg, furnished the Great Elector with new claims in Silesia. In 1537 Frederick II, Duke of Liegnitz, who had married one of the daughters of George the Pious, made with the House of Brandenburg a Covenant of Succession, by which, if the heirs of Frederick should fail, the Silesian Duchies of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau should pass to the House of Brandenburg, and similarly the Bohemian territories of Brandenburg on failure of heirs should pass to the House of Liegnitz. Such an agreement was obviously incompatible with the state of Liegnitz as a fief of the Bohemian Crown; and the arrangement was repudiated by the Emperor Charles V and King Ferdinand. In 1546 the Estates of Silesia examined the deed; it was declared invalid, and Ferdinand ordered the destruction of both the Liegnitz and Brandenburg copies. The Liegnitz copy was destroyed, but the Brandenburg copy was preserved, in defiance of Imperial orders; and, on the death of George William, the Great Elector put forward his claim, again defying the Emperor Leopold, who asked him to give up the document. The Great Elector offered to commute the new claims for Jägerndorf, but failed to obtain this concession, and, in revenge, he entered into close relations with France. In 1682, when Vienna was threatened by the Turks, the Great Elector offered to send a force; and, on the Emperor's declining the offer, the troops were sent to occupy the Silesian duchies claimed by Brandenburg.

Four years afterwards, a reconciliation with the Emperor still further complicated the question of the Brandenburg claims in Silesia. The Great Elector agreed to abandon all his Silesian claims for the cession of the Circle of Schwiebus, part of the Duchy of Glogau, which had been escheated to the Bohemian Crown in the end of the fifteenth century. He was placed in

possession of the territory, which, from 1686 to 1694, was included in the Brandenburg possessions. But his son, the Electoral Prince Frederick, was on bad terms with the Elector, and he entered into a secret agreement to return the territory to Austria, on his own accession to Brandenburg, either in the hope of conferment of the royal dignity upon Brandenburg-Prussia or as part of an arrangement for the repudiation of the will which the Great Elector was believed to have made. The Great Elector died in 1688; and, after some years of negotiation, the Circle of Schwiebus was restored. The Elector Frederick III took the opportunity of insisting that the restoration *ipso facto* revived the original claims to Liegnitz, Brieg, Wohlau, and Jägerndorf; but the justice of this assertion was not admitted by the Emperor, who, indeed, insisted that every Hohenzollern claim in Silesia was invalidated by the circumstance that neither Margrave George the Pious nor Duke Frederick II of Liegnitz possessed any power of conferring the succession on any one not descended from themselves. Jägerndorf, Liegnitz, Brieg, Wohlau, Oppeln, and Ratibor had all, in the view of the Emperor, escheated to the Bohemian Crown, as many other Silesian principalities had done. The circumstance that Hohenzollern tenacity had insisted on a repeated assertion of the claims could not give any validity to them.

From the restoration of Schwiebus in 1694 to the death of the Emperor Charles VI in October 1740, the Hohenzollern pretensions were in abeyance; and King Frederick William I of Prussia paid, in 1732, a visit to Charles VI, in the course of which he was entertained, as the Emperor's guest, in Liegnitz and Jägerndorf. Frederick William I had died six months before the Emperor; and his successor, Frederick II, immediately on receiving the news of the death of Charles VI, determined on an invasion of Silesia. Prussia, like the rest of the Empire, had accepted the Pragmatic Sanction; and Frederick II had, in point of fact, much stronger claims upon the Duchies of Berg and Jülich than on

Silesia. But he had no intention of observing the pledge given by his father to acknowledge the succession of Maria Theresa ; and an attack upon the Rhine duchies was certain to lead to difficulties with France and Holland, while Silesia lay at his mercy.

(8) SILESIAN WARS

It is unnecessary to give more than a very brief outline of the Silesian wars. When Frederick demanded his 'rights', Maria Theresa refused ; but, without waiting for a reply, he proceeded to invade Silesia, asserting pretexts about dangers from Saxony and Bavaria, which he afterwards disavowed in his *Memoirs*. Frederick marched up the Oder to Breslau, which capitulated (January 2, 1741) ; and except for resistance from the hastily defended fortresses of Brieg, Glogau, and Neisse, little or no opposition was made to the invaders. Glogau was captured on March 9, but an Austrian army relieved Neisse early in April and was marching on Brieg when Frederick defeated it at Mollwitz (April 10). Brieg fell in May ; and Maria Theresa, threatened by a new enemy, had to withdraw her troops from Silesia in October. The new enemy was France, with which Frederick had made an offensive alliance by the Treaty of Breslau (June 1741). The rest of the fighting of the campaign was in Bohemia ; and Frederick was left to seize the Silesian strongholds. By the Peace of Breslau in June 1742 (confirmed at Berlin in July), Maria Theresa ceded to Frederick Upper and Lower Silesia, exclusive of Troppau and Teschen, and, in addition, the district of Glatz ; and the King of Prussia, in return, deserted his French, Bavarian, and Saxon allies. The acquiescence of Maria Theresa in the loss of Silesia was understood to be only temporary ; and in 1744 Frederick again made an alliance with France and with Bavaria and other German States. In the second Silesian War, Frederick invaded Bohemia and captured Prague (August 1744), but had to retire into Silesia, followed

by an Austrian army, which, however, was soon driven back into Bohemia by the difficulties of a winter campaign. In the summer of 1745 a second Austrian invasion of Silesia was repelled by Frederick's victory at Hohenfriedberg (May); and the Prussians again entered Bohemia. They defeated the Austrians at Sohr in September, and Frederick gained a third victory at Hennersdorf in November. At Christmas 1745, in return for the recognition of his Silesian possessions, Frederick acknowledged Francis I, the husband of Maria Theresa, as Emperor.

The recovery of Silesia was one of the objects of Maria Theresa in making the alliance with France which is known as the Diplomatic Revolution; and Frederick had to defend his booty in the Seven Years' War. When, however, hostilities ceased, the Austrians held Glatz, but no other part of Silesia. The Treaty of Hubertusburg (February 15, 1763) restored the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin of 1745; and the Prussians were left in possession of the whole of Silesia, except the districts of Troppau and Teschen, which included the larger part of Jägerndorf.

Austria, while maintaining up to the present time the use of the old term, Upper and Lower Silesia, to describe the mutilated fragment left to her, has never made any military effort to recover the province. Suggestions for the restoration of the whole of Silesia were, however, made during the Napoleonic Wars; and so recently as 1866, in the negotiations between Austria and France which preceded the Austro-Prussian War, the Emperor Francis Joseph made the recovery of Silesia one of the objects of a proposed alliance with Napoleon III.

(9) AUSTRIAN SILESIA AFTER 1742

The territory ceded by Maria Theresa to Frederick II was 'all Silesia, except Teschen and the district beyond the River Oppa and the high mountains'. The formula was not without ambiguity, but the

boundary commissions appointed by Frederick II were not disturbed by any Austrian opposition. The small Silesian province has been regarded, since 1742, as an Austrian, not as a Bohemian, province; and in the administrative reorganization carried out by the Emperor Joseph II soon after his accession, it was united with Moravia to form one of the thirteen Departments of the Empire. During his mother's lifetime, Joseph, who shared the responsibilities of government with Maria Theresa, had obtained her consent, in 1773, to the adoption of measures designed to improve the condition of the peasants; and the steps then taken had been the occasion of serious peasant risings in Silesia and the neighbouring districts. But in 1781, when he was sole ruler, he abolished serfdom in Silesia, Moravia, and Bohemia.

Since that date, the history of the province presents no special features, except in 1848 and 1868. In the former year the Bohemians included among the revolutionary demands sent to Vienna the reconstitution of the ancient Bohemian kingdom, including Silesia and Moravia. The claim met the fate of most of the other national and democratic attempts of that year, but it was revived twenty years afterwards. In the interval the constitutions of 1861 and 1867 had given Silesia representatives in the Austrian Reichsrat, but this entirely failed to satisfy Bohemian aspirations; and in October 1868 the national party, during a visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph to Prague, again asked for the revival of the old kingdom. Silesia had in the rearrangements after 1848 become a separate province; and German influence was sufficiently strong in the provincial Diet to obtain a majority against the Bohemian national programme. The Moravian Diet adopted the same attitude. After the suppression of the Bohemian revolt in 1868-9, the question of the relations of Austrian Silesia to Bohemia did not again arise as a matter of practical politics.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) POLITICAL

POLITICAL conditions in Austrian Silesia are complicated by racial distribution and by the Czech claim that the province is part of the old Bohemian kingdom. The census of 1910 showed that there are three large racial groups. Comparison with the census of 1900 shows that while German and Czecho-Slovak elements are increasing the numbers of the Poles have diminished. Other nationalities (Ruthenian, Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian, and Italian) number only 361 individuals in all. The Poles have maintained, through the many centuries of their separation from the Polish kingdom, a strong sense of nationality and of their community of interest with the Poles elsewhere, and the Czechs have a similar feeling towards the Bohemians. These racial differences are marked both in the provincial Diet and in the selection of the twelve Silesian members of the Reichsrat. For administrative purposes, Silesia is divided into nine government districts, with three autonomous towns—Bielitz, Friedek, and the capital, Troppau.

(2) RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL

An overwhelming proportion (nearly 85 per cent.) of the inhabitants of Austrian Silesia are Roman Catholics. The Protestants number only about 14 per cent., nearly all Poles, and 1 per cent. are Jews. There is an adequate supply of educational facilities, provided by 21 Bürgerschulen (primary schools), 7 Ober-gymnasia, 4 Oberrealschulen, 10 Handelsschulen, and Agricultural and Technical Colleges. Of the higher grade schools the Germans have the greatest number in proportion to their population, and the Poles the smallest.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Introductory Note.—Austrian Silesia is 1,987 square miles in extent—almost the size of Northumberland. Its area is 1·7 per cent. of that of all Austria (115,851 square miles), and 9·9 per cent. of that of Bohemia (20,058 square miles). This latter ratio affords a simple index of value when a comparison is made between the absolute figures of production in Austrian Silesia and Bohemia respectively. The population of Austrian Silesia is 2·6 per cent. of the population of all Austria, and is relatively dense, viz. 148 to the square kilometre, as compared with the corresponding figures for Bohemia (130) and for all Austria (105); while the last census showed, for the previous ten years, a greater increase (10·9 per cent.) than that of Austria as a whole (8·6 per cent.) or of Bohemia (7·5 per cent.).

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(a) *Roads and Canals*

Austrian Silesia has more roads to the 100 square kilometres than any other province of Austria, viz. 76·7 kilometres, as compared with 63·7 in Bohemia and 40·4 in all Austria. In waterways, however, it is remarkably poor, and compares unfavourably with Bohemia. It has to the 100 square kilometres only 27 kilometres of waterway fit for boats and none fit for steamers.

The construction of the Elbe, Oder, Danube, and Vistula canals will of course alter this, as the Oder will then be linked up with the canal from Pardubitz to Prerau. Indeed, although the Oder is not an easy river to canalize, since at certain places, e. g. Oderberg, it is liable to flood, a beginning has already been made.

In 1911 the authorities in Prussian Silesia, tired of waiting for the great canal system which had been promised so long, were making the river navigable for vessels of 150 tons as far as Ratibor, some 25 kilometres from the Austrian Silesian frontier. When the canal schemes are carried out, Austrian Silesia will be in the centre of the system, and the industries of the province will certainly be benefited. It will then be possible, for instance, for the coal of Austrian Silesia to be sold to Hungary at a lower price, owing to the facilities for cheap transport afforded by the Danube-Oder Canal.

(b) *Railways*

As part of the Austrian State Railway system (there are no private lines) the railways of Austrian Silesia call for little comment. The network is less dense (1 km. to 8·18 sq. km.) than in Bohemia (1 km. to 7·7 sq. km.), but denser than in Moravia (1 km. to 10·57 sq. km.), and sometimes it is insufficient for the carrying needs of the community; in 1907, to take one instance, the output of the Austrian Alpine Mining Company's coal-mine at Orlau was restricted by congestion on the Ferdinands Nordbahn.

The system possesses one striking feature. Oderberg, just within the Austrian frontier, is the junction at which several long stretches of double lines (the only 'through' double lines in this section of Europe) intersect, viz. the lines from Berlin to Vienna *via* Breslau, from Berlin to Hungary, from Vienna to Warsaw and Petrograd, and from Vienna to Cracow and Lemberg. This cannot fail to influence the commercial and industrial future of Austrian Silesia. Even now the province is visited by a relatively larger number of travellers than Bohemia and Moravia, and this in spite of the fashionable 'cure' resorts of Bohemia, which are responsible for a large influx of visitors thither.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) LABOUR

In this part of Austria, as in Bohemia, the number of persons engaged in agriculture has shown a decline of recent years, while the number of those engaged in industrial pursuits has increased.

In 1910, 6 per cent. of the total number of persons employed were members of trade unions, the same percentage as in Bohemia and Moravia. Strikes, however, were even less frequent in Austrian Silesia than in these two other provinces.

In the coal-mines a relatively much larger number of women and children are employed than in the lignite mines of Bohemia, and the yearly wage of the coal miners in Austrian Silesia, though higher than that of coal miners in other parts of Austria, is considerably lower than that of the lignite miners in the Teplitz and Falkenau districts of Bohemia.

(2) AGRICULTURE

Austrian Silesia is less fertile than Bohemia, producing less per hectare (2.47 acres) of all the important crops, and very much less in the case of wheat and sugar-beet. Of valuable crops like sugar-beet and flax, its absolute production is very small. About half the area of the province consists of arable land and gardens, and about 12 per cent. is devoted to hay or pasture. The chief crops are oats, rye, clover, potatoes, barley, and wheat. Fruit, including the vine, is grown principally in the north-west. Domestic animals are comparatively few, but the number of goats kept is above the average for Austria. Dairy-farming is prosperous, notably in the western districts. Deer, fish, and small game are plentiful.

The following table shows the production of the principal crops in all Austria, Bohemia, and Austrian Silesia in 1911 in hundreds of metric tons :

	Wheat.	Rye.	Barley.	Oats.	Straw.	Potatoes.	Sugar-beet.	Flax (seed and fibre).
All Austria	16026	26446	16201	22700	167495	116049	42497	388
Bohemia	3670	8270	5499	6490	36450	16930	21180	108
Austrian Silesia	123	596	298	680	2840	2270	340	4

In 1913 the figures for the 'corn' (? wheat)¹ harvest were (in hundreds of metric tons): All Austria, 16,228; Bohemia, 4,837; Austrian Silesia, 140.

It is thus not to its fertility that Austrian Silesia is indebted for its relatively large population. Neither do its forest industries account for this, although in Silesia a rather larger proportion (34 per cent.) of the total area of the province is under forest than is the case in Bohemia, while the production of timber is relatively twice as great. In 1913 the forest areas were as follows: All Austria, 9,768,000 hectares; Bohemia, 1,538,000 hectares; Austrian Silesia, 179,000 hectares. Some 60 per cent. of the trees are coniferous (chiefly spruce); the remainder is, for the most part, mixed timber.

(3) MINERALS

Coal.—As the following figures show, it is to its coal-mines that Austrian Silesia owes its industrial prosperity:

NUMBER OF HANDS (INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN)²
EMPLOYED IN VARIOUS KINDS OF MINING, 1910

	Coal.	Lignite.	Iron.	Other metals.	Total.
Bohemia	22676	35899	1862	3925	64362
Moravia	12167	645	32	350	13194
Austrian Silesia	32315	3	13	5	32336
Galicia	6421	441	107	695	7644
All Austria	74112	56954	5607	10594	147287

¹ These figures agree approximately with the wheat harvest of other years. They are from the *Neue Freie Presse* of October 29, 1918.

² Cf. the figures for the population (1910) in millions: Bohemia, 6.7; Moravia, 2.6; Austrian Silesia, 0.7; all Austria, 28.7.

Austrian Silesia, with an area of one-tenth of Bohemia, has half as many hands employed in all kinds of mining, and a much larger number employed in bituminous coal-mining.

The coal-field of Austrian Silesia is part of the great Silesian field which extends in the south over the Austrian frontier to Mährisch-Ostrau and Karwin, in the east to Tenczynek in Galicia, and to Dombrova in Poland. The amount of coal in the Ostrau-Karwin basin, of which about one-third may be apportioned to Austrian Silesia (the rest being in Moravia), is estimated at 3,700,000,000 tons.

The Austrian coal has to be got at a lower depth, and is therefore more expensive to mine than the Prussian coal; it is also of lower calorific value and is not so good for house use as the Prussian coal, much of which is sent to Vienna. On the other hand, the Austrian coal is better for coking. This is important, as the Polish coal is non-coking, and Poland has to import considerable quantities of coke from Prussia and Austria for smelting iron ore; this import of coke into Poland has increased largely of recent years, although, owing to the development of the Dombrova field, the import of coal has largely decreased. The following figures give the production of coke in 1910 in Austrian Silesia, compared with that in Bohemia and Moravia (in metric tons): Austrian Silesia, 1,325,913; Bohemia, 44,519; Moravia, 1,492,731.

The production of pit-coal in 1913 was approximately as follows (in millions of metric tons): All Austria, 16.4; Bohemia, 4.4; Moravia, 2.3; Austrian Silesia, 7.6. Of lignite Austrian Silesia produced only 1,200 tons.

Austrian Silesia has not sufficient coal for its own needs, and imports largely from Prussian Silesia. In 1917 Dzieditz, the chief receiving station, took 400,000 tons; Oderberg, Bielitz, Jägerndorf, and other towns also took large quantities.

Iron.—The production of iron ore in Austrian Silesia is small, and the Trzviets smelting and rolling works

use Swedish, Hungarian, Bukovinian, Spanish, and other ores. In 1913 Austrian Silesia produced 169,900 tons of pig-iron, or nearly one-tenth of the whole output for all Austria.

Coal and Iron Companies.—The Austrian Mining and Smelting Company (capital (German), 35,000,000 kn.) has smelting works, steel works, and rolling mills at Trzynietz in Austrian Silesia, and mines iron ore in Hungary. It also has coal-mines and coking furnaces at Karwin, Peterswald, and Oderfurt. It acquired shares in a coal-mining company at Mährisch-Ostrau (Moravia) in 1910, and in 1912 in a Swedish iron-ore company. The Trzynietz mills employed 2,800 hands and produced 169,060 tons¹ of pig-iron in 1913. The company's output (in metric tons) was in 1911 as follows:

<i>Coal.</i>	<i>Coke.</i>	<i>Pig-iron.</i>	<i>Ingots.</i>	<i>Rolled Steel.</i>
1524900	441700	117400	138900	101400

The Ostrau Mining Company (capital (German), 6,000,000 kn.) has offices at Brünn, and a coal-mine at Polnisch-Ostrau. It employed 1,680 hands, and produced 481,565 tons of coal and 60,000 tons of coke in 1913. It exports to Germany, Russia, and Hungary.

The Freistadt Steel and Iron Works (capital (German-Czech), 3,000,000 kn.) have greatly enlarged their works since 1914.

The Austrian Alpine Mining Company (of Vienna) is a large concern, with mines, smelting furnaces, and machine factories in many places; among them, coal-mines at Orlau and Polnisch-Ostrau. Its production in Austrian Silesia in 1907 was 78,900 tons² of coal and iron ore.

The Wicczek-Ostrau Coal and Coke Company employed 3,161 hands in 1913; its production was: coal 673,100 tons, coke 72,540 tons, and sulphate of ammonia 955 tons.

¹ This amount only falls short of the whole output for Austrian Silesia in 1913 by 840 tons.

² The total output of this company in 1913 (a year of depression) was 3 million tons of coal and iron ore.

Other mineral products include some marble (near Friedeberg and Freiwaldau), an abundance of limestone and building stone, and numerous mineral springs.

(4) MANUFACTURES

The industries of the province of Silesia account for 6·37 per cent. of the total boiler-heating surface used in all the industrial establishments of Austria (as compared with 44·83 per cent. used in Bohemia and 15·98 per cent. in Moravia). This is a large percentage for its area, and points to a relatively intense industrial activity. Apart from coal production this activity is to be found chiefly in the textile industries of the province. The total number of factories in 1913 was 677, more than one-third of the number in Moravia, a province of four times the area.

(a) *Textiles*¹

The *woollen industry* is centred at Jägerndorf and Bielitz. Jägerndorf has 24 mills employing an aggregate of 4,540 hands; Bielitz, 18 mills employing 3,400 hands. Troppau has one cloth mill with head-quarters in Vienna.

As regards the *cotton industry*, Freudenthal has 3 mills employing 2,100 hands; Friedek, 8 mills, 2,700 hands.

For *linens and flax-spinning* Freudenthal has 5 mills employing 1,920 hands; Freiwaldau employs 3,000 hands.

For *jute-spinning and rope-making* Bielitz has 2 mills employing 862 hands; Troppau, 1 mill (800 hands) belonging to the United Jute Mills of Vienna, Budapest, and Prague. Jägerndorf has one rope mill employing 120 hands.

The following table gives the approximate number of hands employed in textile production in Austrian Silesia :

¹ The figures and data refer to the period immediately preceding the war.

Town.	Population.	Cottons.	Woollens.	Linens.
Bielitz	18568	—	3400	—
Jägerndorf	16120	—	4540	—
Freudenthal	under 10000	2100	—	1920
Freiwalldau	" "	—	—	3000
Friedek	" "	2700	—	—

It is clear that though the aggregate production of textiles in Austrian Silesia is small, it is intensive relatively to the population of its towns: thus, small places like Freudenthal and Friedek have a larger number of cotton operatives than the larger towns of Reichenberg and Königshof in Bohemia. Bielitz and Jägerndorf again have a relatively larger number of woollen operatives than Brünn and Neutitschein in Moravia or Asch in Bohemia.

(b) Other Manufactures

Machinery.—Troppau has eight factories employing 930 hands; Jägerndorf, four factories with 550 hands, producing weaving, washing, and drying machines. In Freiwalldau there is one factory which produces agricultural machinery.

Chemical Works, Oil Refineries, &c.—The Petrowitz Chemical Works, with 380 hands, makes sulphuric acid and artificial manures. At Oderberg the Mineral Oil Refinery, with 380 hands, produced in 1913 53,310 tons of refined petroleum, paraffin, and asphalt. Two dye-works at Bielitz employ 450 hands.

Beet Sugar.—The production of this is insignificant—about 3 per cent. of the output of all Austria, as compared with the 33 per cent. of Moravia and the 52 per cent. of Bohemia. In 1913 all Austria produced 1,107,000 metric tons, of which Silesia's share was 34,000 tons.

Brewing and Distilling.—In comparison with the production of Bohemia (47·22 per cent. of the Austrian beer output), that of Austrian Silesia (2·7 per cent.) is almost negligible, but the distilling industry which is made possible by the large potato crop is relatively

considerable. The following figures (in millions of hectolitres) refer to the year 1913 :

Beer : All Austria, 21·0 ; Bohemia, 9·9 ; Moravia, 1·5 ; Silesia, 0·57.

Spirits : All Austria, 1·6 ; Bohemia, 0·46 ; Moravia, 0·19 ; Silesia, 0·09.

(C) COMMERCE

The chief towns and the principal branches of trade have already been indicated in the foregoing sections, particularly in that which deals with manufactures. There is a Chamber of Commerce at Troppau, which, as the capital of the province, with a population of 30,000, is the head-quarters of a considerable number of grain and machinery firms and general merchants. Timber and wool are sold at Bielitz ; cloth and raw produce (including coal) are the chief articles of merchandise at Jägerndorf, grain and yarn at Freudenthal, steel tools and raw produce at Friedek, and wooden wares at Freiwaldau. Teschen, a town of 22,000 inhabitants, has a considerable trade in leather, wool, iron, and wines. Mineral springs have turned Gräfenberg, Karlsbrunn, Lindewiese, and Ustron into thriving watering-places.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The following table shows the share of Austrian taxation borne by the province of Silesia in 1912 :¹

	<i>All Austria.</i>	<i>Silesia.</i>
	<i>Millions of Kronen.</i>	
Taxes on Real Property	171,774	3,139
Taxes on Personal Property	232,260	5,815
Total gross income subject to personal taxes. . .	5,960,596	143,930
Yield of Excise Taxes :		
<i>Spirits</i>	100,633	4,583
<i>Beer</i>	85,496	2,218
<i>Sugar</i>	164,622	6,113
Total yield of all excise taxes	420,216	18,466

¹ In the same year the totals for Moravia were : Real property tax, 13·9 ; Personal taxes, 17·4 ; Excise, 86·1 million kn.

(2) *Banking*

Austrian Silesia has 0·27 per cent. of the share capital of Austrian banks, as contrasted with the 1·7 per cent. of the Moravian, and the 23·35 per cent. of the Bohemian banks ; and 61,000 depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank as contrasted with Bohemia's 480,767.

The *Austro-Hungarian Bank* has branches at Teschen, Friedek, Jägerndorf, Troppau, and Bielitz.

The *Central Bank of the German Savings Banks* has branches at Bielitz, Freudenthal, Freistadt, Freiwaldau, Friedek, Friedeberg, Friedland, Jägerndorf, Teschen, and Troppau.

The *Austrian Silesian Land Credit Institution* at Troppau—founded 1869—does not carry on business for profit.

The *Communal Credit Institution of the Kingdom of Silesia* at Troppau is under the control of the Land Credit Institution.

The *Vienna Banking Company* (*Wiener Bankverein*) has branches at Bielitz, Friedek, Jägerndorf, and Teschen.

The *Imperial Credit Institution for Trade and Industry* has a branch at Troppau, as also have the *Böhmische Union Bank*, the *Austrian Industry and Trade Bank*, and the *Böhmische Industrial Bank*.

The *Bielitz-Biala Trade and Industry Bank* is a branch of the *Böhmische Union Bank*.

Austrian Silesia has 24 Savings Banks, one in each considerable town. The number of savings-bank depositors per 1,000 inhabitants (140 in 1910) is a little below the average for all Austria (149), and about half of the average of the districts in which Germans are the predominant race. Distributive co-operative societies are more numerous than is usual in other parts of Austria ; they numbered 110 in 1910, a figure only exceeded by those for Bohemia and Moravia.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

The three races (Germans, Poles, and Czecho-Slovaks, which inhabit the province of Silesia occupy distinct regions, only mixing at all considerably in the mining district and in the towns of Eastern Silesia.

The administrative offices, large estates, and commercial undertakings generally are in the hands of Germans or of the Germanized nobility, who especially dominate the social and economic life of the eastern part of the province, as is the case in the eastern part of Prussian Upper Silesia.

In the Polish area large landownership and large industrial undertakings are the rule; and in 1911 the large owners and capitalists were all Germans, with apparently only a single exception. The clergy and the officials are said to be all Germans. German is the administrative language; and German representatives have an overwhelming preponderance in the provincial and local councils. The Poles of the province are almost exclusively labourers and small farmers.

The standard of living in the mountainous parts of the province is relatively low. But the population in general has a reputation for industry, the Poles and Slovaks of the hill districts being a race little if at all less thrifty than the Germans, and independent both socially and economically. In industry the Poles are usually under German management, but have a reputation for aptitude in industrial work and willingness to learn. Except in the case of the miners, the general standard of wages was formerly (1880-90) among the lowest in Austria.

In agriculture and forestry the large landowners, especially in Eastern Silesia, have taken the lead in the introduction of modern methods, and appear to have remained in advance of the small farmers, though these are now following their example. Co-operative organizations are well developed in the province,

co-operative credit banks having arisen at a fairly early date out of a system of co-operative grain-stores. There were 93 Raiffeisen societies in the province in 1911.

Trade unions had been little developed until recent years, only 6 per cent. of the workers being in unions in 1897. But in 1914 the figure had risen to 22 per cent., about 14 per cent. of the miners being then members of unions, and about half the textile workers.

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MAPS

Austrian Silesia is covered by two sheets (M. 33 Wien, M. 34 Krakau ; G.S.G.S. 2758) of the 'International' Map, published by the War Office on the scale of 1 : 1,000,000.

For Ethnography, see note on Maps in *Austria, &c*. (No. 1 of this series), p. 28.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the

EDITORIAL NOTE

sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain, or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) POSITION AND AREA

THIS archipelago, which belongs to Portugal, lies 250 miles west of Cape Verde between $14^{\circ} 47'$ and $17^{\circ} 13'$ north latitude and $22^{\circ} 40'$ and $25^{\circ} 22'$ west longitude, and consists of 14 islands and islets, which lie in two converging lines, from west-north-west to east-south-east and from west-south-west to east-north-east. The former, the Windward (Barlavento) Islands, comprise Santo Antão, San Vicente, Santa Luzia, Branco, Razo, San Nicolau, Sal and Boa Vista; the latter, the Leeward (Sotavento) Islands, comprise Brava, the Rombo Islands, Fogo, San Thiago and Maio. Their total land area is about 1,475 square miles. Between Boa Vista and Maio lies the submerged reef, Baixo de João Valente or Leitão, 17 miles long by 9 broad.

(2) SURFACE AND COASTS

The islands are all volcanic in origin and are generally arid, except in the river valleys, where there is luxuriant vegetation, especially during the rainy season. Only Fogo, however, contains an active volcano. The three islands nearest to Africa—Sal, Boa Vista and Maio—are the most barren, and their desert-like characteristics are shared by the southern side of some of the other islands, such as Santo Antão. The islands are all mountainous, and the coasts are indented. The bulk of the level ground is in Sal and Boa Vista.

Santo Antão, which has an area of 266 square miles, is the most north-westerly of the islands and is rugged

and mountainous. In the south-west is a volcanic plateau about 5,000 ft. high, and a range of mountains extends east-north-east across the island, the northern side of which is well watered and fertile.

San Vicente, which has an area of 84 square miles, is triangular in shape, the sides being composed of volcanic ranges. The highest point is Monte Verde (2,483 ft.), in the north-east. On the north-west side is the bay of Porto Grande. The interior of the island is occupied by the wide valley of the Ribeira Julião, which flows into the Porto Grande. The harbour of Mindello, on the Porto Grande, is an important coaling station.

Santa Luzia has an area of 10 square miles. The principal range of hills runs north-west and south-east, the highest points being Monte Grande (1,209 ft.) and Monte Creoulo. The coast is mostly high and unapproachable, but there is a good harbour on the south-west.

Branco is a small waterless uninhabited island two miles long and half a mile broad.

Razo (or *Rodonda*), three miles farther south-east, is five miles in circuit. Both these islands have inaccessible coasts.

San Nicolau has an area of 134 square miles. It is of an irregular shape, with a narrow projection 14 miles long extending east of the mountain-core, with a short range radiating to the south. In the centre of the island is a volcanic mass of which the highest point is Monte Gordo (about 4,369 ft.). North of Monte Gordo are the two steep pyramidal cones of Monte Martinez (about 4,000 ft.). The coast is rocky, especially on the north side; it contains several bays. San Nicolau is more fertile than the islands previously mentioned.

Sal, which has an area of 86 square miles, is mainly flat with detached cones in the north, of which the

chief is Monte Grande (1,340 ft.). Most of the surface is stony and desert. There are many small harbours along all the shores, which render any part of the island accessible.

Boa Vista, with an area of 235 square miles, resembles Sal in its general characteristics, but is less flat. A range of volcanic hills, the Serra do Norte, runs north and south, dividing the island into two nearly equal parts; on each side are isolated hills parted by valleys. The range terminates with the Pico d'Estancia (about 1,235 ft.). The island during the dry season is an arid waste. The shores consist of sandy beaches with rocky points between them. The west coast has three anchorages, the best being the port of Sal Rei.

Maio is 50 miles south of Boa Vista, and has an area of 82 square miles. It is similar to the last two islands in possessing level and sterile tracts of country, and produces a large amount of salt. On the north-east and east sides is a range of hills rising to about 1,200 ft. The coast on this side is mostly rocky, but the other sides are low and sandy. Water is very scarce.

San Thiago, with an area of 358 square miles, is the largest and most populous of the islands. Three ranges of volcanic mountains cross the island from east to west and are separated by plains of varying width. In the south is the long ridge of Malagueta (about 4,000 ft. high), and still farther south is the elevated plateau of the Achada Falcão, which terminates with the Pico Antonia (about 4,500 ft.). The island contains numerous ravines with perennial streams. The east side is cliffy with many indentations; the west is partly sandy and partly rocky.

Fogo has an area of 187 square miles. It is nearly circular and consists principally of the great stratified volcano, Pico do Cano, the highest summit of the Cape Verde Islands and the only active volcano in the

group (about 8,800 ft.). Its cone stands upon a level surface, the Chão, itself 5,000 ft. high. The north side of the island, which is damp and cold, is fertile, but the south is hot and dry, and the only vegetation is found near the few springs.

Brava has an area of 22 square miles. It is very mountainous and has many high peaks, the loftiest of which is Fontainhas (3,609 ft.). Though sterile in some parts, it is nevertheless the most cultivated of the islands. The shores are rocky and precipitous, but there are safe landings at several points.

North-east of *Brava* are the *Rombos*, two small islands, each three miles round, of which the *Ilha de Dentro* is used as a shelter for whaling and fishing vessels, and as pasturage for cattle, while the *Ilha de Fora* supplies much guano.

(3) CLIMATE

The dominant factor in the climate of these islands is the prevalence of the trade-winds from the north-east and east from November to July. The *harmattan*, a wind from the African desert, blows from November to February, and indeed in most months except August and September. The rainy season is August, September and October, with winds from south-east to south-west; the temperature then increases and there is great humidity and constant rain. The rainfall is very unevenly distributed among the islands, and the eastern islands suffer much from lack of rain.

The only places where regular meteorological observations are made are Mindello (in San Vicente) and Praia (in San Thiago). At the former the average temperature is 75° F. (24° C.), the mean maximum temperature is 79° F. (26° C.), the mean minimum 68° F. (20° C.); at the latter the average temperature is 77° F. (25° C.), the mean maximum 82° F. (28° C.), the mean minimum

70° F. (21° C.). The average rainfall at Mindello is 7·5 ins. (19 cm.), at Praia 10·9 ins. (27·7 cm.).

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

The conditions in the various islands differ considerably, though on the whole the group is healthy, Santo Antão probably being the healthiest. At Porto Grande, in San Vicente, a mild fever exists at certain seasons, which attacks the natives after the rains in September, and Europeans during the *harmattan*. Special causes have also led to the spread of tuberculosis.

The unhealthy season in the archipelago is the rainy period; the chief complaints then are dysentery and remittent fevers. Periods of drought are followed by various epidemics. Since 1854 there has been no yellow fever, but a mosquito (*stegomyia*) that can carry the germ is common in the islands, so that infection would be likely to spread rapidly if the disease reappeared. Another great agent for disseminating diseases is the *pulex penetrans*, which came over from Guinea towards the end of last century and is very common.

Of other diseases malaria is rife, but its virulence has been greatly reduced. Leprosy is common on Santo Antão; elephantiasis is found especially on San Thiago, and syphilis especially on San Vicente. Biliosa, the form of bilious remittent fever so much dreaded in the other Portuguese West African colonies, is found only in and around Praia, where it is ascribed to local insanitary conditions.

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

When discovered these islands were uninhabited, but they are now populated by white men, negroes, and mulattoes. The whites form a very small proportion, the Portuguese themselves being only one-twentieth of the entire population. The majority of

the population are descendants of slaves from Guinea, and are either blacks or, to a still greater extent, mulattoes. There is also a Jewish strain in the islands; and the inhabitants of Fogo, though claiming Spanish descent, are mainly negroes.

Great differences are noticeable between the inhabitants of the various islands, determined partly by geographical conditions, partly by occupation, and partly by the extent to which there has been fusion of the different racial elements. The intermarriage of the mulattoes among themselves or with whites has led to the evolution of a definite island type. The Cabo-Verdeans are as a rule taller than the average Portuguese. They have fine physique and are often long-lived, this being especially true of the inhabitants of parts of San Nicolau; the nose has a tendency to be aquiline and the lips are not thicker than those of many Europeans.

The language of the islands is a bastard Portuguese, called Creole (*lingua creoula*), a combination of Portuguese and African elements, mixed with some French and English words. The dialect of Brava more than any other resembles correct Portuguese.

(6) POPULATION

Distribution

In 1916 the total population was estimated at 149,793, of whom 69,001 were men, and 80,792 women. Of these 5,032 were white, 54,662 were negroes, and 90,099 were mulattoes. A recent estimate gave 295 as the number of foreigners, who are principally British engaged in the coaling and telegraph businesses at Mindello.

The figures of the census of 1913 give the population of the various islands as follows:—

	Population	Density per square mile
Santo Antão	33,724	127
San Vicente	10,491	125
San Nicolau	12,041	90
Sal	579	7
Boa Vista	2,823	12
Maio	1,867	23
San Thiago	59,222	165
Fogo	17,800	95
Brava	9,207	418
	<hr/> 147,754	

The density for the whole group is about 100 to the square mile. Santa Luzia, Branco, Razo and the Rombos are uninhabited.

Towns and Villages

The *Anuario Colonial* (1916) says that there are in the Cape Verde Islands seven cities and towns, and 345 villages. The most important town is *Mindello* (pop. 8,500) on the Porto Grande in San Vicente, which has been a great coaling station since 1851 and is also a cable centre. *Praia* on San Thiago (pop. 4,000) is the present capital. It has a fine harbour, second only to that of Mindello. The other chief towns are *San Filipe* (pop. between 3,000 and 5,000) in Fogo; *Ribeirão Grande* (pop. 4,500) in Santo Antão; *Ribeirão Brava* (pop. 4,000) in San Nicolau, which does a considerable coasting trade; *Nossa Senhora da Luz* (or English Road) in Maio, with a good harbour; and *Sal Rei* (pop. 1,000) in Boa Vista near extensive salt-pans.

Movement

The population is increasing slowly. The figures for 1911, 1912, 1913 and 1916 are respectively 142,479, 143,929, 147,754 and 149,793. There is considerable emigration. Though life is hard for the natives, they appear to multiply very rapidly.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1445 to 1462. Discovery of the southern islands.
- 1462. Donation of the islands to Dom Fernando.
- 1463. Discovery of the northern islands.
- 1490. Colonization of Boa Vista and Maio.
- 1503. Colonization of Fogo.
- 1532. Ribeira Grande becomes a bishopric.
- 1585 and 1592. Sir Francis Drake sacks Ribeira Grande.
- 1598 and 1625. Attacks by the Dutch.
- 1614. Praia becomes the capital.
- 1712. The French sack Ribeira Grande, Praia, and Santo Antão.
- 1831. Ribeira Grande sacked by the Miguelists.
- 1838. Mindello (St Vincent) founded.
- 1879. Separation of Portuguese Guinea from Cape Verde Islands colony.

HISTORY

Both the date of the discovery of these islands and the name of their discoverer are subjects of hot dispute. The Genoese Antonio de Noli seems to have been driven by a storm to the southerly island, San Thiago, in one of the years following the discovery of Cape Verde itself by Dinis Dias in 1445, but whether his companion was a Portuguese, Diogo Gomes, or a Venetian named Cadamosto, remains uncertain. The discovery of this, the southerly group of islands, consisting of San Thiago, Maio, and Fogo (then called São Philippe), must be set at latest in 1462, for in that year they, as well as the eastern group, were bestowed by King Afonso upon his brother Dom Fernando.

Soon afterwards Diogo Afonso, sent out by Dom Fernando, discovered the remaining islands, i.e. those of the northern group, Santo Antão, San Vicente, San Nicolau and Santa Luzia. Afterwards (1489) on the death of Dom Fernando the reigning king João II gave all the islands to the Duke of Beja. Boa Vista and Maio were colonized in 1490, and Fogo in 1503.

The colonists settled by the noblemen to whom the islands were granted carried on the cultivation by means of slaves, who were easily obtained from the neighbouring coast of Africa. San Thiago was the most important and most prosperous of the islands. It was divided into two Capitánias, of which the southern was the more important. Its capital, Ribeira Grande, became the principal town in the whole group. It was created a bishopric in 1532, and its wealth attracted raiders in the period of the wars with England and Holland in which Portugal was involved by the Spanish connexion. The English (under Drake) sacked it in 1585, and again in 1592; the Dutch attacked it unsuccessfully in 1598 and 1625. During the wars of the Spanish Succession, when Portugal was allied with England, a French fleet again sacked Ribeira Grande as well as Praia and Santo Antão in 1712 (the year after Rio de Janeiro had been taken by Duguay-Trouin). During the Miguelist war of 1828–35 Ribeira Grande took the part of Dom Pedro and the young queen Maria II, and was sacked by the supporters of Dom Miguel in 1831.

In modern times, owing to its excellent harbour, the island of San Vicente (St Vincent) has become very important. In 1838 the “City of Mindello” was founded on this harbour and given by Royal Decree the position of capital of the whole archipelago. It is usually known as St Vincent. At present, however, the capital is again Praia, in the island of San Thiago, which had first been made the capital in 1614.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) RELIGIOUS

THE great mass of the population, whether white or of negro origin, belongs at least in name to the Roman Catholic Church, although undoubtedly many of the primitive beliefs of the coloured population continue to exist without much disguise. The bishopric established at Ribeira Grande in 1532, still exists with its headquarters at Ribeira Brava in the island of San Nicolau. The Church here as elsewhere in the Portuguese colonies has been disestablished since the constitution of the Republic. A seminary has been hitherto maintained in the island of San Nicolau in connexion with the bishopric.

(2) POLITICAL

The archipelago forms a single overseas province and administrative district, and the Governor holds the relative rank of General of Division. He is aided by two councils—the governing council, of which he himself is president; and the provincial council, presided over by the general secretary (corresponding to the colonial secretary in a British colony). The former council is composed of the bishop or, in his absence, of the superior ecclesiastical authority at the capital, the colonial secretary, and the heads of the different departments, civil and military, including the municipal president and two representative rate-payers. The latter council is comparatively non-official in composition, and includes a deputy for the southern group of islands and

a representative from San Vicente (one of the northern group).

The powers of the Governor are limited as follows:

He may not, even when supported by the votes of his governing council, alter the organic laws of the colony, or legislate against the civil or political rights of the colonists; nor may he modify the limits of the colony, alienate the ownership or use of any part of it to foreigners, or declare war or conclude peace. He may not concede rights of sovereignty, modify, postpone, or disobey the decisions of the tribunals civil, military, or administrative; suspend judges from pay or office; pardon, reduce, or commute penalties, or grant amnesties except to natives in accordance with the terms prescribed by law.

Outside these limits, he may in council perform all functions deemed of advantage to the interests of the colony, whose autonomy in such matters is a wide one.

The Province is divided into seven circles (*concelhos*) of the first class, and two of the second, each circle being subdivided into parishes (*freguezias*). The seven first-class *concelhos* are Santo Antão, San Vicente, San Nicolau, San Thiago (southern part), San Thiago (northern part), Fogo, and Brava; the two second-class are Sal and Boa Vista. Their councils are formed of representatives of the municipalities and are presided over by administrators appointed by the Governor.

Civil and criminal justice is administered by tribunals of the first instance sitting at Praia with jurisdiction over the islands of the southern group, and at Mindello for the islands of San Vicente, San Nicolau, Boa Vista and Sal. Since 1901 a third court with the same powers has been sitting at Maria Pia in the island of Santo Antão, the congestion of work at San Vicente (Mindello) having proved too great for efficiency. Appellate and revisional

jurisdiction is exercised by the High Court (Tribunal de Relação) at Lisbon.

The Government is still carried on under the decree of 1892, as it is considered that the Cape Verde Archipelago is not as yet sufficiently developed to make it advisable to apply the new system of the "Organic Laws of the Ultramarine Provinces" which was approved by Congress in 1914.

(3) EDUCATIONAL

For primary education a school is maintained in every parish in the islands, some of the schools being for boys only, and some for both sexes. No data are available concerning the number of children attending the schools. The seminary in San Nicolau seems still to be the principal secondary school in the group, but its future is uncertain. It is proposed to convert it either into a lyceum or into a technical school. Practical education in trades and handicrafts was introduced by the Decree of Jan. 18, 1906, by which schools were established for instruction in pilotage, seacraft and fish-curing; in carpentry, stone-cutting, masonry, iron-work, ship-building, smelting etc.; also in tailoring and shoemaking. A system of apprenticeship is carried out in these schools. The schools dealing with maritime employments are under the maritime delegate or the Port Captain when he is stationed at San Vicente (Mindello), the principal port. The other schools are under the Director of Public Works.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(a) *Roads and Paths*

METALLED roads are confined to certain of the towns, beyond the limits of which they are continued by cart-tracks. These latter, however, are few and bad, and bridle-tracks, which generally follow the dry beds of streams, form the chief routes to the rural districts. The traffic of the islands is very slight, and the roads, being poorly made, are constantly liable to destruction by winter storms. In 1914 there were in the islands 144 miles of road completed, five under construction, and seventeen projected. The chief roads are in San Thiago from Praia to Tarrafal (31 miles); in Fogo from San Filipe to Mosteiros (25 miles) and from San Filipe to Cova Figueira (20 miles); in San Vicente from Mindello to Monte Viana (11 miles), and in Santo Antão from Ponte do Sul to Paul (8 miles), and from Porto dos Carvoeiros to Ribeira Grande (6 miles).

As in most parts of the islands vegetation is scanty and the soil arid, the rider or foot-passenger is independent of roads and can move freely in any direction, hampered only by the scoriae and loose stones on some of the steeper slopes.

(b) *Posts and Telegraphs*

The postal service is administered from the capital, Praia. There is a general post-office in the chief town of each island except Boa Vista, Sal, and Maio, where the Collector of Customs performs the duties of post-

master. In Santo Antão and San Thiago there are more extended services, the former having seven village sub-offices, and the latter a main office at Tarrafal with two sub-offices dependent upon it, while the general post-office at Praia controls six sub-offices in the district which it serves. The island of Fogo also possesses two sub-offices, besides the central office at the chief town, San Filipe. Foreign mails enter and leave through San Vicente and Praia, the latter being the port of trans-shipment for such mails to and from Portuguese Guinea as have missed the monthly steamer running direct from Lisbon to Bolama.

The island of San Thiago alone possesses an internal postal telegraph system. Praia and San Vicente are united telegraphically by means of the submarine cable of the West African Telegraph Company.

(2) EXTERNAL

(a) Ports

Accommodation.—There are at present two ports of general call for Portuguese and foreign vessels, viz., Mindello or Porto Grande, in the island of San Vicente, and Praia, in the island of San Thiago.

Mindello, on the north-west side of San Vicente, is a coaling station used by vessels of war and merchantmen of all nations. The bay has an entrance two miles wide and penetrates inland for one and a half miles. Between the points of entrance there is an even bottom of 22 fathoms, shoaling on the west side to nine fathoms at three-quarters of a cable from the shore. There is ample anchorage on hard sand, and the harbour is sheltered by lofty hills, though when a north-east wind is blowing there are often sudden squalls. In the centre of the bay the depth of water is 10 fathoms, but alongside the wharves 8 feet only. The piers, which are ten

in number, are accessible only to lighters, by means of which discharge is therefore effected. Boat-sailing is at times dangerous, the bay being liable to heavy gusts off the high land and infested with sharks.

Outside, seven cables north-west from Ponta de João Ribeiro, the northern horn of the bay, is the Ilhéu dos Passaros, a conical islet with a lighthouse at the upper end of an enclosure, the whitewashed walls of which stretch up half the slope of the hillside in the form of a gigantic cross. This walled-in space is visible far out at sea, and thus serves as a landmark easily recognised at night or in misty weather when the island of San Vicente is itself hidden. The light is a white fixed one, 306 feet above high water, and is said to be visible for 25 miles.

Both water and coal are obtainable at Mindello. There is a floating tank to hold 100,000 gallons of water, but the supply is scanty, as it has to be brought by steamer from the neighbouring island of Santo Antão, the local water being not only limited in quantity but so brackish as to be almost undrinkable. The prices charged, moreover, are so high that commanders of vessels find it cheaper to distil their own water. More than 34,000 tons of Welsh coal are usually kept in stock, and of these 5,000 are always kept ready in lighters. The price for coal is very high in comparison with that current in the Canaries.

The port has a quarantine establishment, with a landing-pier of its own, and accommodation for about 50 people.

Praia is the capital of the Cape Verde Islands. It is on the southern coast of San Thiago, and has an open bay, with an entrance $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide. Anchorage is safe for vessels of any size between December and June inclusive, but not for sailing vessels during the rains, as the wind is then apt to blow onshore from the south

with a short sea and heavy swell. On Ponta Temerosa, the western limit of the bay, is a fixed white light at a height of 85 feet, visible in clear weather for 15 miles. There is a lazaretto beside it, and a life-saving rocket apparatus has recently been established. Several patches of shoal-water lie in and around the approaches to the bay, but good holding-ground of volcanic sand at a depth of 8 fathoms is to be found abreast of the Ilhéu de Santa Maria, or Quail Island, inside the port. On Quail Island there used to be a stock of about 1,500 tons of coal available for shipping, some being always kept on lighters for urgent requirements, but Lloyd's Register for 1916-17 contains a warning that this arrangement is no longer to be relied upon. Proposals have been made in Lisbon to extend the coaling depot by connecting the islet and the shore by means of a sea-wall. Good water may be obtained from a floating tank.

A third port, deserving of recognition if the claims set up on its behalf by Portuguese publicists have any validity, is *Tarrafal*, in San Thiago. This port is mainly interesting on account of the attention it received from the Lisbon press in 1911-12, when the Agadir incident and the visit of a German cruiser to the Tagus had aroused uneasiness about the safety of the Portuguese African Colonies. The theory was that it formed the apex of a great strategical triangle, the other angles being occupied by San Miguel in the Azores and Lagos-Portimão in Algarve, southern Portugal. The seas contained in this triangle were to be policed by the fleets of Great Britain and Portugal in co-operation; and it was deemed essential that all three points should be coaling stations, whereas only one, San Miguel, had as yet been equipped for that purpose. From the British Consular Report for 1913 it appears that some steps have been taken to raise the port of Tarrafal to

the desired level. It is of much smaller dimensions than Mindello or Praia.

Nature and Volume of Trade.—The carrying trade between Portugal and the West African colonial ports having been ruled by Portuguese judicial authority to be a coasting trade (*cabotage*), and therefore closed to all vessels save those flying the national flag, a large portion of the imports and a still larger portion of the exports pass through Lisbon, even when that is not the place of their real origin or destination. Owing, however, to the special circumstances of trade in these islands the exclusion of the foreigner is not as complete as in the Portuguese colonies farther south.

In 1913 the ships that entered and cleared in the ports of the archipelago numbered 3,402; of these 1,414 were steamships and 1,988 sailing vessels, while 1,968 were engaged in coasting trade. The tonnage was 4,239,532. Recently there has been a decrease in the number of ships that have entered and cleared, but an increase in their tonnage. The trade of Mindello consists largely of re-exportation to other islands, and the port still retains some importance as a coaling station, though the high price of coal there and other circumstances have combined to reduce this. Steamers from North America to Australia, China and Japan are the only ones that take great quantities of coal at Mindello. German, Italian and French steamers have given up calling there for coal and go instead to Dakar and the Canaries. Praia is a regular port of call for the Portuguese mail-boats, but has no other importance. The figures for 1915 show one steamer entered from Buenos Aires with cargo and cleared in ballast for Senegal, and one small sailing vessel to and from the United States, the total tonnage being under 5,000 tons. The agricultural exports from the Santa Catarina district of San Thiago pass through Tarrafal.

(b) Shipping Lines

The Empresa Nacional de Navegação, reconstructed in 1918 under the style of the Companhia Nacional de Navegação, is a Lisbon shipping company, which holds the virtual monopoly of the Portuguese West African trade south of Madeira. The company has a regular mail and cargo service to the Cape Verde Islands. Its steamers make the voyage three times a month, those sailing on the 7th and 22nd of each month continuing to the ports of Angola, while the third, which sails on the 14th, continues to Guinea.

Of British lines, the two that have most concern with the Cape Verde Islands are the amalgamated lines, the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company and the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. Ships of the former sail once a month from Liverpool, of the latter once a fortnight from Southampton. The Royal Mail steamers touch at Mindello for postal purposes, those of the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. for coal.

(c) Cable and Wireless Communications

Cables run from San Vicente to Fayal in the Azores and to Madeira, and thence to Porthcurno (England) and Carcavellos (Portugal). Southward there are lines to Pernambuco and other Brazilian ports, and *via* Ascension and St Helena to Cape Town; from Ascension a line branches to the River Plate. The connexion with Praia on San Thiago is extended to Bathurst (Gambia) and Freetown (Sierra Leone); at busy hours of the day Praia is cut off, and the line worked through to Freetown. At San Vicente the staff, controlled by the West African Telegraph Company, numbers 100 and is always in attendance, whereas at Praia only one European superintendent and two native assistants are employed. All the foreign work is therefore done through San Vicente.

Communication with Portuguese Guinea is maintained through Bathurst by means of two short cables to Bissau and Bolama, controlled by the African Direct Telegraph Company.

A wireless station has been established in San Vicente and in 1918 was reported to be in actual operation.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) LABOUR

The Cape Verde Islands stand alone among the colonies of Portugal in having no special or exceptional laws, the general code of the mother-country meeting all requirements. The supply of labour is abundant, women working as well as men. Labour is quite free from administrative control, and is only subject to the general principle laid down in the constitution of the Portuguese Republic, namely, that in return for the protection afforded him by the State, the citizen is legally and morally bound to earn his living by work.

The ordinary rate of wages in the islands for unskilled labour is 1s. 5½d. per day for men, 10d. for women; at the coaling ports the men are paid on the piece-work system and are able to earn considerably more. The Cabo-Verdean is free alike from conscription and corvée, the Government engaging its workmen in the open labour market. The low rate of wages paid to the agricultural labourer may be supplemented by the profits of co-partnership arrangements (see pp. 26, 27).

Lack of work and lack of food, however, induce a large number of the inhabitants to emigrate, either under contract to San Thomé and Príncipe, or on their own account to other parts of the world. In the former case they are invited to contract for fixed periods of one to three years, with passage paid both ways. In

Principe they have rendered especially good service, for before the extinction of sleeping sickness they showed unusual powers of resistance to that scourge, and, undeterred by the risk of infection, often re-engaged for a second and even a third period of work. In 1915-16 about 800 new recruits from the Cape Verde Islands went to Principe, taking the place of an almost identical number of time-expired labourers who returned to the archipelago.

As a free emigrant the Cabo-Verdean settles in many parts of the world, some of which offer by no means the most promising prospect. During 1914 there were 3,648 emigrants (2,851 men, 797 women). Of these 1,610 went to North America, 57 to Brazil, 77 to other parts of South America, 24 to Europe, and the rest chiefly to Portuguese colonies. In North America Cabo-Verdeans are to be found chiefly in the New England States, especially New Bedford and Providence, to the former of which 1,066 emigrants went from these islands in 1912. In New England and in Angola they work as fishermen; in British Guiana and in Portuguese Guinea they find profitable occupation as small traders; in the Sandwich Islands and in San Thomé and Principe they are known as somewhat turbulent but industrious estate labourers or overseers of native labour; while in Principe they play a prominent part in the local police force. The Argentine navy employs Cabo-Verdeans largely as seamen, and in that service they frequently rise to the grade of petty officer. The sea is adopted as a profession by many men from Brava, an island from which the inhabitants emigrate freely.

Emigration from Portugal is discouraged; but the Portuguese authorities seem to agree that emigration confers distinct advantages on these islands, both through the experience that the emigrants gather abroad and from the money that they bring or send

back. Wherever they go, it appears that the Cabo-Verdeans work hard, make and save money and send steady remittances home; the postmaster of Brava reports that not a single letter arrives from an emigrant for his family that does not contain a remittance of some amount up to twenty dollars. When circumstances permit, they return to the islands, buy land and build a house.

The total number of emigrants from seven of the Cape Verde Islands, exclusive of the *serviçaes* or indentured labourers in San Thomé and Príncipe, between the years 1900 and 1910 was as follows:—

Brava	3,078
Fogo	1,740
San Thiago	2,549
San Vicente	723
Santo Antão	187
San Nicolau	399
Boa Vista	16

(2) AGRICULTURE

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products.—The islands differ considerably in their degrees of fertility, the chief centres of agriculture being, among the northern islands, Santo Antão and San Nicolau, among the southern, Fogo and Brava.

Coconuts grow on many of the islands; the fruit is neither large nor abundant, but it is especially esteemed on islands such as Maio and Boa Vista, which have a poor water supply.

Coffee is the chief export, and Cape Verde coffee fetches higher prices in the Lisbon markets than any other of the West African kinds. It is indeed so rich in caffen. that many consumers prefer not to use it

unmixed. With three or four times its own weight of a milder coffee, it is quite strong enough for the average palate. The cultivation of coffee might be much developed, but under the present system of small producers it is impossible to grow enough for the foreign market. Coffee is cultivated especially on Santo Antão, Fogo, and San Thiago.

Cotton has been successfully grown, and a good sample of it has been sent from Santo Antão. In the island of San Nicolau it is woven into coarse cloth for local requirements.

Fibres. The *piteira* or Mexican aloe (*Agave mexicana*) is a very common plant, as might be expected from the aridity of most of the islands. A fair supply of fibre for making cordage etc. is obtained from this and from the coconut palm. The growth of *sisal*, with which a beginning has been made, is not likely to be very successful, as it needs more water.

Fruit and Vegetables. *Beans*, *sweet potatoes*, and other European and tropical vegetables are grown on some of the islands. *Bananas* grow well on certain islands, and *pumpkins* are successful. *Orange* growing might be developed, the oranges of Brava and Fogo being reputed the finest in the world; on Santo Antão an orange wine is produced. *Pawpaws* grow on most of the islands, but only on Brava to any considerable extent. *Pineapples* do very well on Fogo, Brava, and San Thiago. *Grapes* are grown, but more for eating than for making wine. *Apples*, *pears*, *plums*, *peaches*, and *strawberries* are cultivated on a small scale, and *figs*, *breadfruit*, *tangerines*, *mangoes*, and *lemons* on a large scale. *Date palms* are little grown, but their cultivation could probably be developed.

Indigo is grown on San Vicente and Fogo.

Maize is grown, but under difficulties. In good years the surplus crop is exported, but in years of drought

considerable quantities are imported from Mozambique and elsewhere, as this grain is the chief constituent in the islanders' dietary.

Purgueira (sometimes incorrectly described in the reports on the islands as castor-oil) is an important product. The plant bears numerous oily seeds which are bought up by the União Fabril of Lisbon and by other Portuguese refineries for treatment and ultimate use as a lubricant or in soap-making. A good deal also goes to the Marseilles market. The residue after the oil has been extracted forms an excellent manure for poor lands, a fact which furnishes a good reason for treating the seeds, as far as possible, in the islands themselves. The esteem in which *purgueira* is held in the Cape Verde Islands contrasts with the neglect it suffers in British India, where it is regarded as a troublesome weed. In the Cape Verde Islands it has to be protected by special regulations, as the wood is good for fuel and therefore liable to be cut down by the inhabitants. The plant grows here better than in America. The true castor-oil plant (*Ricinus communis*) is also to be found but has never attained the same importance for export purposes.

Sugar-cane is cultivated in San Thiago and Santo Antão, and on a smaller scale in San Nicolau and Brava. It is grown not only for its sugar, which is manufactured in a very primitive fashion and in no great quantity, but also for the making of alcohol. All the sugar is consumed in the islands, and it has to be supplemented by imports. Nearly all the spirits are also consumed locally; for, though the figures for the exports are considerable, they probably represent inter-insular traffic, the producing islands supplying the wants of others, such as San Vicente and Sal, which do not manufacture on their own account. Roughly speaking, 1,000 litres of the juice of the sugar-cane yield 70 litres

of spirits; the same quantity of juice yields 200 kilos of sugar and 200 kilos of molasses.

Among miscellaneous products, *tobacco* grows best on Fogo, *cinchona* on Santo Antão. An indigenous reed or bent grass is abundant in Brava, and is used in the manufacture of straw hats, which are said to be equal in quality to those of Panama.

Live-stock.—*Cattle* are reared for the sake of their meat and hides, but milk is poor and butter very scarce. The animals have suffered badly from droughts, especially on the islands of Maio and Santa Luzia. *Goats* are widely distributed; they do great damage to the vegetation, which is far from luxuriant. There are comparatively few *sheep*. The *horses* used on the islands come mostly from Guinea, and to a certain extent from Portugal; except on Fogo and Santo Antão they are not of very good quality. The *donkeys*, on the other hand, are of a strong type and able to carry heavy burdens. There are a few *mules*, and recently *dromedaries* have been introduced. *Poultry*, including turkeys, do well, but a great deal more attention might be given to poultry-keeping.

The figures given below are from an animal census for 1914, in which Maio was not included:

Horned cattle	6,650
Donkeys	10,115
Mules	727
Horses and ponies	1,142
Goats	35,360
Sheep	4,927
Pigs	18,855

The total, 77,776, shows a considerable decline from that of 1902, when it was 102,747.

(b) Methods of Cultivation and Irrigation

The methods of cultivation adopted in these islands are primitive and call for no special remark. In 1878 ploughs were unknown, and those imported since have been viewed mainly as curiosities. Irrigation is a necessity for the successful raising of most of the crops, but no extensive works have been undertaken.

(c) Forestry

One of the most urgent needs of the islands is a systematic scheme of afforestation, as there are no indigenous trees. Enlightened governors have from time to time exerted themselves to make good this deficiency, but their successors in office have frequently failed to follow up the line of policy indicated. A law of 1901 imposes on the concessionaires of unoccupied land the obligation of planting ten trees per hectare; but this law is not strictly enforced. The Central Government have, however, at last created a special department of forestry and agriculture from whose work some continuity may be expected. The distance from Europe prevents the extensive introduction of fresh species, but something has been done in the way of planting sub-tropical trees such as the baobab, dracaena, and eucalyptus.

An institution for the acclimatization of useful exotic plants has been recently established at Praia on the model of the Colonial Botanic Garden at Belem, Lisbon.

(d) Land Tenure ; Profit-sharing Systems

According to law, all unoccupied land in the islands, not duly registered at the Land Record Office (*Conservatoria*) as private property, belongs to the natives. It is parcelled out into holdings, alienable by sale or mortgage, on which the islander can build his own

dwelling and raise whatever crop the soil is capable of bearing. This squatters' tenure has been carried to its greatest development in Brava, but exists in all the agricultural islands of the group.

The larger properties, devoted for the most part to coffee, *purgueira*, and sugar-cane, are chiefly to be found in San Thiago, Santo Antão, and San Nicolau. Wages on these estates, though calculated on a money basis, are usually paid in kind out of the produce of the crops raised, an arrangement preferred both by the labourers, who feel that they are thus obtaining a direct reward for their exertions, and by the proprietors as a guarantee that their interests, being bound up with those of their employees, will be well served.

A noteworthy feature of this arrangement is the contrast it presents to the industrial system in vogue in the other islands, though the latter is by no means unattractive from the labourers' point of view. In the coaling industry of San Vicente, for instance, the average wage paid is 40 centavos per day (about 1s. at the present rate of exchange) for a man and 24 centavos for a woman or a boy. This is paid in coin, the employer undertaking no responsibility for housing, food, or clothing. In agriculture, however, the nominal wage freely agreed to on both sides seldom exceeds half those figures. The nature of the crop generally determines the details of the agreement. *Purgueira*, the harvesting of which is regarded as women's work, is as a rule grown on a peasant-farming system, the landlord providing the seeds and seedlings, and the land on which these are to be raised, the cultivator finding the labour and such implements as may be required. The landlord finally receives half the crop plus one-tenth to cover the tithe payable to the Treasury, the cultivator retaining the rest.

In the island of San Thiago, however, it is a common practice for owners to lease their lands to the native cultivators at rents payable in coin or kind, as may be stipulated. In that island there also exists a system of co-operative farming, single cultivators or groups associating themselves and working under a joint-stock agreement. The crops usually raised under this system are beans, maize, and sugar-cane.

All over the archipelago, where coffee is grown, it remains under the control of the proprietor and is worked for his account.

(3) FISHERIES

The seas of the archipelago abound in fish, the Portuguese naturalist Balthazar Osorio having identified 87 species, including such excellent edible fish as the *badeio* (stockfish), *dourada* (St Peter's fish), *bonita* (a kind of tunny), and *sargo* (sargus). Authorities who have studied local conditions, notably ex-Governor F. de Paula Cid and Ernesto Vasconcellos, emphasize the desirability of fostering both the fishing and the fish-curing industries, pointing out that the archipelago enjoys peculiar advantages in respect of cheap labour, an abundance of salt, and the constant introduction of new ideas and skilled methods by emigrants returning from the United States after years of practice in this line of commerce. In the island of Sal alone, salt production at present amounts to about 330,000 bushels per annum, and, should the cod or stockfish enterprise on the Arguin banks and the adjoining Senegal coast achieve the success anticipated for it, this output might easily be increased. The importance of the trade will be recognised when it is borne in mind that salt fish is among the Portuguese the indispensable basis of the people's dietary, both at home and abroad. Not only the mother country but the provinces of

Guinea, Angola, San Thomé and Príncipe, and the island of Madeira, would afford a permanent market.

The worthless and poisonous kinds of fish taken in the nets might well be used as manure to improve the soil of the islands; as might also the guano which abounds on the Rombo islets and elsewhere.

The whale is a frequent visitor to these coasts, and whaling stations exist on two or three of the islands, the most important being that on the islet of Santa Luzia, close to San Vicente and therefore in touch with the outside world through Mindello. The men of Brava are reputed to be exceptionally skilful with the harpoon.

Efforts, more or less spasmodic, have been made to convert the islands into what they ought to be—a valuable fishing and whaling centre. While he was Colonial Minister, Moreira Junior, who established professional schools in all the colonies, appointed a lecturer on pisciculture to the School of Pilotage at Praia, a special item in the course of instruction being the methods of salting and curing fish. The scheme, however, failed to meet with the support of his successors, and appears for the present to have been shelved.

(4) MINERALS

There are no valuable minerals in these islands. Faint traces of *gold* have been found in ferruginous quartz from Boa Vista. There is also some *iron* in San Vicente.

On Brava there are quarries of a coarse *sandstone*, which is used for building and other purposes, and of a harder bluish *grey stone*, like Yorkshire granite, which is used for building only. On the south-west of San Vicente about 50 ft. above sea-level is an outcrop of *grey granite* like that of Aberdeen, but of finer grain and harder. *Clay* is used for pottery on Boa Vista.

Much *salt* is obtained on Sal, Maio, and Boa Vista by means of artificial salt-pans. *Lime* of the best quality is burnt on Boa Vista, and some also on Brava and San Thiago.

The islands are full of *mineral springs*, the best being on Brava and Santo Antão; they are impregnated with iron, lime, sulphur and acetic acid¹.

(5) MANUFACTURES

The industries of the islands are for the most part rudimentary, but are capable of development should there be any extended market for them.

Coral is at present worked only on a small scale, the industry being in the hands of Neapolitans. It is a valuable product, for which a foreign market could be found. There is a very rich bed of red coral to the south-west of Santo Antão.

Dye-stuffs, such as ochre and a few crude vegetable dyes, are prepared for local use. One of these dye-stuffs is orchilla-weed, which has been of great commercial importance in the history of the colony. It has suffered from the competition of other tropical possessions where it is more abundant, but its export might be increased if sufficient inducement were offered to its cultivators. The growing of indigo has dwindled owing to the competition of synthetic dyes.

Mineral waters are manufactured on San Vicente, and in 1912 about 22,000 litres were sold.

On Boa Vista *pottery* is made; there is a factory which has been idle for some time and needs re-equipment; earthenware vessels are however made by hand in a primitive manner.

There is a *salt* industry in some of the islands (see

¹ There is a full account of the mineralogy of the islands by Immanuel Friedländer (see Authorities, p. 42).

above, p. 29). On Sal there are two companies concerned in the manufacture, one at Santa Maria on the south coast of the island, the other at Pedro Lume on the north coast. The industry employs 95 men and 89 women. The annual production is 1,200,000 decalitres. The salt is transported to the west coast of Africa in sailing vessels. There used to be a considerable export to Brazil, until it was stopped by the protectionist tariff established there.

The manufacture of *sugar* and *alcohol* from sugar-cane has already been mentioned; the following table gives some idea of the extent of this industry, as it stood in 1914:—

Islands	Number of hands	FINISHED PRODUCTS		
		Spirits	Molasses	Sugar
<i>San Thiago</i>		Litres	Litres	Kilos
(i) <i>Praia</i>	480	84,708	—	41,200
(ii) <i>Santa Catarina</i>	328	205,429	—	52,702
<i>Brava</i>	72	6,145	1,226	—
<i>Santo Antão</i>	118	246,687	43,980	—

Miscellaneous Industries.—In San Thiago and Fogo there is a rudimentary manufacture of *ropes* from the fibres of coconut and *piteira*; “Panama” *straw hats* are made on Fogo and Brava, and are worn in the Portuguese navy and merchant-service. A fine *lace* is made by the inhabitants of some of the islands. The *weaving of cotton cloth* for export to the African mainland was at one time an important industry, and notwithstanding the competition of Manchester goods it still exists in Fogo and San Thiago. Other small industries include the manufacture of *purgueira oil* in Fogo, Boa Vista and San Thiago, of *baskets* in San Thiago and San Nicolau, and of *soap* in Fogo and San Thiago.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) DOMESTIC

(a) Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce

No associations formed exclusively for the promotion of trade have been noted as existing in the islands, but the assistance rendered to agriculture by the Banco Nacional Ultramarino deserves recognition (see below, p. 36).

The help given by the Portuguese Government has taken the form of education rather than of commercial organization.

(b) Foreign Interests

The coaling industry at San Vicente is in the hands of four firms, three of which are British, while the fourth, though nominally Portuguese, works with British capital. The West African Telegraph Company at the same port is an English company, having its head office in London. The making of salt in Sal is, or was, partially in French hands. The small coral industry, as has been said above, is conducted by Neapolitans.

No German firm seems to have established itself in the islands, but before the war, one at least, the house of Hesse, Neumann and Co., Hamburg and London, used to maintain a representative, with head-quarters at Funchal. He was constantly travelling with samples and leather, cotton and woollen goods for sale, the articles being indiscriminately British, French and German. He was well known in these islands and in the Portuguese possessions in West Africa, and his only serious competitors were a few representatives of Manchester houses, who occasionally visited the ports and secured orders supplementing those already given to the Hamburg firm.

(2) FOREIGN

(a) *Exports*

The exports of the Cape Verde Islands amount in value to something between a seventh and a thirteenth of the imports. The value of the exports in the years 1910-1914 was as follows:—

	<i>Escudos</i>
1910	319,907
1911	291,920
1912	168,971
1913	354,240
1914	295,768

Portugal, in virtue of her protective fiscal policy, takes about 95 per cent. of these. In 1911 and 1912 respectively the United States took 1·46 and 2·32 per cent., France and the French Possessions 1·28 and 1·96 per cent., the United Kingdom and British Possessions 0·35 and 1·02 per cent. Germany took nothing.

The most important exports are coffee and *purgueira* seeds, which account together for about three-quarters of the total. Goatskins, hides, rum, and, in years when there is no deficiency, maize are among the other chief items. Some trade is done in live animals, fruit and vegetables with French and Portuguese colonies in West Africa.

(b) *Imports*

The value of the imports for the two years 1911 and 1912 respectively was Esc. 1,957,146 and Esc. 2,165,651. In each case about half of the total (55·96 per cent. in 1911 and 54·71 per cent. in 1912) represented goods from the United Kingdom or the British Possessions, while 30·19 per cent. in the former year and 40·15 in the latter were supplied by Portugal. Imports from Germany showed a marked decrease in 1912, in which

year they were less than those from the United States. German goods, trans-shipped at Lisbon to Portuguese ships by the German houses established there, used to find a good market in the islands, because their cheapness, despite their obvious inferiority, appealed to the local customer.

The chief imports are coal, textiles, provisions, flour, sugar, rice, liquors, and tobacco. These are fairly constant, but in individual years large items appear which either are not catalogued at all in other years or appear at a much lower figure. For instance, in 1909 telegraph material, and in 1910 lighters and boats, occupied the third place in the list of imports. Of imports of British origin much the most important is coal, the other chief items being material for the coaling companies and for the West African Telegraph Company. British rice, flour, and sugar are generally priced too high to find a market here. From the United States are imported boots, shoes, and timber in small sailing vessels, which take emigrants in return. Maize is not imported in large quantities except in years when the local crop is poor. In 1913 the islands imported maize to the value of Esc. 107,788, of which 80 per cent. came from the Argentine and practically all the rest from Mozambique; in 1914 the value of maize imported amounted to Esc. 213,978.

A table of imports and exports for 1911 and 1912 will be found in Tables I and II of the Appendix.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

Import duties, which are imposed on a very large number of articles, are in some cases very heavy. That on coal in particular is so high as seriously to imperil the position of San Vicente as a coaling station. Portuguese goods, as in the case of all the other Portuguese possessions, enjoy specially reduced rates. Among foreign

goods which are admitted free of duty are agricultural implements and machinery, sewing machines, scientific instruments, wagons, cars and railway carriages, live animals, vegetables, plants and green fruit, mineral waters, ice, barrel staves, etc.

All exports consigned to Portugal or the Portuguese possessions enjoy a rebate of one-half on the ordinary rates.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

The colony of Cape Verde is free from debt, but between 1910 and 1915 surpluses from the revenues of San Thomé and Príncipe to the amount of Esc. 150,000 had to be transferred to the Treasury to enable it to balance its accounts. These grants do not appear in the published accounts of the Colony, but are duly recorded in the Colonial Office notification authorizing them. A grant-in-aid of Esc. 34,000 was made by the Portuguese Treasury in 1914.

One of the chief sources of revenue is the coal tax, which brought in Esc. 84,000 in 1912-13, and Esc. 72,000 in 1913-14; but as the use of the island coaling stations is declining, and the coaling companies are not inclined to accept the suggestion of the Government for the re-adjustment of the tax upon the basis of an average on the figures for past years, the Treasury has either to find other sources of revenue or to effect economies at the risk of doing permanent injury to the interests of the islands.

The financial position in 1913-14, and the general tendency of revenue and expenditure since 1908-09, are shown in Table III of the Appendix¹. The large

¹ These figures are reproduced from the *Arquipélago de Cabo Verde* by E. J. de Carvalho e Vasconcellos, (1916). They are fuller than any others available, but should be accepted with great caution.

proportion of military charges to total expenditure is partially explained by the fact that health establishments, properly a civil charge, are included under the head of military expenditure. The charges for civil administration, however, are almost equally high in proportion to the total expenditure.

(2) *Currency*

The monetary system is that of Portugal, the only local peculiarity being that the nickel coins of 100 *reis* and 50 *reis*, current in Portugal to this day notwithstanding the reform of the currency introduced by the Republic¹, are not current in this province. Their place is taken by an earlier silver coinage, still current but not very commonly used in Portugal. Notes of the Bank of Portugal are accepted payable at a discount, the only paper money circulating at its face value being the note issue of the local branch of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino.

(3) *Banking*

The position of banking in the Cape Verde Islands does not differ essentially from that described in *San Thomé and Príncipe*, No. 119 of this Series.

The charter of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, granted under an Act of the Portuguese Legislature in 1864, and renewed in 1876 and 1910, is now under revision. The Government contemplates reorganization and unification of the colonial banking system. The existing charter gives the bank the exclusive right to do business in the overseas possessions as a bank of credit, discount, and issue, the head office in Lisbon,

¹ By this reform, which was effected in 1911, the *milreis* was assimilated to the dollar, renamed *escudo* and divided into 100 *centavos* instead of as formerly into 1,000 *reis*. Within the last five years, however, the exchange value of the *escudo* has fallen to about 2s. 6d. of English money, necessitating the raising of foreign postage rates by 50 per cent. in order to bring them into conformity with those fixed by the Geneva Postal Convention.

however, being deprived of the right of issue on account of the monopoly granted to the Bank of Portugal.

Cape Verde being mainly an agricultural colony, the most important function of the bank is that of granting land-credit. In the scheme of reorganization, the existing provisions, objects, and definitions of land-credit operations have been re-stated, and if approved by the Legislature, the powers of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino will be as follows:—

(i) To make advances to Government, administrative bodies and all establishments or associations legally constituted, to agricultural syndicates, and to cultivators, whether ordinary or contract workers, provided such advances are for the construction of roads subsidiary to agriculture or of factories to manipulate agricultural produce, for the clearing of lands, for irrigation works, drainage or reclamation of swamps, for afforestation or for other work for the improvement of the soil. These advances to be secured by mortgage, lien, or collateral security, for terms not exceeding nine years in the case of a lien, and one year in the case of collateral security;

(ii) To encourage, subject to the necessary guarantees, all agricultural improvements, by promoting and taking part in the formation of companies and syndicates for this purpose;

(iii) To discount cultivators' approved bills or promissory notes of a currency not exceeding three months;

(iv) To open cash-credits with approved cultivators for periods not exceeding one year, on the security of a mortgage or lien on produce, titles, and warrants;

(v) To make advances in coin or in kind for sowing and planting, subject to approved security;

(vi) To make similar advances upon crops, standing, harvested, or stored;

(vii) To make similar advances upon cattle and agricultural implements, if insured;

(viii) To re-discount paper already discounted by agricultural companies or syndicates.

There is a branch of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino at Praia and an agency at Mindello.

(4) Foreign Capital

Under the existing regime, which is strictly protectionist, the foreign capitalist is regarded rather as a rival to be kept at arm's length than as a colleague to be welcomed and encouraged.

Existing British and other foreign interests in the Cape Verde Islands are referred to on p. 31.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

The great advantage enjoyed by the Cape Verde Islands is their geographical position. They are on the direct route from the ports of Europe to the ports of Brazil, and are suitably placed for much of the trade between North America and the west coast of Africa. Their comparative proximity to the mother country would give them advantages over most other possessions of Portugal, if their interests were properly fostered.

The retention of the coaling station at San Vicente is of primary importance to the province, but the use of this port for coaling has diminished on account of the high tariff and consequent high prices of coal. If the coal trade ceased, there would be a constant deficit in the budget, and it would be very difficult for the Government to find anything else which could take its place as a source of revenue.

If the industrial and agricultural interests of the islands were adequately fostered, however, there seems to be no reason why they should be outstripped by the Canaries in seaborne trade. It is claimed that the Cape Verde Islands can produce all that is now produced by the Canaries, as well as some commodities, such as coffee, which the Canaries cannot. The *purgueira* oil trade, already fairly flourishing, could be further developed. It has been seen that many kinds of fruit grow excellently in some of the islands, but more might be done with them. Indigo may gain in economic value if the competition of synthetic dyes decreases. The fishing industry might be greatly developed; the presence of salt on Sal and Boa Vista, combined with the proximity of rich fishing-banks, should provide a great opportunity for salting and drying fish on a large scale. It is true that the mineral resources of the islands are slight and much of their surface is arid, but their other resources, coupled with their extremely favourable geographical position, augur well for their future prosperity, if the Portuguese Government takes full advantage of its opportunities.

APPENDIX (TRADE)

TABLE I.—VALUES OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1911 AND 1912

IMPORTS		1911	1912	EXPORTS		1911	1912
Alcohol	...	<i>Escudos</i> 3,412	<i>Escudos</i> 4,425	Alcohol (Rum)	...	<i>Escudos</i> 3,206	<i>Escudos</i> 2,696
Beer	...	2,493	5,123	Animals, Live	...	7,585	7,064
Biscuits	...	24,340	—	Coffee	...	123,945	47,218
Boots and Shoes	...	10,180	11,806	Dried Fish	...	690	1,199
Candles	...	1,775	2,745	Goatskins	...	23,360	7,237
Canvases, Rope, etc.	...	5,355	6,408	Hides	...	12,450	7,128
Cement	...	3,855	5,924	Maize	...	5,940	6,949
Coal	...	882,627	1,101,196	Pargueira Seeds	...	100,205	76,789
Flour	...	91,338	114,012	Salt	...	4,075	3,126
Hardware	...	24,295	21,937	Vegetables	...	1,100	274
Hats	...	5,991	6,127	Miscellaneous	...	9,365	9,291
Metals	...	34,551	34,553				
Oil (vegetable)	...	13,643	18,053				
Paper	...	8,821	8,121				
Petroleum	...	17,062	13,116				
Provisions	...	145,810	100,884				
Rice	...	94,718	62,602				
Soap	...	14,335	17,547				
Sugar	...	34,616	46,154				
Textiles, Cotton	...	221,410	246,886				
Textiles, Silk and Wool	...	20,375	36,447				
Timber	...	15,684	—				
Tobacco	...	41,594	42,192				
Wines	...	39,956	45,891				
Miscellaneous	...	198,910	213,502				
		1,957,146	2,165,651			291,920	168,971

TABLE II.—IMPORTS AND EXPORTS SHOWING COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OR DESTINATION,
1911 AND 1912

	IMPORTS			EXPORTS		
	1911		1912	1911		1912
	Escudos	Percentage of Total	Escudos	Percentage of Total	Escudos	Percentage of Total
Portugal, with Portuguese Islands and Colonies ...	608,657	31.10	870,234	40.18	282,210	93.92
United Kingdom and British Possessions ...	1,094,297	55.91	1,185,008	54.72	1,030	1.02
United States ...	67,576	3.45	51,510	2.38	4,280	2.38
Germany ...	82,424	4.21	2,542	0.12	—	—
France and French Colonies ...	37,102	1.89	10,472	0.43	3,745	1.96
Other Countries ...	67,090	3.42	45,885	2.12	655	0.71
	1,957,146		2,165,651		291,920	168,971

TABLE III.—CHIEF HEADS OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
FOR THE YEARS 1908-09 TO 1913-14¹

	1908-09	1909-10	1910-11	1911-12	1912-13.	1913-14
REVENUE—						
Land Tax and other Direct Taxation ...	<i>Escudos</i> 147,000	<i>Escudos</i> 142,000	<i>Escudos</i> 136,000	<i>Escudos</i> 143,000	<i>Escudos</i> 148,000	<i>Escudos</i> 136,000
Indirect Taxation ...	236,000	249,000	242,000	270,000	248,000	264,000
National Property and Miscellaneous	23,000	26,000	24,000	26,000	28,000	38,000
Revenues ...	400	400	300	10,000	8,000	1,000
Funds with Special Application ...	—	—	—	—	—	35,000
Grant-in-aid by Home Treasury	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	406,400	417,400	402,300	449,000	432,000	474,000
EXPENDITURE—						
Government Administration ...	112,000	109,000	106,000	133,000	108,000	143,000
Treasury ...	53,000	52,000	53,000	62,000	71,000	63,000
Judicial ...	17,000	16,000	15,000	20,000	18,000	19,000
Ecclesiastical ...	15,000	10,000	10,000	13,000	15,000	13,000
Military ...	119,000	122,000	109,000	119,000	113,000	106,000
Naval ...	23,000	23,000	22,000	25,000	26,000	29,000
General Charges ...	19,000	19,000	18,000	21,000	22,000	25,000
Miscellaneous Expenditure ...	32,000	36,000	44,000	23,000	34,000	23,000
Closed Accounts ...	2,000	1,000	300	2,000	1,000	2,000
Extraordinary Expenditure ...	9,000	10,000	21,000	14,000	21,000	51,000
Total	401,000	398,000	398,300	432,000	429,000	474,000
Closing Balances ...	5,400	19,400	4,000	17,000	3,000	—
	406,400	417,400	402,300	449,000	432,000	474,000

¹ See above, p. 34, footnote 1.

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HISTORY OF THE EASTERN QUESTION

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1920

Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense, and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.

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I. GENERAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 600 B.C. Foundation of Greek colony of Byzantium.
146 B.C. Macedonia becomes a Roman province.
106 A.D. Trajan conquers Dacia.
325 A.D. Constantinople founded on site of Byzantium.
577 A.D. Slavs in Macedonia.
610 A.D. Serbs and Bulgars in Balkan Peninsula.
893-927 First Bulgarian Empire. Simeon.
1204 Fourth Crusade. Latin Emperor in Constantinople.
11th-12th cent. Seljuks in Asia Minor.
1300 Osman Sultan at Yenishahr.
1346 Serbian Empire. Stephen Dushan crowned at Skoplye.
1365 Turks in Adrianople.
1389 Battle of Kosovo.
1393 Trnovo captured. Bulgarian Patriarchate abolished.
1453 Turks capture Constantinople.
1535 French protectorate of Holy Places and Capitulations.
1583 and 1675 British Capitulations.
1689 Austrian protectorate of Albanian Catholics.
1699 Peace of Karlowitz. Turks give up Hungary. Roman Catholic religion protected.
1718-39 Austrian rule in Bosnia and Serbia.
1739 Treaty of Belgrade. Russia protects Russian pilgrims.
1740 Renewal of French protectorate of Holy Places.
1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Russian protection of Christians.
1778-1822 Ali Pasha in Yanina.
1797 Treaty of Campo Formio. Austria obtains Dalmatia and France the Ionian Islands.
1797 Napoleon in Egypt.
1799 Montenegrin independence recognised in firman.
1804 Serbian rising. Kara George.
1807-13 French in Cattaro. Illyrian Provinces.
1807 Proposed Russo-French partition of Turkey (Tilsit).
1815 British protectorate of Ionian Islands.
1817 Serbia autonomous under Turkish suzerainty. Milosh Obrenovich.
1821-29 Greek War of Independence.



- 1826 Janissaries exterminated.
- 1829 Treaty of Adrianople.
- 1832 King Otho in Greece. Greek boundaries fixed.
- 1833 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.
- 1841 Straits closed to all foreign Warships.
- 1854-56* Crimean War.
- 1856 Treaty of Paris.
- 1859 Rumania united under Prince Cuza.
- 1863 King George in Greece.
- 1863 Ionian Islands ceded to Greece.
- 1866 Prince Carol in Rumania.
- 1867 Turkish garrisons leave Serbia.
- 1870 Bulgarian Exarchate instituted.
- 1871 Black Sea clauses of Treaty of Paris annulled.
- 1876 Bulgarian "atrocities."
- 1876 Accession of Abdul Hamid. Turkish Constitution.
- 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War.
- 1878 Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.
- 1878 Formation of Albanian League.
- 1879 Alexander Prince of Bulgaria.
- 1881 Annexation of Thessaly and Arta to Greece
- 1881 Carol King of Rumania.
- 1882 Milan King of Serbia.
- 1885 Union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria.
- 1885 Serbo-Bulgarian War.
- 1886 Abdication of Prince Alexander.
- 1887 Ferdinand Prince of Bulgaria.
- 1890 First Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia.
- 1896 Recognition of Prince Ferdinand by Turkey.
- 1896 Last Cretan insurrection.
- 1897 Græco-Turkish War.
- 1898 Crete autonomous under Prince George.
- 1899 New Albanian League.
- 1899 Macedonian Committee's memorial to Powers.
- 1903 Assassination of Alexander of Serbia. King 'Peter Karageorgevich.
- 1903 Austro-Russian and Murzsteg schemes of reform.
- 1905 British proposals. Financial Commission.
- 1908 "Young Turk" Revolution.
- 1908 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina.*
- 1908 Crete proclaims union with Greece.
- 1908. Bulgaria proclaims independence: Ferdinand Tsar.
- 1909 Venizelos in Athens.
- 1910 Nicolas of Montenegro becomes King.
- 1912-13 First and second Balkan Wars.
- 1913 King George of Greece assassinated: Constantine King.
- 1913 Treaties of London and Bucarest and Turco-Bulgarian Treaty.

- 1914 Prince William of Wied in Albania.
1914 Autonomous government in North Epeiros. Convention of Corfu.
1914, July-Aug. Austria declares war on Serbia. Germany, Russia, France, and England declare war.
1914, Nov. Turkey joins German alliance.
1914, Nov. Cyprus annexed by Great Britain.
1914, Dec. Italy occupies Valona.
1915, Feb. Bombardment of Dardanelles.
1915, Apr.-Dec. Dardanelles expedition.
1915, May. Italy joins the Entente.
1915, Oct. Bulgaria joins Austro-German attack on Serbia.
1915, Oct. Allies occupy Salonika.
1916, Aug. Rumania joins the Entente.
1917, Mar. Russian Revolution.
1917, June Constantine deposed. Greece joins the Entente.

1 FOUNDATION OF NATIONALITIES

(The Eastern question is here treated mainly, if not exclusively, as it affects the States of the Balkan Peninsula, i.e., Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Turkey. The policy and interests of the Great Powers in Europe, Asia, and North Africa are only touched on so far as they directly affect this question.)

Introductory.—The beginning of the "Eastern question" is by some dated from the first appearance of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula; by others from the entry of the Turks into Macedonia, and subsequently into Constantinople. Its modern phase may be said to begin with the decadence of the Turkish Empire in the eighteenth century. This decadence had as its external result the encroachment of Austria and Russia from the north, and the constantly increasing intervention of Western Powers which felt their vital interests to be affected; while internally the weakening of the central authority admitted a growing conscious-

ness of nationality among the subject races, and a desire, as opportunity offered, to throw off the Turkish yoke and to attain independence.

The many problems offered by the Balkan Peninsula are due, in the main, to two causes—firstly, its geographical position on the borders of Europe and Asia, with their incompatible social, religious, and political ideals; secondly, to the succession of various races who have from time to time entered it as conquerors or as settlers, sometimes occupying definite areas, but frequently living side by side, with little mixture or amalgamation, in regions to which none of them can justify any exclusive claim. So long as a vigorous conqueror or a strong central government, such as that of Rome, of the stronger Byzantine Emperors, or of the Turkish Sultans, held them in subjection, they could live side by side in comparative tranquillity. But, as soon as this pressure was removed, they have shown a tendency to racial, dynastic, or national enmities which have led to internecine strife and laid waste the country. At the same time the great economic and commercial importance of the region, as controlling the main trade routes between East and West, affected even distant Powers. This importance, conspicuous in ancient and mediæval times, diminished with the preponderance of sea transport by the Cape; but it has revived again in recent times with the re-opening of the overland routes to India and the East, the construction of the Suez Canal, and the various projects for through railway communication between Europe and Asia.

Ancient History.—The first attempt to solve the Balkan problem may be attributed to the Persians, who tried to annex Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece to their great Asiatic Empire, but were subsequently driven back by the Greeks even from the coasts of Asia Minor. The tables were turned by Alexander, who may be said to have annexed Western Asia to Europe. The empire of Alexander and his successors, with its blend of European and oriental ideals, fell as a heritage to

Rome; but its civilisation, both in the Balkan Peninsula and in Asia Minor, was essentially Greek in character as well as in language.

Foundation of Rumanian Nationality.—An exception, however, must be made in the case of Trajan's conquest of Dacia; for the Roman colonists whom he planted beyond the Danube, mingling with the native Dacians, formed a community which still preserves, in language and in sympathy, and even in its name of Rumania, its connection with the Latin peoples of the West. This community was the first to be submerged by the barbarian inroads from the north and east; but the ancestors of the Rumanians withdrew to the mountains, to emerge again after the flood had subsided, and to produce one of the chief factors of the Balkan problem of the present day.

Byzantine Empire.—When Constantine transferred the centre of the Roman world to Constantinople, he conferred on the imperial city a prestige which it has retained through all subsequent vicissitudes. He renamed the city Constantinople, but its old name was not forgotten; and it is the tradition of the Byzantine Empire that has made, and still makes, the possession of Constantinople to be coveted by so many rival claimants. On the separation of the Eastern and Western Empires, the Balkan Peninsula and the adjacent portions of Asia Minor naturally formed the heart of the Byzantine State. The Patriarch of Constantinople claimed to be the head of "Orthodox" or Greek Christendom, thus exercising a religious and political authority which remained almost unimpaired, through various conquests, until the nineteenth century. But divergences in doctrine and practice, not only between Rome and the East but also between various Eastern parties and Churches, led to dissensions and disunion which, even before the approach of the Mohammedan danger, were tearing Christendom asunder, and effectually hindered any combination against a common enemy.

Foundation of Slav Nationalities.—Some of the

barbarian inroads, which were frequent from the fourth century onwards, were only transitory in their effect on the Balkan region; but others led to permanent settlements, which formed the basis of the various nationalities now found in the peninsula. First among these latter invaders were the Slavs, who appeared in Macedonia towards the end of the sixth century A.D., and spread throughout the Balkan Peninsula until they reached from the Danube right up to the north-east of the Adriatic. In the seventh century the Serbs, a Slavonic people, and the Bulgars, of Mongol or Tartar stock, but with Slavonic admixture and adopting a Slavonic language, entered the peninsula, and settled mainly, though not exclusively, in the countries now called by their names. The first to show a power of political organization were the Bulgarians. Their power reached its zenith under Tsar Simeon, whose empire early in the tenth century extended over almost the whole of the peninsula, except Greece and Southern Macedonia. The temporary revival of the Byzantine Empire under Basil, "the Bulgar-slayer," recovered this region for Byzantium in 1014; but in the next century a second Bulgarian Empire was founded, with Trnovo as its capital. A new danger threatened the Greek Empire from the west in the "Franks," who accompanied the Fourth Crusade, set up, in 1204, a Latin Emperor in Constantinople, and held possession, during the succeeding centuries, of Greece and many other parts of Byzantine territory. The Greek imperial dynasty, established meanwhile at Nicææ, recovered Constantinople in 1261; but the leading Power in the Balkans during the succeeding century was Serbia, which under Stephen Dushan acquired an empire, with its capital at Skoplye (Usküb), extending from the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth. It was against the Serbian danger that the Byzantine Emperor called in the aid of the Turks, and thereby diverted their energies in a direction that gave another century's respite to Constantinople.

2. THE TURKS IN EUROPE

Entry of Turks.—The Ottoman Turks, when they succeeded to the empire of the Seljuks in Asia Minor, knew how to take advantage of the political and administrative powers of the Greeks. Osman married his son to a Christian girl, and it has even been said that he “laid on Christian foundations the strength of his dynasty and his State.” The vitality of the Ottoman nation has been in great measure due to such assimilation and actual transfusion of blood from subject races, notably in the case of the tribute of children and the formation of the corps of the Janissaries. In 1365 the Turks established their capital at Adrianople: in 1389 the disastrous defeat at Kosovo placed the Serbians at their mercy. Trnovo, the Bulgarian capital, was captured in 1393, and the Bulgarian Patriarchate abolished. Soon afterwards the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, except Greece and the immediate dependencies of Constantinople, fell into the power of the Turk, who was to exercise an unchallenged supremacy until the nineteenth century. Salonika in 1430, and Constantinople in 1453, shared the fate of the provinces they once had governed; and the Turks succeeded, in appearance as well as in fact, to the Eastern Empire. The Franks held out about a century longer in Greece and the islands; Rhodes was captured in 1522, Cyprus in 1571, and Crete in 1669. There is no need here to follow the expansion and subsequent shrinkage of Ottoman conquests in Europe, Asia, and North Africa. The highest point was reached about 1520, when, after acquiring the control of the sacred cities of the Hejaz, the Sultan of Turkey claimed the Caliphate, a title which, though not undisputed, is of the highest importance to the present day.

Intervention of Western Powers; French Privileges.
—The Great Powers of Western Europe, with their

¹ D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans*, p. 325.

growing interests—commercial, political, and religious—in the East, could not long remain indifferent to the fortune of the rulers of Constantinople. During the earlier years of the Turkish Empire, though Venice took a leading part in fighting the Turks, the privileges granted under the Byzantine Empire to Venetian and other western merchants were renewed, and as the Turks themselves had no inclination or ability for commerce, much of the business of the chief ports was in the hands of “ Frank ” settlers, who usually lived in special quarters. Owing to the discrepancy between Oriental and European ideals of justice and administration, such communities came to desire extra-territorial rights; these were granted by the “ capitulations ” to the French in 1535, when Francis I, to the scandal of Christendom, made the first French alliance with Turkey, and when France was granted special privileges in connection with the Holy Places in and around Jerusalem, renewed on several occasions, notably in 1740 (p. 10). In 1607 it was agreed that Christians of all nations not represented at Constantinople by an Ambassador should be under French protection. Such intervention in the affairs of Turkey has given rise to many of the most serious episodes in the later relations between Turkey and the Powers. England acquired special capitulations in 1583, and again in 1675; and other Powers subsequently gained similar privileges.

Since 1607 France has from time to time claimed to be the official protector of Christians established in Turkey; but the claim has not been generally admitted. The claim of Austria to protect Roman Catholics dates from 1689, and that of Russia to protect Orthodox Christians from 1739. Recently, since 1880 and more especially since 1904, Italy has claimed the right to protect Italian missionaries.

Decline of Ottoman Empire. Austrian Protection of Catholics.—The successive defeats by which the Ottoman Power in Europe, after overrunning Hungary and twice, in 1529 and 1683, reaching the walls of Vienna, was driven back within the limits of the Balkan

Peninsula, affect the Eastern question most directly through the rights acquired by the Great Powers, especially Austria and Russia, to intervene in Balkan affairs. Thus, in 1689, Turkey had to recognise an Austrian protectorate of the Albanian Catholics, and by the Treaty of Karlowitz, in 1699, to promise protection to the Catholic religion within her borders, together with the proviso that the Austrian Ambassador might address complaints and requests to the Porte, both as to religion and as to the visits of pilgrims to the Holy Places at Jerusalem. These rights were confirmed by the Treaties of Passarowitz (1718) and Belgrade (1739) between Turkey and Austria. Austria had meanwhile received large accessions of Serbian immigrants, who had fled from Turkish oppression in the middle of the sixteenth century. The relations thus established between the Slavs in Austria and those beyond the Turkish frontier have ever since offered a difficult problem, and have exercised great influence on both sides of the border. The Treaty of Passarowitz, in 1718, was concluded by the mediation of Great Britain and Holland—an early instance of the intervention of Western Powers in Balkan arrangements. Austria acquired by it a considerable part of the Danubian principalities, Bosnia, and Serbia. On the other hand, Venice finally withdrew from the Morea and the Greek Archipelago, which remained for another century under the Turks; she retained, however, the Ionian Islands and her conquests in Albania and Dalmatia.

3 ADVANCE OF RUSSIA

Approach of Russia.—A new phase of the Eastern question began with the nearer approach of the Russians, who were bound by ties both of race and of religion to many of the subject peoples of European Turkey, and were already seeking an outlet to the Black Sea. So early as 1711, relations were established between Russia and Montenegro, a rapproche-

ment which had far-reaching effects on later. Acting in concert with Austria, Russia claimed in 1739 the north coast of the Black Sea from the Danube to the Caucasus, with the right of navigation in the sea and through the straits. But France, who had already, in 1684, subsidised the Sultan against a "holy alliance," intervened in support of what was to be her settled policy from this time on—the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. By the Treaty of Belgrade (1739) Austria had to give up all her possessions in the Balkan Peninsula. Russia agreed to retire from the Black Sea, and Russian trade in that sea was to be carried in Turkish ships, she, made, however, a stipulation for the protection of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Places. French prestige and influence in Turkey were greatly increased by this treaty. The renewed "capitulations" of 1740 gave many privileges to French subjects in the Ottoman dominions, including that control of the Holy Places in Palestine which was to be the immediate cause of the Crimean War.

Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Schemes of Catherine of Russia.—Russia, after this temporary set-back, made further advances in the Balkan region between 1769 and 1774; and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (App. I), in the latter year, marks an epoch. By it Russia gained command of the whole north coast of the Black Sea, the right of free commercial navigation in that sea, and the establishment of a permanent Russian Embassy in Constantinople; she also acquired a right to protect all Orthodox Christians in Turkey, and even, in the case of the Danubian principalities and the islands, to require better government as well as a free exercise of religion. In 1783 the Crimea was formally annexed. But Russia did not operate from the north only. She sent a fleet into the *Ægean*, which, with the help of British officers, inflicted several defeats upon the Turks; and her emissaries stirred up, in 1770, an insurrection in the Morea, which, though suppressed at the time, anticipated the events of fifty years later. The Empress Catherine, in conjunction with Austria

even drew up a grandiose scheme for the dismemberment of European Turkey and the revival of the Greek Empire in Constantinople. The scheme came to nothing, but by the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 Russia retained all she had won, and her frontier was advanced to the Dniester. These Russian acquisitions excited the apprehensions of the younger Pitt, who tried, in 1788 and 1790, without much success, to arouse attention to them both in England and outside it.

Napoleonic Era.—The Napoleonic era brought a respite to the decaying Ottoman Empire, firstly by distracting Russia from her southerly advance, and secondly through the rivalry of France and England, which led each of them in turn to threaten and to support the Power holding the gate of the East. Napoleon's project of a French empire in the East led him to Egypt; and he secured the Ionian Islands in 1797 as an intermediate post of essential importance. The Venetian possessions on the Dalmatian coast passed to Austria by the Treaty of Campo Formio in the same year. The battle of the Nile in 1798, and the defeat of the French in Egypt in 1801, restored the prestige of England in the Levant; and the integrity of Turkey was guaranteed by the Peace of Amiens in 1802. But Napoleon's Eastern schemes were not abandoned; by a secret clause of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, and at a conference with the Russian Tsar at Erfurt in 1808, a partition of the Turkish territory in Europe was contemplated. France was to obtain Albania, Greece, the Ægean Islands, the chief seaports of Asia Minor, Egypt, and perhaps Syria: Russia was to acquire the Danubian principalities and adjacent territory; while Austria was to receive accessions in the north and west of the Balkan Peninsula. But it was found impossible to come to an agreement as to Constantinople and the Dardanelles, which Russia demanded as essential to her access to the Mediterranean; she refused to be satisfied with the establishment of Constantinople as an independent free city. It is to be noted that this scheme, like that drawn up by Russia and Austria some thirty

years earlier, took no account of the principle of nationality, so strongly to be emphasised in the succeeding period—and this although Prince Czartoriski, one of the earliest advocates of Panslavism, had at the time a leading position in the counsels of Russia. It had, however, no practical result, and Napoleon soon had his hands full elsewhere. The Ionian Islands, despite his belief in their military value to France, became an independent State under the protection of Russia and Turkey in 1800, and passed to Great Britain in 1815. The French occupied Cattaro from 1807 to 1813, when it was captured by the Montenegrins with British help, but was soon afterwards returned to Austria.

The Eastern question was ignored by the Congress of Vienna, and affairs in Turkey were left to settle themselves, though Castlereagh had suggested that the Powers should give a territorial guarantee of the general settlement, in which the dominions of the Porte were to be included. The French Revolution and its sequel had, however, deeply impressed the Balkan peoples; and, although their aspirations were constantly opposed by the reactionary forces represented in the Congress, they could no longer be restrained.

State of Balkan Peoples at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century.—Before proceeding to the epoch of national revivals and wars of independence which mark the next century in the Balkans, it seems advisable to make a brief survey of the position of the various peoples concerned at the beginning of this period.

Montenegro alone, secure in its mountain fastnesses, had never submitted to the Turks, though constantly at war with them; and its independence was recognised by a firman of 1799. All the rest of the peninsula, south of the Austrian and Russian frontiers, was under Turkish rule, though some portions of it possessed a more or less independent administration.

Moldavia and Wallachia.—Moldavia and Wallachia were governed by a succession of Constantinopolitan Greek princes, whose rule was unpopular among the

Rumanian population, and who did little or nothing for the development of the country. The people consequently looked to their northern neighbour for help against Turk and Greek alike, while Russia acquired treaty rights of protecting the religion and political interests of the people of these provinces; up to this time it was geographical proximity rather than racial affinities which dictated her policy. She repeatedly occupied the country during the war with Turkey, and in 1812, by the Treaty of Bucarest, annexed the district of Bessarabia, under which name was included the part of Moldavia lying between the Dniester and the Pruth.

In connection with Moldavia and Wallachia, later to be united as Rumania, must be mentioned the *Vlachs*, or Koutso-Vlachs, who speak a Romance language closely allied to Rumanian. They are found mostly on Mount Pindus, in Thessaly, and in south Albania, and have recently been the object of nationalist propaganda on the part of the Rumanians, who claim them as kinsmen. Their origin is obscure, and they have frequently been classified as Greek; most of them speak that language as well as their own; they have no separate religious organization, but belong to the Greek Orthodox Church. It has been suggested that they are, like the Rumanians, survivors of the original inhabitants Latinised by Roman colonists, as no Rumanian migration into their districts is recorded.

Bulgaria.—The rest of the Balkan Peninsula was divided into provinces under Turkish governors, though none of the subject peoples had entirely forgotten its ancient or mediæval traditions, and some more or less successful efforts at national and literary revivals had been made in the eighteenth century. But so far all attempts to throw off the Turkish yoke had been defeated. Bulgaria, as lying nearest the centre of Turkish rule, was the most completely suppressed, and consequently was the last to recover any degree of independence. With the exception of such nobles and peasants as adopted Islam at various periods, the

Bulgarians remained Christians, but under the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Serbia.—Serbia was in proximity to Austria, which had actually occupied a large portion of Serbian territory from 1718 to 1739, and included within her borders many Serbian refugees and other kindred peoples; the example and help of Montenegro, whither many of the Serbian landowners who remained Christian had migrated, were also close at hand. The peasants had mostly retained their Christian religion, but the land was in the possession of Moslem converts. Both alike were oppressed by the Janissaries, who, especially the more turbulent of them, were sent away from Constantinople into this remote district. The Serbians might have been content to remain under the rule of the Sultan; it was not against this, but against the Janissaries, that they raised the insurrection which was finally to lead them to independence.

Albania.—The fierce mountaineers of Albania, constantly at feud both with one another and with their Christian neighbours, had never been completely subjugated by the Turks. But many of them had turned Moslems, chiefly in order to retain the privilege of bearing arms; and they became in many ways a privileged people. They served in the Turkish army on special terms; they long supplied the Sultan's bodyguard; and many of them were settled in different parts of the Balkan Peninsula to overawe or to replace the Christian population. A considerable number of Albanians had at various times migrated into Greece, where they rapidly became assimilated, and contributed in no small degree to the success of the Greek war of independence. In the south of Albania also, where Greek was used as the official language, the native population had become more or less completely Hellenised; Yanina, in particular, was for a long time an important centre of Greek educational and literary activity. The Albanians had only occasionally shown any power of combining together, notably under George Kastriotis (Skanderbeg)

in 1443-67. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the famous Ali Pasha, who had been appointed Pasha of Yanina in 1788, had practically united the whole of Southern Albania under his rule, until he finally defied the Sultan and was overthrown and assassinated in 1822. His action had no small influence on the outbreak of the Greek insurrection in 1821. Ali's contemporary, Mustapha Pasha Bushati, acquired almost equal power and influence as ruler of Northern Albania; but this also was ephemeral.

Greece.—If Bulgaria and Serbia were inspired by recollections of their earlier history, still more was this the case with the Greeks, who were proud of the classical traditions of their race, and claimed a more direct succession to the glories of the Byzantine Empire. Not only could they lay claim to that empire as Greek in language and traditions, but, even after it had fallen to the Turks, Greek officials had retained a considerable degree of power in its administration. Above all, the Greek Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was head of the Orthodox Church throughout the Turkish dominions; and Greek and Christian had come to be used as almost synonymous terms. The prestige and power thus acquired by the Greeks were a great advantage to them; but they also led to much jealousy and resentment on the part of less privileged Christian races, whose desire for ecclesiastical liberation from the Greeks was as keen as their wish for political independence of the Turks. The Greeks not only inhabited the present Greek Kingdom and the islands and coast of Asia Minor, but they also formed rich and intelligent communities in Constantinople, Odessa, and many other European cities; and the influence of these "Greeks outside Greece" has always been an important factor in the progress and policy of the Greek people.

4. RISE OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Wars of Independence; Serbia.—The first of the Balkan peoples to attain virtual independence,

under a ruler of their own choosing, were the Serbians. Their insurrection under Kara George in 1804 was directed against the oppression of the Janissaries. After it had attained its object, however, they offered to place themselves under the protectorate first of Austria and then of Russia; but they had to submit again to Turkish rule in 1812, only gaining by the Treaty of Bucarest a promise of a certain measure of self-government. A second rising in 1815 led to the recognition by all the headmen of Milosh Obrenovich as their chief, with hereditary rights, in 1817; but he was not formally invested as hereditary prince by the Sultan until 1830. Serbian politics have ever since been complicated by the rivalry of the dynasties of Karageorgevich and Obrenovich. Independence of Turkish suzerainty was not attained until the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Ecclesiastical independence of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was attained in 1831, when the Serbian Church became autocephalous under the Metropolitan of Belgrade.

Greece.—The turn of the Greeks came next, and they aimed from the first at emancipation from the Turkish yoke. Their chief centre of organization was the "Friendly Society," which had many branches outside Greece. An invasion of the Danubian provinces in 1821, under Alexander Ypsilantes, was easily suppressed; but better success attended a simultaneous rising in the Morea, and continued until Mehemet Ali of Egypt sent a strong force to the assistance of the Turks in 1825. The Western Powers at first showed little official sympathy with the insurgents; but Philhellene volunteers, especially British and French, came to their assistance, and contributed in no small degree to the success of their arms, both by land and sea, as well as to a strong movement of public feeling in their favour; London and Paris could not forget the debt of the civilised world to ancient Greece. These considerations, combined with a jealousy of Russia's separate intervention, induced France and England to send a naval expedition

to the Levant and to enforce an armistice. The three combined fleets, acting on the circumstances of the moment, inflicted on the Turkish fleet at Navarino a crushing defeat, which again turned the fortunes of the war in favour of the Greeks (1827). French troops were landed in the Morea, and the insurgents gained further successes, while the forces of Turkey were diverted to meet a new Russian invasion of the Danubian provinces. In the resultant Treaty of Adrianople, in 1829, the independence of Greece was one of the stipulations. The frontiers of the new nation, drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta, and including the islands of the archipelago, but excluding Crete, were fixed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, who acted in common, then, as later, as the three protecting Powers (App. II).

By the Protocol of London (1830) Greece was recognised as an independent monarchical State. Its government had already given rise to serious difficulties; presidents of Greek origin and the requisite experience, such as the Phanariote Mavrokordatos and the Corfiote Capo d'Istria, had been unable to impose their authority upon their fellow-countrymen. It was consequently agreed to adopt the policy ever since followed, as occasion arose in the emergence of a Balkan State from Turkish domination, of setting over it as king or prince a junior member of some dynasty of Northern or Western Europe. The choice in this case finally fell on Otto of Bavaria, who was accordingly installed as King of Greece, with the support of Bavarian Ministers and a body of Bavarian troops. The new kingdom, however, only included a comparatively small proportion of the Greeks in the Turkish Empire; and ample scope was left for Greek irredentism, which formed during the succeeding century the mainspring of the nation's policy.

The Treaty of Adrianople had other important consequences elsewhere. In Wallachia and Moldavia, where in 1822 the Phanariote Greeks had been replaced by princes of native origin, a Russian

protectorate was established; and the rights of Turkey as suzerain were limited to a monetary tribute and the right of investiture of the princes, who were to be elected by national assemblies and to hold office for life. From this time onward French sympathies, already encouraged by the Greek princes, grew rapidly stronger with the growing consciousness of Latin nationality, and have ever since characterised the feelings of the Rumanian people. The treaty also secured freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and in the Straits for merchant ships proceeding to or from Russia; but the Dardanelles remained closed to men-of-war, as agreed by the Treaty of Constantinople between Great Britain and Turkey in 1809.

Turkish Reforms; Russian Advance; Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.—At this time the Ottoman Empire was threatened not only with partition from without, but by disintegration from within. Its powerful vassals, Mehemet Ali in Egypt and Ali Pasha in Yanina, had set up what were virtually independent States. The drastic reforms of the Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) and the extermination of the Janissaries in 1826 gave new life to the Turkish power; but for a time they weakened and disorganized its military efficiency. Russia profited by the opportunity to assert more strongly her claims to predominance in the Balkans. By the Convention of Akkerman in 1826 she was recognised as protector of the Serbs and of the Danubian Principalities. During the revolt of Mehemet Ali of Egypt she came to the assistance of Turkey, and obtained as her reward, in 1833, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (App. III), which constituted the high-water mark of her influence at Constantinople.

This was nominally a defensive alliance between the two countries; but by a secret clause Turkey undertook to close the Dardanelles against the warships of all other nations except Russia, thereby overriding the treaty of 1809, by which the Straits were closed to all

warships. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi caused the gravest apprehensions in England and France; and from that time on the "integrity of the Turkish Empire" became an essential part of the "balance of power" which was the dominating factor in European policy. After several years of stormy and complicated negotiations, the Treaty of London of 1841 was concluded between England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, these five Powers giving joint sanction to an arrangement by which any separate protectorate over Turkish subjects, whether on the part of Russia or of France, was repudiated. As perfect equality before the law had been declared between all Ottoman subjects, of whatever religion or sect, by the Tanzimat of 1839, the need for such external protection appeared to be abolished. Turkey recovered Syria, Crete, and Arabia from Mehemet Ali; and the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were again closed to all foreign ships of war so long as the Turkish Empire was at peace (App. IV).

Events leading up to Crimean War.—Russia did not long acquiesce in her rebuff of 1841, but again began to press her claim to a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Matters were brought to a head by a dispute as to the custody of the Holy Places in Syria with the French, who claimed rights accorded to them by the capitulations of 1535 and 1740. The causes of the Crimean War must, however, be sought in the determination of England and France to check Russian aggression in the Balkan region. Turkey had to make concessions to France, backed by other Catholic Powers, as to the Holy Places; but Russia protested, and Prince Menshikoff was sent to Constantinople to reassert the Russian claim to a general protectorate over all Orthodox Christians in the Levant. In 1853 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe returned to Constantinople. The Tsar, anxious to come to a separate understanding with England, represented that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was imminent, and proposed to occupy Constantinople, offering

Crete and Egypt as compensation to England. This offer was refused; and France also, under Napoleon III, adopted an uncompromising attitude. Russia thereupon occupied the Danubian principalities; not, it was explained, as an act of war, but as a material guarantee of her rights. An attempt to avert war was made; and representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia met at Vienna, and presented a joint note to Russia and Turkey reaffirming the adherence of the Porte to the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji and Adrianople "relative to the protection of the Christian religion." This last phrase, however, was ambiguous; and the Porte, instigated by the British Ambassador, proposed to make them clear by the insertion of the words "by the Sublime Porte" after "the Christian religion." This did not satisfy Russia, and war became inevitable. The Russian forces withdrew from the principalities before the Turkish attack, and they were occupied during the war, under an arrangement with the Porte, by an Austrian army. The objects of the Crimean War, as defined by Lord Clarendon, were to deprive Russia of the treaty rights in virtue of which she had occupied the principalities; to guard Turkey against attack from the Russian navy in the Black Sea; to secure the free navigation of the Danube by removing Russia's uncontrolled possession of the principal mouth; and to remove the ambiguity in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji as to "the protection of the Christian religion."

Action of Balkan States during Crimean War.
—The history of the war is too familiar to need repetition; but an event of great significance is the adherence of Sardinia to the alliance, thereby entitling Italy to a place in the Concert of Europe on the Eastern question. The effect of the war on the different States and peoples of the Balkan Peninsula varied considerably in accordance with their interests and sympathies. Greece was in sympathy with Russia, and showed a desire to seize the opportunity

of annexing Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, a design which was thwarted by the occupation of the Piræus from 1854-57 by Anglo-French troops. Serbia was at the time under the influence of Austria, and was under obligations to both sides. The Prince was on the side of the English, who had supported his recognition, and of the Turks; the people were mainly pro-Russian. The country organized its army, but maintained an armed neutrality; as a reward, it obtained a collective guarantee from the Powers. Montenegro, in accordance with its traditions, was even more in favour of Russia; the Prince had difficulty in restraining his subjects, and hostilities against the Turks actually took place. Turkey offered to give the Prince Herzegovina and a Turkish title in return for an acknowledgment of suzerainty; but he could not go so far. Albania had no collective policy; the Mirdites, under their Prince, joined the Turks. Bulgaria and Macedonia had, as yet, no independent existence. Wallachia and Moldavia played a passive part, first offering a battleground to Russians and Turks, and then submitting to Austrian occupation. Their destiny, as one of the immediate causes of the war, was decided by the Treaty of Paris (App. V).

Treaty of Paris.—The Treaty of Paris, in 1856, is notable as the first example of an agreement between Turkey and the six great European Powers which have since formed the Concert of Europe on the Eastern question. Great Britain, France, Sardinia, Turkey, and Russia had actively participated in the war, and Austria indirectly by her occupation of the principalities; Prussia was also represented. The Six Powers declared the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System of Europe. An attempt was made to settle the main questions which had given rise to the war by a guarantee, on the part of the Six Powers, of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and a statement that they would consider any

act of violation a question of general interest (App. VI). It is to be observed

" that it was a common or collective, and not an individual, guarantee; and, as no Power other than one of the six was likely to make a serious attack upon Turkey, there was little value in the guarantee, though no doubt the statement that any attack upon Turkey would be a question of general interest might afford a justification for any one or more of the Six Powers assisting Turkey in the event of an attack by any of the other Powers. . . By Article 9 it was stated that note was taken of a communication by the Sultan of the firman which he had issued for the benefit of his Christian subjects, and the firman was welcomed. But it was stipulated that this was to give the Powers no right to interfere collectively or separately in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of Turkey. . . Nevertheless, from that date till the Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, the Christian Powers who had come to the assistance of Turkey in the Crimean War and the other Congress Powers felt themselves bound in honour from time to time, as special outbreaks of misgovernment, injustice, or cruelty on the part of the Porte towards its Christian subjects occurred, to offer remonstrances."¹

It was repeatedly stated during this period that no Power sought or would seek any exclusive influence in the fulfilment of these common obligations, France alone reserving her rights as to the Holy Places in Palestine.²

By Articles 22 and 27 the positions of Moldavia and Wallachia were regulated, and a national convention was to be held in each province to decide their definite organization, which was placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers; this organization included

¹ Sir W. G. F. Phillimore, *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace* (London, 1917), p. 78.

² The question has appeared in a new form since the beginning of the present century, owing to the formal recognition secured by certain Powers for their religious, charitable, or educational institutions in Turkey. Between 1901 and 1908 this was done by France, Russia, Germany, and Britain. After 1904 Italy sought to secure protection over her Catholic missions, but France has never renounced her privileges in this matter, especially in Syria.

the establishment of a national armed force. They were, however, to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte. Southern Bessarabia was ceded by Russia to Moldavia. The rights of Serbia were similarly guaranteed, though the word suzerainty is not used in this case. By Articles 10-14 the provisions of previous treaties as to closing the Straits to ships of war were renewed; the Black Sea was neutralised, and no naval arsenals were to be established or maintained on its coast by either Turkey or Russia; its waters were to be open to the mercantile marine of all nations; but no ships of war were to be allowed upon it, except light vessels used by the embassies and police vessels for the Danube.

Dardanelles Question.—These restrictions were offensive to Russia, who seized the opportunity offered by the Franco-German War of 1870 to claim their abrogation.¹ This was done by the Treaty of London in 1871, but a provision was annexed that the Porte might

“open the said Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly or allied Powers, in case [it] should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris.”

By a separate treaty, concluded a fortnight after the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain, France, and Austria agreed to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to regard any infringement of it as a *casus belli*.

5. BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA

Further Assertions of Nationality in Balkans.—The next fourteen years after the Treaty of Paris passed without any decisive crisis in the development of the Eastern question; but several significant events took place during this interval, all in the direction of the assertion of nationality on the part of the subject peoples, and their attainment of a further degree of

¹ Appendix VII, VIII.

independence. The national conventions of Wallachia and Moldavia agitated for the union of the two principalities, and, after meeting with opposition, settled the matter themselves by both electing the same prince, Colonel Cuza, with the title Alexander I, and thereby forming for the first time a united Rumania (1859). On Cuza's abdication, in 1866, Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected his successor; and thus Rumania, like Greece, adopted a foreign dynasty. In 1864 the Rumanian branch of the Orthodox Church was declared independent, national, and autocephalous; and this change, though it was not recognised by the Œcumenical Patriarchate until 1885, separated another large body of Orthodox Christians from Greek supremacy.

Greece had been strengthened in 1863 by the expulsion of Otho and the election as King of the Danish Prince George; and with the acquisition of the Ionian Islands, bestowed on Greece by Britain, came a renewal of the guarantee of the Greek territory and Constitution by the three protecting Powers—Britain, France, and Russia. It is on the basis of this guarantee that they have recently asserted the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Greece. Serbia also gained a step forward by obtaining, in 1867, the final withdrawal of Turkish garrisons from Belgrade and other fortresses within her boundaries.

The Bulgarian Exarchate.—The modern, or Macedonian, phase of the Eastern question may be said to begin with the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. The Bulgarians had had no political existence since their subjugation by the Turks in 1393; and the simultaneous abolition of the Bulgarian Patriarchate of Trnovo had left them without any separate religious recognition; all alike were reckoned as Greek Orthodox Christians, and as subject to the Œcumenical Patriarch at Constantinople. The Greeks fully realised the meaning of this new departure; but, in spite of their opposition, the first Exarch was appointed in

1872, to reside, like the Greek Patriarch, at Constantinople. Thus the Bulgarians obtained an ecclesiastical independence for which they had been agitating for about thirty-five years, having even, in 1860, seriously contemplated transferring their allegiance from the Eastern Church to Rome. The new Exarchate, gained chiefly by Russian influence, rapidly led to further successes in the assertion of their submerged nationality; and Europe generally became for the first time aware of the existence of a people which was soon to take an important place in Balkan problems.

Bulgarian "Atrocities": Russo-Turkish War.—The disturbances leading up to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 began, in 1875, with an insurrection in Herzegovina, in the war against Turkey which followed, Serbia and Montenegro were only saved by the intervention of Russia. Another rising, in 1876, in Bulgaria was repressed by irregular troops by means of the notorious Bulgarian atrocities, which alienated the sympathies of the Western Powers from Turkey. The Berlin Memorandum, by Germany, Austria, and Russia, started negotiations which led to a Conference of the Six Great Powers at Constantinople; reforms in administration in the Turkish provinces were proposed, but Turkey refused to accept the two main principles of an International Commission to superintend the carrying out of the reforms and the participation of the Powers in the appointment of the Christian Valis, who were to be named for five years as Governors of the two provinces of Bulgaria; and consequently the Conference broke up without reaching any result. Turkey, during its sittings, took the opportunity to promulgate a new and liberally reformed Constitution for the Ottoman Empire, including representative government. The proposals of the Powers were, however, insisted on by the Protocol of London, but again rejected by the Porte; Russia decided to intervene, and declared war upon Turkey in April 1877.

During the war, Rumania, who normally desired her independence, at first only gave free passage to the Russian armies through her territory, but later she took an active part in the fighting, and contributed in no small degree to its successful issue. Serbia also joined in, after the fall of Plevna, and captured Pirot, Nish, and Vrania; while Montenegro occupied Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno, thus obtaining at last an outlet to the sea. Greece alone of the Balkan States was not a belligerent, being restrained by promises, mainly on the part of England, that her interests would be considered at the conclusion of the war.

Before the conclusion of peace the British Government sent to Russia a Memorandum stating that no treaty made between Russia and Turkey, affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871, would be considered valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties. Consequently, the Treaty of San Stefano was discussed at a Conference held in Berlin in 1878, and was considerably modified by the Treaty of Berlin. The provisions of the two treaties are, therefore, best taken together, so that the effects of these modifications may be appreciated (App. IX, X).

Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin: Bulgaria.—The distinguishing feature of the map of the Balkans, as drawn up by the Treaty of San Stefano, was the new principality of Bulgaria, which was to include not only most of the present Bulgaria, but also nearly the whole of Macedonia, with Pirot, Vrania, Ūsküb (Skoplje), Okhrida, and Monastir on the west, and Koritsa, Kastoria, Yenitsa, and Kavalla on the south, Salonika, the Khalkidike, and Adrianople being excluded. Apart from these exclusions, this "big Bulgaria" has become the ruling ambition of the Bulgarian people, to whom it would have given a strong predominance in the Balkan Peninsula; and it has consequently been the bugbear of all the other Balkan States. Partly in their interests and that of Turkey but still more from fear that the new principality would be under Russian influence, the Berlin Conference

area between the Danube and the region south of that with the name of Eastern Rumelia. In the government and administration of the principality, there was no great difference between the Russian proposals and those accepted by the Conference. The Prince was to be freely elected by the population, and confirmed by the Powers, with the assent of the Powers, members of whose royal houses were ineligible. Before the election of Prince an Organic Law for the principality was to be drawn up by an assembly of notables; and religious freedom was to be assured. A tribute was to be paid to Turkey, whose suzerainty was acknowledged; to this was added, by the Conference, a fair proportion of the Ottoman Public Debt.

The new province of *Eastern Rumelia*, created by the Berlin Conference, was to be "under the direct political and military authority" of the Sultan, "under conditions of administrative autonomy." It was to have a Christian Governor-General, nominated by the Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years. A European Commission was to be formed to arrange its organization.

The independence of *Rumania*, proclaimed in 1877, was recognised by both treaties; but that of Berlin made it conditional on the possession of equal civil and political rights by all persons, whatever their religious creed or profession. The frontier between Russia and Rumania, though they had fought in alliance, was modified by the restoration to Russia of the portion of Bessarabia, north of the Kilia mouth of the Danube, which Russia had ceded to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. Rumania was compensated by obtaining the whole of the Dobruja and a strip to the south of it between Silistria and the Black Sea.

The articles as to the independence of *Serbia* were similar to those affecting Rumania in both treaties, except that Serbia had also to bear a portion of the Ottoman National Debt. The two treaties, however,

differed considerably as to the new territory assigned to her. That of San Stefano had given her not only the district of Nish and the upper valley of the Morava, but also a region to the west of it, extending close to Novibazar and Mitrovitsa. For this western region the Treaty of Berlin substituted the district around Pirot and Vrania, on the south-east, which Serbia had occupied during the war, but which the Treaty of San Stefano assigned to Bulgaria.

The independence of *Montenegro* was recognised by the Porte and by "all those of the High Contracting Parties who had not hitherto admitted it." Her frontiers, according to the Treaty of Berlin, were extended on almost all sides beyond those before the war, though considerably within those proposed at San Stefano. The frontier, as defined at San Stefano, on the north-east side, approached close to the Serbian boundary, leaving only the narrowest of corridors to connect Bosnia with Macedonia; at Berlin this frontier was moved back, so as to leave a larger intervening space, which, as the Sanjak of Novibazar, has since played a prominent part in Balkan arrangements. On the side of the Adriatic, Montenegro retained the port she had acquired at Antivari, though under severe restrictions as to its use; but she had to give up Spizza, which commands it, and Dulcigno; the last she recovered, after further negotiations, two years later.

The rest of *Macedonia*, taken away from the "big Bulgaria" by the Treaty of Berlin, was restored to the Ottoman Empire; but it was stipulated by Article 23 that the Organic Law drawn up for Crete in 1868

"shall also be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe for which no special organization has been provided by the present treaty. The Sublime Porte shall depute special Commissions, in which the native element shall be largely represented, to settle the details of the new laws in each province. The schemes of organization resulting from these labours shall be submitted for examination to the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the Acts for putting them into force, shall consult the European Commission instituted for Eastern Rumelia."

The Congress of Berlin took place in 1878, but it was not until 1880 that the Treaty of Berlin was put into force; and Macedonia remained for the next thirty-five years a constant source of trouble to the Powers, and of intrigue and rivalry among the contending nationalities.

The provinces of *Bosnia* and *Herzegovina* were to be occupied and administered by Austria; the Sanjak of *Novibazar*, separating Serbia from Montenegro, was to continue under Ottoman administration, but to be garrisoned by Austria. By a convention between Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople ten days before the meeting of the Berlin Conference, Cyprus was to be occupied and administered by Britain, on condition that,

“if Batum, Ardahan, or Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.”

Further undertakings on the part of the Porte as to the protection of the Armenians and other Christians were included in the Berlin Treaty.

Greece, not having been a belligerent, was not mentioned in the Treaty of San Stefano; but, in redemption of the promise made to her, an extension of her frontiers in Epeiros and Thessaly was discussed at Berlin and agreed to by all the Powers except Turkey. No decision on the matter was recorded in the treaty, but in the event of Turkey and Greece being unable to agree upon the rectification suggested, the Six Great Powers “reserved to themselves to offer their mediation.” This was accordingly done; and, after protracted negotiations, the new frontier, giving Greece Thessaly and Epeiros as far as Arta, was agreed upon by a convention signed at Constantinople in May 1881

Such were the immediate results of the Treaty of Berlin. It had made a complete change in the map of the Balkan Peninsula, but the position of the subject peoples remaining under Ottoman administration was in no way ameliorated. Soon after, to enhance their prestige, two of the independent States gave to their Princes the title of King—Rumania in 1881 and Serbia in 1882.

Albanian League.—The proposals of the Treaty of San Stefano greatly alarmed the Albanians; and in 1878, by the formation of the Albanian League, yet another Balkan nationality began formally to assert itself. The Albanians, though not showing much power of political coherence, have at least made an effectual protest against the parcelling out of their country among alien and unsympathetic neighbours. In contrast, however, to other Balkan peoples, their aim was not, at this time or later, complete independence, but the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan and the inviolability of his dominions so far as their own district was concerned.

Union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.—The first breach in the compromise agreed upon at Berlin was due to its separation of Eastern Rumelia from Bulgaria. In 1879 Prince Alexander of Battenberg was elected first Prince of Bulgaria, in accordance with the treaty, and his election was confirmed by the Sultan and by the Powers. In Eastern Rumelia there was from the first an agitation for union, which increased as the predominant Russian influence became more unpopular in that province as well as in Bulgaria. Consequently, when, in 1885, the union of the two was proclaimed after a bloodless revolution at Philippopolis, the positions taken up by Russia and England respectively at Berlin were inverted. Russia opposed the union; while England, represented at Constantinople by Sir William White, realized that a strong Bulgaria was a barrier against Russian aggression, and for some years to come gave her support to Stamboloff, now the leading spirit in Bulgarian

of ambassadors at Constantinople, of Tophane, conferred on the Governor Generalship of the Danubian Principalities, and thus the union became an established fact.

The other Balkan States were greatly alarmed at this accession of strength to Bulgaria, in whom both Serbia and Greece saw a formidable rival to their national ambitions. Serbia declared war, but was defeated by the Bulgarians at Slivnitsa, and was only saved from further disaster by the intervention of Austria. The Peace of Bucarest (1855) re-established the *status quo*. Greece was prevented from taking similar action by an international blockade.

In 1886 Prince Alexander was forced by Russian intrigue to abdicate. A year later Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg was elected as his successor, though Russia and Turkey did not withdraw their opposition to his recognition until 1896. Sympathy with Bulgaria on the part of the other Powers had meanwhile been alienated by the assassination of Stamboloff in 1895.

Macedonian Question. During the twenty five years which followed the union of the two Bulgarias, interest in the Near East was mainly centred in the Macedonian question.¹ After the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878 each of the Balkan races was represented by an independent State, which regarded itself as the champion of its unredeemed kinsmen, and set before itself as a national aspiration and policy the inclusion of those kinsmen within its boundaries. These several policies were irreconcilable, partly because the various races inhabiting Macedonia did not occupy separate or clearly-defined areas, still more because it was disputable to which race many communities or families belonged, and no criteria of language, religion, or national sympathy were generally accepted. In these circumstances, almost unlimited

¹ This is more fully treated in *Macedonia*, No. 21 of this series

scope was offered to the various national propaganda organized within the independent States, and exercised in Macedonia, sometimes through schools, churches, peaceful emissaries, and other legitimate means; sometimes by the less defensible method of armed bands or *komitajis*, who too often aimed at forcible conversion. The main influences at work in Macedonia were Greek and Bulgarian. In 1890 Stamboloff obtained the appointment of the first Bulgarian bishops to the sees of Okhrida and Skoplye, and two more were appointed in 1894. The Ecumenical Patriarch protested, but was unable to prevent these appointments, which seriously affected the ecclesiastical predominance of the Greeks. Serbia had an interest in Old Serbia and the region round her historical capital at Skoplye, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other Southern Slav districts. The Koutso-Vlachs or Macedonian Rumanians had started a national propaganda of their own through schools and other means, and had protested against the transfer of the Thessalian Vlachs to Greece. They could hardly, however, look either for independence or annexation to Rumania, nor would they make common cause with any other Balkan people. There were also, in addition to the Moslem sections of the indigenous population, many Turkish or Anatolian settlers, and many Albanian communities, scattered throughout the country, who were strongly interested in the preservation of Turkish rule, as was also the large Jewish community of Salonika and its various local offshoots. The Turks, who delayed indefinitely the reforms agreed on at Berlin made no serious effort to cope with the disorder, but were content to see that none of the rival parties met with sufficient success to give them a chance of attaining their objects; they therefore lent their support from time to time to one or other of the contending nationalities, so long as it was not strong enough to be formidable, and relied on the knowledge that each of the subject races would rather remain under the

transferred to any of its neighbours. The only hopes of improvement lay in the intervention by the Great Powers, such as Greece, to time in a more or less ineffectual manner. In such co-operation of the Balkan States was actually achieved in 1912, but was frustrated earlier by mutual jealousies.

Greece and Crete.—In 1896 an insurrection took place in Crete, and the insurgents demanded union with Greece. This led to Turkey declaring war on Greece in 1897. Bulgaria and Serbia remained neutral. Russia and Austria had bound themselves by a convention not to intervene separately in Balkan affairs. Greece, unaided by her Balkan neighbours, and with no help from the West except a few Philhellene volunteers, was easily defeated, but was saved from disaster by the intervention of the Powers; the only result to her, apart from paying an indemnity, was a small strategic modification of the Thessalian frontier, bringing Turkish territory close to Larissa. Crete, however, attained autonomy in 1898 under a Christian Governor, in the person of Prince George of Greece, who was appointed High Commissioner by the Four Contracting Powers. Germany and Austria had withdrawn from the Concert on this question; and much indignation was felt in Greece against Germany, who had not only trained the Turkish Army, but was by this time openly giving Turkey her sympathy and support. Though Crete did not attain full independence or union with Greece until later, the island was now in a position similar to that of some of the Balkan States; and its part in the Balkan problem has recently become a prominent one, since it has supplied Greece with her greatest statesman and her finest troops.

Projects of Reform in Macedonia.—In 1899 a Macedonian Committee, established in Sofia, addressed a memorial to the Powers advocating a new solution of the Macedonian question. This was the formation of an autonomous Macedonia, with its

capital at Salonika and a Governor-General of the predominant nationality." The proposal, however, though it met with some sympathy in various quarters, did not meet with any official encouragement; and it was viewed with the greatest apprehension by the partisans of the Greeks and others, who saw in it the possibility of a repetition of the history of Eastern Rumelia, and another step towards the realisation of the "big Bulgaria" of the Treaty of San Stefano. Opposition also came from another quarter in a revival of the Albanian League, which had never been dissolved since its foundation in 1878, though mainly carried on by Albanians living abroad. A great meeting of Albanian notables was summoned at Ipek (Pech) to consider the defence of Islam against the disaffected Christian tribes of Old Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; and the new league had the twofold object of defending the Sultan's dominions against all encroachment and of opposing any changes in the administration of Macedonia.

Meanwhile, the condition of Macedonia went from bad to worse, and the moral obligation to further intervention forced itself upon the Great Powers. The Sultan, becoming alarmed at the state of things, appointed Hilmi Pasha Inspector-General of Macedonia, but no great improvement was effected. In 1903 Russia and Austria drew up at Vienna a scheme of reforms which was supported by the other Powers. It included the appointment of an Inspector-General for a number of years, a reorganized gendarmerie of Moslems and Christians, with foreign officers, and separate budgets for each of the three Macedonian vilayets, on the revenues of which the cost of local administration was to be a first charge. The Sultan accepted the scheme, but its only result was to make both Bulgarians and Albanians more aggressive. Accordingly, a new and more drastic scheme, known as the Mürzsteg Programme, was issued by Russia and Austria in October 1903. Russian and Austrian civil agents were attached to Hilmi Pasha; the reorganiza-

tion of the general administration was entrusted to an Italian general, who was assisted by military officers of the other Powers, in the various districts; the administrative and judicial institutions were to be reformed with the participation of the Christian population. This scheme, however, also proved ineffective. The Greek villages had hitherto probably been the chief sufferers, since they were attacked not only by Turkish irregulars but by Bulgarian *komitajis*; and Greek armed bands were sent across the frontier to their assistance. The best of the leaders of these bands were genuine patriots, more concerned to protect and encourage their own sympathisers than to harry or oppress their opponents. The worst were mere brigands, who exploited the situation to kill and plunder in their own interests. The result, in either case, was to add to the general confusion.

At the same time, various incidents had embittered the Rumanians both against the Bulgarians and against the Greeks. The Greeks and Serbians, on the other hand, were drawn together by their common danger into a sympathy that was later to have important results. In 1905, on the proposal of the British Government, a further step was taken by the Powers. An International Commission was appointed to frame financial reforms, and pressure was put upon Turkey to recognise it; the appointments of the Inspector-General and the foreign officials were prolonged for six years. Remonstrances were simultaneously made at Sofia and Athens against the passage of Bulgarian and Greek bands into Macedonia. Before it could be seen whether this enlarged scheme would be any more successful than its predecessors a revolution took place in Turkey which completely altered the aspect of the Macedonian question.

6. TURKISH REVOLUTION AND BALKAN ALLIANCE

Young Turk Revolution.—It had become evident that the policy and diplomacy of Abdul Hamid,

though it had met with many successes, had led to a state of no longer be tolerated either by the autonomous Balkan States. Accordingly, in 1908, the Young matter into their own hands; and Macedonia readily became the "Committee of Union and Progress" in which its own leading officers, the Young Turks abroad, the Jews of Salonika, and even the hitherto Christians played a considerable part. Its effects were rapid and immediate. Constantinople was occupied, and a representative government and a new Constitution and Administration were announced, which were to make no distinction between Moslem, Christian, and Jew, between Turk, Bulgar, and Greek. The subject peoples welcomed the proclamation effusively, and saw in it the end of all their troubles; the Powers withdrew their representatives on the International Commission. In the independent and autonomous States of the Balkans, on the other hand, the change gave rise to considerable apprehensions. Even if all its promises were fulfilled, it would have precluded or postponed indefinitely their several national aspirations to incorporate within their own frontiers their kinsmen in Macedonia and the territory they inhabited. Some of them, especially the Greeks, were sceptical from the first as to the impartial execution of the proposed reforms; and their doubts were justified by the results of the first elections to the Turkish Parliament, which contained only eighteen Greek members. Crete now proclaimed its union with Greece.

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Bulgaria also took a vigorous line of action; its independence of Turkey was proclaimed, and Prince Ferdinand assumed the title of King (or Tsar). Almost contemporaneously—though the exact relation of the two events to each other is obscure, both having been for some time in contemplation—Austria withdrew her

n of the Sanjak of Novibazar, Herzegovina, in contravention of the Treaty of Berlin, which had entrusted the administration, while reserving the Sultan. This act aroused very much Montenegro and Serbia, who saw the possibility of the formation of a great Southern Balkan State, barred by the presence of a Great Power. Austria so protested; and her protest was emphasised by a boycott on Austrian goods. The diplomatic negotiations which followed were lengthy and complicated. Serbia was with difficulty restrained from rash action by England, Russia, and France, while Germany backed Austria. Finally a compromise was reached on the basis of pecuniary compensation to Turkey; and a similar arrangement was made between Bulgaria and Turkey, Russia undertaking to find part of the compensation demanded. In both cases, however, the change had ultimately to be accepted as a *fait accompli*. Montenegro received compensation in a modification of the restrictions under which she held Antivari.

Rival Railway Schemes.—A further complication had been introduced into the Balkan problem, this time of a commercial nature. Austria, which already offered the only outlet for Serbian produce, and so could at any time put pressure on her smaller neighbour, supported a scheme for joining up her railway system in Bosnia, through the Sanjak of Novibazar, with the direct railway to Salonika. Serbia, backed by Russia, supported the rival scheme of a railway joining the Danube with the Adriatic, and thus giving her a new outlet to the sea through Albania. These two cross-pressures—of Austria towards the Ægean and of Serbia towards the Adriatic—have had an important influence on recent developments in the Balkan Peninsula, the bar opposed by any strong combination of Balkan States being the chief obstacle to Germany's avowed policy of penetration and expansion towards Turkey and the East.

Formation of the Balkan
 Turks, however good may have been, some of their leaders, soon as they had hoped so much from their revolution in Constantinople, instead of at the final loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was easily suppressed, and led to the rise of Abdul Hamid. But the promised union of races and creeds, instead of offering an opportunity for the independent and characteristic development of various national ideals, proved to aim at a uniformity, and to mean in reality the turkification of the whole Empire. Such an end was even more antipathetic to the Christian peoples of the Balkan area and to many of the Moslems also, especially the Albanians—than the old Turkish regime; and the various Balkan States at last decided in common to take the matter into their own hands. All of them had profited by recent experiences to increase greatly the numbers and efficiency of their armies. In Greece, to solve internal difficulties, Mr Venizelos had been summoned from Crete; and his advent not only reformed and strengthened the internal affairs of the country, but inaugurated a more enlightened policy of co-operation with the other Balkan States.

As a result of various meetings and negotiations, treaties of alliance and military conventions were arranged between Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece in February and May 1912, providing for joint action against Turkey if a favourable opportunity should arise. The difficulty of the distribution of the territory that might be acquired, in case of success, was foreseen; and, as between Serbia and Bulgaria, an agreement was embodied in a secret annex to the treaty.¹ It was arranged that a condominium should be provisionally established, and that within three

¹ See full texts in Appendix XI, XII, XIII, XIV.

months from the conclusion of peace the acquired territory should be divided on the following bases:—

Serbia recognised the Bulgarian claim to all the region east of Rhodope and the Struma.

Bulgaria recognised the Serbian claim to all the region north and west of the Shar Mountains.

As to the region lying between Shar, Rhodope, the Aegean, and Okhrida, if the formation of an autonomous province should prove impracticable, it was to be divided by a line running approximately south-west from Mount Golem (north of Kriva Palanka) to Lake Okhrida. Serbia claimed nothing beyond this line; and Bulgaria accepted this frontier, if pronounced for by the Emperor of Russia, whose arbitration as to their rights and interests was accepted by both parties.¹

By this proposed division Struga, Skoplye, and Kumanovo were assigned to Serbia; Okhrida, Monastir, and Ishtip to Bulgaria. It is to be noted in this connection that Skoplye was the capital of the historic Serbian Empire, while Okhrida was for some time the Bulgarian capital and the seat of the Bulgarian Patriarchate. No agreement was made as to distribution of territory between Greece and Serbia or Greece and Bulgaria—a fact which influenced both the conduct of the campaigns and all subsequent events. The opportunity awaited came in consequence of the war between Turkey and Italy in Libya and a serious revolt of the Albanians. The Balkan States sent an ultimatum to Turkey, demanding immediate and drastic reforms. The Great Powers warned them that “in case of war they would not admit, as its result, any modification of the territorial *status quo*.”

¹ The “contested zone” is by some writers restricted to the area between the Shar Mountains and the Golem-Okhrida line, though this is not in accordance with the wording of the treaty. The restriction of the contested zone to this area is emphasised in Gueshoff, *The Balkan League* (London, 1915). He gives a map, which marks the area in question as “zone contestée.”

in European Turkey," and on the Porte the carrying out of the Treaty of London. Turkey returned a dilatory delay to the disturbed state of the world. As a result, war was declared on the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Lausanne put an official end to the Turkish War in October 1912.

First Balkan War (1912)—The progress of the campaign was influenced by a considerable number of political considerations, each state occupying regions which it hoped to acquire. The Bulgars attacked in the direction of Thrace, masked the fort of Adrianople, and advanced, after severe fighting, to the Chatalja lines. The Serbians occupied the Sanjak of Novibazar, thus getting into touch with Montenegro, captured Skopje, the capital of Old Serbia, and Monastir, and then turned to Albania, seizing the ports of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo. Montenegro spent most of her efforts on the siege of Scutari. The Greeks advanced from the north of Thessaly, and then turned to Salonika, thus anticipating the Bulgarians in the possession of this coveted port. Their fleet meanwhile occupied all the Turkish islands in the Ægean and off the coast of Asia Minor, except the Southern Sporades, which had been retained by the Italians on the conclusion of the Libyan war. After an armistice in December 1912 and January 1913 hostilities were resumed, and the Bulgarians captured Adrianople with Serbian aid, the Greeks took Yanina and Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins. Meanwhile the assassination of King George of Greece in Salonika on March 18 deprived the Balkan allies of their most cautious and experienced statesman, and involved disaster both immediately and later.

Treaty of London Second Balkan War.—The intervention of the Great Powers led in May, to the signature of the Treaty of London (App. XV), which was never ratified. By this treaty the Balkan allies obtained from Turkey Crete and all territory

Enos-Midia line; but the islands, except Crete, was reserved, and to form an independent kingdom obliged to give up Scutari, Serbia also losing her conquests in this region and its ports. This led to serious difficulties in the partition of the acquired territory among the allies. Serbia claimed that, to compensate for the loss of an outlet to the Adriatic, the line of demarcation agreed on in the secret annexe to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty should be revised, so as to allow her to retain the region she had actually occupied, and acquire a frontier conterminous with Greece, and access to the Aegean at Salonika. Bulgaria insisted on the secret annexe, and also complained that Greece claimed a much larger share of Macedonia than she was entitled to. An appeal to the Tsar's arbitration was rejected; and, Serbia and Greece having concluded an alliance, the Second Balkan War broke out in June 1913. Hostilities were begun by Bulgaria with a simultaneous attack on the Serbs and the Greeks, but the results were disastrous to her in both cases; Turkey seized the occasion to recover Adrianople, and Rumania invaded Bulgaria, demanding a change of frontier in the Dobruja.

Treaty of Bucarest.—Resistance was useless; and by the Treaty of Bucarest Macedonia was partitioned, mainly in accordance with the actual occupation by each State. Montenegro and Serbia divided the Sanjak of Novibazar and became conterminous. Serbia acquired all Old Serbia and also Monastir and the Vardar Valley as far as Gevgeli, thus becoming conterminous with Greece and having an outlet to the Aegean by the railway to Salonika, where she was allowed an extra-territorial enclave by Greece. Greece acquired all the rest of Southern and Western Macedonia, including Salonika and Kavalla. Bulgaria had to content herself with the region north of the Belashitsa Mountains and east of the Mesta River. She had also to cede a considerable portion of the Dobruja to Rumania. Greece, in addition, retained Crete and

the islands, hitherto belonging to the Ottoman Empire, which she had occupied. A separate treaty was made between Bulgaria and Turkey, revising the frontiers of the Treaty of London; by this Agreement was restored to Turkey, and the lower Maritsa River formed the boundary near the sea, Turkey retained rights over the railway in this region (App. XVI, A, 71).

Albania. In accordance with the Treaty of London, Albania was constituted an autonomous principality, and its frontiers were delimited by an International Commission so as to include Scutari on the north and Valona, Argyrokastro, and Koritsa on the south. Prince William of Wied was appointed as its *Mpret*, and arrived at Durazzo in March 1914.

Results of Balkan Wars, Defects of Arrangement. The territorial acquisitions resulting from the war are represented in the following table --

	Sq. Kilom.	Inhabi- tants	Total After 1913	
			Sq. Kilom.	Inhabi- tants.
Bulgaria: Gained from Turkey	25,257	656,535		
Ceded to Rumania . .	7,525	282,131		
Net gain.	17,732	374,404	114,017	4,711,917
Greece: Gained from Turkey	55,400	2,066,647	120,060	4,698,599
Serbia. " " "	39,000	1,750,000	87,300	4,600,000
Montenegro: " " "	5,100	150,000	14,180	435,000
Rumania: " " Bulgaria	7,525	282,131	145,427	7,791,140

The whole arrangement was a compromise, which satisfied none of the parties concerned, and left many stumbling blocks in the way of any satisfactory settlement. The Greeks though the greatest gainers on the whole, were cut off from North Epeiros, and started a vigorous propaganda and an autonomous Provisional Government in that region; their claims were partially recognised by the Convention of Corfu in May 1914. They also resented bitterly the Italian occupation of

the Southern Sporades (Rhodes, Kos, and the Dodekanese), which, though nominally only provisional, prevented the annexation of these almost entirely Greek islands to the Greek Kingdom.

Bulgaria, though her rulers were immediately responsible for the Second Balkan War, naturally resented its result; for she obtained the smallest share of the conquered territory, while her expenditure in men and money had been the largest, and she had borne the brunt of the fighting against Turkey. Consequently, she watched for an opportunity of enforcing her claims in Macedonia, and of retaliating on her former allies, Serbia and Greece. When, in 1915, she joined the alliance of the Central Powers, she recovered, by an arrangement with Turkey, a district west and south of Adrianople, with the line of the Maritsa and the railway along its western bank; but Turkey remained dissatisfied. Bulgaria also looked to regain all, and more than all, she had to cede to Rumania in the Dobruja.

II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. POPULAR OPINION AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

The question of national sentiment is of paramount importance in any attempt to settle the Eastern Question upon a firm basis. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to make any general statement as to this sentiment in the Balkan Peninsula, because the various Balkan peoples are, save for a few individual statesmen, so much wrapped up in their respective national ambitions or interests that it is premature to look to them for wider views on questions affecting the Balkans as a whole. It will, therefore, be convenient to consider, first, the sentiments of the several Balkan States or districts, and afterwards to see how far their aspirations are mutually exclusive, or admit of any common realisation or compromise.

Albania.—National sentiment in Albania is fully treated in No. 17 of this series, and need only be briefly summarised here. The desire of the Albanians has always been for local independence, rather than for any form of national unity; they were, on the whole, contented with the Turkish regime, under which they held a privileged position, and which usually left them free to follow their tribal customs, and to indulge in feuds among themselves and raids upon their neighbours. The Treaty of San Stefano alarmed them by its proposals to assign considerable districts of Albania to neighbours alien both in race and in religion; and the efforts of the Albanian League (which, however, it must be remembered, was engineered and led from Stambul) were directed to defending the sovereignty of the Sultan against foreign interference, and

quelling the disaffection of the Christian peoples of Macedonia. The Albanians welcomed the Young Turk revolution, so long as it appeared to offer the opportunity of independent development under a strong Turkish Government; but, when the policy of turkification set in, it found among them its most bitter opponents. Yet, even so late as 1911, they asked for the inclusion of all Albania in a single Turkish vilayet. When the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 isolated them from Turkey they received an independent government under a foreign prince. But the experiment was not tried under fortunate conditions; and the new State disintegrated before it was organized.

Bulgaria.—The Bulgarians had for some time desired liberation from the Turkish yoke politically, and from the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch ecclesiastically; but their territorial aspirations first took a definite form in the proposals of the Treaty of San Stefano, which assigned to them, especially in Macedonia, many districts to which the Serbians, Greeks, or Albanians also laid claim. This "big Bulgaria" was greatly curtailed at the Berlin Congress. After the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, a propaganda was vigorously carried on in those parts of Macedonia which the Bulgarians claimed as akin to themselves in race and sympathy. In the negotiations preceding the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Bulgarians accepted a compromise with Serbia, whereby Okhrida and Monastir were to be assigned to Bulgaria; in Eastern Macedonia they succeeded, during the First Balkan War, in occupying some of the region which they claimed; but the Greeks anticipated them at Salonika.

The distribution resulting from the Second Balkan War and the Treaty of Bucarest was bitterly resented by the Bulgarians, and its alteration was one of their main objects in entering the European war. By the Treaty of London they were also to acquire the district of Adrianople as far as the Enos-Midia line, a district which they had occupied after heavy fighting, and

which contained a considerable proportion of Bulgarians; this also was lost in the Second War.

Greece.—The national sentiment of the Greeks is dominated by two ideas—the memory of the ancient glory of Greece and of the Byzantine Empire, and the desire to liberate their unredeemed kinsmen and to incorporate them in the kingdom. The foundation of the Greek State was due in great measure to the inspiration of classical traditions and the sympathy and help those traditions elicited from western Europe; and the limited area of the kingdom, which, even after its enlargement in 1913, only includes about half the Greeks resident in the Levant, made an irredentist propaganda inevitable.

Though the co-operation of the Balkan States was achieved in the First Balkan War of 1912, the Second War, and the Treaty of Bucarest, while drawing Greece and Serbia together, widened the gulf between them both and Bulgaria; and the European War has widened it still further. Constantine XII, as the Greeks liked to call him, was regarded as the successor not only of Constantine XI, but also of Basil the Bulgar-slayer; and M. Venizelos risked a loss of popularity and influence when he advocated the conditional transfer of Kavalla to Bulgaria. It is difficult to follow recent fluctuations in Greek feeling, but it would be hard to overestimate, in regard to this matter, the influence of the Asiatic Islands, and, above all, of Crete, which has exercised a regenerating and organizing influence throughout the Greek Kingdom. The old aspirations survive; but probably they are now more amenable than formerly to the wise and statesman-like guidance of M. Venizelos.

Macedonia.—Popular sentiment in Macedonia is divided on much the same lines as in the Balkans as a whole, since this district—formally divided in 1913 between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria—contains representatives of each of the main Balkan nationalities. The difficulty arises in regions where nationalities are mixed, or the character of the prevailing nationality is

in dispute, above all in the large area inhabited by the Slavonic people, claimed as Bulgars by the Bulgarians, and called Macedo-Slavs by the advocates of Serbia. Whatever their origin, these people have been the subject of vigorous and often violent racial propaganda during the last half-century. While, however, there are many violent partisans, especially among priests and schoolmasters, it is said to be not uncommon in mixed villages for different members of the same family to adopt different nationalities, or even for a family to change its name and nationality, according to circumstances. The desire of the majority of the peasants is probably for peace and orderly government, after so many successive wars, more than for any particular assignments of territory.

The numerous Turks and other Moslems in Macedonia probably realise by this time that no restoration of Turkish rule is practicable. Many, especially among the richer classes, have emigrated to Turkey; to those that remain it is a matter of comparative indifference to which State they are assigned, except in so far as some of the older population, who have turned Moslem, preserve their original racial sympathies.

Montenegro.—There seems no doubt that the popular feeling in Montenegro, as in Serbia, is in favour of Jugo-Slav unity. The pride of the Montenegrins in keeping their mountain sanctuary inviolate has always been associated with sympathy for their less fortunate kinsmen and with efforts to help them in their revolts against alien oppression.

Serbia, the first of the Balkan States to obtain autonomy, has always been confined within more or less artificial boundaries, and has consequently sought opportunities to include within her limits the regions occupied by her kinsmen outside. Her desire was inspired also by the recollection of the old empire of Stephen Dushan, with its capital at Skoplye; it has recently taken a wider scope in the great movement for the unity of the Jugo-Slavs. The regions inhabited by Serbs or their near kinsmen, outside Serbia and

Montenegro, were partly under Turkish rule, partly included in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The reversion of the former was confidently expected by Serbia; and consequently the formal transference of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkish rule to that of Austria in 1908 caused great excitement in the country and almost led to war. Down to 1912 the two chief aspirations of Serbia were the acquisition of "Old Serbia" and of an outlet to the sea. Both seemed to be realised during the Balkan War of 1912-13; and the disappointment of Serbia was accordingly great when the Powers intervened against her possession of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo. Since then, however, the great Jugo-Slav idea, with all its possibilities of political and commercial expansion, has dominated all minor considerations.

Rumania has also her irredentist problem, complicated, as in the case of Serbia, by the different conditions in which the numerous Rumanians outside Rumania are placed. The nationalist feeling for union with them is strong in all cases; but the practicability of its realisation varies with these conditions. The Rumanians of Bessarabia were united with Moldavia from 1856 to 1878, and their transference to Russia in the latter year, after Rumania's valuable help in the Russo-Turkish War, was bitterly resented. The commercial compensation given to Rumania in the port of Constanza and the Dobruja, which was not a Rumanian district, gave little satisfaction to national sentiment. The Rumanians in Transylvania have never, except for a short period under Michael the Brave (1598-1601), been politically united with Rumania; but their oppression by the Magyars has intensified nationalist feeling on both sides of the border, and led, among other causes, to Rumania's declaration of war in 1916.

The case of Bukovina is somewhat different, both historically and racially, since it was part of the Principality of Moldavia, and was not ceded to Austria until 1777; but, on the other hand, the Rumanians

there are only a minority of the population. The Koutso-Vlachs, now included in Serbia, Greece, and Albania, have been the subject of Rumanian propaganda. But, scattered as they are, there can hardly be any practical scheme for their union with Rumania. Rumania has, however, aspirations in the direction of Bessarabia and of Transylvania, which must be reckoned with in any satisfactory solution of the Balkan problem.

Turkey.—The Young Turk movement started in Macedonia, and there are large Moslem sections of the population in many parts of the Balkan Peninsula; these, if not Turkish, in many cases come from Anatolia or even farther east. So far as these are in territory assigned to one of the Balkan States, not much nationalist feeling is likely to persist, especially since the more influential and fanatical Moslems have emigrated, or are likely to emigrate, to Turkish territory. The remaining peasants are likely to settle down to the new conditions, provided their religion is tolerated and their rights safeguarded. The Turks, as a dominant race, are at an end in the Balkan Peninsula, and are not likely to give much trouble, so long as they are treated with justice and toleration; it will, in that case, be a matter of indifference to them under which State they are to remain. Those Moslems who are not "Turks," but converted Slavs, naturally fall into the same racial divisions as their Christian kinsmen.

2. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Any permanent pacification and reconciliation of the Balkan peoples must depend on how far it is possible to meet and satisfy their various national sentiments and aspirations, or, where these are mutually incompatible, to effect a reasonable compromise between them. Only in this way is it possible to avoid a sense of bitterness and injustice, which is sure to lead to further trouble in the near future; and it is to be hoped that a broad sense of justice and expediency, rather than any desire

to reward friends and punish enemies, will be the guiding spirit in any solutions that may be proposed.

There appear to be three main considerations affecting any permanent settlement of Balkan affairs—nationality and popular sentiment; economic conditions, especially access to the sea and to important through routes of international commerce; and scientific frontiers, from the military and naval point of view.

The racial question is most difficult in Macedonia, both because of disputes as to the racial character and national sympathies of large sections of the population, and because different racial elements are often found intermingled in the same district or village. The racial question in Albania does not appear to offer any insuperable difficulties. Any proposal for partition is clearly inadmissible, on the acknowledged principle of respect for small nations and the self-determination of nationalities. On the other hand, the southern regions, where the majority are Greek in race or sympathy, might be assigned to Greece, if their population desire it; the division would be easier if the Italian occupation of Valona and an enclave adjacent to it should be maintained. The Italian possession of Valona suggests an Italian protectorate over an independent Albania, at least until that country shows ability to take entire control of its own affairs.

As to Rumania, Transylvania offers a complicated problem, owing to the presence of a large number of Magyars and Germans. But the only satisfactory solution seems to be that it should be joined to Rumania, with clear guarantees for the protection of the non-Rumanian minorities. This should satisfy the strong feeling in Rumania against the present state of things. The question of the Vlachs, in Macedonia, Albania, and elsewhere, is probably not taken very seriously by the Rumanians themselves, and they cannot hope to annex these scattered people.

There remains the question of Constantinople. The freedom of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles seems to

imply that Constantinople should be a free port under international guarantee.

Economic considerations are considered elsewhere; but it seems necessary to note here how far they would be inconsistent with the solutions suggested on a racial basis. Many difficulties would be avoided if some system, like that under which the Serbians were, in 1913, allowed access to Salonika and an extra-territorial enclave, could be more widely adopted, or even if a certain number of free ports, with railway communication, could be established. Greece has plenty of harbours, but needs facilities for connecting up her railway system with that of Central Europe. These various interests, so far as affected by new frontiers, might perhaps be reconciled by mutual concessions. In any case, they do not seem to render impracticable a solution which may otherwise commend itself.

III. THE STRAITS QUESTION

1695-1739, *Russian Rights in Black Sea*.—The question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which is intimately bound up with that of the rights of navigation in the Black Sea, is an intricate problem of International Law. A discussion of it from the legal point of view would be out of place here; but it will be convenient to give an historical summary of the relevant facts.

So long as no other Power than Turkey owned the shores of the Black Sea, the question of the Straits did not arise. In 1695 Russia constructed a fleet during her attack on the fort of Azov, which was captured in 1696 and assigned to Russia by the Peace of Constantinople in 1700. Azov, together with other forts, had to be razed in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of the Pruth in 1711; in 1736 it was recovered, but had again to be abandoned by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, which also expressly forbade Russia to maintain or to build a fleet or other ships on the Sea of Azov (Zabache) or the Black Sea. Merchandise was to be freely interchanged between Russia and Turkey, but it must be carried on the Black Sea in Turkish ships, according to the arrangement already made by the Commercial Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718.

1774, *Right to pass through Straits*.—By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji in 1774, Russia became definitely a Black Sea Power. Free and unlimited navigation was granted to merchant vessels of both Russia and Turkey in all seas washing their shores, and free

passage to and from the Mediterranean. Freedom of trade was also given to Russian ships in all Turkish ports, together with all privileges and exemptions that were accorded to French and British ships by the capitulations. Turkey, however, evaded the clause as to granting free access through the Straits to the Mediterranean; and this right was confirmed by an explanatory convention in 1779. A Russian man-of-war having entered the Straits of Constantinople in 1780, further discussions took place between the two Powers; and a convention was agreed to in 1781. The right of the passage of the Straits for merchant ships was confirmed again by the Commercial Treaty of 1783, which is quoted as a precedent in later arrangements (Akkerman, 1826).

1798, *Straits opened to Russian Warships, closed to others.*—By the Treaty of Constantinople of December 23, 1798, between Russia and Turkey for mutual defensive action, Turkey agreed to the free passage of Russian warships through the Straits, and closed them to those of other nations. In the following years, while Turkey vacillated between Russia, France, and England, Russia secured a renewal of this article in the treaty of 1805, with the addition of a clause that any attempt of a third Power on the Straits would be regarded as a *casus fœderis*, and jointly opposed by Russia and Turkey. On the other hand, the French representative, Sebastiani, tried to induce the Turks to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all British and Russian ships. Russia protested; and one of the reasons given by Turkey for declaring war on Russia in 1807 was the abuse by Russia of the permission granted her in sending men-of-war through the Straits for other purposes than the protection of the Ionian Islands or similar defensive objects.

1809, *Passage of Straits closed to all Warships.*—In 1807, a British fleet, under Vice-Admiral Duckworth, forced the passage of the Dardanelles and anchored off Constantinople, though no formal declara-

tion of war preceded or followed this action, which was due, according to a treaty concluded between Britain and Turkey in 1809, to "les apparences d'une mésintelligence survenue à la suite des événements du temps." This treaty (sometimes called the Treaty of the Dardanelles) renews the rights of British commerce in the Black Sea and other privileges, as granted by the treaty of 1675 (Capitulations), and recently confirmed in 1799. Article XI runs as follows:—

" Comme il a été de tout temps défendu aux vaisseaux de guerre d'entrer dans le canal de Constantinople, savoir dans le détroit des Dardanelles et dans celui de la mer Noire, et comme cette ancienne règle de l'Empire ottoman doit être de même observée dorénavant en temps de paix vis-à-vis de toute Puissance, quelle qu'elle soit, la cour britannique promet aussi de se conformer à ce principe."

This is virtually the first definite statement, as an international rule, of a principle ever since acknowledged, though it is described as an ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.

1826, Rights of Mercantile Navigation confirmed.—In the Treaty of Akkerman (1826) the right of passage of the Straits by Russian merchant ships was confirmed, as granted by the Commercial Treaty of 1783. Free navigation is secured for Russian merchant ships in all Turkish waters, including the right of transshipment, in case of necessity. And

" The Sublime Porte will accept the good offices of the Imperial Russian Court in granting, in accordance with former precedents, the entrance of the Black Sea to vessels of Powers friendly to the Ottoman Government, which have not, as yet, obtained that privilege; so that the import trade of Russia, by means of their vessels; and the export of Russian produce on board of them, may not be subject to any impediment."

Article 7 of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) confirms the grant of free navigation of the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus to all merchant ships, whether Russian, or under the flags of Powers at peace with Turkey, going to or coming from Russian ports. No delay, search, or detention is to occur; and any

infringement of these stipulations will be considered as an act of hostility, involving reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.

1833, *Straits closed to Foreign, but not to Russian Ships*.—During the troubles with Mehemet Ali, a Russian squadron proceeded to the Bosphorus, and anchored off Constantinople. The fortifications of the Dardanelles were improved under Russian supervision, and six Russian warships were allowed to pass through the Straits. To the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833), in which mutual aid was promised by Russia and Turkey, a separate and secret article was added, which stated that the aid mutually promised was not to be asked for by Russia, but that Turkey,

“in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles—that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatever.”

A protest against this was made on August 26, 1833, by France and Britain, “who hold themselves at liberty to act . . . as if the treaty . . . were not in existence.” Permission for Russian war vessels to pass the Straits is not expressly mentioned in the treaty, but is by many authorities thought to be implied.

1840, *Co-operation for Security of Straits*.—The Convention of London for the Pacification of the Levant (1840) aimed at supporting the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, and provided for the co-operation of Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia with Turkey to place the Straits in security against all aggression. The former Powers were to withdraw their forces to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean respectively when the Sultan “shall deem their presence no longer necessary.” The measure is to be regarded as exceptional, and

“shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been

prohibited for vessels of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.

The Sultan and the Powers agreed to conform to this principle, which thus obtained for the first time a general European sanction.

1841, *Straits closed to all Warships*.—In the Convention of London (1841; sometimes called "The Straits Convention") between the same Powers with the addition of France, the rule as to the Straits was formally restated as follows:—

Art. I.—"His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no foreign ship of war into the said Straits." And all Sovereigns of the other Contracting Powers, "on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared."

Art. II.—"The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed as is usual in the service of the missions of foreign Powers."

Art. III.—"The Sultan reserves to himself to communicate the present convention to all the Powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friendship, inviting them to accede thereto."

1854, *Changes Proposed*.—During the events leading to the Crimean War, the British and French fleets passed the Dardanelles, and afterwards entered the Black Sea, at the invitation of Turkey. These Powers having not yet declared war, Russia, at the Conference of Vienna in March-June 1855, proposed as alternatives either that the Straits should be opened or that they should be closed to the fleets of all Powers alike. This proposal was rejected by the allies, and the war contin

1856, Straits closed to Warships; Black Sea neutralised.—By the Treaty of Paris (1856), the convention of 1841 was revised by common consent; its provisions were, however, repeated verbatim in the accompanying Straits Convention of 1856, with the additional exception of not more than two light vessels for each of the Contracting Powers stationed at the mouths of the Danube. By the same treaty, the Black Sea was

“neutralised; its waters and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of the Powers possessing its coasts or of any other Power.”

The only exception, besides those already mentioned, is a limited number of light vessels, to be maintained by Russia and Turkey for the service of their coasts. “The maintenance or establishment of military-marine arsenals upon the Black Sea, therefore, becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless,” and Russia and Turkey engage not to establish or to maintain any such arsenals.

1870, Russian Denunciation of Neutrality of Black Sea.—The Russian note of October 31, 1870, denouncing the stipulations as to the neutrality of the Black Sea, complains of the exposure to attack of the Russian coasts on that sea, since its entry is interdicted to men-of-war only in time of peace, and asserts that repeated infractions of this rule have taken place.

1871, Neutrality abrogated; Closing of Straits confirmed.—Strong protests were made against such a unilateral denunciation of a treaty signed by all the Great European Powers; and a conference was held in London to consider the matter. By the Treaty of London (1871), the Articles of the Treaty of Paris (1856) as to the neutralisation of the Black Sea were abrogated. But the principle of closing the Straits, as established by the convention of 1856, was maintained,

“ with power to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary, in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris ” (1856).

The Black Sea was to remain open, as heretofore, to the mercantile marine of all nations.

1877, *British and Russian Exchange of Views*.— This is the last international decision on the question, and, having been confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, remains in force to the present day. Among the British interests in the East, as defined in Lord Derby's note to Count Shuvaloff (May 6, 1877), were the arrangements under European sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; and serious objections are stated to their alteration in any particular. The Russian reply (May 18/30, 1877) is as follows:—

“ As regards the Straits, although their two shores belong to the same Sovereign, they form the only outlet of two great seas in which all the world has interests. It is, therefore, important, in the interests of peace and of the general balance of power, that this question should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases.”

In a further memorandum from Count Shuvaloff to Lord Derby (June 8, 1877) it is replied:—

“ With regard to the Straits, the arrangements by virtue of which the Black Sea, which is closed in time of peace, is opened in time of war to all fleets hostile to Russia, were conceived in a spirit of distrust and enmity towards her. It is a question that can only be settled by general agreement, in such a manner as to guarantee the Black Sea against the consequences of the abnormal and exceptional position of the Straits. Would it be possible for Russia, at the outset of a war which may end fortunately for her, to undertake not to make Europe appreciate the necessity of a resettlement of a state of things which was established to her prejudice?”

During the events of 1877-8, Russia and Britain gave a mutual undertaking that neither Power would land troops or occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula or the Dardanelles.

Treaty of Berlin (1878), confirming Treaty of Paris (1856) as to Straits.—In the preliminary bases of peace (Convention of Adrianople) as stated by Russia on January 31, 1878, one condition was that the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to be secured by an understanding with the Sultan. Article XXIV of the Treaty of San Stefano states that:—

“ the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles shall remain open in time of war, as in time of peace, to the merchant vessels of neutral States arriving from or bound to Russian ports. The Sublime Porte consequently engages never henceforth to establish at the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov a fictitious blockade at variance with the spirit of the Declaration signed at Paris, April 4/16, 1856 ”

At the Berlin Congress (1878), the question of the Straits was discussed; and, according to Article LXIII:—

“ The Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, as well as the Treaty of London of March 13, 1871, are maintained in all such of their provisions as are not abrogated or modified by the preceding stipulations.”

British Reservations.—These provisions, as already quoted, are therefore still in force. Lord Salisbury, however, formally declared that Britain's obligation in the matter did not “ go further than an engagement with the Sultan to respect His Majesty's independent determination ”; on the other hand, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that “ the closing of the Straits is a European principle,” and the stipulations concerning it “ are binding on the part of all the Powers, not only as regards the Sultan, but also as regards all the signatory Powers.” Moreover, when, in 1886, Russia fortified and closed the port of Batum, which had been declared a free and commercial port by the Berlin Treaty, Lord Salisbury's declaration to the Congress was quoted in Lord Rosebery's despatch to Sir R. Morier :—

“ that, if Batum were to be maintained on such conditions as would threaten the free navigation of the Black Sea,

England would not have been able to engage herself 'towards the other European Powers' to forgo access to the Black Sea. Considering, however, that Batum was declared a free and commercial port, England would not refuse to renew her engagements regarding the Straits; *i.e.*, she would agree to the maintenance of the *status quo*—the principle of closing to all warships."

Exceptions allowed.—While the regulation as to the Straits remains by treaty as above stated, various exceptions have been allowed under special conditions by Turkey and other Powers. Proposals have also been made for a modification of the rule, though none has met with general acceptance. During the Italo-Turkish War of 1911, Russia's claim to liberty of passage, though not opposed by England and France, was refused through the influence in Constantinople of Germany and Austria.¹

Recent Proposals.—There seems a pretty general agreement among writers of the Entente Powers that the present war must lead to the neutralisation or internationalisation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, under the guarantee of the Powers.² This would mean that the Straits were open to merchant ships and warships of all Powers and at all times, with special provision against any acts of belligerency. The question is intimately bound up with that of the possession of Constantinople. The Russian claim to the city, insisted on by many parties in Russia during the earlier years of the war, appears now to have been dropped. The claims of Greece to the capital of the Byzantine Empire have not so far met with any strong advocacy. Bulgaria, whatever her ambitions, has no historical or racial claim on the city. If, however, Constantinople were to remain Turkish, while the Straits were to be open and unforti-

¹ Phillipson and Buxton, *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles*, pp. 190-2.

² For various proposals see Phillipson and Buxton, *ibid.*, Part III.

fied, its position as the capital of an almost entirely Asiatic Empire would be difficult. A solution that has met with favour in many quarters is that it should be made a free port under international guarantee; and any internationalisation of the Straits seems to imply some such arrangement, though it remains an open question to whom its administration should in that case be entrusted.

IV. THE DANUBE QUESTION¹

Earlier Arrangements; Russia and Turkey.—The question of the right of navigation on the Danube, which is closely connected with that in the Black Sea and the Straits, is discussed in *International Rivers*, No. 149 of this series, §§ 19-23; its history is there given from the Treaty of Paris (1856) onward. Before that time, however, various other treaties or conventions had dealt with the question in a more or less partial manner. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Turkey was the only Power controlling the navigation of the lower course of the Danube from the Iron Gates to the sea, though international agreements had been made between riparian Powers on the Upper Danube, e.g. between Austria and the Elector Palatine in 1779. Though Russian armies had advanced as far as the Kilia mouth in 1770 and 1791, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) fixed the Russo-Turkish boundary at the Bug, and that of Jassy (1792) at the Dniester. It was not until the Treaty of Bucarest (1812) that the Pruth and the Kilia mouth of the Danube became the Russo-Turkish frontier. At the same time it was agreed that navigation on the Danube should be common to the subjects of the two Powers, and that the islands of the Delta should remain unoccupied. This last arrangement having proved impracticable, an amended arrangement was agreed to in 1817, and confirmed by the Convention of Akkerman (1826). By Article III of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), Russian territory was extended to the St George's mouth (the most southerly), including all the islands of the Delta. The merchant vessels of the two Powers were to be

"competent to navigate the Danube throughout its whole course; and those which bear the Ottoman flag may freely

¹ See also *Rumania*, No. 23 of this series, pp. 45-55

enter the Kilia and Sulina embouchures, that of St. George remaining common to the war and merchant flags of the two contracting Powers. But Russian ships of war must not, in sailing up the Danube, go beyond the place of its junction with the Pruth."

International Commerce.—Meanwhile, Austria, having to some extent overcome the difficulties of navigation past the Iron Gates, sought to expand the commerce of her peoples by way of the stream of the Danube. In 1838 she made an agreement with England by which the two Powers mutually guaranteed their free navigation of the Danube and the security of their commerce in the Black Sea,¹ and gave reciprocal privileges to ships of the two Powers sailing by way of the Danube between British and Austrian ports. A treaty between Russia and Austria in 1840 applied to the Danube the principles of free navigation of international rivers laid down by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. These were applied, not only to Russian and Austrian ships, but also to "those of every other nation having the right to navigate in the Black Sea and at peace with Russia." Rights as to towage, &c., are arranged, and Russia undertakes to clear the Sulina mouth and erect a lighthouse. This treaty was to remain in force for ten years, and it was renewed for another year in 1850.

In the notes exchanged between Britain and Austria in 1854, it is stated that

"the relations of the Sublime Porte with the Imperial Court of Russia cannot be re-established on solid and durable bases . . . if the navigation of the Danube at its mouths be not freed from all obstacles, and made subject to the application of the principles established by the Acts of the Congress of Vienna (1815)."

And in the Bases of Conference on the Eastern Question, in the Memorandum presented by Britain,

¹ Larmeroux, J., *La Politique extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie*, 1875-1914, Tome I, p. 259.

Austria, and France to Russia on December 28, 1854, one of the four Articles runs as follows :

“ To give to the freedom of navigation of the Danube all the development of which it is susceptible, it would be desirable that the course of the Lower Danube, beginning from the point where it becomes common to the two river-bordering States, should be withdrawn from the territorial jurisdiction existing in virtue of Article III of the Treaty of Adrianople. In every case the free navigation of the Danube could not be secured if it be not placed under the control of a syndicate authority invested with powers necessary to destroy the obstructions existing at the mouths of that river, or which hereafter may be formed there.”

Treaty of Paris; European Commission.—By the Treaty of Paris (1856), Russia ceased to be a riparian Power on the Danube, the portion of Bessarabia adjoining the Kilia branch being assigned to Moldavia. The islands in the Delta were also assigned to Moldavia by this treaty, but were transferred to Turkey in 1857, together with the Isle of Serpents off the Kilia mouth, not mentioned in previous treaties. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Bessarabia was restored to Russia, Rumania receiving instead the Dobruja and the islands in the Delta south of the Kilia branch, together with the Isle of Serpents, which was to be given to Russia by the Treaty of San Stefano. The establishment by the Treaty of Paris (1856) of the International Commission of the Danube in accord with the principles laid down in 1854, and its subsequent history, are described elsewhere.¹ On the “ Riparian Commission ” constituted at the same time, the Powers represented were Austria, Bavaria, Turkey, and Württemberg, and the three Danubian Principalities. The duration of the International Commission has been repeatedly renewed, its powers increased, and its authority extended, first to Galatz (1878), and then to Braila (1883). It included delegates from Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. To these Rumania was added in 1878, though

¹ For full text of relevant articles of Treaty of Paris see *International Rivers*, No. 149 of this series, Appendix III.

she subsequently refused to accept the consultative position offered to her and to Serbia. At the Conference of London in 1883, Russia resumed her rights over the Kilia mouth.

Austro-Hungarian Claims.—By the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Austria-Hungary was assigned the task of improving the conditions of navigation at the Iron Gates, and given the right to levy a provisional tax in order to cover the cost of these works. This task was delegated to the Hungarian Government, which carried out the work, and inaugurated the new canal in 1896. But the taxes imposed by the Hungarian Ministry of Commerce in 1899 were levied on cargoes as well as on ships, and discriminations were made contrary to the international character of the river.¹

Convention of London (1883).—According to the Convention of London, the Danube, from the Iron Gates to Braila, is under the control of a mixed commission consisting of delegates of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Serbia, with one representative of the European Commission. From Braila to the sea, the European Commission of the Great Powers has complete authority, with extra-territorial powers, with its own flag, and under guaranteed neutrality. Russia, however, controls the Oksakoff mouth, and shares the Kilia mouth with Rumania.

Treaty of Bucarest (1918).—These arrangements have naturally been in abeyance during the European War. The Treaty of Bucarest (1918) reconstituted the European Commission, but made it consist solely of representatives of States situate on the Danube or the European shores of the Black Sea, thus contrasting with the wider scope given by all previous treaties to international interests.²

¹ Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

² For text of these articles see *International Rivers*, No 149 of this series, Appendix IV.

APPENDIX

I. TREATY OF KUCHUK KAINARJI.

July 10/21, 1774.

Russia. Prince Nicolas Repnin. *Turkey.* Resmi Achmet Effendi.
Ibrahim Munis.

ARTICLE VII.

The Sublime Porte promises constantly to protect the Christian Religion in all its Churches, and also agrees that the Ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia may make Representations in favour of the Church to be erected at Constantinople, as well as those officiating therein, and promises to receive these remonstrances as coming from a trustworthy person in the name of a sincerely friendly neighbouring Power.

ARTICLE VIII.

[Permission to Russian subjects to visit Jerusalem and other places.]

ARTICLE XIV.

Besides the Private Church, the Court of Russia shall have the right, in the same manner as other Powers, to erect a Church at Galata, in the street called Bey-Ugla, which Church shall bear the name of Russo-Greek Church, and shall always be under the Protection of the Russian Minister, exempt from all Taxes, and secure from attacks.

ARTICLE XVI.

2. Not to put, in any manner whatever, any obstacle to the exercise of Divine Worship, free in every respect, or to prevent the building of New Churches, or the repair of the old ones, as they were before.

3. To restore to Convents and other Private Persons the Property and Lands around Braila, Choczim, Bender, &c., formerly belonging to them, but which have since been unjustly taken from them.

4. To recognize and to honour Ecclesiastics, according to their rank.

II. TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE.

September 14, 1829.

<i>Russia.</i>	Count Diebitch Za-	<i>Turkey.</i>	Sadik Effendi.
	balkansky.		Abdoul Kedir Bey.
	Count Alexis Orloff.		
	Count F. Pahlen.		

ARTICLE III.

The Pruth shall continue to form the Boundary of the two Empires, from the point where that River touches the Territory of Moldavia as far as its confluence with the Danube. From this place the frontier line shall follow the course of the Danube as far as the embouchure of St. George, so that while leaving all the Islands formed by the different branches of this River in the possession of Russia, the right bank will remain, as heretofore, in that of the Ottoman Porte. It is, nevertheless, agreed that this right bank, commencing from the point where the St. George branch separates from that of Souline, shall remain uninhabited, to the distance of two hours from the river, and that no establishment of any kind whatsoever shall be formed thereon, and that in like manner it shall not be permitted to make any establishment or construct any fortification upon the Islands which shall remain in the possession of the Court of Russia, excepting always the quarantines which shall be thereon established. The merchant-vessels of the two Powers shall be competent to navigate the Danube throughout its whole course, and those which bear the Ottoman flag may freely enter the Kili and Souline embouchures, that of St. George, remaining common to the war and merchant flags of the two Contracting Powers. But the Russian Ships of War must not, in sailing up the Danube, go beyond the place of its junction with the Pruth.

ARTICLE V.

The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia having been in consequence of a Capitulation plac'd under the Suzerainty of the Sublime Porte, and Russia having guaranteed their prosperity, it is understood that they shall preserve all the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them either by their Capitulations, or by the Treaties concluded between the two Empires, or by the Hatti-Sherifs promulgated at different times. In consequence whereof, they shall enjoy the free exercise of their Worship, perfect security, an independent national Government, and full liberty of Commerce. The additional clauses to the preceding stipulations, clauses which are judged to be neces-

sary in order to secure to these two Provinces the enjoyment of their Rights, are consigned to the Separate Act hereunto annexed, which is and shall be considered as forming an integral part of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VI.

The circumstances which have occurred since the conclusion of the Convention of Ackermann not having allowed the Sublime Porte to occupy itself immediately with the carrying into execution the clauses of the Separate Act relative to Servia, and annexed to Article V of the said Convention, it undertakes in the most solemn manner to fulfil them without the least delay, and with the most scrupulous exactitude, and to proceed especially to the immediate restitution of the six districts detached from Servia, so as to secure for ever the tranquillity and welfare of that faithful and devoted nation. The Firman furnished with the Hatti-Sherif commanding the execution of the said clauses shall be delivered and officially communicated to the Imperial Court of Russia within the term of one month, reckoning from the signature of the present Treaty of Peace.

ARTICLE VII.

Russian subjects shall enjoy, throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured to them by the Treaties concluded heretofore between the two High Contracting Powers. This freedom of trade shall not be molested in any way, nor shall it be fettered in any case, or under any pretext, by any prohibition or restriction whatsoever, nor in consequence of any regulation or measure, whether of public government or internal legislation. Russian subjects, ships, and merchandise, shall be protected from all violence and imposition. The first shall remain under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Russian Minister and Consuls ; Russian ships shall never be subjected to any search on the part of the Ottoman authorities, neither out at sea nor in any of the ports or roadsteads under the dominion of the Sublime Porte ; and all merchandise or goods belonging to a Russian subject may, after payment of the Custom-house dues imposed by the tariffs, be freely sold, deposited on land in the warehouses of the owner or consignee, or transhipped on board another vessel of any nation whatsoever, without the Russian subject being required, in this case, to give notice of the same to any of the local authorities, and much less to ask their permission so to do. It is expressly agreed that the different kinds of wheat coming from Russia shall partake of the same privileges, and that their free transit shall never, under any pretext, suffer the least difficulty or hindrance.

The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take especial care that the trade and navigation of the Black Sea, particularly, shall be impeded in no manner whatsoever. For this purpose it admits and declares the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to Russian vessels under the merchant flag, laden or in ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for the purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether, coming from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the Black Sea : such vessels, provided they be merchant ships, whatever their size and tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoyance of any kind, as above provided. The two Courts shall agree upon the most fitting means for preventing all delay in issuing the necessary instructions. In virtue of the same principle the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and of that of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all the merchant ships of Powers who are at Peace with the Sublime Porte, whether going into the Russian ports of the Black Sea or coming from them, laden or in ballast, upon the same conditions which are stipulated for vessels under the Russian flag.

Lastly, the Sublime Porte, recognizing in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of securing the necessary guarantees for this full freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, declares solemnly, that on its part not the least obstacle shall ever, under any pretext whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above all, it promises never to allow itself henceforth to stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether Russian or belonging to nations with whom the Ottoman Porte should not be in a state of declared war, which vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Constantinople and that of the Dardanelles, on their way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black Sea. And if, which God forbid, any one of the stipulations contained in the present Article should be infringed, and the remonstrances of the Russian Minister thereupon should fail in obtaining a full and prompt redress, the Sublime Porte recognizes beforehand in the Imperial Court of Russia the right of considering such an infraction as an act of hostility, and of immediately having recourse to reprisals against the Ottoman Empire.

ARTICLE X.

In declaring its entire adhesion to the stipulations of the Treaty concluded at London on the 24th June/6th July, 1827, between Russia, Great Britain, and France,¹ the Sublime Porte equally accedes to the Act entered into on the 10th/22nd of

¹ Pacification of Greece, which is to become a dependency of Turkey and pay tribute.

March, 1829, with common consent, between those same Powers upon the bases of the said Treaty, and containing the arrangements of detail relating to its definitive execution. Immediately after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty of Peace, the Sublime Porte will appoint Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of agreeing with those of the Imperial Court of Russia, and of the Courts of England and of France, upon the carrying into execution the said stipulation and arrangements.

III. TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI.

July 8, 1833.

<i>Russia.</i> Count Alexis Orloff. A. Bouteneff.	<i>Turkey.</i> Hosrew Mehemet Pasha. Ferzi Akhmet Pasha. Hadgi Mehmet Akiff Reis Effendi.
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ARTICLE I.

There shall be for ever Peace, Amity, and Alliance between His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, their Empires and their Subjects, as well by land as by sea. This Alliance having solely for its object the common defence of their dominions against all attack, their Majesties engage to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the matters which concern their respective tranquillity and safety, and to afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance.

ARTICLE II.

The Treaty of Peace concluded at Adrianople on the 2nd/14th September, 1829, as well as all the other Treaties comprised therein, as also the Convention signed at St. Petersburg on the 14th/26th April, 1830, and the Arrangement relating to Greece, concluded at Constantinople on the 9th/21st July, 1832, are fully confirmed by the present Treaty of Defensive Alliance, in the same manner as if the said transactions had been inserted in it word for word.

ARTICLE III.

In consequence of the principle of conservation and mutual defence, which is the basis of the present Treaty of Alliance, and by reason of a most sincere desire of securing the permanence,

maintenance, and entire Independence of the Sublime Porte, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in the event of circumstances occurring which should again determine the Sublime Porte to call for the naval and military assistance of Russia, although, if it please God, that case is by no means likely to happen, engages to furnish, by land and by sea, as many troops and forces as the two High Contracting Parties may deem necessary. It is accordingly agreed, that in this case the Land and Sea Forces, whose aid the Sublime Porte may call for, shall be held at its disposal.

ARTICLE IV.

In conformity with what is above stated, in the event of one of the two Powers requesting the assistance of the other, the expense only of provisioning the Land and the Sea Forces which may be furnished, shall fall to the charge of the Power who shall have applied for the aid.

ARTICLE V.

Although the two High Contracting Parties sincerely intend to maintain this engagement to the most distant period of time, yet, as it is possible that in process of time circumstances may require that some changes should be made in this Treaty, it has been agreed to fix its duration at 8 years from the day of the exchange of the Imperial Ratifications. The two parties, previously to the expiration of that term, will concert together, according to the state of affairs at that time, as to the renewal of the said Treaty.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

In virtue of one of the clauses of Article I of the Patent Treaty of Defensive Alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two High Contracting Parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it. The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the Patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.

The present Separate and Secret Article shall have the same force and value as if it was inserted word for word in the Treaty of Alliance of this day.

IV. CONVENTION OF LONDON.

July 13, 1841.

<i>Britain.</i> Viscount Palmerston.	<i>Prussia.</i> Baron de Bülow.
<i>Austria.</i> Prince Esterhazy.	<i>Russia.</i> Baron de Brunnow
Baron de Neumann.	<i>Turkey.</i> Chekib Effendi.
<i>France.</i> Baronde Bourqueney.	

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus ; and that, so long as the Porte is at Peace, His Highness will admit no Foreign Ship of War into the said Straits.

And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

ARTICLE II.

It is understood that in recording the inviolability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire mentioned in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver *Firman*s of passage for light Vessels under Flag of War, which shall be employed as is usual in the service of the Missions of Foreign Powers.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan reserves to himself to communicate the present Convention to all the Powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friendship, inviting them to accede thereto.

V. TREATY OF PARIS.

March 30, 1856.

<i>Britain.</i> Earl of Clarendon. Lord Cowley.	<i>Sardinia.</i> Count Cavour. Marquis de Villamarina.
<i>Austria.</i> Count Buol-Schauenstein. Baron de Hübner.	<i>Turkey.</i> Mouhammed Amin Aali Pasha. Mehemmed Djemil Bey.
<i>France.</i> Count Colonna Walewski. Baronde Bourqueney.	<i>Prussia.</i> Baron de Manteuffel. Count Hatzfeldt.
<i>Russia.</i> Count Orloff. Baron de Brunnow.	

ARTICLE VII.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (*Concert*) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement ; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.

ARTICLE VIII.

If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other Signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their Mediation.

ARTICLE IX.

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of Religion or of Race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his Sovereign will.

The Contracting Powers recognize the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire.

ARTICLE X.

The Convention of 13th of July, 1841, which maintains the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire relative to the Closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of Dardanelles, has been revised by common consent.

The Act concluded for that purpose, and in conformity with that principle, between the High Contracting Parties, is and remains annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof.

ARTICLE XI.

The Black Sea is neutralized ; its Waters and its Ports, thrown open to the Mercantile Marine of every Nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of the Powers possessing its Coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV and XIX of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XII.

Free from any impediment, the Commerce in the Ports and Waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to Regulations of Health, Customs, and Police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of Commercial transactions.

In order to afford to the Commercial and Maritime interests of every Nation the security which is desired, Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit Consuls into their Ports situated upon the Coast of the Black Sea, in conformity with the principles of International Law.

ARTICLE XIII.

The Black Sea being neutralized according to the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or establishment upon its Coast of Military-Maritime Arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless ; in consequence, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that Coast any Military-Maritime Arsenal.

ARTICLE XIV.

Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the

Force and the Number of Light Vessels, necessary for the service of their Coasts, which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The Act of the Congress of Vienna having established the principles intended to regulate the Navigation of Rivers which separate or traverse different States, the Contracting Powers stipulate among themselves that those principles shall in future be equally applied to the Danube and its Mouths. They declare that its arrangement henceforth forms a part of the Public Law of Europe, and take it under their Guarantee.

ARTICLE XXII.

The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to enjoy under the Suzerainty of the Porte, and under the Guarantee of the Contracting Powers, the Privileges and Immunities of which they are in possession. No exclusive Protection shall be exercised over them by any of the guaranteeing Powers.

There shall be no separate right of interference in their Internal Affairs.

ARTICLE XXIII.

The Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an Independent and National Administration, as well as full liberty of Worship, of Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation.

The Laws and Statutes at present in force shall be revised. In order to establish a complete agreement in regard to such revision, a Special Commission, as to the composition of which the High Contracting Powers will come to an understanding among themselves, shall assemble, without delay, at Bucharest, together with a Commissioner of the Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE XXIV.

His Majesty the Sultan promises to convoke immediately in each of the two Provinces a Divan *ad hoc*, composed in such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of all classes of society. These Divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the people in regard to the definitive organization of the Principalities.

ARTICLE XXV.

Taking into consideration the opinion expressed by the two Divans, the Commission shall transmit, without delay, to the present seat of the Conferences, the result of its own labours.

The Final Agreement with the Suzerain Power shall be recorded in a Convention to be concluded at Paris between the High Contracting Parties ; and a Hatti-sheriff, in conformity with the stipulations of the Convention, shall constitute definitively the organization of those Provinces, placed thenceforward under the Collective Guarantee of all the signing Powers.

ARTICLE XXVI.

It is agreed that there shall be in the Principalities a National Armed Force, organized with the view to maintain the security of the interior, and to ensure that of the Frontiers. No impediment shall be opposed to the extraordinary measures of defence which, by agreement with the Sublime Porte, they may be called upon to take in order to repel any external aggression.

ARTICLE XXVII.

If the Internal Tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding with the other Contracting Powers in regard to the measures to be taken for maintaining or re-establishing legal order.

No armed Intervention can take place without previous agreement between those Powers.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

The Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime Porte, in conformity with the Imperial Hats which fix and determine its Rights and Immunities, placed henceforward under the Collective Guarantee of the Contracting Powers.

In consequence, the said Principality shall preserve its Independent and National Administration, as well as full Liberty of Worship, of Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation.

ARTICLE XXIX.

The right of garrison of the Sublime Porte, as stipulated by anterior regulations, is maintained. No Armed Intervention can take place in Servia without previous agreement between the High Contracting Powers.

VI. TREATY OF PARIS.

April 15, 1856.

<i>Britain.</i>	Earl of Clarendon Lord Cowley.	<i>France.</i>	Count Colonna Walewski.
<i>Austria.</i>	Count Buol-Schauenstein. Baron de Hübner.		Baron de Bourqueney.

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties Guarantee, jointly and severally, the Independence and the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856.

ARTICLE II.

Any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as a *casus belli*. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their Military and Naval Forces.

VII. RUSSIAN NOTE OF TSARSKOE SÉLO.

October 31, 1870.

Prince Gortchakoff to Baron de Brunnow. [Communicated to Britain and other Powers.]

The successive alterations which the transactions considered as the foundation of the European Balance of Power have undergone during late years, have rendered it necessary for the Imperial Cabinet to inquire how far their results affect the political position of Russia.

Among these transactions, that which interests Russia most directly is the Treaty of 18th/30th March, 1856.

The special Convention between the two States bordering on the Black Sea, which forms an Appendix to this Treaty, contains an engagement on the part of Russia to limit her Naval Forces to a minimum.

In return this Treaty established the principle of the Neutralization of that Sea.

By laying down this principle the signatory Powers intended to remove any possibility of a conflict between the Powers

bordering on the Black Sea, or between them and the Maritime Powers. It was intended to increase the number of the Territories which have been accorded the benefit of Neutrality by the unanimous consent of Europe, and thus protect Russia herself from all danger of attack.

A 15 years' experience has proved that this principle, on which the safety of the whole extent of the Russian Frontiers in this direction exclusively depends, is no more than a theory.

In reality, while Russia was disarming in the Black Sea, and, by a Declaration contained in the Protocols of the Conference, likewise loyally deprived herself of the possibility of taking measures for an effectual Maritime Defence in the adjoining Seas and Ports, Turkey preserved her privilege of maintaining unlimited Naval Forces in the Archipelago and the Straits ; France and England preserved their power of concentrating their squadrons in the Mediterranean.

Again, under the Treaty in question, the entry of the Black Sea was formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War either of the Powers possessing its Coasts or of any other Power ; but the so-called Straits Treaty closes the Straits only in time of Peace to men-of-war. Owing to this contradiction, the shores of the Russian Empire are exposed to attack even from less powerful States whenever they have Naval Forces at their disposal, while all that Russia could oppose to them would be some ships of small size.

The Treaty of 18th/30th March, 1856, has, moreover, not escaped the modifications to which most European transactions have been exposed, and in the face of which it would be difficult to maintain that the written Law, founded upon the respect for Treaties as the basis of Public Right and regulating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which it may have possessed at other times.

We have witnessed the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, whose position had, under the guarantee of the Great Powers, been defined in the Treaty of Peace and the subsequent Protocols, accomplish a series of revolutions which are equally at variance with the letter and spirit of these transactions, and which first led to the Union, and subsequently to the election of a Foreign Prince. These facts have obtained the sanction of the Porte and the consent of the Great Powers,—or, at any rate, the latter have not thought it necessary to enforce their decisions.

The Representative of Russia was the only one who raised his voice to remind the Cabinets that by this tolerance they would be departing from the distinct stipulations of the Treaty.

No doubt, if these concessions to one of the Christian Nationalities of the East had proceeded from a general agreement between the Cabinets and the Porte, and if they had been based upon

a principle alike applicable to all the Christian populations of Turkey, they would have been applauded by the Imperial Cabinet ; but they were exclusive.

The Imperial Cabinet, therefore, could not but be surprised at seeing the Treaty of 18th/30th March, 1856, violated with impunity in one of its most essential clauses, but a few years after its conclusion, and this in face of the Great Powers assembled in Conference at Paris, and representing together the high collective authority on which rested the Peace of the East.

But this infraction was not the only one. Repeatedly, and under various pretexts, Foreign Men-of-War have been suffered to enter the Straits, and whole Squadrons, whose presence was an infraction of the character of absolute Neutrality attributed to those waters, admitted to the Black Sea.

While the pledges offered by the Treaty, and more especially the Guarantees for the effective Neutralization of the Black Sea, were thus being weakened, the introduction of ironclad vessels, unknown and unforeseen at the conclusion of the Treaty of 1856, increased the danger for Russia in the event of War, by adding considerably to the already patent inequality of the respective Naval Forces.

Under these circumstances, His Majesty could not but ask himself what are the Rights and Duties accruing to Russia from these modifications of the general situation and the departures from the engagements which, although conceived in a spirit of distrust towards herself, she has invariably and scrupulously observed.

After maturely considering this question, His Imperial Majesty has arrived at the following conclusions, which you are instructed to bring to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited :—

Our illustrious Master cannot admit, *de jure*, that Treaties, violated in several of their essential and general clauses, should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the interests of his Empire.

His Imperial Majesty cannot admit, *de facto*, that the security of Russia should depend on a fiction which has not stood the test of time, and should be imperilled by her respect for engagements which have not been observed in their integrity.

Confiding in the feelings of justice of the Powers who have signed the Treaty of 1856, as well as in their consciousness of their own dignity, the Emperor commands you to declare that His Imperial Majesty cannot any longer hold himself bound by the stipulations of the Treaty of 18th/30th March, 1856, as far as they restrict his Sovereign Rights in the Black Sea ;

That His Imperial Majesty deems himself both entitled and obliged to denounce to His Majesty the Sultan the Special and

Additional Convention appended to the said Treaty, which fixes the number and size of the Vessels of War which the two Powers bordering on the Black Sea shall keep in that Sea ;

That His Majesty loyally informs of this the Powers who have signed and guaranteed the General Treaty, of which the Convention in question forms an integral part ;

That His Majesty restores to the Sultan the full exercise of his rights in this respect, resuming the same for himself ;

In acquitting yourself of this duty, you will take care to point out that our illustrious Master has only the safety and dignity of his Empire in view. His Imperial Majesty has no wish to revive the Eastern Question. On this point, as on all others, he has no wish but the preservation and consolidation of Peace. He fully adheres to his consent to the general principles of the Treaty of 1856, which have fixed the position of Turkey in the European system. He is ready to enter into an understanding with the Powers who have signed that transaction, for the purpose either of confirming its general stipulations, or of renewing them, or of replacing them by some other equitable arrangement, which may be considered as calculated to secure the tranquillity of the East, and the Balance of Power in Europe.

His Imperial Majesty is convinced that that Peace and that Balance of Power will receive a fresh Guarantee if they are based upon a more just and solid foundation than one resulting from a state of things which no Great Power can accept as a normal condition of its existence.

VIII. TREATY OF LONDON.

March 13, 1871.

<i>Britain.</i>	Earl Granville.	<i>France.</i>	Duc de Broglie.
<i>Germany.</i>	Count Bernstorff- Stinterberg.	<i>Italy.</i>	Chevalier Cadorna.
		<i>Russia.</i>	Baron de Brunnow.
<i>Austria.</i>	Count Apponyi.	<i>Turkey.</i>	Musurus Pasha.

ARTICLE I.

Articles XI, XIII, and XIV of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856, as well as the special Convention concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte, and annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated, and replaced by the following Article.

ARTICLE II.

The principle of the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been established by the

separate Convention of the 30th March, 1856, is maintained, with power to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of Peace to the Vessels of War of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856.

ARTICLE III.

The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to the Mercantile Marine of all Nations.

ARTICLE VIII.

The High Contracting Parties renew and confirm all the stipulations of the Treaty of the 30th March, 1856, as well as of its annexes, which are not annulled or modified by the present Treaty.

IX. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

Preliminaries of Peace between Russia and Turkey.

Signed at San Stefano, ^{19 February}_{3 March}, 1878.

[Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff,
March 23, 1878.]

<i>Russia.</i> Count N. Ignatiew.	<i>Turkey.</i> Safvet Pasha.
A. Nelidow.	Sadoullah Bey.

ARTICLE I.

Afin de mettre un terme aux conflits perpétuels entre la Turquie et le Monténégro, la frontière qui sépare les deux pays sera rectifiée, conformément à la carte ci-annexée, sauf la réserve ci-après, de la manière suivante :—

De la montagne de Dobrostitza, la frontière suivra la ligne indiquée par la Conférence de Constantinople jusqu'à Korito par Bilek. De là la nouvelle frontière ira à Gatzko (Metochia-Gatsko appartiendra au Monténégro) et vers le confluent de la Piva et de la Tara, en remontant au nord par la Drina jusqu'à son confluent avec le Lim. La frontière orientale de la Principauté suivra cette dernière rivière jusqu'à Prijepolje, et se dirigera par Roshaj à Sukha-Planina (laissant Bihor et Roshaj au Monténégro). En englobant Bugowo, Plava, et Gusinje, la ligne frontière suivra la chaîne des montagnes par

Shlieb, Paklen, et le long de la frontière de l'Albanie du nord par la crête des monts Koprivnik, Babavik, Bor-vik, jusqu'au sommet le plus élevé de Prokléti. De ce point la frontière se dirigera par le sommet de Biskaschik et ira en ligne droite au Lac de Tjiceni-hoti. Partageant Tjiceni-hoti et Tjiceni-kastrati elle traversera le Lac de Scutari pour aboutir à la Boyana, dont elle suivra le thalweg jusqu'à la mer. Niksitch, Gatzko, Spouje, Podgoritza, Jabliak, et Antivari resteront au Monténégro.

Une Commission Européenne, dans laquelle seront représentés la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement du Monténégro, sera chargée de fixer les limites définitives de la Principauté, en apportant sur les lieux au tracé général les modifications qu'elle croirait nécessaires et équitables, au point de vue des intérêts respectifs et de la tranquillité des deux pays, auxquelles elle accordera de ce fait les équivalents reconnus nécessaires.

La navigation de la Boyana ayant toujours donné lieu à des contestations entre la Sublime Porte et le Monténégro, fera l'objet d'un règlement spécial qui sera élaboré par la même Commission Européenne.

ARTICLE II.

La Sublime Porte reconnaît définitivement l'indépendance de la Principauté du Monténégro.

Une entente entre le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, le Gouvernement Ottoman, et la Principauté de Monténégro déterminera ultérieurement le caractère et la forme des rapports entre la Sublime Porte et la Principauté en ce qui touche notamment l'institution d'Agents Monténégrins à Constantinople, et dans certaines localités de l'Empire Ottoman, où la nécessité en sera reconnue, l'extradition des criminels réfugiés sur l'un ou l'autre territoire, et la soumission des Monténégrins, voyageant ou séjournant dans l'Empire Ottoman, aux lois et aux autorités Ottomanes, suivant les principes du droit international et les usages établis concernant les Monténégrins.

Une Convention sera conclue entre la Sublime Porte et le Monténégro pour régler les questions se rattachant aux rapports entre les habitants des confins des deux pays et aux ouvrages militaires sur ces mêmes confins. Les points sur lesquels une entente ne pourrait être établie seront résolus par l'arbitrage de la Russie et de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Dorénavant, s'il y a discussion ou conflit, sauf les cas de nouvelles réclamations territoriales, la Turquie et le Monténégro abandonneront le règlement de leurs différends à la Russie et à l'Autriche-Hongrie, qui devront statuer en commun arbitralement.

Les troupes du Monténégro seront tenues d'évacuer le

territoire non compris dans la circonscription indiquée plus haut, dans le délai de dix jours à partir de la signature des Préliminaires de Paix.

ARTICLE III.

La Serbie est reconnue indépendante. Sa frontière, marquée sur la carte ci-jointe; suivra le thalweg de la Drina en laissant le Petit Zwornik et Zakar à la Principauté, et en longeant l'ancienne limite jusqu'aux sources du ruisseau Dezevo, près de Stoilac. De là le nouveau tracé suivra le cours de ce ruisseau jusqu'à la Rivière Raska, et puis le cours de celle-ci jusqu'à Novi-Bazar.

De Novi-Bazar, remontant le ruisseau, qui passe près des villages Mekinje et Irgoviste jusqu'à sa source, la ligne frontière se dirigera par Bosur Planina dans la vallée de l'Ibar et descendra le ruisseau qui se jette dans cette rivière près du village Ribanic.

Ensuite elle suivra le cours des rivières Ibar, Sitnitza, Lab, et du ruisseau Batintze, jusqu'à sa source (sur la Grapachnitsa Planina). De là la frontière suivra les hauteurs qui séparent les eaux de la Kriva et de la Veternitsa et rejoindra, par la ligne la plus courte, cette dernière rivière à l'embouchure du ruisseau Miovatzka, pour remonter celui-ci, traverser la Miovatzka Planina et redescendre vers la Morawa, près du village de Kalimanci.

A partir de ce point la frontière descendra la Morava jusqu'à la Rivière Vlossina, près du village Staïkovtzi, en remontant cette dernière ainsi que la Linberazda et le ruisseau Koukavitze, passera par la Sukha Planina, longera le ruisseau de Vrylo jusqu'à la Nisawa et descendra la dite rivière jusqu'au village de Kronpatz, d'où elle ira rejoindre, par la ligne la plus courte, l'ancienne frontière Serbe au sud-est de Karaoul Baré, pour ne plus la quitter jusqu'au Danube.

Ada-Kalé sera évacué et rasé. Une Commission Turco-Serbe établira sur les lieux, avec l'assistance d'un Commissaire Russe, le tracé définitif de la frontière, dans l'espace de trois mois, et réglera définitivement les questions relatives aux Îles de la Drina. Un Délégué Bulgare sera admis à participer aux travaux de la Commission lorsqu'elle s'occupera de la frontière entre la Serbie et la Bulgarie.

ARTICLE IV.

Les Musulmans qui possèdent des propriétés dans les territoires annexés à la Serbie, et qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de la Principauté, pourront y conserver leurs immeubles, en les faisant affermer ou administrer par d'autres. Une Commission Turco-Serbe, assistée d'un Commissaire Russe,

sera chargée de statuer souverainement, dans le courant de deux années, sur toutes les questions relatives à la constatation des propriétés immobilières où des intérêts Musulmans seraient engagés.

Cette Commission sera également appelée à régler, dans le terme de trois années, le mode d'aliénation des biens appartenant à l'État ou aux fondations pieuses (vacouf) et les questions relatives aux intérêts des particuliers qui pourraient s'y trouver engagés. Jusqu'à la conclusion d'un Traité direct entre la Turquie et la Serbie déterminant le caractère et la forme des relations entre la Sublime Porte et la Principauté, les sujets Serbes voyageant et séjournant dans l'Empire Ottoman seront traités suivant les principes généraux du droit international.

Les troupes Serbes seront tenues d'évacuer le territoire non compris dans la circonscription indiquée plus haut dans le délai de quinze jours, à partir de la signature des Préliminaires de Paix.

ARTICLE V.

La Sublime Porte reconnaît l'indépendance de la Roumanie, qui fera valoir ses droits à une indemnité à débattre entre les deux parties.

Jusqu'à la conclusion d'un Traité direct entre la Turquie et la Roumanie, les sujets Roumains jouiront en Turquie de tous les droits garantis aux sujets des autres Puissances Européennes.

ARTICLE VI.

La Bulgarie est constituée en Principauté autonome tribunaire, avec un Gouvernement Chrétien, et une milice nationale.

Les frontières définitives de la Principauté Bulgare seront tracées par une Commission Spéciale Russo-Turque avant l'évacuation de la Roumélie par l'armée Impériale Russe.

Cette Commission tiendra compte dans ses travaux pour les modifications à introduire sur les lieux au tracé général du principe de la nationalité de la majorité des habitants des confins, conformément aux Bases de la Paix, ainsi que des nécessités topographiques et des intérêts pratiques de circulation pour les populations locales.

L'étendue de la Principauté de Bulgarie est fixée en traits généraux sur la carte ci-jointe, qui devra servir de base à la délimitation définitive. En quittant la nouvelle frontière de la Principauté Serbe le tracé suivra la limite occidentale du Caza de Wrania jusqu'à la chaîne du Kara-dagh.

Tournant vers l'ouest la ligne suivra les limites occidentales des Cazas de Koumanovo, Kotchani, Kalkandelen, jusqu'au Mont Korab; de là, par la Rivière Welestchitza jusqu'à sa

jonction avec la Drine Noire. Se dirigeant vers le sud par le Drine et après par la limite occidentale du Caza d'Ochride vers le Mont Linas, la frontière suivra les limites occidentales des Cazas de Gortcha et Starovo jusqu'au Mont Grammos. Ensuite par le Lac de Kastoria, la ligne frontière rejoindra la Rivière Moglénitza et, après avoir suivi son cours et passé au sud de Yanitza (Wardar Yenidje), se dirigera par l'embouchure du Wardar et par le Galliko vers les villages de Parga et de Sarai-keui; de là par le milieu du Lac Bechik-Guel à l'embouchure des Rivières Strouma et Karassou, et par la côte maritime jusqu'au Buru-Guel; plus loin, partant dans la direction nord-ouest, vers le Mont Tchaltépé par la chaîne du Rhodope jusqu'au Mont Krouchow, par les Balkans Noirs (Kara Balkan), par les Monts Eschek-Koulatchi, Tchepelion, Karakolas et Tschiklar, jusqu'à la Rivière Arda.

De là la ligne frontière sera tracée dans la direction de la ville de Tchirmen et, laissant la ville d'Andrinople au midi, par les villages de Sugutlion, Kara-Hamza, Arnaout-Keui, Akardji, et Enidje, jusqu'à la Rivière Tékéderessi. En suivant le cours de Tékéderessi et de Tchorlderessi jusqu'à Loulé-Bourgaz et de là par la Rivière Soudjak-déré jusqu'au village de Serguen, la ligne frontière ira par les hauteurs directement vers Hakimtabiassi, où elle aboutira à la Mer Noire. Elle quittera la côte maritime près de Mangalia, en longeant les limites méridionales du Sandjak de Toulcha, et aboutira au Danube au-dessus de Rassova.

ARTICLE VII.

Le Prince de la Bulgarie sera librement élu par la population et confirmé par la Sublime Porte avec l'assentiment des Puissances. Aucun membre des dynasties régnantes des Grandes Puissances Européennes ne pourra être élu Prince de la Bulgarie.

En cas de vacance de la dignité de Prince de la Bulgarie l'élection du nouveau Prince se fera dans les mêmes conditions et dans les mêmes formes.

Une Assemblée de Notables* de la Bulgarie, convoquée à Philippopolis (Plowdiw) ou Tyrnowo, élaborera, avant l'élection du Prince, sous la surveillance d'un Commissaire Impérial Russe et en présence d'un Commissaire Ottoman, l'organisation de l'administration future, conformément aux précédents établis en 1830, après la paix d'Andrinople, dans les Principautés Danubiennes.

Dans les localités où les Bulgares sont mêlés aux Turcs, aux Grecs, aux Valaques (Koutzo-Vlachs), ou autres, il sera tenu un juste compte des droits et intérêts de ces populations dans les élections et l'élaboration du Règlement Organique.

L'introduction du nouveau régime en Bulgarie et la surveillance de son fonctionnement seront confiées pendant deux années à un Commissaire Impérial Russe. A l'expiration de la première année après l'introduction du nouveau régime et si une entente à ce sujet s'établit entre la Russie, la Sublime Porte, et les Cabinets Européens, ils pourront, s'il est jugé nécessaire, adjoindre au Commissaire Impérial de Russie des Délégués Spéciaux.

ARTICLE VIII.

L'armée Ottomane ne séjournera plus en Bulgarie et toutes les anciennes forteresses seront rasées aux frais du Gouvernement local. La Sublime Porte aura le droit de disposer à sa guise du matériel de guerre et autres objets appartenant au Gouvernement Ottoman, et qui seraient restés dans les forteresses du Danube déjà évacuées en vertu de l'armistice du 3^e Janvier, ainsi que de ceux qui se trouveraient dans les places fortes de Schoumla et de Varna.

Jusqu'à la formation complète d'une milice indigène suffisante pour le maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et de la tranquillité, et dont le chiffre sera fixé plus tard par une entente entre le Gouvernement Ottoman et le Cabinet Impérial de Russie, des troupes Russes occuperont le pays et prêteront main-forte au Commissaire en cas de besoin. Cette occupation sera limitée également à un terme approximatif de deux années.

L'effectif du corps d'occupation Russe, composé de six divisions d'infanterie et de deux de cavalerie, qui séjournera en Bulgarie après l'évacuation de la Turquie par l'armée Impériale, n'excédera pas 50,000 hommes. Il sera entretenu aux frais du pays occupé. Les troupes d'occupation Russes en Bulgarie conserveront leurs communications avec la Russie, non-seulement par la Roumanie, mais aussi par les ports de la Mer Noire, Varna et Bourgas, où elles pourront organiser pour la durée de l'occupation les dépôts nécessaires.

ARTICLE IX.

Le montant du tribut annuel que la Bulgarie paiera à la Cour Suzeraine en le versant à la Banque que la Sublime Porte désignera ultérieurement, sera déterminé par un accord entre la Russie, le Gouvernement Ottoman, et les autres Cabinets, à la fin de la première année du fonctionnement de la nouvelle organisation. Ce tribut sera établi sur le revenu moyen de tout le territoire qui fera partie de la Principauté.

La Bulgarie sera substituée au Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman dans ses charges et obligations envers la Compagnie

du Chemin de Fer de Roustchouk-Varna, après entente entre la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement de la Principauté, et l'administration de cette Compagnie. Le règlement relatif aux autres voies ferrées qui traversent la Principauté est également réservé à un accord entre la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement institué en Bulgarie, et l'administration des Compagnies intéressées.

ARTICLE X.

La Sublime Porte aura le droit de se servir de la voie de la Bulgarie pour le transport, par des routes déterminées, de ses troupes, munitions, et approvisionnements dans les provinces situées au-delà de la Principauté, et *vice versa*. Afin d'éviter les difficultés et les malentendus dans l'application de ce droit, tout en garantissant les nécessités militaires de la Sublime Porte, un règlement spécial en établira les conditions dans l'espace de trois mois après la ratification du présent acte, par une entente entre la Sublime Porte et l'administration de la Bulgarie.

Il est bien entendu que ce droit ne s'étendra qu'aux troupes Ottomanes régulières et que les irréguliers, les Bachi-Bouzouks et les Circassiens, en seront absolument exclus.

La Sublime Porte se réserve aussi le droit de faire passer à travers la Principauté sa poste et d'y entretenir une ligne télégraphique. Ces deux points seront également réglés de la façon et dans le laps de temps susindiqués.

ARTICLE XI.

Les propriétaires Musulmans ou autres qui fixeraient leur résidence personnelle hors de la Principauté pourront y conserver leurs immeubles en les faisant affermer ou administrer par d'autres. Des Commissions Turco-Bulgares siégeront dans les principaux centres de population sous la surveillance de Commissaires Russes pour statuer souverainement, dans le courant de deux années, sur toutes les questions relatives à la constatation des propriétés immobilières où des intérêts Musulmans ou autres seraient engagés.

Des Commissions analogues seront chargées de régler, dans le courant de deux années, toutes les affaires relatives au mode d'aliénation, d'exploitation, ou d'usage pour le compte de la Sublime Porte, des propriétés de l'Etat et des fondations pieuses (vacouf).

A l'expiration du terme de deux années mentionné plus haut, toutes les propriétés qui n'auront pas été réclamées seront vendues aux enchères publiques et le produit en sera consacré à l'entretien des veuves et des orphelins, tant Musulmans que Chrétiens, victimes des derniers événements.

ARTICLE XII.

Toutes les forteresses du Danube seront rasées. Il n'y aura plus dorénavant de places fortes sur les rives de ce fleuve, ni de bâtiments de guerre dans les eaux des Principautés de Roumanie, de Serbie, et de Bulgarie, sauf les stationnaires usités et les bâtiments légers destinés à la police fluviale et au service des douanes.

Les droits, obligations, et prérogatives de la Commission Internationale du Bas-Danube sont maintenus intacts.

ARTICLE XIII.

La Sublime Porte prend à sa charge le rétablissement de la navigabilité du passage de Soulina et le dédommagement des particuliers dont les biens auraient souffert du fait de la guerre et de l'interruption de la navigation sur le Danube, en affectant à cette double dépense une somme de 500,000 fr. sur celles qui lui sont dues par la Commission Danubienne.

ARTICLE XIV.

Seront immédiatement introduites en Bosnie et en Herzégovine les propositions Européennes communiquées aux Plénipotentiaires Ottomans dans la première séance de la Conférence de Constantinople avec les modifications qui seront arrêtées d'un commun accord entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement de Russie et celui d'Autriche-Hongrie.

Le paiement des arriérés ne sera pas exigé, et les revenus courants de ces provinces, jusqu'au 1^{er} Mars, 1880, seront exclusivement employés à indemniser les familles des réfugiés et des habitants victimes des derniers événements, sans distinction de race et de religion, ainsi qu'aux besoins locaux du pays. La somme qui devra revenir annuellement après ce terme, au Gouvernement central, sera fixé ultérieurement par une entente spéciale entre la Turquie, la Russie et l'Autriche-Hongrie.

ARTICLE XV.

La Sublime Porte s'engage à appliquer scrupuleusement dans l'Ile de Crète, le Règlement Organique de 1868, en tenant compte des vœux déjà exprimés par la population indigène.

Un règlement analogue, adapté aux besoins locaux, sera également introduit dans l'Épire, la Thessalie, et les autres parties de la Turquie d'Europe pour lesquelles une organisation spéciale n'est pas prévue par le présent acte.

Des Commissions Spéciales, dans lesquelles l'élément indigène aura une large participation, seront chargées dans chaque province d'élaborer les détails du nouveau règlement.

Le résultat de ces travaux sera soumis à l'examen de la Sublime Porte, qui consultera le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie avant de les mettre à l'exécution.

ARTICLE XVI.

Comme l'évacuation par les troupes Russes des territoires qu'elles occupent en Arménie, et qui doivent être restitués à la Turquie, pourrait y donner lieu à des conflits et à des complications préjudiciables aux bonnes relations des deux pays, la Sublime Porte s'engage à réaliser sans plus de retard les améliorations et les réformes exigées par les besoins locaux dans les provinces habitées par les Arméniens et à garantir leur sécurité contre les Kurds et les Circassiens.

ARTICLE XVII.

Une amnistie pleine et entière est accordée par la Sublime Porte à tous les sujets Ottomans compromis dans les derniers événements, et toutes les personnes détenues de ce fait ou envoyées en exil seront immédiatement mises en liberté.

ARTICLE XVIII.

La Sublime Porte prendra en sérieuse considération l'opinion émise par les Commissaires des Puissances médiatrices au sujet de la possession de la ville de Khotour, et s'engage à faire exécuter les travaux de délimitation définitive de la frontière Turco-Persane.

ARTICLE XIX.

Les indemnités de guerre et les pertes imposées à la Russie que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie réclame et que la Sublime Porte s'est engagée à lui rembourser se composent de :

(a.) 900,000,000 de roubles de frais de guerre (entretien de l'armée, remplacement du matériel, commandes de guerre) ;

(b.) 400,000,000 de roubles de dommages infligés au littoral méridional du pays, au commerce d'exportation, à l'industrie et aux chemins de fer ;

(c.) 100,000,000 de roubles de dommages causés au Caucase par l'invasion ;

(d.) 10,000,000 de roubles de dommages et intérêts aux sujets et institutions Russes en Turquie.

Total, 1,410,000,000 de roubles.

Prenant en considération les embarras financiers de la Turquie et d'accord avec le désir de Sa Majesté le Sultan, l'Empereur de Russie consent à remplacer le paiement de la plus grande partie des sommes énumérées dans le paragraphe précédent par les cessions territoriales suivantes :—

(a.) Le Sandjak de Toultscha, o'est-à-dire les districts (cazas) de Kilia, Soulina, Mahmoudié, Isaktcha, Toultscha, Matchine, Babadagh, Hirsowo, Kustendje, et Medjidié, ainsi que les Iles du Delta et l'île des Serpents.

Ne désirant pas s'annexer ce territoire et les Iles du Delta, la Russie se réserve la faculté de les échanger contre la partie de la Bessarabie détachée par le Traité de 1856 et limitée au midi par le thalweg du bras de Kilia et l'embouchure du Stary-Stamboul.

La question du partage des eaux et des pêcheries devra être réglé par une Commission Russo-Roumaine dans l'espace d'une année après la ratification du Traité de Paix.

(b.) Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, Bayazet et le territoire jusqu'au Saganlough.

En traits généraux, la ligne frontière en quittant la côte de la Mer Noire suivra la crête des montagnes qui séparent les affluents de la rivière Hopa de ceux de la Rivière Tcharokh et la chaîne de montagnes au sud de la ville d'Artwin jusqu'à la Rivière Tcharokh près des villages Alat et Bechaget; puis la frontière se dirigera par les sommets des monts Dervenikghek, Hortchezor, et Bedjiguin-Dagh par la crête qui sépare les affluents des Rivières Tortoum-tchai et Tcharokh et par les hauteurs près de Zaily-Vihine pour aboutir au village Vihine-Kilissa sur la Rivière Tortoum-Tchai; de là elle suivra la chaîne Sivri-Dagh jusqu'au col de ce nom, en passant au sud du village Noriman; elle tournera ensuite vers le sud-est, ira à Zivine, d'où la frontière, passant à l'ouest de la route qui mène de Zivine aux villages Ardozt et Horassan, se dirigera au sud par la chaîne de Saganlough jusqu'au village Gilitchman; puis par la crête du Charian-Dagh elle arrivera à dix verstes au sud de Hamour au défilé de Murad Tchai; la frontière longera ensuite la crête de l'Alla-Dagh et les sommets du Hori et du Tandourek et, passant au sud de la vallée de Bayazet, ira rejoindre l'ancienne frontière Turco-Persane au sud du Lac de Kazli-gueul.

Les limites définitives du territoire annexé à la Russie, indiquées sur la carte ci-jointe, seront fixées par une Commission composée de délégués Russes et Ottomans.

Cette Commission tiendra compte dans ses travaux tant de la topographie des localités que des considérations de bonne administration et des conditions propres à assurer la tranquillité du pays.

(c.) Les territoires mentionnés dans les paragraphes (a) et (b) sont cédés à la Russie comme équivalent de la somme d'un milliard cent millions de roubles. Quant au reste de l'indemnité, sauf les 10,000,000 de roubles, dûs aux intérêts et institutions Russes en Turquie, soit 300,000,000 de roubles,

le mode de paiement de cette somme, et la garantie à y affecter, seront réglés par une entente entre le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie et celui de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

(d.) Les 10,000,000 de roubles réclamés comme indemnité pour les sujets et institutions Russes en Turquie seront payés à mesure que les réclamations des intéressés seront examinées par l'Ambassade Russe à Constantinople et transmises à la Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE XX.

La Sublime Porte prendra des mesures efficaces pour terminer à l'amiable toutes les affaires litigieuses des sujets Russes pendantes depuis plusieurs années, dédommager ces derniers s'il y a lieu, et faire exécuter sans délai les sentences rendues.

ARTICLE XXI.

Les habitants des localités cédées à la Russie, qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de ces territoires, seront libres de se retirer en vendant leurs propriétés immobilières. Un délai de trois ans leur est accordé à cet effet à partir de la ratification du présent Acte.

Passé ce délai, les habitants qui n'auront pas quitté le pays et vendu leurs immeubles resteront sujets Russes.

Les biens immeubles appartenant à l'Etat ou aux fondations pieuses, sises en dehors des localités précitées, devront être vendus dans le même délai de trois années, suivant le mode qui sera réglé par une Commission spéciale Russo-Turque. La même Commission sera chargée de déterminer le mode de retrait par le Gouvernement Ottoman du matériel de guerre, des munitions, des approvisionnements, et autres objets appartenant à l'Etat, et qui existeraient dans les places, villes, et localités cédées à la Russie et non occupées actuellement par les troupes Russes.

ARTICLE XXII.

Les ecclésiastiques, les pèlerins, et les moines Russes voyageant ou séjournant dans la Turquie d'Europe et d'Asie jouiront des mêmes droits, avantages, et privilèges que les ecclésiastiques étrangers appartenant à d'autres nationalités.

Le droit de protection officielle est reconnue à l'Ambassade Impériale et aux Consulats Russes en Turquie tant à l'égard des personnes sus-indiquées que de leurs possessions, établissements religieux, de bienfaisance, et autres dans les lieux saints et ailleurs.

Les moines de Mont Athos d'origine Russe seront maintenus dans leurs possessions et avantages antérieurs, et continueront à jouir, dans les trois couvents qui leur appartiennent

et dans les dépendances de ces derniers, des mêmes droits et prérogatives que ceux qui sont assurés aux autres établissements religieux et couvents de Mont Athos.

ARTICLE XXIII.

Tous les Traités, Conventions et engagements antérieurement conclus entre les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes relativement au commerce, à la juridiction, et à la position des sujets Russes en Turquie, et qui avaient été supprimés par l'état de guerre, seront remis en vigueur, sauf les clauses auxquelles il serait dérogé par le présent Acte. Les deux Gouvernements seront replacés, l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre, pour tous leurs engagements et rapports commerciaux et autres, dans la situation même où ils se trouvaient avant la déclaration de guerre.

ARTICLE XXIV.

Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles resteront ouverts en temps de guerre comme en temps de paix aux navires marchands des Etats neutres arrivant des ports Russes ou en destination de ces ports. La Sublime Porte s'engage en conséquence à ne plus établir dorénavant, devant les ports de la Mer Noire et de celle d'Azow, de blocus fictif qui s'écarterait de l'esprit de la Déclaration signée à Paris le 4^e Avril, 1856.

ARTICLE XXV.

L'évacuation complète par l'armée Russe de la Turquie d'Europe, à l'exception de la Bulgarie, aura lieu dans l'espace de trois mois après la conclusion de la paix définitive entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Afin de gagner du temps, et d'éviter le maintien prolongé des troupes Russes en Turquie et en Roumanie, une partie de l'armée Impériale pourra être dirigée vers des ports de la Mer Noire et de celle de Marmora pour y être embarquée sur des bâtiments appartenant au Gouvernement Russe ou frétés pour la circonstance.

L'évacuation de la Turquie d'Asie s'opérera dans l'espace de six mois à dater de la conclusion de la paix définitive, et les troupes Russes auront la faculté de s'embarquer à Trébizonde pour retourner par le Caucase ou par la Crimée.

Les opérations de l'évacuation devront commencer immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications.

ARTICLE XXVI.

Tant que les troupes Impériales Russes séjourneront dans les localités qui, conformément au présent Acte, seront restituées

à la Sublime Porte, l'administration et l'ordre des choses resteront dans le même état que depuis l'évacuation. La Sublime Porte ne devra y prendre aucune part durant tout ce temps, et jusqu'à l'entière sortie de toutes les troupes.

Les troupes Ottomanes ne devront entrer dans les localités qui seront restituées à la Sublime Porte, et cette dernière ne pourra commencer à exercer son autorité, que lorsque, pour chaque place et province qui aura été évacuée par les troupes Russes, le Commandant de ces troupes en aura donné connaissance à l'officier désigné à cet effet de la part de la Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE XXVII.

La Sublime Porte prend l'engagement de ne sévir d'aucune manière, ni laisser sévir, contre les sujets Ottomans qui auraient été compromis par leur relation avec l'armée Russe pendant la guerre. Dans le cas où quelques personnes voudraient se retirer avec leurs familles à la suite des troupes Russes, les autorités Ottomanes ne s'opposeront pas à leur départ.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

Immédiatement après la ratification des Préliminaires de Paix, les prisonniers de guerre seront rendus réciproquement par les soins des commissaires, spéciaux nommés de part et d'autre, et qui se rendront à cet effet à Odessa et à Sébastopol. Le Gouvernement Ottoman payera tous les frais de l'entretien des prisonniers qui lui seront restitués en dix-huit termes égaux dans l'espace de six années d'après les comptes qui seront établis par les commissaires susmentionnés.

L'échange des prisonniers entre le Gouvernement Ottoman et ceux de la Roumanie, de la Serbie, et du Monténégro, aura lieu sur les mêmes bases, en déduisant toutefois, dans le décompte à établir, le nombre des prisonniers restitués par le Gouvernement Ottoman du nombre des prisonniers qui lui seront restitués.

ARTICLE XXIX.

Le présent Acte sera ratifié par leurs Majestés Impériales l'Empereur de Russie et l'Empereur des Ottomans, et les ratifications seront échangées dans quinze jours, ou plus tôt si faire se peut, à St-Petersbourg, où l'on conviendra également du lieu et de l'époque à laquelle les stipulations du présent Acte seront revêtues des formes solennelles usitées dans les Traités de Paix.

Il demeure toutefois bien entendu que les Hautes Parties Contractantes se considèrent comme formellement liées par le présent Acte depuis le moment de sa ratification.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont revêtu le présent Acte de leurs signatures, et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à San Stéfano, le ^{dix-neuf Février}_{trois Mars}, mil huit-cent soixante dix-huit.

Paragraphe final de l'Article XI de l'Acte des Préliminaires de Paix signé aujourd'hui ^{19 Février}_{3 Mars}, 1878, qui a été omis, et qui doit faire partie intégrante du dit Article :—

Les habitants de la Principauté de Bulgarie qui voyageront ou séjourneront dans les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman seront soumis aux lois et aux autorités Ottomanes.

X. TREATY OF BERLIN.

* Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878.

<i>Britain.</i>	Earl of Beaconsfield. Marquess of Salisbury. Lord Odo Russell.	<i>France.</i>	M. W. H. Waddington. Comte de Saint-Vallier. M. F. H. Desprez.
<i>Germany.</i>	Prince Bismarck. de Bülow. Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst.	<i>Italy.</i>	Comte Corti. Comte de Launay.
<i>Austria.</i>	Count Andrassy. Count Károlyi. Baron de Haymerle.	<i>Russia.</i>	Prince Gortchakow. Comte Schouvaloff. M. P. d'Oubril.
		<i>Turkey.</i>	Carathéodory Pasha. Mehemed Ali Pasha. Sadoullah Bey.

* ARTICLE I^{er}.

La Bulgarie est constituée en Principauté autonome et tributaire sous la suzeraineté de S. M. I. le Sultan ; elle aura un Gouvernement Chrétien et une milice nationale.

ARTICLE II.

La Principauté de Bulgarie comprendra les territoires ci-après :

La frontière suit au nord la rive droite du Danube depuis l'ancienne frontière de Serbie jusqu'à un point à déterminer par une Commission Européenne à l'est de Silistrie et, de là, se dirige vers la Mer Noire au sud de Mangalia, qui est rattaché au territoire Roumain. La Mer Noire forme la limite est de la Bulgarie. Au sud, la frontière remonte, depuis son embouchure, le thalweg du ruisseau près duquel se trouvent les villages Hodžakiöj, Selam-Kiöj, Aivadžik, Kulibe, Sudžuluk ;

traverse obliquement la vallée du Deli Kamcik, passe au sud de Belibe et de Kemhalik et au nord de Hadžimahale, après avoir franchi le Deli Kamcik à 2½ kilomètres en amont de Čengei ; gagne la crête à un point situé entre Tekenlik et Aidos-bredza et la suit par Karnabad Balkan, Prisevica Balkan, Kazan Balkan au nord de Kotel jusqu'à Demir Kapu. Elle continue par la chaîne principale du Grand Balkan, dont elle suit toute l'étendue jusqu'au sommet de Kosica.

Là elle quitte la crête du Balkan, descend vers le sud entre les villages de Pirtop et de Dužanci, laissés l'un à la Bulgarie et l'autre à la Roumémie Orientale, jusqu'au ruisseau de Tuzlu Dere, suit ce cours d'eau jusqu'à sa jonction avec Smovskio Dere, puis cette rivière jusqu'à son confluent avec Smovskio Dere, près du village de Petricevo, laissant à la Roumémie Orientale une zone de 2 kilomètres de rayon en amont de ce confluent, remonte entre les ruisseaux de Smovskio Dere et la Kamenica, suivant la ligne de partage des eaux, pour tourner au sud-ouest à la hauteur de Voinjak, et gagner directement le point 875 de la carte de l'Etat-Major Autrichien.

La ligne-frontière coupe en ligne droite le bassin supérieur du ruisseau d'Ichtiman Dere, passe entre Bogdina et Karaúla, pour retrouver la ligne de partage des eaux séparant les bassins de l'Isker et de la Marica, entre Čamurli et Hadžilar, suit cette ligne par les sommets de Velina Mogila, le col 531, Zmailica Vrh, Sumnatica, et rejoint la limite administrative du Sandjak de Sofia entre Sivri Taš et Čadir Tepe.

De Čadir Tepe, la frontière, se dirigeant au sud-ouest, suit la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins du Mesta Karasu d'un côté et du Štruma Karasu de l'autre, longe les crêtes des Montagnes du Rhodope appelées Demir Kapu, Iskoštepe, Kadimesa Balkan, et Aiji Gedük jusqu'à Kapetnik Balkan, et se confond ainsi avec l'ancienne frontière administrative du Sandjak de Sofia.

De Kapetnik Balkan la frontière est indiquée par la ligne de partage des eaux entre les vallées de la Rilska-reka et de la Bistrice-reka, et suit le contrefort appelé Vodenica Planina, pour descendre dans la vallée de la Štruma au confluent de cette rivière avec la Rilska-reka, laissant le village de Barakli à la Turquie. Elle remonte alors au sud du village de Jelešnica, pour atteindre, par la ligne la plus courte, la chaîne de Golema Planina au sommet de Gitka, et y rejoindre l'ancienne frontière administrative du Sandjak de Sofia, laissant toutefois à la Turquie la totalité du bassin de la Suha-reka.

Du Mont Gitka, la frontière ouest se dirige vers le Mont Crni Vrh par les Montagnes de Karvena Jabuka, en suivant l'ancienne limite administrative du Sandjak de Sofia dans la partie supérieure des bassins de Egrisu et de la Lepnica, gravit

avec elle les crêtes de Babina-palona, et arrive au Mont Crni Vrh.

Du Mont Crni Vrh, la frontière suit la ligne de partage des eaux entre la Struma et la Morawa par les sommets du Strešer, Filogolo, et Mešid Planina, rejoint par la Gačina, Crna Trava, Darkovska, et Drainica plan, puis le Deščani Kladanec, la ligne de partage des eaux de la Haute Sukowa et de la Morawa, va directement sur le Stol, et en descend pour couper à 1,000 mètres au nord-ouest du village de Seguša la route de Sofia à Pirot. Elle remonte en ligne droite sur la Vidlič Planina et de là sur le Mont Radočina dans la chaîne du Kodža Balkan, laissant à la Serbie le village de Doikinci, et à la Bulgarie celui de Senakos.

Du sommet du Mont Radočina la frontière suit vers l'ouest de la crête des Balkans par Ciprovec Balkan et Stara Planina jusqu'à l'ancienne frontière orientale de la Principauté de Serbie près de la Kula Smiljova Cuka, et de là cette ancienne frontière jusqu'au Danube, qu'elle rejoint à Rokovitza.

Cette délimitation sera fixée sur les lieux par la Commission Européenne, où les Puissances Signataires seront représentées. Il est entendu—

1. Que cette Commission prendra en considération la nécessité pour S. M. I. le Sultan de pouvoir défendre les frontières du Balkan de la Roumélie Orientale.

2. Qu'il ne pourra être élevé de fortifications dans un rayon de 10 kilomètres autour de Samakow.

ARTICLE III.

Le Prince de Bulgarie sera librement élu par la population et confirmé par la S. Porte, avec l'assentiment des Puissances. Aucun membre des dynasties régnantes des Grandes Puissances Européennes ne pourra être élu Prince de Bulgarie.

En cas de vacance de la dignité princière l'élection du nouveau Prince se fera aux mêmes conditions et dans les mêmes formes.

ARTICLE IV.

Une assemblée de Notables de la Bulgarie, convoquée à Tirnovo, élaborera, avant l'élection du Prince, le Règlement Organique de la Principauté.

Dans les localités où les Bulgares sont mêlés à des populations Turques, Roumaines, Grecques ou autres, il sera tenu compte des droits et des intérêts de ces populations en ce qui concerne les élections et l'élaboration du Règlement Organique.

ARTICLE V.

Les dispositions suivantes formeront la base du droit public de la Bulgarie :—

La distinction des croyances religieuses et des confessions ne pourra être opposée à personne comme un motif d'exclusion ou d'incapacité en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries, dans quelque localité que ce soit.

La liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes sont assurées à tous les ressortissants de la Bulgarie, aussi bien qu'aux étrangers, et aucune entrave ne pourra être apportée soit à l'organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, soit à leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels.

ARTICLE VI.

L'administration provisoire de la Bulgarie sera dirigée jusqu'à l'achèvement du Règlement Organique par un Commissaire Impérial Russe. Un Commissaire Impérial Ottoman, ainsi que les Consuls délégués *ad hoc* par les autres Puissances Signataires du présent Traité, seront appelés à l'assister à l'effet de contrôler le fonctionnement de ce régime provisoire. En cas de dissentiment entre les Consuls délégués, la majorité décidera et, en cas de divergence entre cette majorité et le Commissaire Impérial Russe ou le Commissaire Impérial Ottoman, les Représentants des Puissances Signataires à Constantinople, réunis en Conférence, devront prononcer.

ARTICLE VII.

Le régime provisoire ne pourra être prolongé au delà d'un délai de neuf mois à partir de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité.

Lorsque le Règlement Organique sera terminé il sera procédé immédiatement à l'élection du Prince de Bulgarie. Aussitôt que le Prince aura été institué, la nouvelle organisation sera mise en vigueur, et la Principauté entrera en pleine jouissance de son autonomie.

ARTICLE VIII

Les Traités de Commerce et de Navigation, ainsi que toutes les Conventions et arrangements conclus entre les Puissances étrangères et la Porte, et aujourd'hui en vigueur, sont maintenus dans la Principauté de Bulgarie, et aucun changement n'y sera apporté à l'égard d'aucune Puissance avant qu'elle n'y ait donné son consentement.

Aucun droit de transit ne sera prélevé en Bulgarie sur les marchandises traversant cette Principauté.

Les nationaux et le commerce de toutes les Puissances y seront traités sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité.

Les immunités et privilèges des sujets étrangers, ainsi que les droits de juridiction et de protection Consulaires, tels qu'ils ont été établis par les Capitulations et les usages, resteront en pleine vigueur tant qu'ils n'auront pas été modifiés du consentement des parties intéressées.

ARTICLE IX.

Le montant du tribut annuel que la Principauté de Bulgarie paiera à la Cour Suzeraine, en le versant à la banque que la S. Porte désignera ultérieurement, sera déterminé par un accord entre les Puissances Signataires du présent Traité, à la fin de la première année du fonctionnement de la nouvelle organisation. Ce tribut sera établi sur le revenu moyen du territoire de la Principauté.

La Bulgarie devant supporter une part de la Dette Publique de l'Empire, lorsque les Puissances détermineront le tribut, elles prendront en considération la partie de cette dette qui pourrait être attribuée à la Principauté sur la base d'une équitable proportion.

ARTICLE X.

La Bulgarie est substituée au Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman dans ses charges et obligations envers la Compagnie du chemin de fer de Roustchouk-Varna, à partir de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité. Le règlement des comptes antérieurs est réservé à une entente entre la S. Porte, le Gouvernement de la Principauté et l'administration de cette Compagnie.

La Principauté de Bulgarie est de même substitué pour sa part aux engagements que la S. Porte a contractés tant envers l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'envers la Compagnie pour l'exploitation des chemins de fer de la Turquie d'Europe, par rapport à l'achèvement et au raccordement ainsi qu'à l'exploitation des lignes ferrées situées sur son territoire.

Les Conventions nécessaires pour régler ces questions seront conclues entre l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Porte, la Serbie et la Principauté de Bulgarie immédiatement après la conclusion de la paix.

ARTICLE XI.

L'armée Ottomane ne séjournera plus en Bulgarie ; toutes les anciennes forteresses seront rasées aux frais de la Principauté dans le délai d'un an, ou plus tôt si faire se peut ; le

Gouvernement local prendra immédiatement des mesures pour les détruire, et ne pourra en faire construire de nouvelles. La Sublime Porte aura le droit de disposer à sa guise du matériel de guerre et autres objets appartenant au Gouvernement Ottoman et qui seraient restés dans les forteresses du Danube déjà évacuées en vertu de l'Armistice du 31 Janvier, ainsi que de ceux qui se trouveraient dans les places fortes de Schoumla et de Varna.

ARTICLE XII.

Les propriétaires Musulmans ou autres qui fixeraient leur résidence personnelle hors de la Principauté pourront y conserver leurs immeubles en les affermant ou en les faisant administrer par des tiers.

Une Commission Turco-Bulgare sera chargée de régler, dans le courant de deux années, toutes les affaires relatives au mode d'aliénation, d'exploitation ou d'usage, pour le compte de la S. Porte, des propriétés de l'État et des fondations pieuses (Vakoufs), ainsi que les questions relatives aux intérêts des particuliers qui pourraient s'y trouver engagés.

Les ressortissants de la Principauté de Bulgarie qui voyageront ou séjourneront dans les autres parties de l'Empire Ottoman seront soumis aux autorités et aux lois Ottomanes.

ARTICLE XIII.

Il est formé au sud des Balkans une province qui prendra le nom de 'Roumélie Orientale', et qui restera placée sous l'autorité politique et militaire directe de S. M. I. le Sultan, dans des conditions d'autonomie administrative. Elle aura un Gouverneur-Général Chrétien.

ARTICLE XIV.

La Roumélie Orientale est limitée au nord et au nord-ouest par la Bulgarie, et comprend les territoires inclus dans le tracé suivant :—

Partant de la Mer Noire, la ligne frontière remonte, depuis son embouchure, le thalweg du ruisseau près duquel se trouvent les villages Hodžakiöj, Selam Kiöj, Aivadsik, Kulibe, Sudžuluk, traverse obliquement la Vallée du Deli Kamčik, passe au sud de Belibe et de Kemhalik et au nord de Hadžimahale, après avoir franchi le Deli Kamčik à 2½ kilomètres en amont de Čengei ; gagne la crête à un point situé entre Tekenlik et Aidos-Bredža, et la suit par Karnabad Balkan, Prisevica Balkan, Kazan Balkan, au nord de Kotel jusqu'à Demir Kapu. Elle continue par la chaîne principale du Grand Balkan, dont elle suit toute l'étendue jusqu'au sommet de Kosica.

A ce point, la frontière occidentale de la Roumémie quitte la crête du Balkan, descend vers le sud entre les villages de Pirtop et de Dužanci, laissés l'un à la Bulgarie et l'autre à la Roumémie Orientale, jusqu'au ruisseau de Tuzlu Dere, suit ce cours d'eau jusqu'à sa jonction avec la Topolnica, puis cette rivière jusqu'à son confluent avec Smovskio Dere près du village de Petričevo, laissant à la Roumémie Orientale une zone de 2 kilomètres de rayon en amont de ce confluent, remonte entre les ruisseaux de Smovskio Dere et la Kamenica, suivant la ligne de partage des eaux, pour tourner au sud-ouest, à la hauteur de Voinjak, et gagner directement le point 875 de la carte de l'Etat-Major Autrichien.

La ligne frontière coupe, en ligne droite, le bassin supérieur du ruisseau d'Ichtiman Dere, passe entre Bogdina et Karaúla, pour retrouver la ligne de partage des eaux séparant les bassins de l'Isker et de la Marica, entre Čamurli et Hadžilar, suit cette ligne par les sommets de Velina Mogila, le col 531, Zmailica Vrh, Sumnatica, et rejoint la limite administrative du Sandjak de Sofia entre Sivri Taš et Čadir Tepe.

La frontière de la Roumémie se sépare de celle de la Bulgarie au Mont Čadir Tepe, en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux entre le bassin de la Marica et de ses affluents d'un côté et du Mesta Karasu et de ses affluents de l'autre, et prend les directions sud-est et sud, par la crête des Montagnes Despoto Dagħ, vers le Mont Kruschowa (point de départ de la ligne du Traité de San Stefano).

Du Mont Kruschowa la frontière se conforme au tracé déterminé par le Traité de San Stefano, c'est-à-dire, la chaîne des Balkans Noirs (Kara Balkan), les Montagnes Kulaghy-Dagħ, Eschek-Tschpellü, Karakolas et Ischiklar, d'où elle descend directement vers le sud-est pour rejoindre la rivière Arda, dont elle suit le thalweg jusqu'à un point situé près du village d'Adačali, qui reste à la Turquie.

De ce point la ligne frontière gravit la crête de Beštepe Dagħ, qu'elle suit pour descendre et traverser la Maritza à un point situé 5 kilomètres en amont du pont du Mustafa Pacha ; elle se dirige ensuite vers le nord par la ligne de partage des eaux entre Demirhanli Dere et les petits affluents de la Maritza jusqu'à Küdeler Baır, d'où elle se dirige à l'est sur Sakar Baır, de là traverse la Vallée de la Tundža, allant vers Büjüĸ Derbend, qu'elle laisse au nord, ainsi que Soudzak. De Büjüĸ Derbend elle reprend la ligne de partage des eaux entre les affluents de la Tundža au nord et ceux de la Maritza au sud, jusqu'à la hauteur de Kaibilar, qui reste à la Roumémie Orientale, passe au sud de V. Almali entre le bassin de la Maritza au sud et différents cours d'eau qui se rendent directement vers la Mer Noire, entre les villages de Belevrin et Alatlı ;

elle suit au nord de Karanlik les crêtes de Vosna et Zuvak, la ligne qui sépare les eaux de la Duka de celles du Karagač-Su, et rejoint la Mer Noire entre les deux rivières de ce nom.

ARTICLE XV.

S. M. le Sultan aura le droit de pourvoir à la défense des frontières de terre et de mer de la province en élevant des fortifications sur ces frontières et en y entretenant des troupes.

L'ordre intérieur est maintenu dans la Roumémie Orientale par une gendarmerie indigène, assistée d'une milice locale.

Pour la composition de ces deux corps, dont les officiers sont nommés par le Sultan, il sera tenu compte, suivant les localités, de la religion des habitants.

S. M. I. le Sultan s'engage à ne point employer de troupes irrégulières telles que Bachi-Bozouks et Circassiens dans les garnisons des frontières. Les troupes régulières destinées à ce service ne pourront en aucun cas être cantonnées chez l'habitant. Lorsqu'elles traverseront la province, elles ne pourront y faire de séjour.

ARTICLE XVI.

Le Gouverneur-Général aura le droit d'appeler les troupes Ottomanes dans les cas où la sécurité intérieure ou extérieure de la province se trouverait menacée. Dans l'éventualité prévue, la S. Porte devra donner connaissance de cette décision, ainsi que des nécessités qui la justifient, aux Représentants des Puissances à Constantinople.

ARTICLE XVII.

Le Gouverneur-Général de la Roumémie Orientale sera nommé par la S. Porte, avec l'assentiment des Puissances, pour un terme de cinq ans.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, une Commission Européenne sera formée pour élaborer, d'accord avec la Porte Ottomane, l'organisation de la Roumémie Orientale. Cette Commission aura à déterminer, dans un délai de trois mois, les pouvoirs et les attributions du Gouverneur-Général, ainsi que le régime administratif, judiciaire et financier de la province, en prenant pour point de départ les différentes lois sur les vilayets et les propositions faites dans la huitième séance de la Conférence de Constantinople.

L'ensemble des dispositions arrêtées pour la Roumémie Orientale fera l'objet d'un Firman Impérial, qui sera promulgué par la Sublime Porte et dont elle donnera communication aux Puissances.

ARTICLE XIX.

La Commission Européenne sera chargée d'administrer, d'accord avec la Sublime Porte, les finances de la province jusqu'à l'achèvement de la nouvelle organisation.

ARTICLE XX.

Les Traités, Conventions, et arrangements internationaux, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, conclus ou à conclure entre la Porte et les Puissances étrangères, seront applicables dans la Roumémie Orientale comme dans tout l'Empire Ottoman. Les immunités et privilèges acquis aux étrangers, quelle que soit leur condition, seront respectés dans cette province. La S. Porte s'engage à y faire observer les lois générales de l'Empire sur la liberté religieuse en faveur de tous les cultes.

ARTICLE XXI.

Les droits et obligations de la S. Porte, en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer dans la Roumémie Orientale, sont maintenus intégralement.

ARTICLE XXII.

L'effectif du corps d'occupation Russe en Bulgarie et dans la Roumémie Orientale sera composé de six divisions d'infanterie et de deux divisions de cavalerie, et n'excédera pas 50,000 hommes. Il sera entretenu aux frais du pays occupé. Les troupes d'occupation conserveront leurs communications avec la Russie, non seulement par la Roumanie d'après les arrangements à conclure entre les deux Etats, mais aussi par les ports de la Mer Noire, Varna et Bourgas, où elles pourront organiser, pour la durée de l'occupation, les dépôts nécessaires.

La durée de l'occupation de la Roumémie Orientale et de la Bulgarie par les troupes Impériales Russes est fixée à neuf mois à dater de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité.

Le Gouvernement Impérial Russe s'engage à terminer, dans un délai ultérieur de trois mois, le passage de ses troupes à travers la Roumanie et l'évacuation complète de cette Principauté.

ARTICLE XXIII.

La Sublime Porte s'engage à appliquer scrupuleusement dans l'Ile de Crète le Règlement Organique de 1868, en y apportant les modifications qui seraient jugées équitables.

Des règlements analogues adaptés aux besoins locaux, sauf en ce qui concerne les exemptions d'impôt accordées à la Crète, seront également introduits dans les autres parties de

la Turquie d'Europe pour lesquelles une organisation particulière n'a pas été prévue par le présent Traité.

La Sublime Porte chargera des Commissions Spéciales, au sein desquelles l'élément indigène sera largement représenté, d'élaborer les détails de ces nouveaux règlements dans chaque province.

Les projets d'organisation résultant de ces travaux seront soumis à l'examen de la Sublime Porte, qui, avant de promulguer les actes destinés à les mettre en vigueur, prendra l'avis de la Commission Européenne instituée pour la Roumélie Orientale.

ARTICLE XXIV.

Dans le cas où la Sublime Porte et la Grèce ne parviendraient pas à s'entendre sur la rectification de frontière indiquée dans le Treizième Protocole du Congrès de Berlin, l'Allemagne, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, et la Russie se réservent d'offrir leur médiation aux deux parties pour faciliter les négociations.

ARTICLE XXV.

Les Provinces de Bosnie et d'Herzégovine seront occupées et administrées par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie ne désirant pas se charger de l'administration du Sandjak de Novi-Bazar, qui s'étend entre la Serbie et le Monténégro dans la direction sud-est jusqu'au delà de Mitrovitz, l'Administration Ottomane continuera d'y fonctionner. Néanmoins, afin d'assurer le maintien du nouvel état politique ainsi que la liberté et la sécurité des voies de communication, l'Autriche-Hongrie se réserve le droit de tenir garnison et d'avoir des routes militaires et commerciales sur toute l'étendue de cette partie de l'ancien Vilayet de Bosnie. A cet effet les Gouvernements d'Autriche-Hongrie et de Turquie se réservent de s'entendre sur les détails.

ARTICLE XXVI.

L'indépendance du Monténégro* est reconnue par la S. Porte et par toutes celles des Hautes Parties Contractantes qui ne l'avaient pas encore admise.

ARTICLE XXVII.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d'accord sur les conditions suivantes :—

Dans le Monténégro la distinction des croyances religieuses et des confessions ne pourra être opposée à personne comme un motif d'exclusion ou d'incapacité en ce qui concerne la

jouissance des droits civils et politiques, l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions, et honneurs, ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries, dans quelque localité que ce soit. La liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes seront assurées à tous les ressortissants du Monténégro aussi bien qu'aux étrangers, et aucune entrave ne pourra être apportée, soit à l'organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, soit à leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

Les nouvelles frontières du Monténégro sont fixées ainsi qu'il suit :—

Le tracé partant de l'Ilinobrdo au nord de Klobuk descend sur la Trebinjčica vers Grančarevo, qui reste à l'Herzégovine, puis remonte le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à un point situé à un kilomètre en aval du confluent de la Čepelica et, de là, rejoint, par la ligne la plus courte, les hauteurs qui bordent la Trebinjčica. Il se dirige ensuite vers Pilatova, laissant ce village au Monténégro, puis continue par les hauteurs dans la direction nord, en se maintenant autant que possible à une distance de 6 kilomètres de la route Bilek-Korito-Gacko, jusqu'au col situé entre la Somina-Planina et le Mont Čurilo, d'où il se dirige à l'est par Vratkoviči, laissant ce village à l'Herzégovine, jusqu'au Mont Orlin. A partir de ce point, la frontière—laissant Ravno au Monténégro—s'avance directement par le nord-nord-est en traversant les sommets du Lebernšik et du Volujak, puis descend par la ligne la plus courte sur la Piva, qu'elle traverse, et rejoint la Tara en passant entre Crkvica et Nedvina. De ce point elle remonte la Tara jusqu'à Mojkovac, d'où elle suit la crête du contrefort jusqu'à Siškojezero. A partir de cette localité elle se confond avec l'ancienne frontière jusqu'au village de Sekulare. De là, la nouvelle frontière se dirige par les crêtes de la Mokra Planina, le village de Mokra restant au Monténégro, puis elle gagne le point 2166 de la carte de l'Etat-Major Autrichien, en suivant la chaîne principale et la ligne du partage des eaux, entre le Lim d'un côté, et le Drin, ainsi que la Cievna (Zem), de l'autre.

Elle se confond ensuite avec les limites actuelles entre la tribu des Kuči-Drekaloviči d'un côté, et la Kučka-Krajna, ainsi que les tribus des Klementi et Grudi, de l'autre, jusqu'à la plaine de Podgorica, d'où elle se dirige sur Plavnica, laissant à l'Albanie les tribus des Klementi, Grudi, et Hoti.

De là, la nouvelle frontière traverse le lac près de l'îlot de Gorica-Topal, et à partir de Gorica-Topal, elle atteint directement les sommets de la crête, d'où elle suit la ligne du partage des eaux entre Megured et Kalimid, laissant Mrkovič au Monténégro et rejoignant la Mer Adriatique à V. Kruči.

Au nord-ouest le tracé sera formé par une ligne passant de la côte entre les villages Susana et Zubci et aboutissant à la pointe extrême sud-est de la frontière actuelle du Monténégro sur la Vrsuta-Planina.

ARTICLE XXIX.

Antivari et son littoral sont annexés au Monténégro sous les conditions suivantes :—

Les contrées situées au sud de ce territoire, d'après la délimitation ci-dessus déterminée, jusqu'à la Bojana, y compris Dulcinjo, seront restituées à la Turquie.

La commune de Spiča jusqu'à la limite septentrionale du territoire indiqué dans la description détaillée des frontières sera incorporée à la Dalmatie.

Il y aura pleine et entière liberté de navigation sur la Bojana pour le Monténégro. Il ne sera pas construit de fortifications sur le parcours de ce fleuve, à l'exception de celles qui seraient nécessaires à la défense locale de la place de Scutari, lesquelles ne s'étendront pas au delà d'une distance de 6 kilomètres de cette ville.

Le Monténégro ne pourra avoir ni bâtiments ni pavillon de guerre.

Le port d'Antivari et toutes les eaux du Monténégro resteront fermées aux bâtiments de guerre de toutes les nations.

Les fortifications situées entre le lac et le littoral sur le territoire Monténégrin seront rasées, et il ne pourra en être élevé de nouvelles dans cette zone.

La police maritime et sanitaire, tant à Antivari que le long de la côte du Monténégro, sera exercée par l'Autriche-Hongrie au moyen de bâtiments légers garde-côtes.

Le Monténégro adoptera la législation maritime en vigueur en Dalmatie. De son côté, l'Autriche-Hongrie s'engage à accorder sa protection Consulaire au pavillon marchand Monténégrin.

Le Monténégro devra s'entendre avec l'Autriche-Hongrie sur le droit de construire et d'entretenir à travers le nouveau territoire Monténégrin une route et un chemin de fer.

Une entière liberté de communications sera assurée sur ces voies.

ARTICLE XXX.

Les Musulmans ou autres qui possèdent des propriétés dans les territoires annexés au Monténégro, et qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de la Principauté, pourront conserver leurs immeubles en les affermant ou en les faisant administrer par des tiers.

Personne ne pourra être exproprié que légalement pour cause d'intérêt public, et moyennant une indemnité préalable.

Une Commission Turco-Monténégro sera chargée de régler dans le terme de trois ans toutes les affaires relatives au mode d'aliénation, d'exploitation, et d'usage pour le compte de la S. Porte des propriétés de l'État et des fondations pieuses (Vakoufs), ainsi que les questions relatives aux intérêts des particuliers qui s'y trouveraient engagés.

ARTICLE XXXI.

La Principauté du Monténégro s'entendra directement avec la Porte Ottomane sur l'institution d'agents Monténégro à Constantinople et dans certaines localités de l'Empire Ottoman où la nécessité en sera reconnue.

Les Monténégro voyagent ou séjournant dans l'Empire Ottoman seront soumis aux lois et aux autorités Ottomanes suivant les principes généraux du droit international et les usages établis concernant les Monténégro.

ARTICLE XXXII.

Les troupes du Monténégro seront tenues d'évacuer, dans un délai de vingt jours à partir de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, ou plus tôt si faire se peut, le territoire qu'elles occupent en ce moment en dehors des nouvelles limites de la Principauté. Les troupes Ottomanes évacueront les territoires cédés au Monténégro dans le même délai de vingt jours. Il leur sera toutefois accordé un terme supplémentaire de quinze jours, tant pour quitter les places fortes et pour en retirer les approvisionnements et le matériel que pour dresser l'inventaire des engins et objets qui ne pourraient être enlevés immédiatement.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

Le Monténégro devant supporter une partie de la Dette Publique Ottomane pour les nouveaux territoires qui lui sont attribués par le Traité de Paix, les Représentants des Puissances à Constantinople en détermineront le montant, de concert avec la S. Porte, sur une base équitable.

ARTICLE XXXIV.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes reconnaissent l'indépendance de la Principauté de Serbie en la rattachant aux conditions exposées dans l'Article suivant.

ARTICLE XXXV.

En Serbie la distinction des croyances religieuses et des confessions ne pourra être opposée à personne comme un

motif d'exclusion et d'incapacité en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs, ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries, dans quelque localité que ce soit.

La liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes seront assurées à tous les ressortissants de la Serbie aussi bien qu'aux étrangers, et aucune entrave ne pourra être apportée soit à l'organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, soit à leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels.

ARTICLE XXXVI.

La Serbie reçoit les territoires inclus dans la délimitation ci-après :—

La nouvelle frontière suit le tracé actuel en remontant le thalweg de la Drina depuis son confluent avec la Save, laissant à la Principauté le Mali Zvornik et Sokhar, et continue à longer l'ancienne limite de la Serbie jusqu'au Kopaonik, dont elle se détache au sommet du Kanilug. De là elle suit d'abord la limite occidentale du Sandjak de Nisch par le contrefort sud du Kopaonik, par les crêtes de la Marica et Mrdar Planina, qui forment la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins de l'Ibar et de la Sitnica d'un côté et celui de la Toplica de l'autre, laissant Prepolac à la Turquie.

Elle tourne ensuite vers le sud par la ligne du partage des eaux entre la Brvenica et la Medvedja, laissant tout le bassin de la Medvedja à la Serbie, suit la crête de la Goljak Planina (formant le partage des eaux entre la Kriva Rjeka d'un côté et la Poljanica, la Veternica, et la Morawa de l'autre) jusqu'au sommet de la Poljanica. Puis elle se dirige par le contrefort de la Karpina Planina jusqu'au confluent de la Koinska avec la Morawa, traverse cette rivière, remonte par la ligne de partage des eaux entre le ruisseau Koinska et le ruisseau qui tombe dans la Morawa près de Neradovce, pour rejoindre la Planina Sv. Ilija au-dessus de Trgovište. De ce point elle suit la crête de Sv. Ilija jusqu'au Mont Kljuc, et, passant par les points indiqués sur la carte par 1516 et 1547 et par la Babina Gora, elle aboutit au Mont Crni Vrh.

A partir du Mont Crni Vrh la nouvelle délimitation se confond avec celle de la Bulgarie, c'est-à-dire :

La ligne frontière suit la ligne de partage des eaux entre la Struma et la Morawa par les sommets de Strešer, Vilogolo, et Mešid Planina, rejoint par la Gašina, Crna Trava, Darkosvka, et Drainica Plan, puis le Deščani Kladanec, la ligne de partage des eaux de la Haute Sukowa et de la Morawa, va directement sur le Stol et en descend pour couper à 1,000 mètres au nord-ouest du village de Seguša la route de Sofia à Pirost. Elle remonte, en ligne droite, sur la Vidlic Planina, et de là

sur le Mont Radočina, dans la chaîne du Kodža Balkan, laissant à la Serbie le village de Doikinci et à la Bulgarie celui de Senakos.

Du sommet du Mont Radočina la frontière suit vers le nord-ouest la crête des Balkans par Ciprovec Balkan et Stara Planina jusqu'à l'ancienne frontière orientale de la Principauté de Serbie près la Kula Smiljova čuka, et, de là, cette ancienne frontière jusqu'au Danube, qu'elle rejoint à Rakowitza.

ARTICLE XXXVII.

Jusqu'à la conclusion de nouveaux arrangements rien ne sera changé en Serbie aux conditions actuelles des relations commerciales de la Principauté avec les pays étrangers.

Aucun droit de transit ne sera prélevé sur les marchandises traversant la Serbie.

Les immunités et privilèges des sujets étrangers, ainsi que les droits de juridiction et de protection Consulaires, tels qu'ils existent aujourd'hui, resteront en pleine vigueur tant qu'ils n'auront pas été modifiés d'un commun accord entre la Principauté et les Puissances intéressées.

ARTICLE XXXVIII.

La Principauté de Serbie est substituée pour sa part aux engagements que la Sublime Porte a contractés, tant envers l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'envers la Compagnie pour l'exploitation des chemins de fer de la Turquie d'Europe, par rapport à l'achèvement et au raccordement ainsi qu'à l'exploitation des lignes ferrées à construire sur le territoire nouvellement acquis par la Principauté.

Les Conventions nécessaires pour régler ces questions seront conclues immédiatement après la signature du présent Traité entre l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Porte, la Serbie, et, dans les limites de sa compétence, la Principauté de Bulgarie.

ARTICLE XXXIX.

Les Musulmans qui possèdent des propriétés dans les territoires annexés à la Serbie, et qui voudraient fixer leur résidence hors de la Principauté, pourront y conserver leurs immeubles, en les affermant ou en les faisant administrer par des tiers.

Une Commission Turco-Serbe sera chargée de régler, dans le délai de trois années, toutes les affaires relatives au mode d'aliénation, d'exploitation, ou d'usage pour le compte de la S. Porte, des propriétés de l'État, et des fondations pieuses (Vakoufs), ainsi que les questions relatives aux intérêts des particuliers qui pourraient s'y trouver engagés.

ARTICLE XL.

Jusqu'à la conclusion d'un Traité entre la Turquie et la Serbie, les sujets Serbes voyageant ou séjournant dans l'Empire Ottoman seront traités suivant les principes généraux du droit international.

ARTICLE XLI.

Les troupes Serbes seront tenues d'évacuer, dans le délai de quinze jours à partir de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité, le territoire non compris dans les nouvelles limites de la Principauté.

Les troupes Ottomanes évacueront les territoires cédés à la Serbie dans le même délai de quinze jours. Il leur sera toutefois accordé un terme supplémentaire du même nombre de jours tant pour quitter les places fortes, et pour en retirer les approvisionnements et le matériel, que pour dresser l'inventaire des engins et objets qui ne pourraient être enlevés immédiatement.

ARTICLE XLII.

La Serbie devant supporter une partie de la Dette Publique Ottomane pour les nouveaux territoires qui lui sont attribués par le présent Traité, les Représentants à Constantinople en détermineront le montant, de concert avec la S. Porte, sur une base équitable.

ARTICLE XLIII.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes reconnaissent l'indépendance de la Roumanie en la rattachant aux conditions exposées dans les deux Articles suivants.

ARTICLE XLIV.

En Roumanie la distinction des croyances religieuses et des confessions ne pourra être opposée à personne comme un motif d'exclusion ou d'incapacité en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions, et honneurs, ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries, dans quelque localité que ce soit.

La liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes seront assurées à tous les ressortissants de l'État Roumain aussi bien qu'aux étrangers, et aucune entrave ne sera apportée, soit à l'organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, soit à leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels.

Les nationaux de toutes les Puissances, commerçants ou autres, seront traités en Roumanie, sans distinction de religion, sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité.

ARTICLE XLV.

La Principauté de Roumanie rétrocède à S. M. l'Empereur de Russie la portion du territoire de la Bessarabie détachée de la Russie en suite du Traité de Paris de 1856, limitée à l'ouest par le thalweg du Pruth, au midi par le thalweg du bras de Kilia et l'embouchure de Stary-Stamboul.

ARTICLE XLVI.

Les îles formant le delta du Danube, ainsi que l'île des Serpents, le Sandjak de Toultscha, comprenant les districts (cazas) de Kilia, Soulina Mahmoudié, Isaktcha, Toultscha, Matchin, Babadagh, Hirsovo, Kustendje, Medjidié, sont réunis à la Roumanie. La Principauté reçoit en outre le territoire situé au sud de la Dobroutscha jusqu'à une ligne ayant son point de départ à l'est de Silistrie et aboutissant à la Mer Noire au sud de Mangalia.

Le tracé de la frontière sera fixé sur les lieux par la Commission Européenne instituée pour la délimitation de la Bulgarie.

ARTICLE XLVII.

La question du partage des eaux et des pêcheries sera soumise à l'arbitrage de la Commission Européenne du Danube.

ARTICLE XLVIII.

Aucun droit de transit ne sera prélevé en Roumanie sur les marchandises traversant la Principauté.

ARTICLE XLIX.

Des Conventions pourront être conclues par la Roumanie pour régler les privilèges et attributions des Consuls en matière de protection dans la Principauté. Les droits acquis resteront en vigueur tant qu'ils n'auront pas été modifiés d'un commun accord entre la Principauté et les parties intéressées.

ARTICLE L.

Jusqu'à la conclusion d'un Traité réglant les privilèges et attributions des Consuls entre la Turquie et la Roumanie, les sujets Roumains voyageant ou séjournant dans l'Empire Ottoman, et les sujets Ottomans voyageant ou séjournant en Roumanie, jouiront des droits garantis aux sujets des autres Puissances Européennes.

ARTICLE LI.

En ce qui concerne les entreprises de travaux publics et autres de même nature, la Roumanie sera substituée pour tout le territoire cédé aux droits et obligations de la Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE LII.

Afin d'accroître les garanties assurées à la liberté de la navigation sur le Danube, reconnue comme étant d'intérêt Européen, les Hautes Parties Contractantes décident que toutes les forteresses et fortifications qui se trouvent sur le parcours du fleuve depuis les Portes de Fer jusqu'à ses embouchures seront rasées et qu'il n'en sera pas élevé de nouvelles. Aucun bâtiment de guerre ne pourra naviguer sur le Danube en aval des Portes de Fer, à l'exception des bâtiments légers destinés à la police fluviale et au service des douanes. Les stationnaires des Puissances aux embouchures du Danube pourront toutefois remonter jusqu'à Galatz.

ARTICLE LIII.

La Commission Européenne du Danube, au sein de laquelle la Roumanie sera représentée, est maintenue dans ses fonctions et les exercera dorénavant jusqu'à Galatz dans une complète indépendance de l'autorité territoriale. Tous les Traités, arrangements, actes et décisions relatifs à ses droits, privilèges, prérogatives et obligations sont confirmés.

ARTICLE LIV.

Une année avant l'expiration du terme assigné à la durée de la Commission Européenne les Puissances se mettront d'accord sur la prolongation de ses pouvoirs ou sur les modifications qu'elles jugeraient nécessaires d'y introduire.

ARTICLE LV.

Les règlements de navigation, de police fluviale et de surveillance depuis les Portes de Fer jusqu'à Galatz seront élaborés par la Commission Européenne assistée de délégués des Etats Riverains et mis en harmonie avec ceux qui ont été ou seraient édictés pour le parcours en aval de Galatz.

ARTICLE LVI.

La Commission Européenne du Danube s'entendra avec qui de droit pour assurer l'entretien du phare sur l'Ile des Serpents.

ARTICLE LVII.

L'exécution des travaux destinés à faire disparaître les obstacles que les Portes de Fer et les Cataractes opposent à la navigation est confiée à l'Autriche-Hongrie. Les Etats Riverains de cette partie du fleuve accorderont toutes les facilités qui pourraient être requises dans l'intérêt des travaux.

Les dispositions de l'Article VI du Traité de Londres du

13 Mars, 1871, relatives au droit de percevoir une taxe provisoire pour couvrir les frais de ces travaux, sont maintenues en faveur de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

ARTICLE LVIII.

La S. Porte cède à l'Empire Russe en Asie les territoires d'Ardahan, Kars, et Batoum avec ce dernier port, ainsi que tous les territoires compris entre l'ancienne frontière Russo-Turque et le tracé suivant :—

La nouvelle frontière partant de la Mer Noire, conformément à la ligne déterminée par le Traité de San Stefano, jusqu'à un point au nord-ouest de Khorda et au sud d'Artwin, se prolonge en ligne droite jusqu'à la rivière Tchoroukh, traverse cette rivière et passe à l'est d'Aschmichen, en allant en ligne droite au sud pour rejoindre la frontière Russe indiquée dans le Traité de San Stefano à un point au sud de Nariman, en laissant la ville d'Olti à la Russie. Du point indiqué près de Nariman la frontière tourne à l'est, passe par Tebreneç, qui reste à la Russie, et s'avance jusqu'au Pennek Tschai.

Elle suit cette rivière jusqu'à Bardouz, puis se dirige vers le sud, en laissant Bardouz et Jönikiy à la Russie. D'un point à l'ouest du village de Karaougan la frontière se dirige sur Medjingert, continue en ligne directe vers le sommet de la montagne Kassadagh et longe la ligne du partage des eaux entre les affluents de l'Araxe au nord et ceux du Mourad Sou au sud, jusqu'à l'ancienne frontière de la Russie.

ARTICLE LIX.

S. M. l'Empereur de Russie déclare que son intention est d'ériger Batoum en port franc, essentiellement commercial.

ARTICLE LX.

La vallée d'Alaschkerd et la ville de Bayazid, cédée à la Russie par l'Article XIX du Traité de San Stefano, font retour à la Turquie.

La Sublime Porte cède à la Perse la ville et le territoire de Khotour, tel qu'il a été déterminé par la Commission Mixte Anglo-Russe pour la délimitation des frontières de la Turquie et de la Perse.

ARTICLE LXI.

La Sublime Porte s'engage à réaliser, sans plus de retard, les améliorations et les réformes qu'exigent les besoins locaux dans les provinces habitées par les Arméniens, et à garantir leur sécurité contre les Circassiens et les Kurdes. Elle donnera connaissance périodiquement des mesures prises à cet effet aux Puissances, qui en surveilleront l'application.

ARTICLE LXII

La Sublimé Porte ayant exprimé la volonté de maintenir le principe de la liberté religieuse en y donnant l'extension la plus large, les Parties Contractantes prennent acte de cette déclaration spontanée.

Dans aucune partie de l'Empire Ottoman la différence de religion ne pourra être opposée à personne comme un motif d'exclusion ou d'incapacité en ce qui concerne l'usage des droits civils et politiques, l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs, ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries.

Tous seront admis sans distinction de religion à témoigner devant les Tribunaux.

La liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes sont assurées à tous, et aucune entrave ne pourra être apportée, soit à l'organisation hiérarchique des différentes communions, soit à leurs rapports avec leurs chefs spirituels.

Les ecclésiastiques, les pèlerins et les moines de toutes les nationalités voyageant dans la Turquie d'Europe ou la Turquie d'Asie jouiront des mêmes droits, avantages, et privilèges.

Le droit de protection officielle est reconnu aux Agents Diplomatiques et Consulaires des Puissances en Turquie tant à l'égard des personnes susmentionnées que de leurs établissements religieux, de bienfaisance et autres dans les Lieux Saints et ailleurs.

Les droits acquis à la France sont expressément réservés, et il est bien entendu qu'aucune atteinte ne saurait être portée au *statu quo* dans les Lieux Saints.

Les moines du Mont Athos, quel que soit leur pays d'origine, seront maintenus dans leurs possessions et avantages antérieurs, et jouiront, sans aucune exception, d'une entière égalité de droits et prérogatives.

ARTICLE LXIII.

Le Traité de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856, ainsi que le Traité de Londres du 13 Mars, 1871, sont maintenus dans toutes celles de leurs dispositions qui ne sont pas abrogées ou modifiées par les stipulations qui précèdent.

ARTICLE LXIV.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berlin dans un délai de trois semaines, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le sceau de leurs armes.

Fait à Berlin, le treizième jour du mois de Juillet, mil huit cent soixante-dix-huit.

XI. BULGARO-SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND SECRET ANNEXE.

Signé à Sophia, le 29 février, 1912.¹

Bulgaria. I. E. Guéchoff.
A. Niképhorof.

Serbia. M. Milovanovitch.
R. Poutnik.

Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie.

SA Majesté Ferdinand I, Roi des Bulgares, et Sa Majesté Pierre I, Roi de Serbie, pénétrés de la conviction de la communauté d'intérêts et de la similitude des destinées de leurs États et des deux peuples frères, bulgare et serbe, et décidés à défendre solidairement, avec des forces communes, ces intérêts et à s'efforcer de les mener à bonne fin, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie se garantissent mutuellement leur indépendance politique et l'intégrité de leur territoire, en s'engageant d'une manière absolue et sans restriction d'aucune sorte à se porter réciproquement secours, avec la totalité de leurs forces, dans tout cas où l'un des deux royaumes serait attaqué par un ou plusieurs États.

ARTICLE II.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent de même à se porter mutuellement secours, avec la totalité de leurs forces, au cas où l'une quelconque des grandes Puissances tenterait de s'annexer, ou d'occuper, ou d'appréhender avec ses troupes, même provisoirement, n'importe quelle partie des territoires de la péninsule des Balkans se trouvant actuellement sous la domination turque, si l'une des parties contractantes estime ce fait contraire à ses intérêts vitaux et constituant un *casus belli*.

ARTICLE III.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à ne conclure la paix que conjointement et après entente préalable.

¹ Text of XI, XII, XIII, and XIV is taken from I. E. Guéchoff, *L'Alliance Balkanique*, Paris, 1915.

ARTICLE IV.

Une convention militaire sera conclue à l'effet d'assurer l'exécution du présent traité d'une manière complète et la plus conforme au but poursuivi. Cette convention stipulera aussi bien tout ce qu'il y aura lieu d'entreprendre de part et d'autre en cas de guerre, que tout ce qui, ayant trait à l'organisation militaire, la dislocation et la mobilisation des troupes, les rapports des hauts commandements, devra être établi, dès le temps de paix, pour la préparation et la bonne conduite de la guerre.

La convention militaire fera partie intégrante du présent traité. Son élaboration devra commencer au plus tard quinze jours après la signature du présent traité et être terminée dans le délai maximum de deux mois.

ARTICLE V.

Le présent traité et la convention militaire seront en vigueur du jour de leur signature jusqu'au 31 décembre, 1920, inclusivement. Ils ne pourront être prorogés au delà de ce délai qu'après une entente complémentaire, expressément sanctionnée, des deux parties contractantes. Toutefois, au cas où au jour de l'expiration du traité et de la convention militaire les deux parties se trouveraient être en guerre ou sans avoir liquidé encore la situation résultant de la guerre, le traité et la convention seront maintenus en vigueur jusqu'à la signature de la paix ou à la liquidation de l'état de choses amené par la guerre.

ARTICLE VI.

Le présent traité sera établi en deux exemplaires uniformes, rédigés tous les deux en langue serbe et bulgare. Il sera signé par les Souverains et les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères des deux États. La convention militaire, également en deux exemplaires rédigés en bulgare et en serbe, sera signée par les Souverains, les Ministres des Affaires Étrangères et les plénipotentiaires militaires spéciaux.

ARTICLE VII

Le présent traité et la convention militaire ne pourront être publiés ou communiqués à d'autres États qu'après entente préalable des deux parties contractantes, et ce conjointement et simultanément.

Une entente préalable sera de même nécessaire pour l'admission d'un tiers État dans l'alliance.

Fait à Sophia, le 29 février, 1912.

Annexe secrète au Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre le
Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie.

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Au cas où il surviendrait en Turquie des troubles intérieurs, de nature à mettre en danger les intérêts nationaux ou d'État des parties contractantes ou de l'une d'elles, comme au cas où des difficultés intérieures ou extérieures avec lesquelles la Turquie se verrait aux prises mettraient en cause le maintien du *statu quo* dans la péninsule des Balkans, celle des deux parties contractantes qui aboutirait la première à la conviction qu'une action militaire doit être engagée de ce fait s'adressera, par une proposition motivée, à l'autre partie, qui sera tenue d'entrer immédiatement dans un échange de vues, et si elle ne tombe pas d'accord avec son alliée, de lui donner une réponse motivée.

Si une entente en vue d'une action intervient, cette entente devra être communiquée à la Russie, et au cas où cette Puissance ne s'y opposerait pas, l'action sera engagée conformément à l'entente établie et en s'inspirant en tout des sentiments de solidarité et de communauté d'intérêts. Dans le cas contraire—soit si une entente n'intervient pas—les deux États feront appel à l'opinion de la Russie, laquelle opinion sera, si et dans la mesure dans laquelle la Russie se prononcera, obligatoire pour les deux parties.

Au cas où, la Russie s'abstenant de donner son opinion et l'entente entre les deux parties contractantes ne pouvant, même après cela, être obtenue, celle des deux parties qui est pour une action déciderait d'engager cette dernière à elle seule et à ses risques, l'autre partie sera tenue d'observer une neutralité amicale viv-à-vis de son alliée, de procéder sur-le-champ à une mobilisation dans les limites prévues par la convention militaire et de se porter, avec toutes ses forces, au secours de son alliée, si un tiers État prenait le parti de la Turquie.

ARTICLE II.

Tous les accroissements territoriaux qui seraient réalisés par une action commune dans le sens des articles 1^{er} et 2 du traité et de l'article 1^{er} de la présente annexe secrète tombent sous la domination commune (condominium) des deux États alliés. Leur liquidation aura lieu sans retard, dans un délai maximum de trois mois après le rétablissement de la paix, et sur les bases suivantes :

La Serbie reconnaît à la Bulgarie le droit sur les territoires

à l'est des Rhodopes et de la rivière Strouma ; la Bulgarie reconnaît le droit de la Serbie sur ceux situés au nord et à l'ouest du Char-Planina.

Quant aux territoires compris entre le Char, les Rhodopes, la mer Égée et le lac d'Ochrida, si les deux parties acquièrent la conviction que leur organisation en province autonome distincte est impossible en vue des intérêts communs des nationalités bulgare et serbe ou pour d'autres raisons d'ordre intérieur ou extérieur, il sera disposé de ces territoires conformément aux stipulations ci-dessous :

La Serbie s'engage à ne formuler aucune revendication en ce qui concerne les territoires situés au delà de la ligne tracée sur la carte ci-annexée et qui, ayant son point de départ à la frontière turco-bulgare, au mont Golem (au nord de Kr. Palanka) suit la direction générale du sud-ouest jusqu'au lac d'Ochrida, en passant par le mont Kitka, entre les villages de Metejevo et Podarjikon, par le sommet à l'est du village Nerav, en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux jusqu'au sommet 1,000, au nord du village de Baschévo, entre les villages de Liubentzi et Petarlitza, par le sommet Ostrich 1,000 (Lissetz-Planina), le sommet 1,050 entre les villages de Dratch et Opila, par les villages de Talichmantzi et Jivalevo, le sommet 1,050, le sommet 1,000, le village Kichali, la ligne principale de partage des eaux Gradichté-Planina jusqu'au sommet Gorichté, vers le sommet 1,023, suivant ensuite la ligne de partage des eaux entre les villages Ivankovtzi et Loghintzi, par Vetersko et Sopot sur le Vardar. Traversant le Vardar, elle suit les crêtes vers le sommet 2,550 et jusqu'à la montagne Petropole, par la ligne de partage des eaux de cette montagne entre les villages de Krapa et Barbarès jusqu'au sommet 1,200, entre les villages de Yakryenovo et Drenovo, jusqu'au mont Tchesma (1,254), par la ligne de partage des eaux des montagnes Baba-Planina et Krouchka-Tepessi, entre les villages de Salp et Tzerske, jusqu'au sommet de la Protoyska-Planina, à l'est du village de Belitza, par Bréjani, jusqu'au sommet 1,200 (Ilinska-Planina), par la ligne de partage des eaux passant par le sommet 1,330 jusqu'au sommet 1,217 et entre les villages de Livoichta et Gorentzi jusqu'au lac d'Ochrida près du monastère de Gabovtzi.

La Bulgarie s'engage à accepter cette frontière si Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, qui sera sollicité d'être l'arbitre suprême en cette question, se prononce en faveur de cette ligne.

Il va de soi que les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à accepter comme frontière définitive la ligne que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, dans les limites sus-indiquées, aurait trouvée correspondre le plus aux droits et aux intérêts des deux parties.

ARTICLE III.

Copie du traité et de la présente annexe secrète sera communiquée conjointement au Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, qui sera prié en même temps d'en prendre acte, de faire preuve de bienveillance à l'égard des buts qu'ils poursuivent, et de prier Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie de daigner accepter et approuver les attributions désignées pour sa personne et son Gouvernement par les clauses de ces deux actes.

ARTICLE IV.

Tout différend qui surgirait touchant l'interprétation et l'exécution d'une quelconque des clauses du traité et de la présente annexe secrète et de la convention militaire sera soumis à la décision définitive de la Russie, dès lors que l'une des deux parties aura déclaré qu'elle estime impossible une entente par des pourparlers directs.

ARTICLE V.

Aucune des dispositions de la présente annexe secrète ne pourra être publiée ou communiquée à un autre État sans une entente préalable des deux parties et l'assentiment de la Russie.

Fait à Sophia, le 29 février, 1912.

XII. CONVENTION MILITAIRE ENTRE LE ROYAUME DE BULGARIE ET LE ROYAUME DE SERBIE.

Sofia, le 29 avril, 1912.

CONFORMÉMENT à l'esprit et sur la base de l'article III¹ du Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie et afin de mieux assurer la conduite de la guerre avec succès et la réalisation plus complète des buts que l'alliance a en vue, les deux parties contractantes conviennent des stipulations ci-dessous, qui auront en tout même force et valeur que les dispositions du traité lui-même.

ARTICLE I.

Le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie s'engagent, dans les cas prévus par les articles I et II du Traité d'Alliance et par l'article I de l'annexe secrète à ce traité, à se

¹ Page 116. The article referred to appears to be IV, not III, in the text given.

porter mutuellement secours, la Bulgarie avec une force armée qui ne devra pas être inférieure à 200,000 combattants, et la Serbie avec une force d'au moins 150,000 combattants, en mesure aussi bien de combattre à la frontière que de prendre part à des opérations militaires hors du territoire national.

Dans ce nombre ne sauraient être compris ni les combattants de formations surnuméraires, ni ceux du troisième ban serbe, ni les troupes territoriales bulgares.

Ce contingent de combattants devra être rendu à la frontière ou au delà des frontières de son territoire national—dans la direction où il devra être dirigé suivant les causes et le but de la guerre, et d'après le développement des opérations militaires—au plus tard le vingt et unième jour après la déclaration de la guerre ou la communication de l'État allié que le *casus fœderis* s'est produit. Toutefois, même avant l'expiration de ce délai, les deux parties considéreront comme leur devoir d'alliée—et si cela est conforme à la nature des opérations militaires et peut contribuer à l'issue favorable de la guerre—d'envoyer, même partiellement et dans les limites de la mobilisation et de la concentration, leurs troupes sur le champ de bataille dès le septième jour à partir de la déclaration de la guerre ou de la survenance du *casus fœderis*.

ARTICLE II.

Si la Roumanie attaque la Bulgarie, la Serbie est tenue de lui déclarer immédiatement la guerre et de diriger contre elle ses forces, d'au moins 100,000 combattants, soit sur le moyen Danube, soit sur le théâtre d'opérations de la Dobroudja.

Au cas où la Turquie attaquerait la Bulgarie, la Serbie s'engage à pénétrer en Turquie et à distraire de ses troupes mobilisées 100,000 combattants au moins pour les diriger sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar.

Si la Serbie se trouve être à ce moment seule ou conjointement avec la Bulgarie, déjà en guerre avec un tiers État, elle engagera contre la Roumanie ou la Turquie toutes les troupes dont elle conservera la libre disposition.

ARTICLE III.

Si l'Autriche-Hongrie attaque la Serbie, la Bulgarie est tenue de déclarer immédiatement la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie et de diriger ses troupes, d'au moins 200,000 combattants, en Serbie, de telle sorte que, unies à l'armée serbe, elles opèrent soit offensivement, soit défensivement, contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La même obligation incombera à la Bulgarie vis-à-vis de la Serbie au cas où l'Autriche-Hongrie, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, d'accord ou sans le consentement de la Turquie, ferait

pénétrer ses troupes dans le sandjak de Novi-Bazar, et où par suite la Serbie lui déclarerait la guerre ou, pour la défense de ses intérêts, dirigerait ses troupes dans le sandjak et par là provoquerait un conflit armé entre elle et l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Au cas où la Turquie attaquerait la Serbie, la Bulgarie s'engage à franchir immédiatement la frontière turque et à prélever sur ses troupes, mobilisées conformément à l'article I de la présente Convention, une armée forte d'au moins 100,000 combattants, qui sera dirigée sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar.

Si la Roumanie attaque la Serbie, la Bulgarie est tenue d'attaquer les troupes roumaines dès qu'elles auront pénétré, en traversant le Danube, sur le territoire serbe.

Si la Bulgarie, dans l'un quelconque des cas envisagés par le présent article, se trouve déjà, seule ou conjointement avec la Serbie, en guerre avec un tiers État, elle est tenue de porter au secours de la Serbie toutes les troupes dont elle conserverait la libre disposition.

ARTICLE IV.

Si la Bulgarie et la Serbie, suivant une entente préalable, déclarent la guerre à la Turquie, l'une et l'autre seront tenues, s'il n'en est disposé autrement par un arrangement spécial, de prélever sur leurs troupes, mobilisées conformément à l'article I de la présente Convention, et de diriger sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar, une armée d'au moins 100,000 combattants.

ARTICLE V.

Au cas où l'une des parties contractantes déclarerait la guerre à un tiers État sans entente préalable et sans le consentement de l'autre partie contractante, cette dernière sera déliée des obligations prévues à l'article I de la présente Convention, mais sera tenue d'observer, pendant la durée de la guerre, une neutralité amicale vis-à-vis de son alliée, ainsi que de mobiliser sans retard une force d'au moins 50,000 combattants qui sera concentrée de manière à assurer au mieux la liberté des mouvements de son alliée.

ARTICLE VI.

En cas de guerre conjointe, aucune des parties contractantes ne pourra conclure avec l'ennemi d'armistice plus long que vingt-quatre heures, sans une entente préalable et sans le consentement de l'autre partie.

Une entente préalable et par écrit sera de même nécessaire pour que des pourparlers de paix puissent être engagés et un traité de paix signé.

ARTICLE VII.

Pendant la durée de la guerre, les troupes de chacune des parties contractantes seront commandées et toutes leurs opérations seront dirigées par leurs propres commandements.

Lorsque des corps de troupes appartenant aux armées des deux États opéreront contre un même objectif, le commandement commun sera pris, pour des unités de même importance, par le chef le plus ancien en grade, et pour des unités d'importance différente par le chef le plus ancien au point de vue du commandement exercé.

Lorsqu'une ou plusieurs armées distinctes appartenant à une des parties contractantes seront mises à la disposition de l'autre partie, elles se trouveront sous les ordres de leurs propres commandants qui, pour la conduite stratégique des opérations, seront soumis au commandant en chef de l'armée à la disposition de laquelle elles sont mises.

En cas de guerre conjointe contre la Turquie, le commandement en chef sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar appartiendra à la Serbie si l'armée principale serbe opère sur ce théâtre et si elle est numériquement plus forte que les troupes bulgares sur ce théâtre, conformément à l'article IV de la présente Convention. Toutefois si l'armée principale serbe n'opère pas sur ce théâtre et lorsqu'elle y sera numériquement plus faible que les troupes bulgares, le commandement en chef sur ce théâtre appartiendra à la Bulgarie.

ARTICLE VIII.

Au cas où les troupes des deux parties contractantes se trouveraient placées sous les ordres d'un même commandant, tous les ordres et toutes les prescriptions se rapportant à la conduite stratégique des opérations tactiques communes seront rédigées dans les deux langues — en bulgare et en serbe.

ARTICLE IX.

En ce qui concerne le ravitaillement et les subsistances en général, le logement, le service médical, le transport des blessés et malades ou l'inhumation des morts, le transport du matériel de guerre et autres objets similaires, l'armée de chacune des parties contractantes jouira des mêmes droits et facilités sur le territoire de l'autre partie et par les mêmes procédés que les troupes de cette dernière partie, conformément aux lois et règles locales. Toutes les autorités locales doivent, dans le même but, prêter leur appui aux troupes alliées.

Le paiement de toutes les subsistances sera réglé par chaque partie pour son compte aux prix locaux, de préférence en

espèces, et dans des cas exceptionnels contre bons délivrés spécialement.

Le transport des troupes et de tout le matériel de guerre, subsistances et autres objets en chemin de fer et les frais y relatifs seront à la charge de la partie sur le territoire de laquelle ce transport a lieu.

ARTICLE X.

Les trophées appartiennent à l'armée qui les aura pris.

Dans le cas où la prise a lieu par l'effet d'un combat en commun sur le même terrain, les deux armées partageront les trophées proportionnellement aux forces des combattants qui y auront directement participé.

ARTICLE XI.

Durant la guerre, chaque partie contractante aura un délégué dans l'état-major du commandement en chef ou dans les commandements des armées, lesquels délégués entretiendront la liaison entre les deux armées sous tous les rapports.

ARTICLE XII.

Les opérations stratégiques et les cas qui ne sont pas prévus, ainsi que les contestations qui pourraient surgir, seront réglées d'un commun accord par les deux commandements en chef.

ARTICLE XIII.

Les chefs des états-majors des armées alliées s'entendront, immédiatement après la conclusion de la présente Convention, sur la distribution des troupes mobilisées d'après l'article I de cette Convention et leur groupement dans la zone de concentration dans les cas exposés ci-dessus, sur les routes qui devront être réparées ou construites de nouveau en vue de la concentration rapide sur la frontière et les opérations ultérieures.

ARTICLE XIV.

La présente Convention sera en vigueur à partir du jour de sa signature et durera tant qu'aura force le Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance auquel elle est annexée à titre de partie intégrante.

*Arrangement entre les États-Majors de Bulgarie et de Serbie.**Varna, 19 juin, 1912.*

Serbia. Gen. Poutnik.

Bulgaria. Gen. Fitcheff.

Conformément à l'article XIII de la Convention militaire existant entre le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie, les délégués désignés par les deux parties ont, sur la base des plans d'opérations respectifs, convenu de ce qui suit :

Au Cas d'une Guerre entre la Bulgarie et la Serbie d'une part et la Turquie de l'autre :

Dans l'hypothèse où la principale armée turque serait concentrée dans la région d'Uskub, Koumanovo, Kratovo, Kotchani, Vélès, les troupes alliées destinées à agir sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar seront réparties comme suit :—

1. Une armée serbe de deux divisions marchera, par le Kara-Dagh, sur Uskub. Cette armée formera l'aile droite des troupes alliées ;

2. Une armée serbe de cinq divisions d'infanterie et une division de cavalerie avancera, par la vallée de la Moravitzza et de la Ptchina, sur le front Koumanovo-Kratovo. Cette armée constituera le centre des troupes alliées avec la mission d'opérer de front contre l'ennemi ;

3. Une armée bulgare de trois divisions formera l'aile gauche des troupes alliées, avec la mission d'opérer contre l'aile droite et sur les derrières de l'ennemi, dans les directions de Kustendil, Egri-Palanka, Uskub et Kustendil, Tzarévo-Sélo, Kotchani.

4. Les deux chefs d'état-major général reconnaîtront ensemble la région entre Kustendil et Vrania, et si cette reconnaissance démontre la possibilité d'employer de grandes masses dans la direction Kustendil, Egri-Palanka, Uskub, les deux divisions serbes destinées à opérer, par le Kara-Dagh, contre Uskub, seront, si la situation générale le permet, employées à renforcer l'aile gauche des troupes alliées et seront concentrées à cet effet près de Kustendil.

5. Pour couvrir le flanc droit des troupes alliées, le chef d'état-major de l'armée serbe disposera à sa convenance des trois divisions restantes du deuxième ban.

6. Le chef d'état-major de l'armée bulgare s'engage à agir pour la prompte mise en état de la route de Bossilograd à Vlassina.

7. Si la situation exige le renforcement des troupes bulgares sur le théâtre d'opérations de la Maritza et si, pour le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar, toutes les troupes ci-dessus énumérées

ne sont point indispensables, les unités nécessaires seront transportées de ce dernier théâtre d'opérations sur celui de la Maritza. A l'inverse, si la situation exige le renforcement des troupes alliées sur le théâtre d'opérations du Vardar et si le maintien de toutes les troupes désignées pour les opérations sur le théâtre de la Maritza n'est pas indispensable, les unités nécessaires seront transportées de ce théâtre sur celui du Vardar.

Annexe.

Les deux états-majors généraux s'engagent :

(a.) A échanger tous leurs renseignements sur les armées des pays limitrophes ;

(b.) A se procurer mutuellement le nombre voulu d'exemplaires de tous les règlements, instructions, cartes, &c., tant officiels que secrets ;

(c.) A envoyer chacun dans l'armée alliée un certain nombre d'officiers chargés de se familiariser avec son organisation et d'en étudier la langue, conformément à l'article II¹ de la Convention militaire.

(d.) Les chefs d'état-major des armées serbe et bulgare se rencontreront chaque automne pour se mettre au courant de la situation générale et pour introduire dans les arrangements conclus les modifications rendues nécessaires par les changements de la situation.

GÉNÉRAL R. POUTNIK.
GÉNÉRAL FITCHEFF.

Remarque.—Le groupement des troupes alliées et l'idée première des opérations appartiennent à l'état-major général serbe ; je n'en prends point la responsabilité.

Signé : GÉNÉRAL FITCHEFF.'

Avis exprimés par les représentants des états-majors.

Au cours de l'examen concerté du plan d'opérations contre la Turquie, le chef de l'état-major bulgare a établi ce qui suit :

1. J'estime que dans une guerre contre la Turquie la vallée de la Maritza formera le principal théâtre d'opérations et que c'est là qu'il faudra frapper le coup décisif, car je suppose que, vu la configuration du terrain et les importants objectifs stratégiques, les principales forces de l'armée turque y seront concentrées ;

¹ Art. XI appears to be meant.

‘ 2. Ceci étant, je propose à l’état-major serbe d’étudier la question de savoir comment il pourra renforcer l’armée bulgare dans la vallée de la Maritza, pour qu’elle acquière la supériorité numérique sur l’ennemi en ayant en vue la concentration supposée de la force turque dans cette vallée.

‘ 3. Les troupes nécessaires pour renforcer l’armée bulgare sur le théâtre de guerre de la Maritza peuvent être prélevées sur les contingents du théâtre de la guerre en Macédoine sans égard à leur nationalité.

‘ Belgrade, le 23 août/5 septembre, 1912.

‘ Le Chef de l’état-major général,

‘ GÉNÉRAL-MAJOR FITCHEFF.’

Au cours de l’examen concerté du plan d’opérations contre la Turquie, le chef de l’état-major serbe est resté d’avis :

‘ 1. Que la vallée du Vardar formera le principal théâtre de la guerre et que là seront concentrées les plus grandes forces de l’ennemi ;

‘ 2. Ceci étant, il faudra concentrer sur ce théâtre, au début de la campagne, des forces alliées plus nombreuses ;

‘ 3. L’état-major, tenant compte de l’importance générale du théâtre de la guerre du Vardar, ayant en vue surtout la configuration du terrain et la saison prévue pour les opérations militaires, ainsi que cette circonstance politique, à savoir que les armées grecque et monténégrine opéreront dans le même temps contre l’armée turque sur ce théâtre, déclare :

‘ (a) Que toute l’armée serbe doit opérer contre l’armée turque du théâtre de la guerre du Vardar, et,

‘ (b) Que l’armée bulgare alliée doit envoyer de Kustendil même sur le théâtre de la guerre du Vardar une force d’au moins une division (24 bataillons avec l’artillerie et tous les services requis) pour grossir l’effectif de l’armée serbe.

‘ Belgrade, le 23 août/5 septembre 1912.

‘ Le suppléant de l’adjoint au chef de l’état-major général, colonel d’état-major,

‘ Signé : JIVOTINE MITCHITCH.’

Arrangement entre les états-majors de Bulgarie et de Serbie.

Sur la base de l’article 4 de la convention militaire existant entre le royaume de Bulgarie et le royaume de Serbie, les délégués désignés par les deux parties, les chefs de leurs états-majors respectifs, après avoir examiné le projet d’une guerre

offensive contre la Turquie, ont, d'un commun accord, pris la résolution qui suit :

' 1. Toute l'armée serbe opérera sur le théâtre de la guerre de la Macédoine en s'engageant à assurer la ligne d'opération Egri-Palanka-Kustendil.

' 2. La totalité de l'armée bulgare opérera dans la vallée de la Maritza, en détachant une division, au début des opérations, sur la ligne Kustendil-Doupnitza. Une garnison spéciale sera laissée à Doupnitza pour la sécurité de la ville.

' 3. Une division serbe du premier ban sera transportée en chemin de fer à Kustendil et formera au début, avec la division bulgare, une armée qui coopérera avec la principale armée serbe.

' Si la principale armée serbe refoule les Turcs au delà de la ligne Uskub-Vélès-Chtip. et si elle se porte à l'attaque au sud de cette ligne, les Bulgares pourront se servir de leur division pour renforcer les troupes du théâtre de guerre de la Maritza, en laissant des troupes territoriales à la frontière macédonienne.

' 4. L'organisation du transport sera la suivante : la ligne Pirot-Tzaribrod-Sofia-Kustendil sera laissée à la disposition de l'état-major serbe dès la cinquième journée de la mobilisation. Les transports se feront par des trains serbes, le matériel roulant bulgare ne pouvant pas être disponible à ce moment.

' 5. Le ministère bulgare de la Guerre assurera dans les premiers temps l'approvisionnement de la division serbe.

' Les provisions de vivres prises aux Bulgares seront rendues en nature par le ministère serbe de la Guerre.

' 6. L'arrangement du 19 juin 1912 entre les chefs d'état-major respectifs (signé à Varna) reste en vigueur après la présente combinaison.

* ' Sofia, le 15 septembre 1912.

' GÉNÉRAL-MAJOR FITCHEFF.

' GÉNÉRAL R. POUTNIK.'

XIII. GRAECO-BULGARIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE

Signed at Sofia, May 16 (29), 1912.

CONSIDÉRANT que les deux royaumes désirent formement la conservation de la paix dans la Péninsule balkanique et peuvent par une alliance défensive solide mieux répondre à ce besoin ;

Considérant, dans ce même ordre d'idées, que la coexistence pacifique des différentes nationalités en Turquie, sur la base d'une égalité politique réelle et véritable, et le respect des

droits découlant des traités ou autrement concédés aux nationalités chrétiennes de l'Empire, constituent des conditions nécessaires pour la consolidation de l'état de choses en Orient ;

Considérant, enfin, qu'une coopération des deux royaumes dans le sens indiqué est de nature, dans l'intérêt même de leurs bons rapports avec l'Empire ottoman, à faciliter et à corroborer l'entente des éléments grec et bulgare en Turquie ;

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares se promettant de ne pas donner une tendance agressive quelconque à leur accord purement défensif et ayant résolu de conclure une alliance de paix et de protection réciproque dans les termes ci-dessous indiqués, ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes : M. Demetrius Panas ; et

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares : M. Ivan Eustratief Guéchoff ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, ont arrêté ce qui suit :

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Si, contrairement au sincère désir des deux hautes parties contractantes et en dépit d'une attitude de leurs Gouvernements évitant tout acte d'agression et toute provocation vis-à-vis de l'Empire ottoman, l'un des deux États venait à être attaqué par la Turquie, soit dans son territoire, soit par une atteinte systématique aux droits découlants des traités ou des principes fondamentaux du droit des gens, les deux hautes parties contractantes sont tenues à se prêter réciproquement secours avec la totalité de leurs forces armées, et par suite à ne pas conclure la paix que conjointement et d'accord.

ARTICLE II.

Les deux hautes parties contractantes se promettent mutuellement, d'un côté, d'user de leur influence morale auprès de leurs congénères en Turquie, afin qu'ils contribuent sincèrement à la coexistence pacifique des éléments constituant la population de l'Empire, et de l'autre côté de se prêter une assistance réciproque et de marcher d'accord dans toute action auprès du Gouvernement ottoman ou auprès des Grandes Puissances qui aurait pour but d'obtenir ou d'assurer la réalisation des droits découlant des traités ou autrement concédés aux nationalités grecque et bulgare, l'application de l'égalité politique et des garanties constitutionnelles.

ARTICLE III.

Le présent traité aura une durée de trois ans à partir du jour de sa signature et sera renouvelé tacitement pour une

année sauf dénonciation. La dénonciation doit être notifiée au moins six mois avant l'expiration de la troisième année à partir de la signature du traité.

ARTICLE IV.

Le présent traité sera gardé secret. Il ne pourra être communiqué à une tierce Puissance soit intégralement, soit en partie, ni divulgué en partie ou en tout, qu'avec le consentement des deux hautes parties contractantes.

Le présent traité sera ratifié le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Les ratifications seront échangées à Sophia (ou à Athènes).

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Sophia, en double expédition, le 16 mai, 1912.

Déclaration.

L'ARTICLE 1^{er} ne se rapporte notamment pas au cas où une guerre viendrait à éclater entre la Grèce et la Turquie par suite de l'admission dans le Parlement grec des députés crétois contre la volonté du Gouvernement ottoman ; dans ce cas, la Bulgarie n'est tenue qu'à garder vis-à-vis de la Grèce une neutralité bienveillante. Et comme la liquidation de la crise des affaires d'Orient née des événements de 1908, aussi quant à la question crétoise, correspond à l'intérêt général, et est même de nature, sans troubler l'équilibre dans la Péninsule balkanique, à y consolider dans l'intérêt de la paix la situation internationale, la Bulgarie (indépendamment des engagements assumés par le présent traité) promet de ne gêner d'aucune façon une action éventuelle de la Grèce qui tendrait à la solution de cette question.

XIV. MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GREECE.

Signed at Sofia, September 22 (October 5), 1912.

SA Majesté le Roi des Hellènes et Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares, désirant compléter par une Convention militaire le Traité d'Alliance conclu à Sophia le 16 mai, 1912, entre le Royaume de Grèce et le Royaume de Bulgarie, ont dans ce but nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires :

Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes : son Excellence M. D. Panas, et M. le Capitaine J. Métaxas ;

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares : son Excellence M. Iv. Ev. Guéchoff, et M. le Général Iv. Fitcheff ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Dans le cas où, conformément aux obligations découlant du Traité d'Alliance défensive conclu à Sophia le 16 mai, 1912, entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie, la Grèce interviendrait militairement contre la Turquie dans une guerre bulgaro-turque, ou bien la Bulgarie dans une guerre gréco-turque, les deux États grec et bulgare s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement secours, soit la Grèce avec un effectif atteignant au minimum 120,000 hommes, et la Bulgarie avec un effectif d'au moins 300,000 hommes ; ces forces devront être aptes aussi bien à entrer en campagne sur la frontière qu'à prendre part à des opérations militaires en dehors des limites du territoire national.

Les troupes susindiquées devront être concentrées à la frontière et à même de la franchir au plus tard le vingtième jour qui aura suivi la mobilisation ou l'avis donné par l'une des parties contractantes que le *casus fœderis* s'est produit.

ARTICLE II.

Au cas où la Grèce viendrait à être attaquée par la Turquie, la Bulgarie s'engage à déclarer la guerre à cette dernière Puissance et à entrer en campagne contre elle avec l'ensemble de ses forces, fixées, aux termes de l'article I^{er}, à un minimum de 300,000 hommes, en conformant ses opérations militaires au plan élaboré par l'état-major bulgare.

Au cas où la Bulgarie viendrait à être attaquée par la Turquie, la Grèce s'engage à déclarer la guerre à cette dernière Puissance et à entrer en campagne contre elle avec l'ensemble de ses forces fixées, aux termes de l'article I^{er}, à un minimum de 120,000 hommes, en conformant ses opérations militaires au plan élaboré par l'état-major grec. L'objectif principal de la flotte hellénique devra toutefois être de se rendre maîtresse de la mer Egée et d'interrompre les communications par cette voie entre l'Asie Mineure et la Turquie d'Europe.

Dans les cas prévus aux deux paragraphes précédents, la Bulgarie s'engage à opérer offensivement avec une partie importante de son armée contre les forces turques concentrées dans la région des vilayets de Kossovo, Monastir et Salonique. Si la Serbie, en vertu de ses accords avec la Bulgarie, prend part à la guerre, la Bulgarie pourra disposer de la totalité de ses forces militaires en Thrace ; mais dans ce cas elle prend par le présent acte l'engagement avec la Grèce que des forces

militaires serbes, d'un effectif d'au moins 120,000 combattants, opéreront offensivement contre les forces turques concentrées dans la région des trois vilayets susmentionnés.

ARTICLE III.

Si la Grèce et la Bulgarie, aux termes d'une entente préalable, déclarent la guerre à la Turquie, elles sont l'une et l'autre tenues — à moins qu'il n'en soit disposé autrement par un accord spécial — de faire entrer en campagne les effectifs prévus à l'article 1^{er} de la présente Convention.

Les dispositions des deux derniers paragraphes de l'article II sont dans ce cas aussi applicables.

ARTICLE IV.

Au cas où l'un des Gouvernements contractants déclarerait la guerre à un Etat autre que la Turquie sans une entente préalable et sans le consentement de l'autre Gouvernement ce dernier est délié des obligations exposées à l'article 1^{er}, mais reste néanmoins tenu d'observer, pendant toute la durée de la guerre, une neutralité amicale à l'égard de son allié.

ARTICLE V.

En cas de guerre conjointe, aucun des Etats alliés ne pourra conclure d'armistice d'une durée supérieure à vingt-quatre heures sans une entente préalable et sans le consentement de l'autre Etat allié.

L'entente des deux parties contractantes, contenue dans un accord écrit, sera de même nécessaire pour que l'une d'elles puisse engager des négociations en vue de la paix ou conclure un traité de paix.

ARTICLE VI.

Dans le cas où la Grèce et la Bulgarie ayant mobilisé leurs forces armées ou étant entrées en campagne, la Grèce se verrait obligée de régler la question crétoise suivant les vœux des populations de l'île et serait pour cela attaquée par la Turquie, la Bulgarie s'engage à se porter à son secours conformément à l'article 1^{er} de la présente Convention.

ARTICLE VII.

Les chefs d'état-major général des armées grecque et bulgare devront se renseigner mutuellement et en temps opportun sur leurs plans d'opérations en cas d'une guerre. Ils devront, en outre, faire connaître tous les ans les modifications apportées à ces plans du fait de circonstances nouvelles.

ARTICLE VIII.

La présente Convention deviendra obligatoire pour les deux parties contractantes sitôt après avoir été signée ; elle demeurera en vigueur pendant toute la durée du Traité d'Alliance défensive du 16 mai, 1912, auquel elle est incorporée à titre de partie intégrale.

Fait à Sophia, en double exemplaire, le 22 septembre, 1912.

XV. 'TREATY OF' LONDON.

Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.

Signed at London, May 30, 1913.

<i>Bulgaria.</i>	Dr. Stojan Danev.	<i>Serbia.</i>	Stojan Novakovitch.
	M. Madjarov.		A. Nikolitch.
<i>Greece.</i>	E. Skouloudis.		Milenko Vesnitch.
	J. Gennadius.		I. Pavlovitch.
	G. Streit.	<i>Turkey.</i>	Osman Nizamy Pasha.
<i>Montenegro.</i>	J. Popovitch.		Batzaria Effendi.
	Comte L. de Voïnovitch.		Ahmed Réchic' Bey.

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Il y aura, à dater de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité, paix et amitié entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans d'une part, et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés d'autre part, ainsi qu'entre Leurs héritiers et successeurs, Leurs États et sujets respectifs, à perpétuité.

ARTICLE II.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans cède à Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés tous les territoires de Son Empire sur le continent européen à l'ouest d'une ligne tirée d'Enos sur la mer Egée à Midia sur la mer Noire, à l'exception de l'Albanie.

Le tracé exact de la frontière d'Enos à Midia sera déterminé par une commission internationale.

ARTICLE III.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent remettre à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le Président de la République Française, à Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà

des Mers, Empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies le soin de régler la délimitation des frontières de l'Albanie et toutes autres questions concernant l'Albanie.

ARTICLE IV.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans déclare céder à Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés l'île de Crète et renoncer en Leur faveur à tous les droits de souveraineté et autres qu'Il possédait sur cette île.

ARTICLE V.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent confier à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le Président de la République Française, à Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies le soin de statuer sur le sort de toutes les îles ottomanes de la mer Égée, l'île de Crète exceptée, et de la péninsule du Mont-Athos.

ARTICLE VI

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent remettre le soin de régler les questions d'ordre financier résultant de l'état de guerre qui prend fin et des cessions territoriales ci-dessus mentionnées à la commission internationale convoquée à Paris, à laquelle Ils ont délégué Leurs représentants.

ARTICLE VII.

Les questions concernant les prisonniers de guerre, juridiction, nationalité et commerce seront réglées par des conventions spéciales.

ARTICLE FINAL.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées à Londres dans le plus bref délai possible.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires des Hautes Parties contractantes ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Londres, le 17 (30) mai, 1913, à midi 35 (heure de Greenwich).

NOTA.—Le texte ci-dessus, quant à l'ordre des Hautes Parties contractantes au préambule et de signatures, est celui de l'exemplaire en possession du Gouvernement bulgare.

XVI. TREATY OF BUCAREST

Treaty of Peace between Rumania, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

Signed at Bucarest, August 10, 1913.

<i>Rumania.</i>	T. Maioresco. A. Marghiloman. Take Ionesco. C. G. Dissesco. Gen. C. Coanda. Col. C. Christesco.	<i>Serbia.</i>	N. P. Pachitch. M. G. Ristitch. Dr. M. Spalaïko- vitch. Col. K. Smilia- nitch. Lt.-Col. D. Kala- fatovitch.
<i>Greece.</i>	E. Veniselos. D. Panas. N. Politis. Capt. A. Exodactylos. Capt. C. Pali.	<i>Bulgaria.</i>	D. Tonchef. Gen. I. Fitcheff. Dr. S. Ivantchov. S. Radef. Lt.-Col. Stanciof.
<i>Montenegro.</i>	Gen. Ianko Vou- kotitch. J. Matanovitch.		

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Il y aura, à dater du jour de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité, paix et amitié entre Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie, Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares, Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro et Sa Majesté le Roi de Serbie, ainsi qu'entre leurs héritiers et successeurs, leurs États et sujets respectifs.

ARTICLE II.

Entre le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Roumanie, l'ancienne frontière entre le Danube et la mer Noire est, conformément au procès-verbal arrêté par les délégués militaires respectifs et annexé au Protocole No. 5 du 22 juillet (4 août), 1913, de la Conférence de Bucarest, rectifiée de la manière suivante :—

La nouvelle frontière partira du Danube, en amont de Turtukaïa, pour aboutir à la mer Noire au sud d'Ekrène.


Entre ces deux points extrêmes, la ligne frontière suivra le tracé indiqué sur les cartes 100000 et 200000 de l'état-major roumain et selon la description annexée au présent article.

Il est formellement entendu que la Bulgarie démantèlera, au plus tard dans un délai de deux années, les ouvrages de fortifications existants et n'en construira pas d'autres à Roustchouk, à Schoumla, dans le pays intermédiaire, et dans une zone de 20 kilom. autour de Baltchik.

Une commission mixte, composée de représentants des deux hautes parties contractantes, en nombre égal des deux côtés, sera chargée, dans les quinze jours qui suivront la signature du présent traité, d'exécuter sur le terrain le tracé de la nouvelle frontière, conformément aux stipulations précédentes. Cette commission présidera au partage des biens-fonds et capitaux qui ont pu jusqu'ici appartenir en commun à des districts, des communes ou des communautés d'habitants séparés par la nouvelle frontière. En cas de désaccord sur le tracé et les mesures d'exécution, les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à s'adresser à un Gouvernement tiers ami pour le prier de désigner un arbitre dont la décision sur les points en litige sera considérée comme définitive.

ARTICLE III.

Entre le Royaume de Bulgarie et le Royaume de Serbie, la frontière suivra, conformément au procès-verbal arrêté par les délégués militaires respectifs et annexé au Protocole No. 9 du 25 juillet (7 août), 1913, de la Conférence de Bucarest, le tracé suivant :—

La ligne frontière partira de l'ancienne frontière, du sommet Patarica, suivra l'ancienne frontière turco-bulgare et la ligne de partage des eaux entre le Vardar et la Strouma, avec l'exception que la haute vallée de la Stroumitza restera sur territoire serbe ; elle aboutira à la montagne Belašica, où elle se reliera à la frontière bulgare-grecque. Une description détaillée de cette frontière et son tracé sur la carte  de l'état-major autrichien sont annexés au présent article.

Une commission mixte, composée de représentants des deux hautes parties contractantes, en nombre égal des deux côtés, sera chargée, dans les quinze jours qui suivront la signature du présent traité, d'exécuter sur le terrain le tracé de la nouvelle frontière, conformément aux stipulations précédentes.

Cette commission présidera au partage des biens-fonds et capitaux qui ont pu jusqu'ici appartenir en commun à des districts, des communes, ou des communautés d'habitants séparés par la nouvelle frontière. En cas de désaccord sur le tracé et les mesures d'exécution, les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à s'adresser à un Gouvernement tiers ami pour le prier de désigner un arbitre dont la décision sur les points en litige sera considérée comme définitive.

ARTICLE IV.

Les questions relatives à l'ancienne frontière serbo-bulgare seront réglées suivant l'entente intervenue entre les deux hautes parties contractantes, constatée dans le protocole annexé au présent article.

ARTICLE V.

Entre le Royaume de Grèce et le Royaume de Bulgarie, la frontière suivra, conformément au procès-verbal arrêté par les délégués militaires respectifs et annexé au Protocole No. 9 du 25 juillet (7 août), 1913, de la Conférence de Bucarest, le tracé suivant :—

La ligne frontière partira de la nouvelle frontière bulgaro-serbe sur la crête de Belašiča planina, pour aboutir à l'embouchure de la Mesta à la mer Égée.

Entre ces deux points extrêmes, la ligne frontière suivra le tracé indiqué sur la carte 200000 de l'état-major autrichien et selon la description annexée au présent article.

Une commission mixte, composée de représentants des deux hautes parties contractantes, en nombre égal des deux côtés, sera chargée, dans les quinze jours qui suivront la signature du présent traité, d'exécuter sur le terrain le tracé de la frontière conformément aux stipulations précédentes.

Cette commission présidera au partage des biens-fonds et capitaux qui ont pu jusqu'ici appartenir en commun à des districts, des communes ou des communautés d'habitants séparés par la nouvelle frontière. En cas de désaccord sur le tracé et les mesures d'exécution, les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à s'adresser à un Gouvernement tiers ami pour le prier de désigner un arbitre dont la décision sur les points en litige sera considérée comme définitive.

Il est formellement entendu que la Bulgarie se désiste, dès maintenant, de toute prétention sur l'île de Crète.

ARTICLE VI.

Les quartiers généraux des armées respectives seront aussitôt informés de la signature du présent traité. Le Gouvernement bulgare s'engage à ramener son armée, dès le lendemain de cette signification, sur le pied de paix. Il dirigera les troupes sur leurs garnisons, où l'on procédera, dans le plus bref délai, au renvoi des diverses réserves dans leurs foyers.

Les troupes dont la garnison se trouve située dans la zone d'occupation de l'armée de l'une des hautes parties contractantes seront dirigées sur un autre point de l'ancien territoire bulgare et ne pourront gagner leurs garnisons habituelles qu'après évacuation de la zone d'occupation sus-visée.

ARTICLE VII.

L'évacuation du territoire bulgare, tant ancien que nouveau, commencera aussitôt après la démobilisation de l'armée bulgare, et sera achevée au plus tard dans la quinzaine.

Durant ce délai, pour l'armée d'opération roumaine, la zone de démarcation sera indiquée par la ligne Sistov-Lovcea-Turski-Izvor-Glozene-Zlatitza-Mirkovo-Araba-Konak-Orchania-Mezdra-Vratza-Berkovitza-Lom-Danube.

ARTICLE VIII.

Durant l'occupation des territoires bulgares, les différentes armées conserveront le droit de réquisition, moyennant paiement en espèces.

Elles y auront libre usage des lignes de chemin de fer pour les transports de troupes et les approvisionnements de toute nature, sans qu'il y ait lieu à indemnité au profit de l'autorité locale.

Les malades et les blessés y seront sous la sauvegarde desdites armées.

ARTICLE IX.

Aussitôt que possible après l'échange des ratifications du présent traité, tous les prisonniers de guerre seront réciproquement rendus.

Les Gouvernements des hautes parties contractantes désigneront chacun des commissaires spéciaux chargés de recevoir les prisonniers.

Tous les prisonniers aux mains d'un des Gouvernements seront livrés au commissaire du Gouvernement auquel ils appartiennent ou à son représentant dûment autorisé, à l'endroit qui sera fixé par les parties intéressées.

Les Gouvernements des hautes parties contractantes présenteront respectivement l'un à l'autre, et aussitôt que possible après la remise de tous les prisonniers, un état des dépenses directes supportées par lui pour le soin et l'entretien des prisonniers, depuis la date de la capture ou de la reddition jusqu'à celle de la mort ou de la remise. Compensation sera faite entre les sommes dues par la Bulgarie à l'une des autres hautes parties contractantes et celles dues par celles-ci à la Bulgarie, et la différence sera payée au Gouvernement créancier aussitôt que possible après l'échange des états de dépenses sus-visés.

ARTICLE X.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Bucarest dans le délai de quinze jours, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Bucarest, le 28^e jour du mois de juillet (10^e jour du mois d'août) de l'an 1913.

XVII. TURCO-BULGARIAN TREATY

Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Constantinople, September 16 (29), 1913.

[Ratifications exchanged at Constantinople, October 1 (14), 1913.]

SA Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares, animés du désir de régler à l'amiable et sur une base durable l'état de choses créé par les événements qui se sont produits depuis la conclusion du Traité de Londres,¹ de rétablir les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage si nécessaires pour le bien-être de leurs peuples, ont résolu de conclure le présent traité et ont choisi respectivement à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans : Talaat Bey ; le Général Mahmoud Pacha ; Halil Bey ;

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares : le Général Savoff ; M. Natchévitch ; M. Tocheff ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE I^{er}.

La frontière entre les deux pays prend son point de départ à l'embouchure de la rivière Rezvaja, au sud du monastère San Ivan, se trouvant sur la mer Noire ; elle suit le cours de cette rivière jusqu'au point de jonction des rivières Pirogu et Déliva, à l'ouest de Kamila-köj. Entre l'embouchure et le point de jonction plus haut mentionné, la rivière Rezvaja, à partir de l'embouchure, suit d'abord la direction du sud-ouest et, laissant à la Turquie Placa, forme un coude et se dirige vers le nord-ouest et puis vers le sud-ouest ; les villages Madzura et Pirgoplo restent en territoire ottoman. La rivière Rezvaja, après avoir suivi, à partir de Pirgoplo, la direction du sud sur une longueur approximative de 5½ kilom., forme un coude vers l'ouest et le nord et se prolonge ensuite, légèrement incurvée vers le nord, dans la direction générale de l'ouest. Dans cette partie, les villages Likudi, Kladara restent en territoire bulgare et les villages Ciknigor, Mavrodio et Lafva reviennent à la Turquie ; ensuite, la frontière, suivant toujours la rivière Rezvaja, laisse Torfu-cifik à la Bulgarie, se dirige vers le sud-est et, laissant le village Radoslavci en territoire ottoman,

oblique vers l'ouest à 800 mètres environ au sud de ce village ; elle laisse le village Kamila-köj en territoire ottoman et arrive à une distance de 400 mètres environ à l'ouest de ce village, au point de jonction des rivières Pirogu et Déliva.

La ligne frontière suit, à partir du point de jonction des rivières Pirogu et Déliva, le cours du Déliva et, se prolongeant avec ladite rivière dans la direction générale du nord-ouest, laisse à la Turquie les villages Paspala, Kandildzik et Déli et se termine à l'est de Souk Sou ; ce dernier village reste à la Turquie, tandis que Sévéligu revient à la Bulgarie. La ligne frontière, après avoir passé entre Souk Sou et Sévéligu, continue dans la direction du nord-ouest, en suivant la crête qui passe sur les côtes 678, 619 et 563 ; au delà de la côte 563, elle laisse le village Caglaïk (Cajirlik) en territoire ottoman et, contournant ce dernier village à 3 kilom. à l'est et au nord, gagne le ruisseau Goléma. La frontière suit le cours du Goléma sur une longueur de 2 kilom. environ et arrive au point de jonction de ce ruisseau avec l'autre bras de la même rivière, qui vient du sud de Karabanlar (Karabaalar). A partir de ce point de jonction, la ligne frontière passe sur la crête au nord du ruisseau venant de Türk-Alatli pour aboutir à l'ancienne frontière turco-bulgare.

Le point de jonction de la nouvelle ligne et de l'ancienne frontière se trouve à 4 kilom. à l'est de Türk-Alatli, au point où l'ancienne frontière turco-bulgare forme un coude vers le nord, dans la direction de Ajkiri-Jol.

A partir de ce point, elle suit exactement l'ancienne frontière turco-bulgare jusqu'à Balaban-Basi, à l'ouest de la Tundja et au nord du village Derviska-Mog.

La nouvelle ligne frontière se sépare de l'ancienne frontière aux environs de Balaban-Basi et descend en ligne droite vers Dermen-Déré. Le point où la nouvelle frontière se sépare de l'ancienne se trouve à 2 kilom. de distance de l'église du village Derviska-Mog. La frontière, après avoir laissé le village Derviska-Mog, dans le territoire ottoman, suit le cours du Dermen-Déré jusqu'au village Bulgar-Lefké et laisse ce village en territoire bulgare. A partir des lisières est et sud de Bulgar-Lefké, la ligne frontière abandonne le cours du Dermen-Déré et se dirige vers l'ouest, laisse en territoire ottoman les villages Türk-Lefké et Dimitri-köj et, en suivant la ligne de partage des eaux entre Bük-Déré et Demirhan-Déré (côte 241), arrive au point le plus septentrional du coude formé par la Marica vers le nord, à l'est de Mustafa-Pasa. Cette partie du coude se trouve à 3½ kilom. de distance de l'entrée est du pont de Mustafa-Pasa. La frontière suit la partie ouest du coude de la Marica jusqu'au moulin et, de là, arrive en ligne droite, atteignant Cermen-Déré, au nord du pont du chemin de fer

(Cermen-Déré est la rivière qui se jette dans la Marica à 3 kilom. à l'est du village Cermen) et puis, contournant Cermen au nord, va à Tazi-Tépési. La frontière laisse Cermen à la Turquie et, suivant le cours de Cermen-Déré, coupe la ligne du chemin de fer au nord-ouest de Cermen ; elle suit toujours la même rivière et monte à Tazi-Tépési (côte 613). (Le point où Cermen-Déré coupe la ligne du chemin de fer au nord-ouest de Cermen se trouve à une distance de 5 kilom. du centre du village de Cermen et à 3,200 mètres de la sortie ouest du pont de Mustafa-Pasa.)

La frontière laisse en territoire ottoman le point le plus élevé de Tazi-Tépési et, à partir de ce point, suit la ligne de partage des eaux entre l'Arda et la Marica en passant par les villages Jajladzik et Gjuldruk (Goldzik), qui restent en territoire ottoman.

A partir de Goldzik, la frontière passe par la côte 449 et ensuite descend à la côte 367 et, à partir de cette côte, se dirige vers l'Arda dans la direction sud, à peu près en ligne droite. Cette ligne droite passe à 1 kilom. à l'ouest de Bektasli, qui reste en territoire ottoman.

La ligne frontière, après être arrivée de la côte 367 à l'Arda, suit vers l'est la rive droite de l'Arda et arrive au moulin qui se trouve à 1 kilom. au sud du village de Cingirli ; à partir de ce moulin, elle suit la ligne de partage des eaux se trouvant à l'est de Gajdohor-Déré ; elle passe à 1 kilom. à l'est du village Gajdohor et, laissant le village Drébisna à la Bulgarie, en passant à peu près à 1 kilom. à l'est de ce village, descend à Atéren-Déré à 1 kilom. au sud du susdit village ; de là, elle va dans la direction du sud-ouest, par le plus court chemin, à la source du ruisseau qui coule entre les villages Akalan et Kajlikliköj et suit le thalweg de ce cours d'eau pour descendre à la rivière Kizil-Déli. A partir du susdit ruisseau, la frontière, laissant Gökcebunar en Bulgarie, emprunte le cours de Kizil-Déli-Déré et, de là, en suivant le thalweg du ruisseau qui se sépare vers le sud en un point se trouvant à 4 kilom. au sud de Mandrica et à 3 kilom. à l'est de Soganliki-Bala, va à la source du même ruisseau ; elle descend ensuite par le plus court chemin à la source du Mandra-Déré ; elle suit le thalweg du Mandra-Déré, à partir de sa source, pour joindre la Marica à l'ouest de Mandra. Dans cette partie, le village Krantu reste en territoire bulgare et les villages Bas-Klisa, Ahirjanbunar et Mandra reviennent à la Turquie.

A partir de ce point, la frontière suit le thalweg de la Marica jusqu'au point où le fleuve se sépare en deux branches, à 3½ kilom. au sud du village de Kaldirköz ; de là, elle suit le thalweg de la branche droite, qui passe non loin de Férédzik, pour aboutir à la mer Egée. Dans cette partie, les marais d'Ak-Sou,

ainsi que les lacs de Quénéli-Gheulet et de Kazikli-Gheul, restent à la Turquie et les lacs de Touzla-Gheul et de Drana-Gheul reviennent à la Bulgarie.

ARTICLE II.

Dix jours après la signature du présent traité par les Plénipotentiaires susmentionnés, les armées des deux parties contractantes qui, en ce moment, occuperaient des territoires revenant à l'autre partie, s'empresseront de les évacuer et, dans l'espace des quinze jours suivants, de les remettre, conformément aux règles et aux usages, aux autorités de l'autre partie.

Il est en outre entendu que les deux États démobiliseront leurs armées dans l'espace de trois semaines, à partir de la date du présent traité.

ARTICLE III.

Les relations diplomatiques, ainsi que les communications postales, télégraphiques et de chemin de fer, reprendront entre les hautes parties contractantes immédiatement après la signature du présent traité.

L'arrangement sur les Muftis, formant l'Annexe II du présent traité,¹ sera applicable dans tous les territoires de la Bulgarie.

ARTICLE IV.

En vue de favoriser les relations économiques entre les deux pays, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à remettre en vigueur, aussitôt après la signature du présent traité et pour un délai d'un an à dater de ce jour, la Convention pour le Commerce et la Navigation conclue le 6 (19) février, 1911, et à accorder à leurs produits industriels, agricoles et autres toutes les facilités douanières compatibles avec leurs engagements existant à l'égard des Puissances tierces.

La déclaration consulaire du 18 novembre (1^{er} décembre), 1909), sera également remise en vigueur pendant le même délai.

Toutefois, chacune des hautes parties contractantes pourra créer des consulats généraux, consulats, vice-consulats de carrière dans toutes les localités de leurs territoires où des agents de Puissances tierces sont admis.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent en outre à procéder, dans le plus bref délai possible, à la nomination de Commissions mixtes pour négocier un Traité de Commerce et une Convention consulaire.

ARTICLE V.

Les prisonniers de guerre et otages seront échangés dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la signature du présent traité, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

Cet échange aura lieu par les soins de commissaires spéciaux nommés de part et d'autre.

Les frais d'entretien desdits prisonniers de guerre et otages seront à la charge du Gouvernement au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent.

Toutefois, la solde des officiers payée par ce Gouvernement sera remboursée par l'État dont ils relèvent.

ARTICLE VI.

Une amnistie pleine et entière est accordée par les hautes parties contractantes à toutes les personnes qui ont pris part aux hostilités ou qui se sont compromises dans les événements politiques antérieurs au présent traité.

Les habitants des territoires cédés jouiront de la même amnistie pour les événements politiques y survenus.

Le bénéfice de cette amnistie cessera à l'expiration du délai de deux semaines fixé par les autorités légalement constituées lors de la réoccupation des territoires revenant à la Bulgarie et dûment porté à la connaissance des populations.

ARTICLE VII.

Les originaires des territoires cédés par l'Empire ottoman au Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie et qui y sont domiciliés deviendront sujets bulgares.

Ces originaires devenus sujets bulgares auront, pendant un délai de quatre ans, la faculté d'opter sur place en faveur de la nationalité ottomane, par une simple déclaration aux autorités locales bulgares et un enregistrement aux consulats Impériaux ottomans. Cette déclaration sera remise, à l'étranger, aux chancelleries des consulats bulgares et enregistrée par les consulats ottomans. L'option sera individuelle et n'est pas obligatoire pour le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

Les mineurs actuels useront de l'option dans les quatre ans qui suivent leur majorité.

Les musulmans des territoires cédés devenus sujets bulgares ne seront pas assujettis pendant ce délai au service militaire, ni ne payeront aucune taxe militaire.

Après avoir usé de leur faculté d'option, ces musulmans quitteront les territoires cédés, et cela jusqu'à échéance du délai de quatre ans prévu plus haut, en ayant la faculté de faire passer en franchise de droits de sortie leurs biens meubles. Ils peuvent toutefois conserver leurs biens immeubles de toutes catégories, urbains et ruraux, et les faire administrer par des tiers.

ARTICLE VIII.

Les sujets bulgares musulmans de tous les territoires de la Bulgarie jouiront des mêmes droits civils et politiques que les sujets d'origine bulgare.

Ils jouiront de la liberté de conscience, de la liberté et de la pratique extérieure du culte. Les coutumes des musulmans seront respectées.

Le nom de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, comme Khalife, continuera à être prononcé dans les prières publiques des musulmans.

Les communautés musulmanes, constituées actuellement ou qui se constitueront à l'avenir, leur organisation hiérarchique, leurs patrimoines seront reconnus et respectés ; elles relèveront sans entraves de leurs chefs spirituels.

ARTICLE IX.

Les communautés bulgares en Turquie jouiront des mêmes droits dont jouissent actuellement les autres communautés chrétiennes de l'Empire ottoman.

Les Bulgares sujets ottomans conserveront leurs biens meubles et immeubles et ne seront aucunement inquiétés dans l'exercice et la jouissance de leurs droits de l'homme et de propriété. Ceux qui ont quitté leurs foyers lors des derniers événements pourront retourner dans un délai de deux ans au plus tard.

ARTICLE X.

Les droits acquis antérieurement à l'annexion des territoires, ainsi que les actes judiciaires et titres officiels émanant des autorités ottomanes compétentes, seront respectés et inviolables jusqu'à la preuve légale du contraire.

ARTICLE XI.

Le droit de propriété foncière dans les territoires cédés, tel qu'il résulte de la loi ottomane sur les immeubles urbains et ruraux, sera reconnu sans aucune restriction.

Les propriétaires d'immeubles ou de meubles dans lesdits territoires continueront à jouir de tous leurs droits de propriété, même s'ils fixent, à titre provisoire ou définitif, leur résidence personnelle hors de la Bulgarie. Ils pourront affermer leurs biens ou les administrer par des tiers.

ARTICLE XII.

Les vakoufs mustesna, mulhaka, idjarétein, moukataa, idjaréi-vahidé, ainsi que les dîmes vakoufs, dans les territoires cédés, tels qu'ils résultent actuellement des lois ottomanes, seront respectés.

Ils seront gérés par qui de droit.

Leurs régimes ne pourront être modifiés que par indemnisation juste et préalable.

Les droits des établissements religieux et de bienfaisance de l'Empire ottoman sur les revenus vakoufs dans les territoires cédés, à titre d'idjaréi-Vahidé, de moukataa, de droits divers, de contre-valeur de dîmes vakoufs et autres, sur les vakoufs bâtis ou non bâtis, seront respectés.

ARTICLE XIII.

Les biens particuliers de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, ainsi que ceux des membres de la dynastie Impériale, seront maintenus et respectés. Sa Majesté et les membres de la dynastie Impériale pourront les vendre ou les affermer par des fondés de pouvoirs.

Il en sera de même pour les biens du domaine privé qui appartiendraient à l'État.

En cas d'aliénation, préférence sera accordée, à conditions égales, aux sujets bulgares.

ARTICLE XIV.

Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à donner à leurs autorités provinciales des ordres afin de faire respecter les cimetières et particulièrement les tombeaux des soldats tombés sur le champ d'honneur.

Les autorités n'empêcheront pas les parents et amis d'enlever les ossements des victimes inhumées en terre étrangère.

ARTICLE XV.

Les sujets de chacun des États contractants pourront séjourner et circuler librement, comme par le passé, sur le territoire de l'autre État contractant.

ARTICLE XVI.

Le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie est subrogé aux droits, charges et obligations du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à l'égard de la Compagnie des Chemins de fer orientaux, pour la partie de la ligne à elle concédée et située dans les territoires cédés.

Le Gouvernement Royal de Bulgarie s'oblige à rendre sans retard le matériel roulant et les autres objets appartenant à ladite compagnie et saisis par lui.

ARTICLE XVII.

Tous les différends et litiges qui surviendraient dans l'interprétation ou l'application des articles XI, XII, XIII et

XVI du présent traité seront réglés par l'arbitrage à La Haye, conformément au compromis formant l'Annexe III¹ du présent traité.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Le Protocole relatif à la frontière (Annexe 1); l'arrangement concernant les Muftis (Annexe 2); le compromis d'arbitrage (Annexe 3); le Protocole relatif au chemin de fer et à la Maritza (Annexe 4) et la déclaration se rapportant à l'article X (Annexe 5) sont annexés au présent traité dont ils font partie intégrante.

ARTICLE XIX.

Les dispositions du Traité de Londres sont maintenues en ce qui concerne le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et le Royaume de Bulgarie pour autant qu'elles ne sont pas abrogées ou modifiées par les stipulations qui précèdent.

ARTICLE XX.

Le présent traité entrera en vigueur immédiatement après sa signature.

Les ratifications en seront échangées dans la quinzaine à dater de ce jour.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait en double exemplaire à Constantinople, le 16 (29) septembre 1913.

ANNEXE 1^{re}.

Protocole N^o. 1.

(A.) Les hautes parties contractantes ont convenu d'ajouter à la description de la frontière insérée à l'article 1^{er} du traité les remarques suivantes :

1. La frontière est décrite d'après la carte de l'état-major autrichien à l'échelle de 1 : 200,000 et le tracé en est marqué sur un croquis annexe, copié sur cette carte.

Les indications se rapportant à la partie inférieure et à l'affluent de la Maritza sont enregistrées d'après la carte topographique à l'échelle de 1 : 50,000 et elles sont portées sur une carte détaillée et complète de cette partie, indiquant la frontière définitive de Mandra à l'embouchure.

2. Des commissions mixtes composées d'officiers ottomans et bulgares traceront la carte de la nouvelle ligne frontière sur un espace de 2 kilom. de chaque côté de cette ligne, à l'échelle

de 1 : 25,000 ; la frontière définitive sera marquée sur cette carte. Ces commissions seront divisées en trois sections et commenceront leurs travaux simultanément dans les parties suivantes : la côte de la mer Noire, le territoire situé entre la Maritza et l'Arda et celui compris entre l'Arda et Mandra.

Après cette opération, la ligne frontière sera appliquée sur le terrain et des pyramides y seront élevées par les soins desdites commissions mixtes. Les protocoles de la frontière définitive seront dressés par les commissions.

3. Lors du tracé de la ligne frontière, les commissions relèveront le plan des propriétés privées ou publiques restant en deçà ou au delà de la ligne.

Les deux hauts Gouvernements examineront les mesures à prendre pour éviter des conflits qui pourraient éventuellement surgir de l'exploitation de pareilles propriétés.

Il est bien entendu que jusqu'à ce qu'une entente intervienne à ce sujet les propriétaires continueront à jouir librement de leurs biens, comme par le passé.

4. Les protocoles antérieurement dressés par les deux parties en ce qui concerne les parties de l'ancienne frontière turco-bulgare maintenues actuellement telles quelles resteront en vigueur.

Si les bornes-frontière, ou koulés, se trouvant dans ces parties, sont détruites ou endommagées, il sera procédé à leur reconstruction ou restauration.

5. Pour les rivières et les ruisseaux, sauf la Toundja, la Maritza et l'Arda, la ligne frontière suivra le thalweg des cours d'eau. Pour les trois susdites rivières, la ligne frontière est indiquée exactement dans le protocole.

(B.) La délimitation en ce qui concerne les îles situées dans le lit de la Maritza sera confiée à une commission spéciale.

Il a été également convenu que les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à s'entendre, le moment venu, pour la canalisation de la Maritza.

(C.) Les deux Gouvernements sont d'accord pour faciliter l'échange facultatif mutuel des populations bulgare et musulmane de part et d'autre, ainsi que de leurs propriétés dans une zone de 15 kilom. au plus, le long de toute la frontière commune.

L'échange aura lieu par des villages entiers.

L'échange des propriétés rurales et urbaines aura lieu sous les auspices des deux Gouvernements et avec la participation des anciens des villages à échanger.

Des commissions mixtes nommées par les deux Gouvernements procéderont à l'échange et à l'indemnisation, s'il y a lieu, de différences résultant de l'échange de biens entre villages et particuliers en question.

ANNEXE 2.

Arrangement concernant les Muftis.

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Un Mufti en chef résidera à Sofia et servira d'intermédiaire entre les Muftis de la Bulgarie dans leurs relations avec le Cheïkh-ul-Islamat, pour les affaires religieuses et civiles relevant du Chéri, et avec le Ministère bulgare des Cultes.

Il sera élu par les Muftis de la Bulgarie et, parmi ceux-ci, réunis spécialement à cet effet. Les Mufti-Vékilis prendront part à cette réunion, mais seulement en qualité d'électeurs.

Le Ministère bulgare des Cultes notifiera l'élection du Mufti en chef, par l'entremise de la Légation impériale à Sofia, au Cheïkh-ul-Islamat, qui lui fera parvenir un menchour et le murassélé l'autorisant à exercer ses fonctions et à accorder, de son côté, le même pouvoir aux autres Muftis de la Bulgarie.

Le Mufti en chef aura, dans les limites des prescriptions du Chéri, le droit de surveillance et de contrôle sur les Muftis de la Bulgarie, sur les établissements religieux et de bienfaisance musulmans, ainsi que sur leurs desservants et leurs mutévellis.

ARTICLE II.

Les Muftis sont élus par les électeurs musulmans de la Bulgarie.

Le Mufti en chef vérifie si le Mufti élu réunit toutes les qualités requises par la loi du Chéri et, en cas d'affirmative, il informe le Cheïkh-ul-Islamat de la nécessité de lui délivrer l'autorisation nécessaire pour rendre les fetvas (menchour). Il délivre au nouveau Mufti, en même temps que le menchour ainsi obtenu, le murassélé nécessaire pour lui conférer le droit de juridiction religieuse entre les musulmans.

Les Muftis peuvent, à condition de faire ratifier leur choix au Mufti en chef, proposer la nomination, dans les limites de leurs circonscriptions et dans les localités où on en verrait la nécessité, des Mufti-Vékilis, qui auront à y remplir les fonctions déterminées par le présent arrangement, sous la surveillance directe des Muftis locaux.

ARTICLE III.

La rétribution du Mufti en chef, des Muftis et des Mufti-Vékilis, ainsi que du personnel de leurs bureaux, sera à la charge du Gouvernement royal bulgare et sera fixé en considération de leur dignité et de l'importance de leur poste.

L'organisation du Bach-Muftilik sera fixée par un règlement élaboré par le Mufti en chef et dûment publié.

Le Mufti en chef, Muftis et Mufti-Vékilis, ainsi que leur personnel, jouiront de tous les droits que les lois assurent aux fonctionnaires bulgares.

ARTICLE IV.

La révocation des Muftis et de leurs Vékils aura lieu conformément à la loi sur les fonctionnaires publics.

Le Mufti en chef, ou son délégué, sera appelé à siéger au conseil disciplinaire toutes les fois que ce dernier aura à se prononcer sur la révocation d'un Mufti ou d'un Mufti-Vékili. Toutefois, l'avis du Mufti en chef ou de son délégué servira audit conseil de base à l'appréciation des plaintes de caractère purement religieux.

L'acte de révocation d'un Mufti ou Mufti-Vékili fixera le jour de l'élection de son remplaçant.

ARTICLE V.

Les heudjets et jugements rendus par les Muftis seront examinés par le Mufti en chef, qui les confirmera, s'il les trouve conformes aux prescriptions de la loi du Chéri, et les remettra au département compétent afin d'être mis à exécution.

Les heudjets et jugements qui ne seront pas confirmés pour cause de non-conformité à la loi du Chéri seront retournés aux Muftis qui les auraient rendus et les affaires auxquelles ils ont trait seront examinées et réglées de nouveau suivant les prescriptions de ladite loi. Les heudjets et jugements qui ne seront pas trouvés conformes aux prescriptions de la loi du Chéri ou ceux dont l'examen au Cheikh-ul-Islamat aura été demandé par les intéressés seront envoyés par le Mufti en chef à son Altesse le Cheikh-ul-Islam.

Les heudjets et jugements confirmés par le Mufti en chef ou sanctionnés par le Cheikh-ul-Islamat seront mis à exécution par les autorités bulgares compétentes. Dans ce cas, ils seront accompagnés d'une traduction en langue bulgare.

ARTICLE VI.

Le Mufti en chef fera, le cas échéant, aux autres Muftis les recommandations et communications nécessaires en matière de mariage, divorce, testaments, successions et tutelle, pension alimentaire (nafaka) et autres matières du Chéri, ainsi qu'en ce qui concerne la gestion des biens des orphelins. En outre, il examinera les plaintes et réclamations se rapportant aux affaires susmentionnées et fera connaître au département compétent ce qu'il y aurait lieu de faire conformément à la loi du Chéri.

Les Muftis étant aussi chargés de la surveillance et de l'administration des vakoufs, le Mufti en chef aura, parmi ses attributions principales, celle de leur demander la reddition de leurs comptes et de faire préparer les états de comptabilité y relatifs.

Les livres relatifs aux comptes des vakoufs pourront être tenus en langue turque.

ARTICLE VII.

Le Mufti en chef et les Muftis inspecteront, au besoin, les conseils d'instruction publique et les écoles musulmanes ainsi que les médressés de la Bulgarie et adopteront des dispositions pour la création d'établissements scolaires dans les localités où le besoin s'en ferait sentir ; le Mufti en chef s'adressera, s'il y a lieu, au département compétent pour les affaires concernant l'instruction publique musulmane.

Le Gouvernement royal créera à ses frais des écoles primaires et secondaires musulmanes dans la proportion établie par la loi sur l'instruction publique bulgare. L'enseignement aura lieu en langue turque et en conformité du programme officiel, avec enseignement obligatoire de la langue bulgare.

Toutes les lois relatives à l'enseignement obligatoire ainsi qu'au nombre et aux droits des instituteurs continueront à être appliquées au corps enseignant des communautés musulmanes. Les appointements du personnel enseignant ou autre de ces institutions seront réglés par le Trésor bulgare dans les mêmes conditions que ceux des corps enseignants des institutions bulgares.

Une institution spéciale sera également créée pour former des Naïbs.

ARTICLE VIII.

Dans chaque chef-lieu ou ville ayant une nombreuse population musulmane, il sera procédé à l'élection d'une communauté musulmane, chargée des affaires vakoufs et d'instruction publique secondaire. La personnalité morale de ces communautés sera reconnue en toute circonstance et par toutes les autorités.

Les vakoufs de chaque district devant être administrés, selon les lois et dispositions du Chéri, par la communauté musulmane respective, c'est la personnalité morale de cette dernière qui sera considérée comme propriétaire de ces vakoufs.

Les cimetières publics musulmans et ceux sis à proximité des mosquées sont compris dans le domaine des biens vakoufs appartenant aux communautés musulmanes, qui en disposeront à leur convenance et conformément aux lois de l'hygiène.

Aucun bien vakouf ne peut en aucun cas être exproprié sans que sa contre-valeur soit versée à la communauté respective.

On veillera à la bonne conservation des immeubles vakoufs sis en Bulgarie. Aucun édifice du culte ou de bienfaisance ne pourra être démoli que pour une nécessité impérieuse et conformément aux lois et aux règlements en vigueur.

Dans le cas où un édifice vakouf devrait être exproprié pour des causes impérieuses, on ne pourra y procéder qu'après la désignation d'un autre terrain ayant la même valeur par rapport à l'endroit où il se trouve situé, ainsi qu'après le paiement de la contre-valeur de la bâtisse.

Les sommes à payer comme prix des immeubles vakoufs qui seront expropriés pour des causes impérieuses seront remises aux communautés musulmanes pour être entièrement affectées à l'entretien des édifices vakoufs.

ARTICLE IX.

Dans les six mois qui suivront la signature du présent arrangement une commission spéciale, dont le Mufti en chef fera partie de droit, sera nommée par le Gouvernement bulgare et aura pour but, dans une période de trois ans à partir de la date de sa constitution, d'examiner et de vérifier les réclamations qui seront formulées par les mutévellis ou leurs ayants droit.

Ceux des intéressés qui ne seraient pas contents des décisions de la commission pourront recourir aux tribunaux compétents du pays.

ANNEXE 3.

Compromis d'Arbitrage.

ARTICLE I^{er}.

Au cas où quelque différend ou litige surviendrait, d'après les prévisions de l'article XVII du traité conclu en date de ce jour entre le Gouvernement impérial ottoman d'une part, et le Gouvernement royal de Bulgarie de l'autre, ce différend ou ce litige sera déféré à l'arbitrage à La Haye, conformément aux dispositions ci-après.

ARTICLE II.

Le Gouvernement demandeur notifiera au Gouvernement défenseur la ou les questions qu'il entendra soumettre à l'arbitrage, au fur et à mesure qu'elles surgiront, et donnera à leur sujet des indications succinctes, mais précises.

ARTICLE III.

Le tribunal arbitral auquel la ou lesdites questions seront soumises sera composé de cinq membres, lesquels seront désignés de la manière suivante :

Chaque partie, aussitôt que possible et dans un délai qui n'excédera pas deux mois à partir de la date de la notification spécifiée dans l'article précédent, devra nommer deux arbitres.

Le sur-arbitre sera choisi parmi les Souverains de Suède, Norvège et Hollande. Si on ne tombe pas d'accord sur le choix de l'un de ces trois Souverains, le sort en décidera. Si la partie défenderesse ne nomme pas ses arbitres dans le délai précité de deux mois, elle pourra le faire jusqu'au jour de la première réunion du tribunal arbitral. Passé ce délai, la partie demanderessse indiquera le Souverain qui aura à choisir le sur-arbitre. Après le choix dudit sur-arbitre, le tribunal se constituera valablement par le sur-arbitre et par les deux arbitres choisis par la partie demanderessse.

ARTICLE IV.

Les Puissances en litige se feront représenter auprès du tribunal arbitral par des agents, conseils ou avocats, en conformité des prévisions de l'article LXII de la Convention de La Haye pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.¹

Ces agents, conseils ou avocats seront désignés à temps par les parties pour que le fonctionnement de l'arbitrage ne subisse aucun retard.

Toutefois, si la partie défenderesse s'en abstient, il sera procédé à son égard par défaut.

ARTICLE V.

Le tribunal arbitral, une fois constitué, se réunira à La Haye à une date qui sera fixée par les arbitres et dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la nomination du sur-arbitre. Après le règlement en conformité avec le texte et l'esprit de la Convention de La Haye de 1907 de toutes les questions de procédure qui pourraient surgir et qui ne seraient pas prévues par le présent compromis, ledit tribunal ajournera sa prochaine séance à la date qu'il fixera.

Toutefois, il reste convenu que le tribunal ne pourra ouvrir les débats sur les questions en litige ni avant les deux mois, ni plus tard que les trois mois qui suivront la remise du contre-mémoire ou de la contre-réplique prévue par l'article VII.

¹ Brit. State Papers, Vol. c, page 308

ARTICLE VI.

La procédure arbitrale comprendra deux phases distinctes : l'instruction écrite et les débats, qui consisteront dans le développement oral des moyens des parties devant le tribunal.

La seule langue dont fera usage le tribunal et dont l'emploi sera autorisé devant lui sera la langue française.

ARTICLE VII.

Dans le délai de dix mois au plus tard à dater de la notification prévue à l'article II, la partie demanderesse devra remettre à chacun des membres du tribunal arbitral, en cinq exemplaires, et à la partie défenderesse, en trente exemplaires, les copies complètes, écrites ou imprimées, de son mémoire, contenant toutes pièces à l'appui de sa demande, lesquelles se référeront à la ou aux questions en litige.

Dans un délai de dix mois plus tard après cette remise, la partie défenderesse devra remettre à chacun des membres du tribunal, ainsi qu'à la partie demanderesse, en autant d'exemplaires que ci-dessus, les copies complètes, manuscrites ou imprimées, de son contre-mémoire avec toutes les pièces à l'appui.

Dans le délai d'un mois après cette remise, la partie demanderesse notifiera au président du tribunal arbitral si elle a l'intention de présenter une réplique. Dans ce cas, elle aura quatre mois au plus, à compter de cette notification, pour communiquer ladite réplique dans les mêmes conditions que le mémoire. La partie défenderesse aura alors cinq mois, à compter de cette communication, pour présenter sa contre-réplique dans les mêmes conditions que le contre-mémoire.

Les délais fixés par le présent article pourront être prolongés de commun accord par les parties ou par le tribunal, quand il le jugera nécessaire pour arriver à une décision juste.

Mais le tribunal ne prendra pas en considération les mémoires, contre-mémoires et autres communications qui lui seront présentées par les parties après l'expiration du dernier délai fixé par lui.

ARTICLE VIII.

Si dans les mémoires ou autres pièces échangées l'une ou l'autre partie s'est référée ou a fait allusion à un document ou papier en sa possession exclusive, et dont elle n'aura pas joint la copie, elle sera tenue, si l'autre partie le demande, de lui en donner copie au plus tard dans les trente jours.

ARTICLE IX.

Les décisions du tribunal arbitral sur la ou les questions en litige seront prononcées dans le délai maximum d'un mois après la clôture, par le président, des débats relatifs à cette ou ces questions.

ARTICLE X.

Le jugement du tribunal arbitral sera définitif et devra être exécuté strictement, sans aucun retard.

ARTICLE XI.

Chaque partie supporte ses propres frais et une part égale des frais du tribunal.

ARTICLE XII.

En tout ce qui n'est pas prévu par le présent compromis, les stipulations de la Convention de La Haye de 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux seront appliquées aux arbitrages résultant du présent compromis, à l'exception, toutefois, des articles qui ont été réservés par les parties contractantes.

ANNEXE 4.

Protocole No. 2.

LE tracé de la frontière coupant le fleuve Maritza et le chemin de fer Moustafa-Pacha-Andrinople-Dédé Agatch, qui desservent les territoires ottomans et bulgares, il a été convenu entre les deux parties contractantes que, pour préserver les relations commerciales et autres des moindres entraves, les règlements et les usages qui régissent actuellement les mouvements commerciaux, tant sur le fleuve Maritza que sur ladite ligne ferrée, ainsi que tous les droits, taxes et autres découlant desdits règlements, seront maintenus dans leur plénitude, et que toutes facilités compatibles avec lesdits règlements et usages seront accordées. Aucune modification ne pourra y être introduite sans un accord préalable entre les deux États contractants et les administrations desdits chemins de fer et fleuve. Le transit direct des marchandises sera exempt de droits et taxes quelconques ; toutefois, chaque Gouvernement pourra réglementer la surveillance dudit transit.

Les dispositions ci-dessus ne s'appliqueront pour le chemin de fer que jusqu'au jour où les deux hautes parties contractantes auront déjà construit simultanément, la Bulgarie une ligne de raccordement à la mer Egée, dans son territoire, et la Turquie une ligne aboutissant à ladite mer.

Il est bien entendu qu'en temps de paix la Bulgarie sera libre, jusqu'à la construction de la ligne prévue, qui aura lieu au plus tard dans dix ans, de faire transporter sur ledit chemin de fer, ainsi que sur le fleuve, des recrues, des troupes, des armes, des munitions, des vivres, etc.

L'Etat ottoman aura toujours le droit de prendre les mesures de surveillance nécessaires.

Toutefois, ce transport de troupes et autres ne pourra commencer qu'à partir de trois mois à dater de ce jour.

ANNEXE 5.

Déclaration.

EN ce qui concerne l'article X du traité, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman déclare qu'il n'a point consenti, depuis l'occupation par les forces bulgares des territoires cédés, à des cessions de droits à des particuliers, en vue de restreindre les droits souverains de l'Etat bulgare.

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In addition to those quoted in the histories of the different Balkan States (Handbooks Nos. 16-23 and 57-66), the following give more general treatment of the subject :—

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The most important treaties and other documents are given in EDWARD HERTSLET, *The Map of Europe by Treaty*, vols. I-III, 1814-1875 (London, 1875), and vol. IV, 1875-1891 (London, 1891).

MAPS.

For maps of the different Balkan States, see notes in the special Handbooks, Nos. 16-23 and 58-65.

For historical boundaries, see Skeleton Map of South-Eastern Europe (G.S.G.S., No. 3703), on the scale of 1:1,500,000, issued by the War Office, in connection with this series, December 1918; and the accompanying Table of Treaties, &c.

For ethnography, see (1) the Ethnographical Map of Central and South-Eastern Europe (G.S.G.S., No. 3703*a*), issued by the War Office (December 1918), in connection with this series, in four sheets, on the scale of 1:1,500,000; the two southern sheets (Northern Italy and South-Eastern Europe) contain the countries here concerned; an explanatory note is added. (2) For Turkey in Asia, see the Ethnographical Map of Eastern Turkey, &c., published by the Royal Geographical Society, 1910 (G.S.G.S., No. 2901), on the scale of 1:2,000,000. (3) *L'Europe ethnique et linguistique: Atlas descriptif en trois cartes*, &c., published by De Agostini's Geographical Institute, Novara (1917), on the scale of 1:3,000,000.

NOTE EXPLANATORY OF THE MAP SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITIES IN THE BALKAN PENINSULA

THE racial character of the various Balkan peoples and their distribution is considered in Handbooks Nos. 15 to 23. The main racial elements are Slavonic (including Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgars), Rumanian (including Vlachs), Albanian, Greek, and Turkish.

No racial distinction can be drawn between the Serbs and Montenegrins, nor between these and the Bosnians, Herzegovinians, and Croats to the north. On the side of Albania there is much dispute as to the racial boundary, the partisans of each people claiming that it is strongly represented within the boundaries of the other, the Albanian claim being apparently the better founded. In the direction of Macedonia also the southern and eastern limit of the Serbs is a matter of controversy.

The Bulgars are fairly homogeneous in Bulgaria itself, in the regions adjacent to it east of the Struma, and in the vilayet of Adrianople. Their language is Slavonic, though they are generally held to be mainly of Tartar race in origin. The extreme racial claims of the Bulgarians are indicated by the territory assigned to them by the Treaty of San Stefano (see Map of Historical Boundaries).

Between the regions undisputedly Serbian or Bulgarian there lies a large area, comprising a great part of Macedonia; it extends from the Struma to Okhrida, and from the Shar Mountains almost to the sea. The

large majority of the population of this area is Slavonic, and has been the subject of endless racial disputes and of rival national propaganda. The Bulgarians, who have been most successful in this matter, claim the whole Slavonic population as Bulgar. The advocates of the Serbs call it Macedo-Slav. A compromise between Serbia and Bulgaria on the question was reached in 1912.¹ As to race and language, these people appear to shade, by scarcely perceptible grades, from Serbs on the west to Bulgars on the east. The region round Pirot and Vrania, included by the Treaty of Berlin in the kingdom of Serbia, was assigned to the Bulgarians by the Treaty of San Stefano, and is still claimed by them on racial grounds, though the sympathies of the population are clearly Serbian. On the other hand, Serbian authorities assert that the population between the Isker and the Timok, north-west of Sofia, is more Serbian than Bulgarian.

Rumanians form almost the entire population in Rumania, with the exception of the Dobruja. They are also in a large majority in Bessarabia, and a great number of them are found outside the Balkan region, in western Transylvania and south-eastern Bukovina. They have also penetrated, in considerable numbers, into the north-east corner of Serbia, in the angle between the Timok and the Danube. The Koutso-Vlachs, who are akin to the Rumanians and speak a Rumanian dialect, are mainly found on Mount Pindus, in the district south of Samarra; but groups of Vlach villages are scattered about throughout Macedonia and central and south Albania. In addition there are many Vlach traders in the towns, and nomad shepherds in country districts. Their numbers are therefore very difficult to estimate, nor can their distribution be clearly indicated in a map.

¹ See above, pp. 41, 49.

The Albanians inhabit Albania, with some Serb admixture in the north and some Greek admixture in the south. Some Albanian districts have been assigned to Montenegro and Serbia, especially round Dulcigno and Jakova, and in the region of Kosovo. There are also Albanians in Epeiros, between Yanina and the sea. In Greece there are many Albanians, both on the mainland and on certain islands; but they were settled there long before the War of Independence, and are Greek in national feeling, though many of them still speak Albanian.

The population of Old Greece, as it was before 1913, was exclusively Greek, with the exception of these Albanian settlements and some Vlachs and Turks in Thessaly. The same may be said of all the islands in the Aegean joined to Greece since that date, with the exception of a certain number of Turks in Crete, Mitylene, Chios, and elsewhere. On the northern mainland the racial question is more complicated and controversial. The coastal regions, from Olympus to Constantinople, and on the Black Sea up to Burgas and Varna, are mainly inhabited by Greeks, and this Greek fringe extends also down the west coast of Asia Minor. How far the Greek district extends inland in Macedonia is discussed in Handbook No. 21, *Macedonia*, p. 14. A strong Greek commercial element is also found in many towns which are not predominantly Greek in race.

The name 'Turk' is often loosely applied to any Moslem population in the Balkans, except such as retain a distinct racial character, like the Albanians or the Bulgarian Pomaks. There is a fairly continuous band of Turkish settlements extending from Constantinople to Seres and the Khalkidike, mostly at some little distance from the coast, and up the valleys of the Struma and Vardar as far as Veles; there is also

a considerable Turkish district north of Kozani. On the Black Sea coast of Thrace the Turks have withdrawn to a great extent within the last fifty years from the district around Varna ; but a large Turkish population remains inland in this region.

Other nationalities do not appear in sufficient numbers or in sufficiently definite local areas to be indicated in the map. The Jews form the majority of the population in Salonika, and are found in some other Macedonian towns ; they are numerous in Rumania, and form a large community in Constantinople. Armenians also are found in considerable numbers in Constantinople and Adrianople. Other races occur mainly as survivals of settlements that were made from time to time, partly for political reasons, partly to develop the country ; examples may be seen in the German, Russian, and Tartar colonies in the Dobruja and Bessarabia. There are also, in Rumania, some remnants of Magyar settlements on the Sereth near Bacău and around Bucarest. Outside the Balkan States there is a large and homogeneous mass of Magyars in the east of Transylvania, and there is a considerable German population adjoining them on the west. There is thus a serious barrier between the Rumanians to the east and those to the west of these districts.

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 42

GERMAN COLONIZATION

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

Editorial Note.

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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GERMAN COLONIZATION

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1526 Acquisition of Caracas by Welser banking house.
- 1531 Acquisition of mining rights in Chile by house of Fugger.
First half of sixteenth century. German expeditions to interior of Central America.
- 1647 Formation of Brandenburg East India Company.
- 1681 Great Elector acquires territory in Guinea.
- 1772 *Seehandlungsgesellschaft* formed at Berlin.
- 1799-1804 Alexander von Humboldt's journeys in South and Central America.
Eighteenth century. German emigration to Russia and America.
- 1829 Alexander von Humboldt's journey to Northern Asia.
- 1830 onwards. Strong stream of emigration to U.S.A.
- 1840-80 Period of German exploration in Africa.
- 1842-9 Period of formation of first German associations to promote emigration and colonization.
- 1856 Publication of von Graeve's *Entwurf zur Erwerbung von Kolonien für Preussen*.
- 1862 Bismarck Minister-President and Foreign Minister for Prussia.
- 1867 Publication of Friedel's and Kersten's books on colonization.
Bismarck Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister of North German Confederation.
- 1868 Formation of Central Association for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German interests abroad.
- 1872-82 Bismarck opposed to idea of German Colonial Empire.
- 1876 Conference of colonial and geographical experts at Brussels. Formation of International African Society.
German Treaty of Friendship with Tonga Islands.
- 1877-9 German Treaty of Friendship with Samoan Islands.
- 1878 Publication of von Weber's *Vier Jahre in Afrika*.
- 1880 Colonial Conference at Berlin. Bismarck invites Diet to guarantee interest to a Samoan company. Colonization of New Guinea proposed.

- 1882 Lüderitz's acquisitions in South-West Africa. German Colonial Association formed.
- 1883 Queensland Government annexes Eastern New Guinea.
- 1884 Troubles in Samoa. German annexation of South-West Africa, Togoland, and Cameroon. German New Guinea Company formed. Society for German colonization formed.
- 1885 The Berlin Act. First Mail Steamship Subsidy Bill passed. Further German attempts at annexation in Africa frustrated. British annexation of Bechuanaland. Charter granted to Karl Peters in East Africa. Boundaries between British and German spheres in West Africa defined. German annexation of Pacific Islands. Agreement between Germany and France on Pacific questions. German East Africa Company formed.
- 1886 Agreement between Great Britain and Germany as to Zanzibar and East Africa.
- 1889 Samoan Act. Wissmann in East Africa.
- 1890 Resignation of Bismarck. Anglo-German African Convention. Colonial Department and Council formed.
- 1893 Anglo-German agreement as to West Africa.
- 1894 Imperial Order restricting power of military in colonies.
- 1895 Jameson Raid. Colonial Council reorganized.
- 1896 Usambara Railway opened.
- 1897 Franco-German agreement as to Togoland boundaries and West Africa. Proceedings against Peters.
- 1898 Acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany.
- 1899 Germany purchases the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana Islands. Rhodes visits Berlin. Arenberg disclosures. Anglo-German Convention as to Samoa and Tonga.
- 1899-1902 South African War.
- 1900 Anglo-German agreement on Chinese questions.
- 1903-07 Herero Rebellion.
- 1905-06 Risings in East Africa.
- 1906 Marshall Islands taken over by German Empire.
- 1907 Creation of German Colonial Office. Dernburg's Reforms.
- 1911 Acquisition by Germany of part of the French Congo.

I

EARLY HISTORY

i. *To the Middle of the Seventeenth Century*

GERMAN historians of the colonial movement are accustomed to look for the origin of this movement to

the early migrations of the German tribes. A thousand years ago North Germans moved eastward in large numbers into the regions inhabited by the Slavonic races; and, having once settled there, gradually extended their influence over large areas, either supplanting or overshadowing the original populations.

Not only Eastern Prussia, but the Russian provinces of Livonia, Courland, and Esthonia, known as the Baltic Provinces, were colonized by the Teutonic knightly orders in the thirteenth century. Old German colonies are also found in many other parts of the Russian Empire. In the south, Saxon and Swabian colonists in the twelfth century established themselves in Siebenbürgen (Transylvania), and in parts of Hungary and Bohemia, supplanting the Czechs and other Slavonic communities.

The adventurous spirit of the North Germans was similarly shown in the creation in the thirteenth century of the great trading and maritime corporation, the Hanseatic League, with depots not only in a large number of German towns, but in many foreign countries. "Not Clive, but a Hamburg senator," wrote the Württemberg publicist Moser over a hundred years ago, voicing the German lament even of that distant day over neglected opportunities, "would command the Ganges to-day, had the aims of the Hanseatic towns been supported instead of combated by the old Empire."

The colonizing instinct of the Germans was illustrated in a striking way when, in 1526, the Augsburg trading and banking house of Welser acquired, as security for a loan, the province of Caracas, in Venezuela, in virtue of a charter granted by Emperor Charles V. Swabian families were despatched to the country; but the difficulty of keeping a province so far distant proved greater than the act of acquisition, and twenty years later the Welsers were glad to retrocede their little empire to Spain. In 1531 the Fuggers, not to be outdone by their townsmen, obtained permission

from the same Emperor to search for and exploit minerals on part of the coast of Chile. In the second half of the seventeenth century the Elector of Bavaria and Count Casimir of Hanau unsuccessfully attempted to acquire a portion of Dutch Guiana.

At an early date Germans also took a modest part in exploration. A South German, the geographer Martin Beheim, of Augsburg, accompanied the Portuguese Diego Cam when he discovered the mouth of the Congo in 1484; and there were German expeditions to the interior of South America, led by Schmiedel and Philipp von Hutten, as early as the first half of the sixteenth century.

ii. *The Great Elector*

The first practical attempts to create the beginnings of a German colonial empire were made in the last quarter of the seventeenth century by the Great Elector of Brandenburg. His objects in so doing were more commercial than political or imperialistic in the modern sense, nor were his schemes undertaken without thought of personal advantage. His first foreign venture was the formation of the Brandenburg East India Company in 1647; but towards the close of his reign he conceived the idea of extending his rule to West Africa. In 1681, after unsuccessfully trying to bargain with France for the establishment of a German settlement in Guinea, he acquired territory there on his own account in virtue of treaties with native chiefs; and, a year later, formed the Brandenburg Trading Company for the coast of Guinea, upon which he conferred the right to trade for thirty years under his flag on the African coast occupied by him.

In 1687 the Elector acquired the island of Arguin, lying south-east of Cape Blanco, and by arrangement with Denmark established a depot on the island of St. Thomas, the better to facilitate the slave trade. He also endeavoured to gain a footing in America, and

negotiated for the acquisition of one of the Antilles. His greatest ambition, however, was to have a share in the wealth of the East Indies; and with that end in view he formed his East India Company on the model of the older English (1600) and Dutch (1601) companies of that name, though the project never prospered.* He died in 1688 before his colonial schemes had matured or secured a lasting hold upon the imagination or faith of his subjects.

iii. *Frederick I and Frederick II*

Frederick I.—The Great Elector's successor, the first King of Prussia, for a time continued his interest in colonial undertakings. In the second year of his reign his fleet occupied Crab Island, between St Thomas and Puerto Rico; and later he even conceived the idea of acquiring the isthmus of Panama; but the opposition of Spain prevented the realisation of this bold project. Nevertheless, the time came when he abandoned his father's African enterprise, which had never prospered. After subsidising it for a long time, in the vain hope of retrieving its broken fortunes, he sold it in 1718 to the Dutch West India Company. Thus the first Prussian experiment in colonial enterprise came to a premature and inglorious end. The colonial movement was born out of due time; Brandenburg possessed neither the ships, the money, nor the men needed to carry it to a successful issue.

Frederick II.—Thenceforward, for two centuries, Prussia and Germany remained without colonies. Frederick the Great brought new maxims into Prussian statecraft; and one of these was expressed in the words, "All distant possessions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth a principality 250 miles away." Nevertheless, he had all the Hohenzollerns' appreciation of the importance of maritime trade. He favoured the North Sea and the Baltic ports; promoted the establishment in 1772 in Berlin of a commercial and financial undertaking known as the *Seehandlungsgesellschaft* (Maritime Trading Com-

pany) for the negotiation of oversea trade (which continues as a State institution to the present day); and sanctioned the formation in 1750 of the Prussian Asiatic Trading Company of Emden, which city was made a free port in the following year. He refused, however, to be led into colonial adventures.

Looking back upon these early unsupported beginnings, one is impressed by the thought of how nearly Prussia, 200 years ago, was on the way to become a great colonial Power. Had the Great Elector been followed by even a short succession of rulers imbued with his ideas and fired by his imperialistic ambitions, it is not inconceivable that the place of France and Belgium in the African continent might have fallen to Prussia, and through her to the German Empire. The chance was not taken, and it never occurred again.

iv. *Emigration*

While colonization in the territorial sense made no progress, the formation of German settlements in various parts of the world continued. The Baltic provinces of Courland and Livonia attracted many German emigrants; and many small settlements, composed for the most part of agriculturists, were formed in other parts of the Russian Empire. The movement towards that country began in the time of Peter the Great and Catherine II, and continued throughout the eighteenth century. Agricultural colonies of Germans were also formed in Turkey, Greece, Rumania, Palestine, Syria, and elsewhere.

The first migration of Germans to North America had been almost contemporaneous with the Great Elector's colonial adventures. William Penn had visited Germany in 1677; and six years later a small body of German settlers crossed the Atlantic and settled in Philadelphia. These emigrants were followed by others, who settled in townships to which German names were usually given—Krisheim, Crefeld, Sommerhausen, &c. After the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV in 1707, a large number of the im-

poorish inhabitants of that province emigrated to America, often with English help, and formed communities, like Neuburg and Rhinebeck, in the Carolinas. Throughout the eighteenth century isolated bodies of German emigrants, largely religious enthusiasts and refugees, continued to cross the Atlantic.

Soon after the Napoleonic Wars, which left the Continent crushed by misery and impoverishment, emigration—suspended during the Continental blockade—for the first time took ominous dimensions. Large numbers of people now left West and South Germany for North America, Brazil, Mexico, Algeria, and certain of the British colonies, especially Australia, Canada, and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania).

Settlements in Brazil.—In Brazil, which had become independent in 1822, the Germans kept together and formed independent and homogeneous communities, in which their old life and traditions were assiduously fostered. German emigration to Brazil had begun about 1818. The first German colonies to be established there were Leopoldina, in the province of Bahia, and São Leopoldo, in the province of Rio Grande do Sul. During the following twenty years many other settlements were formed on the coast and in the interior, land being offered to the new-comers on favourable terms. The civil wars of the years 1835 to 1844 threw the country back, but later the colonies regained the lost ground, and a new influx of Germans began. In the middle of the century German emigration thither began to be organized and regulated by emigration and colonization societies, one of the earliest of which was formed at Düsseldorf in 1843. A Hamburg society, formed in 1849, bought land in Santa Catarina, and founded there in 1850 the colony of Blumenau, now a town of 40,000 inhabitants, the majority being of German descent. Since that time the German colonies in the provinces of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina have in general made considerable progress; while those in the hotter northern provinces, like São Paulo and

Parana, have continued more or less stationary. Moreover, in time the earlier friendly treatment of the immigrants gave place to less cordial treatment, and emigration to Brazil fell into ill-repute; so much so, that in 1859 the Prussian and some other German Governments prohibited it, the prohibition lasting in the case of Prussia for thirty-seven years.

Nevertheless, at the time of the establishment of the German Empire, there were in Brazil some 46,000 Germans, distributed in a large number of fairly homogeneous enclaves, for the most part small, yet clinging tenaciously to the language and domestic life of the homeland. Of these colonies in Brazil a recent German writer, Herr Königsherg, referring particularly to Rio Grande do Sul, says :—

“ These colonies have built a State within a State. Of German customs very little has been lost; also, the German dialect, with its native idiom, is handed down from generation to generation. Portuguese is little spoken, and even then the Germans use it with great difficulty.”

The compilers of the *Handbuch des Deutschtums im Ausland* for 1906 estimated the number of inhabitants of German parentage and descent in Brazil at 345,000, of whom 150,000 were in Rio Grande do Sul and 80,000 in Santa Catarina; the number is now believed to be about 400,000, more than one-half in Rio Grande do Sul.

United States, &c.—From 1830 forward the stream of emigration became stronger; and now the United States were the chief gainers. It is estimated that during the three years 1833-35 alone, 85,000 German emigrants settled in the States, while the average yearly emigration during the period 1830-44 is variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000. Official returns of the aggregate German emigration during the half-century 1831 to 1880 show the following decennial totals :—

1831-1840	177,000
1841-1850	485,000
1851-1860	1,130,000

1861-1870	970,000
1871-1880	619,000
1831-1880	3,381,000

After allowing for a large amount of repatriation, it has been estimated that during the first eighty years of last century 4,500,000 Germans emigrated, all but half a million seeking new homes in the United States.

In the middle of the century, after the discovery of the goldfields of Australia, there was a large emigration to that country, and so late as 1884 the number of German-born inhabitants of Australia was estimated at 42,000. In the later years of the period a considerable number went also to British North America. In addition, more or less homogeneous colonies of Germans were formed in South America—in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

Emigration Societies.—About the middle of the century a large number of emigration societies were formed, some on a philanthropic, others on a commercial, basis. Such were the German Association for the Protection of German Emigrants to Texas, founded in 1842 under the presidency of Prince Solms, which established several colonies of Germans in that State; the Emigration Association of Düsseldorf, a commercial undertaking formed in 1843, which operated in Brazil, without advantage to the emigrants whom it persuaded to go thither; the Prussian Colonization Association of Berlin for the Mosquito Coast, dating from 1844; the Central American Colonization Association, which acquired land for settlement in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and elsewhere; a Prussian association for the assistance of emigrants to West Australia; a Stuttgart association, which founded the colony of Valdivia, in Chile; a Hamburg association, formed as a company in 1849, which assisted in the establishment of German settlements in South Brazil that still survive and flourish; while other associations were formed to assist and regulate emigration

to Argentina, Mexico, and Central America. Of early emigration societies following national and general objects the most noteworthy were the National Association for German Emigration, formed at Frankfort in 1848 for the purpose of organizing emigration on national lines and looking after the welfare of the people sent abroad, and the Association for the Centralization of German Emigration and Colonization, formed in Berlin in the following year as a sort of advice and intelligence agency for intending emigrants; but local associations were established on the same lines in many of the larger towns, such as Hamburg and Dresden. Few of these organizations had a long life, though some have carried on their activities with varying success to the present day. Their work was supplemented by the efforts of a number of purely commercial and trading associations.

Beyond now and then discouraging or prohibiting the touting activities of emigration agents acting in the interests of undesirable countries, the German Governments took no steps to regulate emigration until the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1867. Since then the Central Government has taken the question more and more under its control; though, it must be added, as much from the desire to prevent the evasion of military service as from concern for the welfare of the emigrants.

v. Missions and Exploration

Missions.—Religious missions likewise played a part, though it was not until comparatively recent times important, in preparing the ground for a future colonial movement. The Rhenish, Bohemian, Basel, and Bremen missions, in particular, worked in territories which were later to play a prominent part in that movement.

Exploration.—Still more, however, was Germany's gaze directed outward by the enterprise and reports of her numerous travellers and explorers, who began to

be active in various parts of Africa, Asia, and elsewhere from the beginning of last century. Between the years 1799 and 1804 Alexander von Humboldt carried on his famous investigations in South and Central America, following these in 1829 by his expedition to Northern Asia. Early in the last century J. L. Burckhardt and Friedrich Horneman explored in North Africa, in 1812 and 1816 respectively, both in the service of the English African Association; other German pioneers were E. Rüppell, who travelled in Nubia, the Upper Nile region, and Abyssinia; Hemprich, C. G. Ehrenberg, and Prokesch, who travelled in Egypt; as well as Rose, Schlimper, von Kütte, and Kielmayer.

In the middle of the century exploration received a stronger impetus. Ludwig Leichardt, from 1841 forward, explored Northern Australia, where he eventually met a disastrous end; from 1842 to 1847 W. K. Peters was at work in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa; in 1848 the missionary Rebmann discovered Kilimanjaro; in 1849 James Richardson, Adolf Overweg, and Heinrich Barth undertook expeditions to the region of Lake Chad, the first two being murdered; while Barth, who had previously travelled in North Africa and Asia Minor, discovered the Benue and reached Timbuctoo. J. L. Krapf visited Central Africa, going as far as Lake Nyasa, and later accompanying an English expedition to Abyssinia; and early in the fifties Eduard Vogel led an expedition to the Sudan and reached the Wadai, where he was murdered, a fate which also met Karl Moritz von Beurmann in the same region a few years later. Between 1854 and 1860 Baron Heinrich von Maltzan explored Algeria, North Morocco, Tunis, Tripoli, Upper Egypt, the Sahara, and South Morocco; between 1854 and 1857 the brothers Schlaginowitz travelled in India and Asia; and Albert Roscher in 1859 explored Kilimanjaro.

About the same time Karl von der Decken also led an expedition to East Africa, whence he did not return; Adolf Bastian, the ethnologist, made repeated journeys

in Asia and Africa; in 1861 Gerhard Kohlts explored West Morocco; and between 1865 and 1867 the same explorer traversed Africa from Tripoli to Bornu, and proceeded by way of Lake Chad and the Niger to Lagos, returning later to Central Africa. In 1864 Karl Mauch explored Matabeleland; and in the two following years Gustav Fritsch travelled through the Orange Free State and Bechuanaland. Between 1869 and 1873 Gustav Nachtigal explored the Libyan Desert and the Upper Sudan; and in 1880-82 Pogge and Hermann Wissmann made their famous march through Africa. Other explorers in that continent from the 'seventies onward were Robert Flegel, who did good work in the Niger and Benue regions in 1879; the brothers Gustav and Clemens Denhardt, who explored the Tana country in 1878; Oscar Lenz, who reached Timbuctoo in 1880; Emil Holub (Central South Africa); Otto Kersten, a companion of von der Decken, who returned to East Africa; Lenz, who explored the Gabun and Ogowe territories in 1873-1877; Buchner, Mechow, Junker, Güssfeld, Schweinfurth, Alexander Ziegler, Gustav Mann, Paulus Dehse, and Eduard Schnitzer (later and better known as Emin Pasha)

It will be noticed how, more than any other quest, the penetration of the still unrevealed secrets of the Dark Continent drew these men as with a magnet; and their collective contributions to African exploration and discovery give them a worthy place beside the explorers and travellers of British, French, and other races.

vi. *Writers and Associations*

Writers.—From the early part of the century also there were publicists who were fully alive to the importance of colonies, and who, observing how Great Britain and other countries had acquired large portions of the African continent, urged Germany to do the same while there was still time. Thus the subject gradually gained prominence in the literature of the day—in

works of travel, political essays, and economical writings. About 1825 Friedrich List, both by writings and platform addresses, began to advocate colonial enterprise as one of the measures supremely necessary to the economic and political development of Germany. Other contemporary political economists, such as Wilhelm Roscher, similarly pressed the claims of a colonial policy.

"The fruits of colonization," Roscher wrote in one of his earliest works, "are usually reaped only in the second generation, and such long waiting is not to the mind of our time. Yet Germany must lose no time if the last suitable territories are not to be seized by other and more resolute nations."

Much was also written on the subject by less-known writers.

Early in the 'forties, colonization was much discussed in political circles. Charles Greville relates in his *Memoirs* how, when visiting Germany in 1843, he was surprised to hear people talking of the need for "colonies and a navy."¹ The idea of emulating the Great Elector occurred at that time to the fertile mind of Frederick William IV, who sanctioned the opening of negotiations for the purchase of California, then subject to Mexico. The Prussian envoy at Washington favoured the proposal, but Alexander von Humboldt appears to have dissuaded the King.

In 1856 a noteworthy book was published by a military officer named von Graeve, containing "a project for the acquisition of colonies for Prussia" (*Entwurf zur Erwerbung von Kolonien für Preussen*). The author proposed that an arrangement should be made with Mexico for the cession to Prussia of the fertile district of Sonora, in the northern part of the country, a territory about 20,000 English square miles in extent, and with a population at the time of about 120,000. To this colony Prussians were to emigrate in sufficient

¹ *Memoirs*, Second Part, *Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria*, vol. II, p. 180.

numbers; and the author predicted, among the consequences of his scheme,

“ the reduction of poverty at home, the extension of Prussian trade abroad, the speedy growth of Prussian naval power, and the elevation of Prussia to the position of a World-Power.”

As an addition to this project, von Graeve proposed the establishment of German plantation colonies in the South Seas, and particularly in New Guinea, as being at that time an unclaimed territory. The author had foresight, for he suggested that Prussia should carry out these colonial plans before the construction of the Suez Canal, since, when that project was completed, he anticipated a general scramble for territory in Africa and the East in which England, France, and Holland would be the chief gainers.

Associations.—An important influence upon the colonial movement was exerted by several associations of a scientific character which were formed in the second half of the century. The most important of these was the Central Association for Commercial Geography and the Promotion of German Interests Abroad, formed in Berlin in 1868. The society defined its objects as follows:—

“ The study of those lands in which organized German settlements already exist, the social and commercial conditions and the spread of information thereon, the promotion of emigration to regions where settlers of German origin are already established under conditions favourable to the genius of the German people, the promotion of intellectual and material intercourse between the German colonial settlements and the German Fatherland; and, lastly, the furtherance of trade and navigation and the acquisition of colonies.”

There were branches in other capitals and large towns of Germany, as well as in several foreign countries—Argentina, Brazil, and New South Wales. Some of the affiliated societies at home, however, soon cut themselves adrift from the parent organization, and adapted themselves to the special economic interests of

their localities; such were the West German Association for Colonization and Export of Düsseldorf, which became an important propagandist agency in the service of the colonial movement, amalgamating in 1882 with the German Colonial Association, then formed at Frankfort, and the Leipzig and Stuttgart Associations for Commercial Geography. In 1882 the German Colonial Association was founded; and two years later the Society for German Colonization, the forerunner of the German East Africa Company, was formed in Berlin, with the primary object of promoting the establishment of German agricultural settlements in Africa; while the South American Colonization Society was formed at Leipzig.

Of the societies of a more scientific character which indirectly served the colonial cause, the principal were the German Society for the Scientific Exploration of Equatorial Africa, formed in 1873, and the German African Society of 1876; these were in 1878 merged in the German African Society of Berlin. Many of the later African explorers were sent out by the last-named society.

vii. *Acquisition advocated*

While public attention was thus being directed to the question of colonization from many quarters and on many different lines, it is important to note that the colonial advocates of those days did not in all cases propose or contemplate the acquisition of territory; many of them had in mind merely the establishment on foreign soil of German settlements of the old kind. Only from the middle of the century can the colonial question be said to have passed into the stage, if not yet of practical action, at least of practical calculation and design. Travellers and explorers were no longer content to bring back merely the scientific results of their investigations; their efforts now took a more practical and acquisitive turn. Not a few of them returned home fired with imperialistic ambitions

eager to see Germany emulate the enterprise of the older colonial Powers. Von der Decken, who between 1860 and 1865 explored the Kilimanjaro region and various parts of the East African coast, wrote home in August, 1864 :—

“ I am persuaded that in a short time a colony established here would be most successful, and after two or three years would be self-supporting. It would become of special importance after the opening of the Suez Canal¹. It is unfortunate that we Germans allow such opportunities of acquiring colonies to slip by.”

Five years later Karl Mauch, after exploring the Zambezi and visiting Mashonaland and the Transvaal, wrote of the latter country : “ Would to God that this fine country might become a German colony ! ” Similarly Gerhard Rohlfs returning to Germany after exploration in the Cameroon country, addressed to his countrymen the appeal : “ Is it not deplorable that we “ are obliged to assist, inactive and without power to “ intervene, in the expansion of England in Central “ Africa ? ”

The movement naturally derived encouragement from the Hanseatic merchants and planters. These traders were settled in Zanzibar, the South-West, and Liberia as early as the 'forties; and during the two following decades they appeared in Sierra Leone, Lagos, Togoland, and the Cameroons, on the west coast, and in Mozambique and Somaliland on the east coast, while further afield they were rivals of British enterprise in Australasia and the South Seas. Not possessing colonies, Prussia, the North German Confederation, and the Empire successively concluded most-favoured-nation-treatment treaties with European States, and treaties of friendship and commerce with independent native rulers, in respect of such territories. Nevertheless, the traders settled in Africa grew increasingly impatient as they saw other countries add to their possessions, while Germany still remained land-

¹ Opened in 1869.

less and inactive, though gradually the African continent was being partitioned. Moreover, all this time the German States were losing heavily by emigration; and the outflow, instead of helping to build up Germanism abroad, for the most part went, as before, to countries where it was bound sooner or later to be merged in the dominant nationalities.

All sorts of colonial schemes were proposed by men whose minds had firmly grasped a great central idea, yet who for the most part had little appreciation of practical politics. Among the countries recommended as fields for colonial enterprise were Madagascar, Formosa, New Guinea, and many other islands of the Pacific—Hawaii, Fiji, Tonga, the Gilbert, Ellice, Marshall, Solomon, and Caroline Islands, the New Hebrides, and the New Britain Archipelago, and also parts of Africa. The proposal to appropriate New Guinea, though entirely unofficial, created excitement in Australia; and the British Government was urged to annex the island at once before it was forestalled. The failure to listen to this warning was attended by disastrous results at a later date.

Considerable influence was exerted by a book published in 1867 by Ernst Friedel, in which he discussed "the founding of Prusso-German colonies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with special reference to Eastern Asia." In this volume he advanced the thesis, which in later years became an article of faith with the German imperialistic party:—"Maritime commerce, ships of war, and colonies are three complementary terms. The value of each is diminished if one of the three is wanting." About the same time Richard Brenner and Dr. Otto Kersten, who had been members of von der Decken's expedition, proposed the settlement of a part of East Africa by Germans. Brenner had been in Witu the year before, when the Sultan Simba had either asked or authorised him to obtain the protection of Prussia against his enemy the Sultan of Zanzibar, in return for which service he promised to welcome German settlers and traders, though

not, it would seem, to alienate his territory. Kersten wrote a book (*Über Kolonisation in Ostafrika*, 1867), in which he particularly recommended the settlement of the Mombasa, Kilimanjaro, and Victoria Nyanza regions.

COLONIAL SCHEMES

i. *Reluctance of Bismarck*

SOME of these projects might have proved feasible had the Government been willing, or in a position, to take action; but these conditions were lacking. Since 1862 Bismarck had been Minister-President and Foreign Minister of Prussia, and since 1867 Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the North German Confederation. He was too much occupied with domestic and military questions, and above all with the problem of Germany's consolidation, to give a thought to projects of colonial expansion. To him it was a contradiction to talk of a German Empire oversea before the German Empire in Europe had been established. German statesmen, in general, were at that time impressed more by the risks than the advantages of colonial empire, and unique opportunities of entering the ranks of colonial Powers were thus allowed to pass by unseized.

One of the commonest arguments advanced against imperialistic enterprise at that time was the lack of a navy. This argument was used by Bismarck in his first important utterance on the colonial question, in the form of a letter written on January 9, 1868, to von Roon, the Minister of War and Marine, wherein he said:—

"The advantages expected from colonies for the trade and industry of the mother-country rest, for the most part, on illusions. For the costs entailed by the establishment, support, and particularly by the retention of the colonies, very often exceed—as the experience of the colonial policy of England and France proves—the benefit derived by the mother-land, apart from the fact that it is difficult to justify the imposition of heavy taxation upon the whole nation for the benefit of a few branches of trade and industry."

For the rest, he contended that the defence of colonies was incompatible with the principle of universal service, which contemplated only home defence; that they would be a potential source of international discord; and finally that they were rather a matter for private enterprise than for State action.

It is noteworthy that just before the date of this letter the *North German Gazette*, a journal which even then stood in close relationship to the Government, had published a series of articles (February 1867) advocating the establishment of a German colonial empire. Prussia, the writer said, should acquire colonies before it was too late; the British Empire was still steadily expanding; soon the best chances would have passed away; and meanwhile the country was being bled by emigration. It was understood that these outspoken articles were written by Privy Councillor Lothar Bucher, who had been attached to the Foreign Office for several years, and was destined to be at a later date the most favoured confidant of its famous head. Bucher appears to have imbibed colonial enthusiasm in his earlier journalistic days during residence in England, whose institutions he diligently studied on the spot. In reports on the London Exhibition of 1851, for example, he had written strongly of Germany's need of colonies.

Bismarck, however, was not alone in his opposition to colonization. A strong body of politicians and economists held the same attitude. The individualistic school was still a power in German politics; and with this school the doctrine of non-intervention was an article of faith. Not only so, but British imperialism seemed at the time to offer a warning to other nations. The Indian Mutiny, the resurgence of civil disorder in Canada, and the rising and subsequent political complications in the Ionian Islands were all episodes which seemed to discourage the idea of foreign enterprises. France, owing to her unfortunate adventures in Mexico, had suffered loss of prestige. Even Russia had just sold her possessions in America to the United States (1867). All such events seemed to be opposed to colo-

nial expansion, and their cumulative effect upon German political opinion was distinctly deterrent.

Holding such opinions as those illustrated above, it is not surprising that at the time of the Franco-German War, when in 1871 voices called loudly for the seizure of French colonies—Cochin-China, Tahiti, the Marquesas Islands, Réunion, even Algiers and Madagascar ---as a part of the expected indemnity, Bismarck turned a deaf ear to all seductions of the kind. When, during the peace negotiations at Versailles, the idea of acquiring Pondicherry and other French colonies was still urged upon him by men high in position, he replied:--

“ I want no colonies. They are only good for providing offices. For us colonial enterprises would be just like the silks and sables in Polish noble families, who for the rest have no shirts.”¹

Two years later (1873) he said to Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador in Berlin:—

“ Colonies would be a source of weakness, because they could only be defended by powerful fleets, and Germany’s geographical position does not necessitate her development into a first-class maritime Power.”

Bismarck’s actions, no less than his words, at that time and later, are not only instructive as proving how completely he was still under the domination of what were then known as “ Liberalistic ” doctrines, and how far he was from sympathising with large imperialistic enterprises, but they convincingly refute the common assumption that, in taking up the colonial question some years later, he was merely carrying out a long-prepared and deeply-laid design.

ii. *Unofficial Action*

During the first decade of the German Empire the colonial movement continued to be almost altogether an unofficial movement. While the number of its adherents in political, scientific, and commercial circles was steadily growing, the Foreign

¹ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. I, p. 68.

Office in Berlin, and most of all its head, the Imperial Chancellor, looked on in cautious inaction, apparently willing at the most to follow, but not willing in any circumstances to lead.

Of the political parties represented in the Imperial Diet only the two Conservative groups and the National Liberals were as yet openly favourable to the movement. The Radicals, true to their individualistic principles, were conspicuously hostile; the Clericals individually were divided in sympathy, yet as a party they held back; while the smaller groups were either unfriendly or sceptical. Public sentiment in general was determined by the attitude of Bismarck himself; and the fact that he was still opposed to the acquisition of colonies was, for the mass of people, a sufficient reason for holding the same view.

During these years Bismarck consistently resisted all the proposals of oversea annexation which colonial enthusiasts continued to press upon his attention. When, in 1872, the ruler of the Fiji Islands, and, in 1874, the Sultan of Zanzibar, asked for the protection of the Empire, he promptly declined to give it; and the Fiji Islands went to Great Britain soon afterwards. Bismarck seemed to welcome the action of the United States Government in proposing to declare a protectorate over Samoa in 1875, and instructed the German Consul there not to carry on a separate policy of his own.

On the occasion of a dispute with Spain in 1874 he avowed the renunciation of colonies as a deliberate act of German policy, while at the same time insisting on the duty of other countries to reciprocate by showing fair play to German trade in their colonial territories. When a German official in the Chinese service proposed the establishment of German settlements in China, and Bismarck was asked by the Crown Prince to consider and report on the idea, the answer which he gave was that Germany had neither money nor the right men for such an enterprise, and that to undertake it would weaken her position abroad. So little jealous was he of

the imperialistic aspirations of other Powers at that time. But at the Berlin Congress in 1878, he urged France to take Tunis, pressed Egypt upon Great Britain, and directed Italy to Tripoli.

iii. *The Colonial Movement*

His known lukewarmness failed, however, to daunt the spirits of the men who were behind the colonial movement. The more difficult it seemed to be to move him, the more their efforts and schemes multiplied. Patriotic feeling had finally revolted at the idea of German explorers continuing to open up undeveloped territories for other nations to appropriate at a later date, and of German emigrants serving simply to populate alien countries and fill up the waste places of their colonial empires.

"The question for us to consider," wrote the German colonial pioneer Moldenhauer in 1878, "is whether Germany is prepared to do anything else than send scientific missions to Africa, and to strew the continent with the bones of her explorers."¹

He urged the formation of a powerful company, with or without Government assistance, which should at once obtain for Germany a place in Central Africa.

Several other noteworthy signs of the progress of the colonial idea occurred at that time. Ernst von Weber, influenced, doubtless, by Great Britain's recent annexation of the Transvaal (1877), vigorously urged that Germany should at once, before it was too late, give attention to South Africa and the opportunities which still existed there for successful colonization. In his book, *Vier Jahre in Afrika*, published in 1878, von Weber discussed colonial prospects in the Transvaal, emphasising the need for the immediate acquisition of territory, with a view to turning to good account Germany's emigration. In 1879 Dr. Fabri, of the Rhenish Mission, answered affirma-

¹ *Erörterungen über Colonial- u. Auswanderungswesen* (Jahresbericht d. Vereins für Geog. und Statistik). Frankfurt-a.-M., 1878.

tively the question, "Does Germany need colonies?" (*Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?*), in a book in which he discussed the idea of establishing trading settlements in South America, New Guinea, North Borneo, Madagascar, Central Africa, Formosa, and Samoa. In order the better to propagate his ideas, Fabri in 1880 established at Düsseldorf the West German Association for Colonization and Export.

In November 1880 some Berlin bankers and merchants laid before Bismarck a plan for the colonisation of New Guinea. The Chancellor declined to consider it, telling the memorialists that whatever they wished to do must be done without Government co-operation. The same reply was given to the supporters of a North Borneo scheme who likewise tried to win his sympathy. Renewed propagandism was made at this time for action in New Britain, New Ireland, Formosa, and Morocco; and now Damaraland and Namaqualand, in South-West Africa, began to receive serious notice.

At that time every German explorer or traveller, on returning home, urged the advantages and claims of the particular corner of the globe with which he was most familiar. Thus, in 1882, Baron von Maltzan, on returning from Senegal, expatiated on the merits of that country, and endeavoured to establish a company with the object of acquiring land there and throwing it open to colonization by German families. In the same year propagandism was unsuccessfully made for East Africa. In 1878 the brothers Denhardt undertook an exploring expedition to the Tana country, and after an absence of several years returned with fascinating stories of fertile territories, friendly populations, and a favourable climate. More important still, they were the intermediaries of a message from the ruler of the Tana country—the same Sultan (Achmed Simba), who had formerly sought the protection of Prussia through Richard Brenner—asking that he might be allowed to place himself under the ægis of the Empire. Once more (September 1882) the request was refused.

All these schemes, and others less definite, powerfully though they appealed to the zealots of the colonial cause, left Bismarck unconvinced. He is reported to have said to a deputy of the Diet in 1881 :—

“ So long as I am Imperial Chancellor we shall carry on no colonial policy. We have a navy that cannot sail; and we must have no vulnerable points in other parts of the world which would serve as booty for France as soon as we were at war with her.”

Yet the colonial pioneers worked on undismayed. In 1880 the Central Association for Commercial Geography called a colonial conference in Berlin; and colonial questions now regularly appeared on the programme of other economic and political conferences.

New Influences.—Nevertheless, unseen by others, and perhaps for a time unperceived by himself, an accumulation of events and influences, acting upon him in many ways and from different directions, were urging Bismarck forward. One episode which helped to modify his attitude on the colonial question was the Fiji islands dispute with Great Britain. When, in October 1874, these islands were annexed by Great Britain, in agreement with their ruler, all lands were made over to the British Crown in the first instance, and questions of title to such properties as were claimed by foreigners were referred to a Commission for adjudication. German traders some of whom had been settled in the islands since 1860, alleged that obstacles were put in the way of the examination and proof of their titles, and that rightful claims were arbitrarily rejected. Their Government had repeatedly brought specific complaints to the notice of the British Foreign Office, but had failed to secure a settlement. A man of prompt decision himself, this procrastination and apparent unwillingness to give to his countrymen's grievances a fair hearing was a source of vexation to the German Chancellor, and created in his mind, as he said later, the impression that, if Germans oversea were to have effectual protection, they must look for it to the Imperial Government.

The resignation, on the eve of the introduction of Protection in 1879, of his Liberal colleagues in the Prussian Ministry, and particularly of Delbrück, the "keeper of his economic conscience," undoubtedly led Bismarck to regard the colonial question with a more open mind. Still more, however, was he influenced by the colonial activity which other nations, notably France, Portugal, and Belgium, began to show in Africa at the close of the 'seventies, since this gave rise to the apprehension that Germany, unless she asserted herself without delay, would be excluded from any share in that continent.

The first clear indication of a new orientation in the Government's attitude towards colonization came in 1880, when Bismarck invited the Diet to give a guarantee for the payment of interest to a company which was being formed to take over certain German properties in Samoa. These properties belonged to the old Hamburg trading house of Godeffroy, which had fallen into financial difficulties. Herr Godeffroy offered his estates to the German Trading and Plantation Company; but, when the promoters of the company invited the public to subscribe, only one-fifth of the required amount was forthcoming, and the result was that the entire property was mortgaged to a London banking house. At the request of certain German banks, Bismarck interested himself in the matter; and, rather than see an old and large German enterprise pass permanently into English hands, he promised to ask the Diet to give a guarantee of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest on a capital of £400,000 for twenty years. The proposal was made to the Diet in April 1880, but was rejected and, though the necessary capital was raised by other means and the mortgaged property redeemed, Bismarck accepted the Diet's decision as a warning that Parliamentary opinion was not as yet ready for colonial experiments costing public money. The incident only confirmed him in the attitude which he had avowed a short time before in a conversation with Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe, then German Ambassador in Paris.

whose diary contains the entry under date February 22, 1880: "Now, as before, he will not hear of colonies. He says our navy is not adequate to protect nor our "bureaucracy skilful enough to administer them." For a short time longer Bismarck would not hear of colonial schemes of any kind.

III

THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

i. *Colonial Revival*

It is probable that the principal factor in Bismarck's conversion to colonial ideas was the outburst of imperialism which occurred in Europe at the close of the 'seventies, and was the signal for an unparalleled era of exploration and annexation in the African continent. At that time the only important colonial empires in Africa were those of Great Britain, France, and Portugal. Great Britain had hitherto been content with her paramountcy in the south; Egypt and the Sudan were as yet outside her special sphere of active influence. France already controlled Algeria in the north and some small territories on the West Coast, where she was extending her Gabun colony towards the Congo; Tunis, however, was already as good as hers, though she only occupied it in 1881; and she was gradually asserting predominance in Madagascar. Portugal could claim Mozambique on the east coast and Angola on the west, but she also advanced an ancient and obscure title to a considerable region at the mouth of the Congo.

Now was witnessed a wave of imperialism which speedily changed the political aspect of a large part of Africa. The older colonial Powers threw off the lethargy which seemed to have fallen upon them; and new aspirants to empire, such as Belgium, Germany, and Italy, for the first time put forward claims to the vast unappropriated territories. Belgium may be said to have precipitated the ensuing general scramble for territory, which did not end until the partition of that continent had been practically completed.¹

¹ See, in this connexion, *The Partition of Africa*, No. 89 of this series.

Conference at Brussels.—On September 12, 1876, a conference of geographers and colonial experts met at Brussels, at the invitation of King Leopold, with the object of devising measures for the exploration of Central Africa as part of an international enterprise. The result was the formation of the *Société Africaine Internationale* as a co-operative agency for that purpose. Affiliated national committees were to be formed in the various countries represented at the conference, and twelve such organizations promptly came into existence, the most notable being those of Belgium, Germany, and France. The British delegates, however, instead of forming a national committee, founded in March 1877 the African Exploration Fund of the Royal Geographical Society. In thus following an independent course, Great Britain merely anticipated the action of the other countries; for the branch societies soon ceased to trouble about the international centre, and began to work in their own way for national ends.

Stanley and De Brazza.—In the meantime, H. M. Stanley, returning to Europe from his second expedition to Africa in January 1878, had entered the service of the King of the Belgians, who in November of that year formed the *Comité des Etudes du Haut Congo*, which soon after became a purely Belgian enterprise, with the name *Association internationale du Congo*. In the following January Stanley again left Europe for Africa, now as the emissary of the new association, and undertook the memorable expedition by which he laid the foundations and erected the framework of the future Congo Free State. De Brazza, who had already explored Central Africa in the service of France, likewise organized a second expedition in December 1879, with a view to penetrating the region between Gabun and Lake Chad, with the result that a vast tract of territory in the Congo basin passed under the sway of France and was organised in 1882 as French Congo.

This action of Belgium and France, with that of Portugal in regard to the Congo a little later, roused the German colonial party to unexampled energy; and

Bismarck now recognised that the time for active intervention had arrived, since the probable alternative was the permanent exclusion of Germany from any share in African territory.

ii. *New German Associations*

Several new and influential propagandist organizations were formed about this time, the principal being the German Colonial Association (*Deutscher Kolonialverein*) of 1882. The initiative was taken by the traveller Baron von Maltzan, who won over Prince zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg for the idea. Both men favoured the establishment of settlements by private action; their aim was to divert the flow of German emigration from American and British countries to oversea territories which should be under the German flag. The first idea was that the association should try to acquire not large territories, but small trading stations—partly because of the great cost involved by the former, but also owing to the fear of arousing the suspicions of neighbouring States—and then to seek the Empire's protection for them. Before the inaugural meeting was held, Prince Hohenlohe had secured the co-operation of the Duke of Ratibor, Counts Arnim, Stolberg, and Frankenberg, and the great colliery proprietor, Herr von Stumm. When, however, Herr von Kusserow, Bismarck's colonial adviser, was consulted, he refused to commit himself, an attitude which was regarded as indicating the Chancellor's disapproval or apathy. Towards the end of the year the statutes had been drawn up; and the constituent meeting was held on December 6, 1882, Prince Hohenlohe becoming president.¹ The Colonial Association enjoyed tolerable success for an enterprise of the kind; by the end of 1884 its membership was over 9,000. Its seat was soon transferred to Berlin, in order that it might

¹ Prince Hohenlohe retained the position of president until 1894.

keep in close touch with the Government and the Parliamentary parties sympathetic to the colonial movement. In course of time, many branch associations were formed.

Influenced by the growth of the colonial sentiment, the German African Society now turned its attention to the question whether more might not be done for the commercial development, in the national interest, of the territories in which it had hitherto taken a merely scientific interest. Accordingly, in May 1882, the society published a considered colonial programme, in which it urged the importance of sending out without delay two separate expeditions, one proceeding from the coast of Angola and working towards the Congo, establishing stations on the way in virtue of agreements with the local rulers, and the other starting from the Benue in the direction of the middle course of the river, and confining itself to exploration pure and simple. The society also addressed to the Government a petition, urging it to use its influence to prevent the Congo and Niger, with their navigable tributaries, from being annexed by any European State, and to keep these waters neutral and open to the trade of all nations on equal terms.

The appearance upon the scene of the German Colonial Association, backed by so many men of eminence in public and commercial life, was a decisive event in the history of the German colonial movement. Another of equal importance remains to be mentioned. On June 28, 1882, a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and France delimiting their spheres of influence on the West Coast of Africa north of Sierra Leone. One of its stipulations was that each State should give to the subjects of the other equal treatment in its colonial territories in that part of Africa. In view of this Convention, and of the fact that other States were likewise negotiating over their relationships and commercial interests in the same region, the idea occurred to Bismarck of bringing Germany into special Conventions with these States, so supplementing

the existing commercial treaties with them, and making German trade in their African territories more secure

iii. *Bismarck acts*

Accordingly, on April 14, 1883, Bismarck instructed the Prussian envoy to the Hanseatic cities to obtain from their Senates an expression of opinion as to how the interests of German traders on the West Coast of Africa might best be protected and furthered. The result of this enquiry was a long memorandum, dated July 6, 1883, which was prepared by the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, and duly placed before the Imperial Government. It pointed out that a large part of the West African Coast was already in the hands of Great Britain, France, and Portugal, and that the tendency of these States was to extend their jurisdiction. It paid a willing tribute to the generous spirit in which the British colonial authorities facilitated trade without distinction of nationality, but complained that other countries were less considerate. As measures of relief, needful in the interest of Germans in particular, it recommended (a) the establishment of a German Consul for the Gold Coast; (b) the permanent stationing of ships of war in West African waters, for which purpose it was urged that the island of Fernando Po should be acquired from Spain as a coaling station; and (c) the conclusion of treaties of commerce and friendship with the more powerful chiefs, with a view to giving to Germany a more prominent position on the coast and ensuring freedom for her trade. Further, the Chamber of Commerce urged the acquisition of a trading colony on the mainland opposite Fernando Po; and the Cameroon country was mentioned as specially suitable for the purpose. Pointing out that Great Britain had her eye upon this region, the report urged that action to this end should be taken without delay, or Germany would be prevented for ever from gaining a territorial foothold in West Africa. It is certain that Bismarck received this

report gratefully, as throwing, perhaps for the first time, a clear light upon his path. In the event, the programme so recommended was in substance carried out.

iv. *The Congo*

In the meantime, abortive action taken by Great Britain and Portugal, with a view to the creation of a more settled commercial status in the Congo region had led to the meeting of the Congo Conference. Ever since the Portuguese explorer, Diogo Cam, discovered the mouth of the Congo (1485), Portugal had claimed, though she had never exercised, suzerainty over the contiguous territory. For the better part of a century successive Portuguese Governments had endeavoured to induce Great Britain to recognise their claim to the West African coast between $5^{\circ} 12'$ and 8° south latitude, which would have given Portugal exclusive control of the Congo mouth. So far had Great Britain been from acknowledging this claim, however, that in 1856 orders had been issued for British cruisers in West African waters to prevent Portugal by force from attempting to extend her dominion north of Ambriz; and thirty years later the Portuguese Government was reminded that these orders were still unrecalled.

Apprehensive of the outcome of the International Congo Association and the expeditions of Stanley and de Brazza, the Portuguese Government again approached the British Foreign Office in November 1882. Lord Granville, deeming that a settlement would "assist in the abolition of slavery and the civilisation of Africa by the extension of legitimate commerce," agreed to negotiate; and without discussing the question of title—as to which he adhered to the attitude of his predecessors—he laid down certain broad principles as a basis of agreement. Upon these principles negotiations continued for more than a year, Lord Granville never concealing his view that the Governments were not engaged in a merely dual arrangement, and that if

an agreement were to ensue it must be one which the other Powers would be willing to accept.

"It is obvious," he wrote on March 15, 1883, "that there could be no advantage in concluding a treaty which would not be accepted by other Powers whose acceptance would be indispensable before it could come into operation."

While the negotiations were in progress, Portugal tried to obtain from France a similar recognition of her claims, offering in return to agree to the acquisitions lately made by de Brazza in the higher Congo region; but her overtures were declined. A further incident, which increased Portugal's uneasiness and strengthened her desire for an agreement with Great Britain, occurred in September 1883, when the *Institution du Droit international*, meeting at Munich, adopted resolutions declaring that the entire Congo basin, hitherto deemed to be a sort of no-man's-land, should be internationalised and made an every-man's-land by the application to the river and its tributaries of the principle of free navigation, and to the adjacent territories of the principle of the commercial "open door." Against these resolutions the Portuguese Government promptly protested to the Powers; yet, while affirming its claim to the Congo mouth and the coast between Lomé and Chiloango, it professed to repudiate any desire to restrict trade in that region—a disclaimer that came too late to carry complete conviction.

v. *The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty*

The result of the negotiations was the conclusion of a treaty, dated February 26, 1884, by which the British Government acknowledged Portuguese sovereignty on the coast between 5° 12' and 8° south latitude and in the interior as far as Noki, subject to various stipulations, of which the principal were:—the Congo territory as above defined to be open to the trade of all nations on equal terms; and commerce and navigation on the coast and on the

Rivers Congo and Zambezi and their affluents to be free for the subjects and flags of all nations; no monopolies, exclusive concessions, or differential dues or other imposts to be introduced; no transit dues to be levied on goods passing through the region recognised as under Portuguese authority; complete liberty for religion and missionary enterprise; the Customs tariff not to exceed for ten years the Mozambique tariff of 1877, after which revision to be subject to the consent of both contracting States; rights already enjoyed by British subjects and commerce in all the African possessions of Portugal to be guaranteed, in addition to most-favoured-nation treatment; the contracting States to use all possible means for the purpose of finally extinguishing slavery and the slave trade on the eastern and western coasts of Africa; and Great Britain to have the reversion of any territorial rights claimed by Portugal between 5° east and 5° west longitude on the coast of Mina.

Opposition to the Treaty.—No sooner had the treaty been published than protests poured into London and Lisbon from all sides—from France, Belgium, Germany, Holland Spain, and the United States. From the first the German Government, acting under pressure of the great industrial and mercantile interests, made itself the mouthpiece of the general opposition. Bismarck claimed for Germany no proprietary interest in the Congo basin, but he objected to so large a slice of West Africa, with its great waterway, being disposed of by two States without any reference to the rest, and in particular to the proposal that these two States should alone regulate the navigation and trade of the Congo. In April he informed the Portuguese and British Governments that he could not acknowledge the treaty. While he was sounding the other European Governments as to the expediency of common

¹ In the treaty as first drafted Lord Granville had proposed that the navigation of the Congo should be regulated by an International Commission, and only on Portugal's pressure did he agree to the alternative of a joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission.

action in the matter, the French, Dutch, and Spanish Governments were also conferring upon concerted measures, while the United States Senate had already given a practical sign of its hostile attitude by recommending the President (April 10) to acknowledge the International Association as the preponderant Power in the Congo region, and by proposing the conclusion of an international agreement with a view to ensuring perfect freedom of navigation on the river and its tributaries and freedom of trade for all nations. King Leopold had also been moving, with a view to making secure his Congo dominion. On April 23 he made certain of the support of France by promising her a right of pre-emption in respect of the territories of the International African Association in the event of their changing hands¹ The day before this arrangement was concluded the United States Government had recognised the flag of the International Association as "that of a friendly Government."

The Treaty abandoned.—Bismarck, looking for an ally in the task of challenging the unpopular treaty, turned to France, as the rival of Portugal in the Congo region and of Great Britain in Egypt. Soon the Governments of all the principal States interested had assured the German Foreign Office that they were in full sympathy with its action; and the organization of resistance to the treaty was consequently easy. On May 5 the German Ambassador in London, Count Münster, was instructed to inform the British Government that Germany sought no privileges on the Congo for herself; yet, on the other hand, that she was opposed to any arrangements which would place her and other Powers at a disadvantage. On May 26 the British Government made suggestions to

¹ This arrangement was notified to the Powers by the French Government on May 31, 1884. It was confirmed by the Foreign Minister of the Congo Free State in a letter of April 22, 1887, to the French Ambassador in Brussels, and was embodied in a formal treaty on February 5, 1895 (see Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, II, 546-7).

Berlin for the modification of the treaty: would Bismarck, it asked, be willing to appoint a German delegate to the Congo Commission? Bismarck's reply was, in effect, that it was too late to talk of modifications, and that the treaty must be abandoned and the work be done again by a different method and with different intentions. The Portuguese Government, he said, had already proposed an international conference; and to such a conference Germany would be prepared to send a plenipotentiary. Referring to the general question, he claimed for all Powers equal rights in the Lower Congo regions. "We are not in a position," he wrote, "to admit that the Portuguese or any other nation have a previous right there."

Finding that the treaty was heartily disliked on all hands, the British Government formally abandoned it. Lord Granville had some reason for resentment that Bismarck had taken the question out of his hands in so brusque a fashion; and in a communication to the Berlin Foreign Office (June 30) he reminded that statesman that

"but for the persistent opposition of the British Government, unsupported by any other Power, Portugal would, in all probability, have long since established herself in the Congo district. Great Britain refused the recognition of her sovereignty; and the object of the recent negotiations has been to give that recognition which, as Portugal claimed, was withheld by her (Great Britain) alone, in return for substantial guarantees of freedom for the commerce of the world."

vi. *The Berlin Conference*

Conference Proposed.—Already Bismarck had actively taken up the idea of an international conference; and, M. Ferry having accepted it, he prepared the ground by conversations with Baron de Courcel, the French Ambassador to Berlin. Before agreeing to take part in the conference, Lord Granville required to be informed of the general intentions of the conveners, and to be assured that they had no idea of pressing upon the Powers a cut-and-dried programme

prepared in advance, after the manner of some earlier international conferences. He was informed that the programme comprised the questions of freedom of commerce in the Congo territory; the application to the Congo and Niger of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna (Articles CVIII to CXVI) regarding freedom of navigation (duly modified, as they had been already in the case of the Elbe, Danube, and other rivers); and the determination of the formalities under which new annexations on the coasts of Africa were to be considered effective. As to the last, Bismarck gave the assurance that his Government would "ensure that the principles unanimously laid down by the jurists and judges of all lands, including England, shall be practically applied."

Satisfied by this and later explanations that the two Powers were in substantial agreement as to the aims to be followed, Lord Granville gave his assent on October 22, and four days later the German and French Governments invited all the States of Europe and the United States of America to a conference to be held in Berlin. Just before it met, Germany concluded a convention with the International Association of the Congo (November 8), acknowledging it as a sovereign State, in return for guarantees securing freedom for German trade and protection for the lives and properties of German citizens, including the right to settle and traffic in land therein.

The Conference.—The conference met on November 15, 1884, and its sessions lasted until February 26 of the next year. Bismarck both opened and closed the proceedings with statesmanlike speeches, but took little part in the intermediate proceedings. The results of the conference were embodied in the General Act of the Conference, better known as the Berlin Act, of February 26, 1885.¹

At the closing session of the conference Bismarck

¹ For the principal provisions of this Convention see *The Belgian Congo*, No. 99 of this series, pp. 195-8.

used words which just thirty years later were to acquire a sombre significance:

The special conditions in which you have opened up wide tracts of territory to commercial enterprise have required special guarantees for the preservation of peace and public order. The evils of war would assume a specially fatal character if the natives were led to take sides in disputes between the civilised Powers. After careful consideration of the dangers which might attend such contingencies, in the interests of commerce and civilisation you have sought to devise means to withdraw a large part of the African continent from the oscillations of general politics, and to confine the rivalry of nations therein to the peaceful pursuits of trade and industry."

vii *The Congo Free State*

A further result of the conference was the formation of the territories of the International African Association into the International State of the Congo, and the acknowledgment of this State by all the Powers. In April 1885 King Leopold was authorised by the Belgian Parliament to become head of the new African State which was to be joined to Belgium in personal union, and on August 1 the King notified the Powers of his assumption of this position and of the change of the name of his new kingdom to the Congo Free State. This State was declared "eternally neutral".¹ The actual boundary claims of the States territorially interested in the Congo question were adjusted by means of independent negotiations.

For Germany in particular, next to the assurance of fair play for her trade, the principal effect of the Berlin Conference was that it brought her for the first time into the full current of colonial politics. While the Conference was deliberating, her Government was busily engaged in proclaiming protectorates both in Africa and in the Southern Seas.

¹ The Congo State was annexed to Belgium in 1908.

IV

PERIOD OF ACQUISITION

(a) THE PRELIMINARIES

i. *British Policy in South Africa*

ALTHOUGH her explorers and travellers had occupied themselves more with North and Central Africa than with any other parts of that continent, when Germany made her first colonial acquisitions it was to the South that her attention was turned. There Great Britain was supreme, though from the middle of last century the attitude of the Home Government had been unfavourable to the extension of imperial responsibilities, notwithstanding that open and subterranean endeavours of many kinds were even then being made to counteract British influence. This attitude received official avowal in 1850, when, in endorsing the annexation of the Orange River, the Privy Council besought the Queen to let that be the last British appropriation in South Africa, and recommended

“ that all officers who represent or who may hereafter represent Your Majesty in Southern Africa should be interdicted in terms as explicit as can be employed, and under sanctions as grave as can be devised, from making any additions, whether permanent or provisional, of any territory, however small, to the existing dominions of Your Majesty in the African continent.”

Fifteen years later (1865) a Committee of the House of Commons unanimously recommended the same policy of abstention in regard to West Africa, affirming that any further extension of territory or assumption of government, or new treaties offering protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient. The position then taken was confirmed when, in 1867, the Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Philip Wodehouse, urged the declara-

tion of British sovereignty over the south-west coast as far as the 22° of south latitude, which would have brought into the Empire about 450 miles of the coast from Cape Colony northward; for the answer of the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, was a definite refusal. All that was done at that time was to annex some of the small guano islands in the neighbourhood of Angra Pequena.

In 1868 a German missionary society, the Rhenish Mission of Barmen, which since 1842 had been working in Namaqualand and Damaraland, on the south-west coast of Africa, formally petitioned the British Government to make itself responsible for the peace and good government of these regions by annexing them outright, and the Government of the North German Confederation supported the society's request for protection. A promise of protection was given to the German residents, but no move was made in the direction of annexation.

Nor was the Imperial Government much more responsive when, in 1875, the Cape Parliament petitioned it to annex Whale (Walfisch) Bay and other parts of that coast. The Cape authorities followed up this action by the despatch to the country in 1876 of a Commissioner, Mr J. C. Palgrave, to explain to the tribes "the benefit they would derive from colonial rule and "government, which they had from time to time in "past years expressed themselves desirous of securing." The result of the mission was that an overwhelming majority of the chiefs and native population, as well as the German missionaries and other Europeans resident in the country, pronounced strongly in favour of annexation by the British Crown. In consequence of these proceedings, Sir Bartle Frere, the Governor at the Cape, in a despatch to Lord Carnarvon dated November 13, 1877, urged that British sovereignty should be proclaimed over the entire coast from Cape Colony to Angola, as well as from Natal to the frontiers of Portuguese territory on the opposite coast; but his advice was not followed, the Government appropriating

only Whale Bay and a tract of adjacent coastal territory, annexed to Cape Colony in 1884. Basutoland, the Griqua Lands, and the Transvaal had in the meantime come under the British Crown; but the Kaffir, Zulu, and Basuto wars had discouraged the Imperial Government from adding to its responsibilities; and even the ardour of the forward party in Cape Colony, seemed to have cooled down.

In July 1880 war broke out between the Hereros and the Namaquas. In November, incited thereto by the Rhenish Mission, the German Government requested Great Britain to extend to German missionaries and traders resident in the disturbed countries the same measure of protection which might be given to British subjects. Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, gave the desired undertaking, but subject to the reservation that Great Britain could not assume responsibility for any events occurring outside British territory, which was said to be confined to "Whale Bay and a very small portion of country immediately surrounding it." In order to make clear the British attitude on the question of territorial sovereignty, Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, on December 30 of the same year, informed Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the Orange River was to be regarded as the north-western frontier of Cape Colony, and that the Government would not support the extension of British jurisdiction over Great Namaqualand and Damaraland. In 1880, in fact, all British officials were withdrawn from Damaraland, and Whale Bay remained the only point on the south-west coast at which British influence was represented.

ii. *England and the Transvaal*

A growing section of the German colonial party had for some time entertained the idea of establishing German influence in South Africa; and

the tension between Great Britain and the Dutch communities there afforded an opportunity for unofficial intrigue, of which full use was made. The Transvaal Government itself was said to have invited German intervention, though it may reasonably be doubted whether the Boers, with their strong love of independence, would have welcomed Germany's formal protection on any terms. Nevertheless, energetic endeavours were made by Germans resident and travelling in South Africa to further their country's influence, not only in the Transvaal, but in the other territories outside the effective suzerainty of the British Crown.

German Views.—The Dresden traveller Ernst von Weber is reported to have put before Bismarck in 1872 the idea of offering German protection to the Transvaal. Germany was then settling down after a great war; and Bismarck, unwilling to face new responsibilities, refused to consider the suggestion. Four years later two colonial politicians, representing influential trading firms, financiers, and others, approached the Chancellor with a systematically worked-out plan of colonization which, if it had been practicable, might have made Germany a serious rival to Great Britain in South Africa. The idea was to establish German colonies in the neighbourhood of the Transvaal Republic; and, with this end in view, to acquire either Delagoa Bay (belonging to Portugal) or Santa Lucia Bay (part of the still independent native kingdom of Zululand) and construct a railway thence to Pretoria, the capital of the Boer Republic. That done, German emigration was to be diverted from the United States to South Africa by means of State-assisted steamship services; and it was predicted that a large and prosperous German community could be formed within ten years.

Bismarck appears to have been impressed by the scheme; but he also saw the risks which its execution would involve, and he was not satisfied that the nation would be prepared for a venture of the kind. In particular, he feared to do anything that might excite the

jealousy or sensibility of either Great Britain or France. All he promised, therefore, was to submit the scheme to his advisers for careful examination; and more than that it does not appear to have received.

Nevertheless, the German political literature of the day laid growing stress upon the call of Germany to be a pioneer of civilisation in South Africa, as one of the most natural outlets for German population and enterprise. The historian Treitschke even professed to foresee the end of British sway there.

In 1879 von Weber again put into concrete form the aspirations of the imperialists whose attention was centred upon South Africa. In an article which he contributed to the *Geographische Nachrichten* of the Berlin Geographical Society in November of that year he proposed, as a preliminary step, the pursuance of what would now be called a policy of "peaceful penetration." Germans were to emigrate to South Africa in large numbers, and so to possess the land.

"What could not such a country, full of such inexhaustible natural treasures, become if, in course of time, it were filled with German immigrants? . . . A constant mass of such immigrants would gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance of Germans over the Dutch population, and of itself would by degrees effect the Germanisation of the country in a peaceful manner."

It was his idea to use the Transvaal as a base from which to push forward German influence step by step to the Zambezi.

British Views.—Von Weber's article attracted the attention of Sir Bartle Frere, who, in alarm, forwarded a translation of it to the Colonial Office in London. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, in a despatch of September 18, 1880, discounted von Weber's idea when it was submitted to him for observations, and that of German colonization in general.

"Herr von Weber's plan," he wrote, "will not meet with any support either at the hands of the German Government or on the part of the German Parliament, while German emigrants feel more attracted by a republican form of government

than by that of a Crown colony. The German Government feel more the want of soldiers than of colonies, and consequently discourage emigration. The German Parliament has marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies, however advantageous to German enterprise, by the rejection of the Samoa Bill. Under present circumstances, therefore, the plan for a German colony in South Africa has no prospect of success."

That had been Lord Odo Russell's opinion ever since Bismarck had assured him, seven years before, that he wanted no colonies, since they would only be a source of weakness.¹ He was undoubtedly still right in refusing to believe that the German Government would risk a rupture with Great Britain in the interest of any such scheme of aggression as von Weber proposed; but he was wrong, as events were speedily to prove, in assuming that Bismarck would indefinitely continue his opposition to colonization on principle. Reassured by the ambassador's report, however, the Home Government appears to have thought no more about either von Weber's scheme or the prospect of having Germany as a colonial neighbour in South Africa or anywhere else.

(b) THE ACQUISITIONS

In the following survey of Germany's colonial acquisitions, which now began, it will be convenient to take these in chronological sequence.

¹ Lord Odo Russell appears to have kept the Foreign Office in this belief long after the justification for it had disappeared. In a despatch of February 7, 1885, to the ambassador's successor, Sir Edward Malet, Lord Granville wrote: "Until the receipt of a report from Lord Amthill [Lord Odo Russell] of June 14 last [1884] of conversations he had had with Prince Bismarck, and up to the interviews which I had about the same time with Count Herbert Bismarck, I was under the belief that the Chancellor was personally opposed to German colonization. The reports of Lord Amthill were continuously and strongly to that effect; and on March 15, 1884, his Excellency, referring to the agitation on the subject among the shipping and commercial classes in Germany, stated that it was well known that the Prince was absolutely opposed to their ardent desire for the acquisition of colonies by Germany, and was determined to combat and oppose their growing influence."

1. *South-West Africa*

Unofficial Action.—If to most onlookers in other countries the sudden change in the attitude of Germany appeared inexplicable, the shock which it caused them was solely due to the fact that they had not sufficiently, if at all, distinguished in the past between official policy and private action—the one hitherto consistently hesitant, unsympathetic, and unwilling to countenance colonial enterprise in the absence of a clear national mandate; the other concentrated with unwearying zeal upon its objective, and urging forward the Government with all the force and resource at its command.

It was a Bremen merchant, F. A. E. Lüderitz, who in the end virtually forced the hand of his Government, and committed it to action of which the consequences were to be so important and far-reaching. Lüderitz fixed upon the portion of South-West Africa lying north of the Orange River, and forming part of Namaqualand, as his sphere of operations. This territory, with the adjacent Damara-

¹ The nucleus of the South-West African Colony was the Bay of Angra Pequena, with an adjacent area. The story of the Angra Pequena episode is told in the form of diplomatic despatches from the British side in "Correspondence respecting the Settlement at Angra Pequena, on the South-West Coast of Africa" (C. 4190, August 1884); "Further Correspondence respecting the Settlement at Angra Pequena, on the South-West Coast of Africa" (C. 4262, December 1884); "Copy of a Despatch from the Right Honourable the Earl of Derby, K.G., to Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, relative to the establishment of a German Protectorate at Angra Pequena and along the neighbouring coast" (C. 4265, December 1884); "Further Correspondence respecting the claims of British subjects in the German Protectorate on the South-West Coast of Africa" (C. 5180, August 1887); with "Memoranda of Conversations at Berlin on Colonial Matters between Mr. Meade, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, and Prince Bismarck and Dr. Busch" (C. 4290, February 1885). From the German side in "Angra Pequena," a series of despatches covering the period November 4, 1880—October 15, 1884, published by the German Foreign Office in the latter year.

land, had been repeatedly visited and explored from early in the eighteenth century forward, but no nation had deemed its possession of value, and the British claims extended only to Whale Bay and several of the islands lying off Angra Pequena.

On November 16, 1882, Lüderitz informed the German Foreign Office that he intended to despatch a cargo of merchandise to a point on the south-west coast of Africa between the 22nd and 28th degrees of south latitude still in the hands of native rulers, with whom his representative had instructions to conclude agreements, giving him, in return for a yearly tribute, a monopoly of trade in their territories and complete rights over lands to be acquired for trading purposes. It was his wish to place these prospective possessions under the protection of the Empire, and he therefore asked whether and upon what conditions such protection would be given.

Bismarck's Intervention.—Bismarck took time to reply to this enquiry. After satisfying himself as to the *bona fides* of Lüderitz and his project, he communicated with the British Government, which, in the following February, was asked to state whether it exercised the rights of sovereignty over, or intended to extend protection to, that region, and was desired, if such were the case, to give protection to Lüderitz's enterprise, failing which the Government would do it, yet "without having the least design to establish a footing in South Africa." Lord Granville replied on February 23, 1883, that the Government of the Cape had "certain establishments on the coast," but that, without knowing more precisely where the proposed German factory was to be set up, he was not in a position to say whether the British Government would be willing to afford protection to it or not. He therefore asked for details, in order, that the Cape Government might be asked to report whether and to what extent the German wishes could be met.

It is a fair assumption—and the point is important in view of subsequent developments—that at this time

the German Government would have been perfectly satisfied if the British Foreign Office had signified its willingness to give protection to the undertaking of Herr Lüderitz, and that it had no idea of intervening in South-West Africa, except in the event of a refusal. The enquiries made at Bismarck's instigation, the written reply of Lord Granville, and a despatch forwarded in consequence to Berlin by the German Ambassador, Count Münster, all justify this conclusion. The action of the British Foreign Office, therefore, was perfectly regular, and such as was called for by the German communication.

It does not appear that the more precise information desired by the British Foreign Office was supplied from Berlin, or that Lord Granville gave further thought to the question until his attention was again called to it abruptly seven months later. It is probable that Bismarck's omission to locate the Lüderitz claims, as he was invited to do, was deliberate, and was due to a decision to change his ground. At a later date he disclaimed the idea that he had intended merely to seek British protection for the German settlement to be established, complained that a meaning and intention which he had never entertained were read into his enquiry, and said that what he wanted was to have his own action regularised from the beginning. This exposition of his attitude was made, however, under the influence of bitterness created by misunderstandings; and there seems no reason to doubt that his motive in approaching the British Government was in the first instance really friendly, and had for its object to discover whether the ground was free or not. It is clear that, as soon as the British Government, though unable as yet to claim the South African territory, began to act in a way that suggested that a claim would presently be advanced, Bismarck asked himself why Germany should not appropriate the country and take under her own protection those of her subjects who might settle there.

Lüderitz in South-West Africa.—Meanwhile Lüderitz had got to work. His agent reached South-West Africa on April 9, 1883, and on May 1 acquired from the chief, Joseph Frederick, a tract of land on the Bay of Angra Pequena about 200 English square miles in extent, with a coast-line of 10 miles. Whether the purchase price was £200 and 100 rifles or £100 and 200 rifles, Lüderitz does not appear to have paid much for his acquisition. The first news of his action reached Great Britain in the form of a paragraph, telegraphed to the London *Daily News* from Cape Town on July 9, and published by that journal on the 12th; but it does not appear at first to have seriously impressed either the Government or public opinion. The Foreign Office was encouraged in taking the matter lightly by a despatch from the British Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, Sir John Walsham (August 31), who, recalling the despatch of Odo Russell (now Lord Ampthill) of September 9, 1880, gave the assurance :—

“ It would be a mistake to suppose that the Imperial Government have any present intention of establishing Crown colonies, or of imitating . . . the practice adopted by France of assuming a protectorate over any territory acquired by a French traveller or explorer. The German Government are opposed to any plan which might hamper their foreign relations; and I believe that what Lord Ampthill stated in his despatch, to which I have referred, is as true to-day as it was in 1880.”

At the Cape feeling was far less tranquil. As soon as news of Lüderitz’s action was received there, a British gunboat proceeded to Angra Pequena; but on arrival (September 8) its commander was informed by the German naval officer already installed there that he was now in German waters.

Anglo-German Relations.—As no further word had come from the British Foreign Office, Bismarck on August 18, 1883, informed the German Consul-General at Cape Town that the Government had decided to give protection to Lüderitz’s acquisitions in so far as they were not in conflict with other well-founded rights,

whether of the native population or the English. On September 10 the German Chargé d'Affaires in London told the Foreign Office what Lüderitz had done, and now asked the pointed question whether the British Government claimed suzerainty over the bay of Angra Pequena, and, if so, on what grounds its claim rested. It was significant that there was no longer any suggestion of a desire for British protection. As no reply had been given to their enquiry by November 16, the German Ambassador called on Lord Granville in order to repeat it. In the meantime Lüderitz had extended his Angra Pequena acquisition, and had now secured a strip of territory 20 geographical miles deep running along the coast from the Orange River to the 26th degree of south latitude—a fact notified to the Berlin Foreign Office on November 20.

On the following day Lord Granville replied to Count Münster's enquiry that, although the British Government had not proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty along the whole coast, but only at certain points, such as Whale Bay and the Angra Pequena islands,

"they consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18° and the frontier of Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights."

Bismarck refused to accept the view that territory which Great Britain had never claimed might not be claimed by any other country, as involving the application of a British Monroe doctrine to Africa. Accordingly, acting on instructions, the German Ambassador on December 31, 1883, wrote to Lord Granville, citing the repeated British disclaimers of sovereignty in the disputed region, and stating:—

"The fact, confirmed by your Lordship, that British sovereignty beyond the frontier of Cape Colony is limited to Whale Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena is one of the assumptions under which the Imperial Government is justified and entitled to grant to the house of Lüderitz the protection of

the Empire for a settlement which this firm contemplates establishing on territory outside the sovereignty of any other Power on the south-west coast of Africa."

He also recalled the British theories on the subject of occupation and sovereignty, according to which a country was not justified in claiming rights over territories which it did not actually govern; and added that, if Great Britain now claimed territorial sovereignty over the whole of South-West Africa, he must ask on what title such a claim was based, and what steps had been taken to give adequate protection to German subjects and their properties.

For nearly four months more the British Foreign Office gave no further sign, though in the meantime the Cape Government had been asked if it was prepared to take over the disputed territory—a question to which no immediate reply was given. During this time Bismarck, to all appearance, was still halting between two opinions on the general question of colonization. More than once he told the Diet that, if it did not want colonies and was not prepared to meet the contingent liabilities, he would certainly not force them upon it; and that it was for the nation and not the Government to give the necessary impetus to practical measures of the kind.

Before he finally made up his mind he caused a memorandum on the whole question of the acquisition and administration of colonies to be prepared by the Director of Colonial Affairs in the Foreign Office, Herr von Kusserow. In this important report, dated April 8, 1884, the view was taken that the Government should proceed by the method of Royal Charters, such as had been granted to British colonial companies—and, so lately as 1881, to the British North Borneo Company—leaving the administration of the territories to the companies, and confining the Empire's responsibility to the stationing of ships of war in African waters and the establishment of a sufficient consular system. This view Bismarck adopted, and it became the keynote of his attitude towards all later colonial enterprises.

Bismarck acts.—When the negotiations with Great Britain had lasted a year without reaching a definite issue, Bismarck determined to follow his own course. Herr von Kusserow has related how, in the same month, he asked his chief whether he should again enquire in London when an answer to the note of December 31 might be expected, upon which Bismarck rejoined, "Now we will act!" He thereupon sent, on April 24, 1884, to the German Consul-General at Cape Town a telegram (the substance of which was simultaneously conveyed to the German Ambassador in London for communication to the Government there) settling once for all, so far as Germany was concerned, the question of suzerainty over the disputed territory. The telegram ran thus :—

"According to reports of Herr Luderitz, the English colonial authorities doubt whether his acquisitions north of the Orange River can claim German protection. You will publicly declare that he and his settlements are under the protection of the German Empire."

The dilatory temper of the Government in London was still reflected at the Cape; and it was only after prolonged delay that the Governor informed the Colonial Secretary (May 29) that it had been

"decided to recommend Parliament to undertake the control and cost of the coast line from the Orange River to Walfisch Bay, including Angra Pequena,"

though Germany had already proclaimed a protectorate over part of this region.

In the meantime Lord Derby had told a deputation of South African merchants (May 16) that, while Great Britain had never regarded Angra Pequena as British territory, she had claimed "a sort of general right" to object to any other Power annexing it; and he repeated Lord Odo Russell's *obiter dictum* of September 1880, to the effect that Germany had no intention of establishing colonies. Three days later he stated in the House of Lords that Great Britain had hitherto

neither made a formal claim to Angra Pequena nor established a Government there. On May 24 the German Government was still asking for a reply to its note of December 31, 1883. Two days earlier the Foreign Office had asked the Colonial Office that "no unnecessary delay" might be allowed to occur in returning an answer to that communication.

On June 3 the German Consul-General at the Cape informed his Government that the Colony was prepared to take over the entire coast as far as Whale Bay, including Angra Pequena. In communicating this information to the Ambassador in London, the German Foreign Office instructed him to inform Lord Granville that it could not acknowledge the occupation proposed; and contested the right of the Cape in the matter. In reply to this protest, Lord Granville, whose hands were tied owing to the complications with the Colonial Office and the Cape Government, promised to do his utmost to adjust the dispute. On the 10th Bismarck himself sent a long despatch to Count Münster, instructing him to recall to Lord Granville's mind the history of the Angra Pequena episode, and stating that, in asking the British Government in the first instance whether it would be willing to protect the Lüderitz undertaking, he did so only *pro formâ*, knowing that it was not in a position to do so without assuming a territorial status which did not at the time exist.

"My intention in these soundings," he wrote, "was directed towards obtaining from England an official acknowledgment that those coastal territories were in the European sense *res nullius* . . . towards obtaining from England the certainty and acknowledgment that she had hitherto had no demonstrable legal claims or title to occupation in those regions. England might have exhaustively answered our question in a week without referring it to the Cape, since it was only a question of a declaration of the legal, demonstrable status of England at that time."

He reproached Lord Granville and Lord Derby with having interpreted his question as an invitation to England to annex the coast herself. He had a feeling,

he said, that England was not treating Germany as an equal; and he instructed Count Münster that he must not encourage the idea that Germany was willing to sacrifice her vital interests to her wish for a good understanding with Great Britain, sincere though that wish was. Count Herbert Bismarck, an official in the Berlin Foreign Office, was sent to London with these instructions, nominally in order to communicate them with greater emphasis, but in reality to take charge of colonial affairs at the Embassy.

British Diplomacy.—The Angra Pequena episode, perplexing enough because of the conflicting claims involved and the fact that on the British side two Departments of State, whose sympathies were not entirely identical, were concerned, was further complicated by extraneous issues. Cross-currents of a political character were flowing all the time, so that it soon became hopeless to expect that the question involved would be decided solely on its merits. It was in the summer of 1884 that the collective protest of the Powers against the Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty of the preceding February was organised, Germany here working cordially with France. Moreover, Great Britain was at that time hampered by her uncertain position in Egypt, and it rested with Germany to cast a decisive influence either for or against her. It was Bismarck's boast that he could at all times be either a good friend or a good enemy; and he was now in the best possible position for bargaining with the British Government.

In a despatch of May 5, forwarded to Count Münster for communication to the British Foreign Secretary, he gave practical expression to his favourite maxim, "Do ut des"; for he said frankly that, while he was able and willing to co-operate with Great Britain on the Egyptian question, there must be a *quid pro quo*, and that it must be offered in the domain of colonial affairs. Later Bismarck complained in the Diet that he had received no reply to this despatch, which for better effect he produced to the astonished deputies. Lord

Granville promptly rejoined that his Government had not answered it because it had not received it. Enquiry brought to light the fact that Bismarck had himself countermanded it.

It was at this time, too, that Germany first raised the question of the cession of Heligoland. Lord Granville has left a memorandum, dated May 17, 1884, in which he records how Count Münster in confidential conversation had suggested the cession of the island.

"It was (the ambassador had said) a place of no importance to us in its present state, whereas it would be of immense importance to Germany, to ourselves, and the whole world if it was made into a good harbour of refuge. This would be an expensive work for us to undertake. We could not be expected to go to such expense, whereas Germany would be quite ready to undertake it. Prince Bismarck wished to cut a canal into the Baltic, which also would be a great advantage to us, as the most powerful maritime nation of the world. But Heligoland, which, of course, would be always open to our ships, would be a necessary key to such a plan."¹

The idea that Heligoland might one day pass into German hands was not a wholly new one. It had occurred to Lord Granville twelve years before; but now that the proposal was made by Bismarck he professed discreet surprise, and for the moment the question was allowed to drop.²

¹ Fitzmaurice, *Life and Letters of the Second Earl Granville*, vol. II, p. 351

² In January 1885, while a second colonial dispute, regarding New Guinea, was in course of adjustment, Bismarck, through his mouthpiece in London, raised the question again. He laid stress once more on the advantages to British shipping and commerce of the harbour to be constructed; but now no disguise was made of the intention strongly to fortify the island should it change hands. Once more Lord Granville treated the question, in Bismarck's own phrase, "dilatatorily." It was, however, his opinion that "the cession would be unpopular in itself," and that Liberal Ministers would not be the best people to make it, but "it sometimes occurs to me whether it would not be a price worth paying if it would secure a perfectly satisfactory end to the Egyptian financial mess." It fell to another Foreign Secretary to give the

In the existing circumstances it was inevitable that considerations of policy quite as much as those of equity would decide the attitude of the British Foreign Office on the Angra Pequena question. As a result of conversations between Lord Granville, the German Ambassador, and Count Herbert Bismarck, the Cape Government was enjoined on June 17 to suspend action; and four days later the British Cabinet decided to acknowledge Germany's sovereignty.

Attitude of the Cape.—Nevertheless, the Ministers at the Cape clung for some time to the hope that the south-west coast might still be saved for the colony, believing that Germany was more concerned to have protection for her subjects than to annex territory. To some extent Lord Derby encouraged this hope. On July 14 he telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson the Government's decision not to oppose Germany's claim to give protection to German subjects who had acquired concessions or formed settlements where British jurisdiction did not exist, but offered to proclaim British authority in any other places on the coast where British subjects had valid claims if the Colonial Parliament would agree to meet the cost. He suggested, therefore, that the coast from Angra Pequena northward should be placed under British protection. In consequence of this message, the Cape Parliament two days later passed resolutions in favour of annexing the entire coast from the Orange River to the Portuguese frontier, inclusive of the German acquisition, and thereafter sent Mr. J. C. Palgrave as Commissioner to Hereroland for the purpose of winning over the native population and the chiefs.

Informed by the German Consul-General of what was being done, Bismarck again intervened with a decisive step. Two German vessels of war were ordered to the spot, and on August 7

final answer, for in June 1885 the Gladstone Ministry fell, and the first Administration of Lord Salisbury succeeded.—*Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 425 and 862.

the territory from the Orange River to the 26th degree of south latitude was declared to be under the Empire's protection; while early in September possession was taken of the coast from the latter point to the Portuguese frontier north of Cape Frio, with the exception of Whale Bay. In the meantime Bismarck (August 22) addressed to the British Foreign Office a strong despatch, in which he protested against the resolutions of the Cape Parliament, complained again of the long delays of the British Government, accused it of playing fast and loose with Germany in the matter, and told Lord Granville that the continuance of friendly relations between the two Governments required that the colonial resolutions should not be approved.

This reminder that Bismarck could be disagreeable if he liked could not be ignored by Ministers severely hampered by the Egyptian question. The British Government now decided to recognise Germany's claims to the entire coast, with the exception of Whale Bay, only stipulating for an undertaking that British rights and interests should be protected, and that no penal settlement should be established in the new colony. To this proposal Bismarck replied that it was self-evident that British rights would be respected; but as to the question of a penal settlement said that, though Germany had no intention of establishing one, he would give no promise on the subject, since he disputed the British right to require it. On September 22 the British Government finally accepted the German annexation unconditionally, and the episode was regarded as closed.

Just before this (September 17) the Cape Government had sent home a final protest that

"no weight has been attached to the wishes of the colony with regard to the coast-line from the Orange River northward, notwithstanding the offer of the colony to undertake all responsibility and cost in connection with the coast."

It also urged the Government to annex the remaining unappropriated portions (*i.e.*, the fertile interior) of

Damaraland and Namaqualand, a suggestion to which Lord Derby discreetly replied (November 11) that

"it would not be in accordance with international amity to annex the territory immediately adjacent to the existing German limit."

Lord Derby did his utmost to pacify wounded colonial feeling; yet, in a letter of December 4 to Sir Hercules Robinson, he stated frankly that to have further pressed a claim to the south-west coast and its back-country would have been unjustifiable. He pointed out that the dispute related to "a strip of territory to which England had no sufficient legal title," and in which German trading and missionary interests were apparently more considerable than British.

"Great Britain," he said, "which already possesses large tracts of unoccupied territory, could not fairly grudge to a friendly Power a country difficult of development, with regard to which it might have been said that we had never thought it worth acquiring until it seemed to be wanted by our neighbour."

Acquisition of South-West Africa.—The formalities necessary to the definitive assumption of sovereignty by the German Empire were conducted by Dr Gustav Nachtigal,¹ who had already been despatched to Africa as Imperial Commissioner. Nachtigal arrived at Angra Pequena in October, having first made a series of annexations in West Africa,² and he at once concluded further treaties with the native chiefs in the name no longer of Lüderitz, but of the Empire. The boundaries still remained to be fixed, and this task was facilitated by the declaration of the British Government that it did not desire to make any annexations west of 20° E longitude, which was accordingly regarded as the dividing-line between the two spheres of influence east and west. Later (March 1885) a joint Commission met at Cape Town in order to adjust more formally the respective frontiers, and its work was completed to mutual satisfaction in September. In December of the following year a similar agreement was concluded with

¹ See p. 63.

² See pp. 54, 65.

Portugal, the River Kuniene being accepted as the northern boundary of the protectorate.

In the meantime Lüderitz, who had been a national hero for more than a year, proved financially to be a man of straw. He had talked impressively of his own resources and of the "princely merchants" who were behind him; and the public had taken him at his own valuation. When, however, the money of his powerful patrons was needed it was not forthcoming. Early in 1885 an English company offered to buy up his claims; but Berlin banking houses came to the rescue, and on April 5 the German South-West African Colonial Company was formed, with a capital of £60,000. After Lüderitz's lands, titles, and rights had been paid for and other initial expenditure incurred, only a balance of some £15,000 remained for general purposes. It was evident that the company had not sufficient money to administer and develop the colony; and the Government, therefore, against its will and contrary to its principles, appointed a Commissioner to transact the necessary administrative and judicial work.

Whatever may be said of the wisdom of opposing Germany in the first instance, on the strength of claims which must have been known to be untenable, it remains to be added that South-West Africa was lost to the British Empire by indecision and want of foresight. Both the Imperial and Cape Governments had considered the question of annexation for many years, and on each occasion had failed to make up their minds. A wholly unprejudiced English writer says:—

"Every scrap of evidence that could prove British rights over the coast was sought for and put forward; but, when it came to be coolly weighed, there was no shadow of documentary proof that any step had ever been taken to annex any part of the region except Walfisch (Whale) Bay and one or two guano islands off Angra Pequena. The evidence was all the other way. British Ministers had repeatedly during the past twenty-five years positively declined to undertake the responsibility of annexing Damaraland and Namaqualand. . . . It

was only after the country had been irrevocably lost that any real desire for its possession seems to have found expression in Cape Colony.'''

ii. *The First Mail Steamship Subsidy Bill: The Diet and Colonization*

While the Angra Pequena dispute was still unsettled, Bismarck seized the opportunity which it offered of directly testing the sentiment of the Reichstag on the general question of colonization by asking its approval of a scheme of mail steamship subsidies. At that time the German Government paid in these subsidies the sum of £15,000 yearly, a small fraction of the amount similarly expended by Great Britain, France, and even Italy and Austria-Hungary. In 1884 it was proposed to subsidise lines to East Asia and Australia to the maximum amount of £200,000 a year for fifteen years.

Opposition in the Diet.—In the Budget Committee the Progressist deputies Richter, Bamberger, and Rickert fiercely opposed the colonial idea, Bamberger representing the entire movement as ridiculous, dangerous, and menacing to the world's peace. In his reply to these and other critics, Bismarck vigorously repudiated the idea that Germany must not think of embarking on colonial projects from fear of offending other nations, though he incidentally paid a cordial tribute to the fairness which had always been shown by the British Government towards the trade of other nations. Dealing with the extent of the Government's liabilities in taking up the colonial question, he declared that its intention was to give to the colonial enterprises not money, but only protection. He had no intention to create garrisons, forts, barracks, harbours, and a large administrative apparatus. The colonial adventurers would themselves have to bear the cost of administration; and, if the colonies failed, the loss and discredit would fall on them and not on the Empire.

¹ J. S. Keltie, *The Partition of Africa*, p. 186.

Passing of the Bill.—The debates on the Bill were continued until June 28, but the measure was not carried further that session. Nevertheless, the debates proved an effective piece of propaganda for the colonial movement. When the Reichstag reassembled in November, after a general election on a military measure, the Government reintroduced the Bill in a larger form, for a mail service to Africa had been added and the subsidies increased to £270,000. In the end the line to Africa was struck out and the subsidies reduced to £200,000; and, so amended, the Bill was passed on April 31, 1885. The grouping of parties in the final division was significant, as broadly indicating their attitude then and for a long time to the general question of colonial policy. The majority in favour of the Bill comprised the two Conservative factions, the National Liberals, and a section of the Clericals, while the minority consisted of the German Progressists and the People's Party (both Radical groups), the Social Democrats, the Poles, and a majority of the Clericals.

iii. *Further Colonial Schemes in South Africa*

Santa Lucia.—German efforts to colonize South Africa at that time were not confined to the west coast. In 1884 German agents also tried to obtain a foothold in Santa Lucia Bay, Delagoa Bay, and Pondoland. Encouraged by his swift success in Angra Pequena, in May Lüderitz sent an agent named Einwald to Zululand in order to secure land concessions there, and for a time his designs seemed to be prospering. Later in the year concessions were, in fact, obtained on his behalf from Dinizulu and other chiefs; and it was even hoped to gain control of Santa Lucia Bay, whence it was proposed to construct a railway to the Transvaal. Great Britain, however, had prior claims there, and they were asserted with a promptitude which had been lacking in the Angra Pequena affair. Einwald had

already telegraphed to Berlin informing the Government that he had concluded certain treaties, and asking that a vessel of war might be sent to annex the bay at once. Before his treaties reached Germany the British authorities on the spot heard of his action; and the British flag was hoisted in the bay by the commander of H.M.S. *Goshawk* on December 18, and possession formally taken in the name of the British Crown. The German Government formally protested against this act, but later withdrew its protest, giving an undertaking on June 25, 1885, that it would annex no territory south of Delagoa Bay.

Pondoland and Delagoa Bay.—A German attempt to gain a foothold in Pondoland was similarly frustrated; for there likewise British treaty rights were indisputably clear. Equally delusive were the hopes which were centred upon Delagoa Bay, a region definitely recognised as Portuguese since July 1875, though subject to Portugal's undertaking that she would not cede it to any Power other than Great Britain.

Bechuanaland.—In the case of another territory bordering on the Cape, viz., Bechuanaland, the British authorities forestalled both Dutch and German ambitions. The Dutch of the Transvaal had for some years been pressing into this territory, the British Government protesting, and had concluded treaties of protection with the native chiefs in 1884. In 1885 Bechuanaland and the abortive little republics of Goshen and Stellaland, founded by the Dutch, together with the Kalahari Desert, were annexed, and the Dutch settlers compelled to withdraw within their own frontiers. The effect of this annexation was that a British possession cut off German South-West Africa from the Boer States.

Boer War.—Nevertheless, Germany's unofficial agents continued for a long time to direct their efforts and hopes to South Africa as a sphere of colonial expansion. It was jealousy of British influence far more than concern for the independence of the Dutch communities that inflamed German feeling at the time of the

Jameson Raid of December 1895, and still more during the Boer war of 1899-1902.¹

iv. *Togoland and Cameroon*

Nachtigal and Buchner.—No sooner did the news of Bismarck's changed attitude on the colonial question become known than German traders settled or interested in other parts of Africa hastened to conclude treaties with the native chiefs, and in this way large tracts of territory passed into their hands for utterly inadequate considerations or none at all. It was notorious that small kingdoms were to be bought in Africa at that time for a little money and much brandy.

The next acquisitions were made in West Africa, where German traders had long been settled both on the coast and in the interior. Early in 1884 the Government appointed Dr. Nachtigal, then Consul-General in Tunis, as a roving Imperial Commissioner, and instructed him to visit, in the gunboat *Möwe*, various parts of the west and south-west coasts of Africa, accompanied by Dr. Buchner. Both men were experienced travellers.

On April 16 the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Lisbon were directed to inform the Governments to which they were accredited of Nachtigal's intended journey to the West African coast, and its objects, so far as these could be disclosed, and to ask that they would afford him assistance. The communication made to the British Foreign Office was to the effect that Nachtigal had been instructed to report on the state of German commerce on that coast, and to "conduct, on behalf of the Imperial Government, negotiations connected with certain questions." The last

¹ The *Grensboten* of July 4, 1895, wrote: "For us the Boer States, with the coasts that are their due, signify a great possibility. Their absorption in the British Empire would mean the blocking-up of our last way towards an independent agricultural colony in a temperate climate. Will England obstruct our path? If Germany shows determination, never."

words aroused no suspicion at the Foreign Office, and the desired courtesies were accordingly shown. When the British Government told the story of the movements of the Nachtigal expedition, it claimed that it had for some time been preparing to annex Cameroon. Nevertheless, official action to that end does not appear to have been expedited on the receipt of the German message; the consul (Hewett) accredited to Cameroon was then absent from the country on leave, and a month passed before he was directed to return to his post.

Nachtigal's instructions gave the first place to the acquisition, in the name of the Empire, of territory in Angra Pequena and on the West African coast between the Niger delta and Gabun, particularly the portions opposite the island of Fernando Po, in the Bight of Biafra, west from the mouth of the Cameroon River as far as Cape St. John; but Little Popo was also to be visited with the same aim in view.

Nachtigal's Acquisitions: Togoland.—Nachtigal's journey, viewed as one of acquisition, proved very fruitful. Like many of the early German imperialists, he proceeded on the principle of annexing territory first and investigating titles and negotiating with other claimants at leisure, confident that after his claims had been sifted, something substantial would remain. Although, therefore, acting thus, he seized several blocks of territory which had to be abandoned later, Germany was able to retain the bulk of his West African acquisitions, and they made an appreciable addition to the new colonial empire. Early in July he declared Togoland a German protectorate, hoisting his flag at Little Popo (visited by a German vessel of war in the preceding January, on which occasion some of the local chiefs had asked for Germany's protection), Bagida, and Lomé, and in September in Porto Seguro. Later it was found that the French had already concluded treaties with the chiefs of Little Popo, though these treaties had not been divulged; and, when they

were brought to his knowledge, Bismarck promptly acknowledged the prior title.

Cameroon.—From Togoland Nachtigal proceeded to Cameroon. Here his operations were no less successful, though they evoked strong protests from the British Government. The attitude of Great Britain towards this part of West Africa likewise had been strangely wanting in foresight. Several times in recent years the chiefs had petitioned to be placed under the British Crown, but their petitions were either ignored or answered evasively. The British Government had decided, in November 1883, to annex Victoria, in Ambas Bay, where the English Baptists had had a mission since 1858, and to proclaim a protectorate over the Oil River districts; but these designs were not carried into effect until Germany had appeared on the scene. When Nachtigal presented himself in Cameroon, King Bell and his fellow chiefs, weary of British delay and disregard, at once placed themselves under German protection.

British Action.—In the meantime (May 16) Consul Hewett had been instructed to return to his post and inform the chiefs that the Queen was prepared to "extend to them her power and protection." He was warned, however, that it was not intended to annex Cameroon at present, but only to obtain the chiefs' assurance that they would be willing to cede their territory when asked to do so. Nachtigal concluded his treaties on July 12, just in time to forestall the absent British Consul; for, when Mr. Hewett arrived in the Cameroon River on the 19th, the German flag had been hoisted for five days. Nachtigal acquired Biafra Bay territory from Bimbia to Little Batanga, and he also hoisted his flag at Benita and at points south of Great Batanga; but, as soon as it was pointed out that the latter territories were claimed by France, he withdrew.

Mr. Hewett did all that was now possible; he annexed Victoria, the island of Mondoleh, and other minor points, and later proclaimed a protectorate over

the whole of the still unclaimed coast-line from the Rio del Rey to Lagos, including the Niger delta and the Oil Rivers. On August 29 the British Government formally protested against Germany's annexation of Cameroon and Bimbia, pointing out that both in 1879 and 1881 the chiefs of these territories had sought British protection; that an examination of their petition had been promised in 1882; and that in the following year they had reiterated their desire to have British protection and no other. In other words, the British Government had for five years known that Cameroon was waiting to be taken; and yet, although all that time the German colonial movement was increasing in vigour and persistence, it had failed to make sure of the now lost territory. Germany's answer was that, whatever the British Government might have intended to do, it had not done it, and that the territory was under no protection at all at the time of its seizure. Bismarck, in turn, protested later against the British appropriation of Amba Bay as an act intended "to prevent the possibility of an expansion of our position."

In Germany Nachtigal's prompt and skilful stroke created great jubilation, though this received a momentary check when news of the outbreak of disorders came from Cameroon in October and vessels of war had to be sent out. In England Germany's easy acquisition of a colony which, it was felt, should have fallen to the British Crown, occasioned corresponding mortification, though the public resentment was directed quite as much against the Government Departments which had been guilty of lax and unbusinesslike methods as against the country which had profited by their procrastination.

Definition of Boundaries.—In April 1885 the two Powers defined the boundaries of their contiguous territories, Germany simultaneously withdrawing her protest against the hoisting of the British flag in Santa Lucia Bay, and undertaking not to make acquisitions

of territory or establish protectorates between the colony of Natal and Delagoa Bay.

The Niger.—German action in another part of West Africa at that time was frustrated, but by private enterprise. In April 1885 Herr Flegel, who had long been settled in Lagos, and had already done much exploration on the middle Niger and the Benue, was commissioned by the German African Society and the German Colonial Society to secure a foothold on the former river. Before this could be done, however, the British United African Society despatched Mr. Joseph Thomson to that region; and that intrepid explorer succeeded in concluding treaties with the Sultans of Sokoto and Gando, by which these territories came under British protection before Flegel arrived at his destination

v. *German East Africa*

Zanzibar.—From time immemorial the Sultan of Zanzibar¹ had claimed sovereignty on the mainland from Warscheik in the north to Cape Delgado in the south, and far into the interior. The United States had concluded a commercial treaty with him so early as 1835: Great Britain followed in 1839, and France in 1844. In 1859 the German Hanseatic cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, likewise entered into treaty relationships with Zanzibar (the treaty being transferred later to the North German Confederation and the Empire), though German traders had been settled in the island since 1844.

All this time and for long afterwards British influence, both politically and commercially, was supreme at the Sultan's Court, and it was directed towards maintaining the independence of his kingdom, formally acknowledged by Great Britain and France together in 1862. So highly did Seyyid Bar-

¹ Until the death of Sultan Said in 1856, Zanzibar formed part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muscat, with whom the earlier treaties were concluded.

gash esteem the British connection that in 1878 he was willing to give to Sir William Mackinnon a seventy years' concession, transferring to him the Customs and administration of the entire interior of East Africa as far as the lakes; but Lord Beaconsfield, who was then Prime Minister, declined to accept on behalf of the Empire a responsibility so large. Nevertheless, much valuable work was done at that time by British enterprise for the development of the interior. Sir William Mackinnon and Sir T. Fowell Buxton constructed a road running 60 miles inland from Dar es-Salaam; James Stewart, the engineer, made a road between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa; and the African Lakes Corporation, formed in 1878, opened up a portion of Nyasaland, introducing plantations, and doing much for the material civilisation of the native population. Sir John Kirk, who had been Livingstone's companion on the Zambezi, had been the British representative at Zanzibar since 1868; and he remained at his post for twenty years, during which time he enjoyed the Sultan's complete confidence and maintained British influence upon a firm foundation.

German Exploration.—Long before Germany began to regard East Africa from the standpoint of practical colonization, German explorers had been active in various parts of the country. In 1867 Brenner, travelling in Witu, persuaded a sultan of the country to seek through him the protection of the Prussian Government; but, though duly made, the request was not complied with. Two years later Kersten vainly urged the annexation of the country south of the Juba. In 1875 Vice-Admiral Livonius recommended the Admiralty to place Zanzibar itself under the protection of the Empire; and in the same year Ernst von Weber again advocated the settlement by Germans of the Juba country. Later, in 1879, the three travellers, Clemens and Gustav Denhardt and Dr. Fischer, endeavoured to interest the nation and the Government in Witu.

Germans at Zanzibar.—While Germans were thus busy unofficially in East Africa, their Government was not inactive in Zanzibar. The appointment of a permanent consul-general and the conclusion of a most-favoured-nation commercial treaty, to supersede that which the Empire had inherited in 1871, had been talked of since 1880, and in 1884 both projects were realised. This move led the British Government to invite an exchange of views; and there was relief in London when the German Foreign Office in November gave the assurance that it did not aim at establishing a protectorate over Zanzibar. Although at that time the Cameroon episode was only a few months old, Lord Granville drew from this assurance the conclusion that Germany "considered that country beyond the sphere of her political activity" (letter to Sir Edward Malet, January 14, 1885), a conclusion soon to be proved unfounded.

Karl Peters.—In the meantime Dr Karl Peters, a young and ambitious journalist and pseudo-scientist, with a strong love of adventure, was endeavouring to stimulate interest in the Zambezi country. He even succeeded in gaining audience of Bismarck, but failed to impress that wary statesman. As the German Colonial Society was not sufficiently aggressive, Peters and some of his friends formed, in March 1884, the Society for German Colonization. Its object was to make a more decisive move in colonial enterprise, by diverting the stream of emigration to German oversea territories. A proposal for colonization in the interior of Mosamedes (Angola) having been discountenanced by the Foreign Office as impinging upon territory claimed by Portugal, Peters and his associates fell back upon the alternative of an expedition to East Africa, a project which had the support of von Weber. Accordingly, the company adopted the outlines of a scheme for the establishment of an agricultural and trading colony in the Usagara or some other suitable territory; and a mission was despatched to Zanzibar to equip the necessary expedition.

The object of this mission, though not published to the world, came to the knowledge of official circles, with the result that, on the arrival of the travellers in Zanzibar, the German representative there informed them, in the name of the Imperial Chancellor, that no protection could be given either for their land acquisitions or their personal safety, and that whatever they chose to do would be done entirely at their own risk. Undeterred by their rebuff, the party crossed over to the mainland early in November, landing at Sandani. Following the Wami River inland, as soon as they had passed the narrow strip of territory within which the Sultan of Zanzibar exercised direct suzerainty and entered the Usagara country, they concluded treaties with a number of native chiefs on behalf of the society. Before the end of the year territories lying north of the port of Bagamoyo, with an area of 60,000 square miles, had been acquired virtually as a free gift.

In the following February Peters was back in Berlin with a wallet full of treaties, not a few of which had undoubtedly been obtained from the chiefs by misrepresentation or in ignorance of their meaning. By means of glowing descriptions of the country and its prospects, he now succeeded without difficulty in forming the German East Africa Company for the exploitation of his acquired rights.

Grant of Charter.—The Government, which had refused to countenance Peters when he sought its patronage with empty hands, now readily gave him (February 12, 1885) the desired imperial letter of protection, the first of the kind to be issued. The charter stipulated that the Company should administer its territories on the British Chartered Company plan; that it should remain a German undertaking; and that its directors should be German subjects. The new Company having been successfully launched, help came from influential sources. The Prussian *Seehandlung*, a State banking enterprise, invested £25,000 in the venture; and the Emperor and some of the other German princes also took shares. Peters soon returned

to East Africa in order to further the Company's interests there and add to its already large domain.

Attack on the Sultan.—In the meantime, the Government was preparing to face a new political situation in East Africa. In December, 1884, it was announced in the German Press that Dr. Rohlfs was on his way to Zanzibar; and new apprehensions were aroused in England that an attack upon the independence of the Sultan was contemplated. The Foreign Office invited assurances on the subject; but the answer from Berlin was evasive. Lord Granville's fears were in reality quite justifiable. Before long it became evident that the German representative in Zanzibar was bent on squeezing the Sultan out of the territories in the interior of East Africa over which he claimed suzerainty, with a view to supplanting him by the German East Africa Company. The agents of this company had already made further expeditions into the interior, returning with more treaties of the usual kind, professing to confer a title to large territories in Swahililand, Somaliland (both coast and interior), and elsewhere. The brothers Denhardt also returned to their old haunt, the Tana country, having formed a Tana Committee and received a promise of imperial protection for any enterprise they might establish there. Now they were instrumental in placing the Sultan of Witu under the Empire's protection, which was offered in May.

Suspicious of the proceedings which had taken place on the mainland, the Sultan of Zanzibar telegraphed to the German Emperor on April 25, challenging the action of the German expeditions. He also sent troops into the interior to enforce his authority, whereupon a German squadron was sent to Zanzibar to overawe him (August 7). In the end (August 14), on the advice of the British Government, given through Sir John Kirk, he withdrew both his protests and his men, and acknowledged the German claims.

British Attitude.—Made wary by untoward experiences in other parts of Africa, Lord Granville had

decided to play for safety; and he certainly carried concession to an extreme length, at the Sultan's expense. In a despatch of May 25 Lord Granville had assured Bismarck that Great Britain had no desire to oppose Germany in her projects of colonization in East Africa; but, on the contrary, would welcome her co-operation there in the cause of civilization, the suppression of slavery, and commercial development. With what was, perhaps, an excess of consideration, he also volunteered the information that an English financial group (the British East Africa Association, the prime mover in which was Sir W. Mackinnon) was interesting itself in a project for developing certain territories between the coast of East Africa and the lakes, to which it proposed to carry a railway, adding that the Government would not support the scheme

“ unless they were fully satisfied that every precaution were taken to ensure that it would in no way conflict with the interests of the territory that has been taken under German protectorate, nor affect that part of the Sultan's dominions lying between that territory and the sea.”

To this despatch Bismarck replied with a request that action in regard to the new British company might be deferred until it had been ascertained exactly what territories had been acquired by the German expeditions.

Agreement with Germany.—By this time Bismarck had discovered that Peters and the Denhardts, like Lüderitz of earlier fame, lacked both substance and responsibility; and that, if given too free a hand, they might involve the Empire in serious difficulties. Hence, when Lord Granville proposed the appointment of a boundary commission to consider titles and delimit the spheres of influence of the two countries, he at once agreed. A change of Government in June brought Lord Salisbury to power and to the Foreign Office, but he continued the conciliatory policy of his predecessor. The boundary proposal was pursued further; and eventually the British and German Governments concluded an agreement (October 29—November 1, 1886),

by which the northern limit of the German sphere of influence and the southern limit of British influence were determined. The whole of the delectable Kilimanjaro region, where Sir H. H. Johnston had obtained valuable concessions of territory in 1884, passed under German control; while the country north of the Tana and that lying to the north-west of the British sphere, including Uganda, were also left free for German operations. To the Sultan of Zanzibar were assigned the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, and Mafia, a strip of coast 10 nautical miles wide, and certain towns. The little Witu country, more important for its position than its proportions, remained independent, though recognised as falling within Germany's province. As a final stroke of irony, Germany agreed to adhere to the Anglo-French agreement of March 18, 1862, declaring the independence of Zanzibar, and to try to persuade the Sultan to come under the Congo Act of 1885, while Great Britain undertook to support Germany in negotiations with Zanzibar for the leasing to her of the duties leviable in Dar es-Salaam and Pangani.

The Sultan's authority was now whittled down to a shadow of his ancient claims; but he was helpless, and accordingly he signed the agreement on December 4. France formally accepted it on the 7th. By a further agreement of December 30 with Portugal the River Rovuma was confirmed as the boundary between German East Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.

Outside Germany it was generally believed that, owing to the undue compliance of the British Foreign Secretary (at that time Lord Iddesleigh), that Power received more than her due share of the partitioned territory, though a later readjustment (1890) removed some of the resulting disadvantages for Great Britain.

vi. *New Guinea*

German Interests.—While German agents were busy with colonial projects in various parts of Africa, the

old idea of securing a foothold in the Pacific was revived in a practical way. From the middle of the nineteenth century, and in some cases from an earlier date, German firms had had trading stations and factories in all the important groups of islands in the Western Pacific; and occasionally German vessels of war visited these. Moreover, the acquisition of part of New Guinea was one of the projects put forward most persistently by the earlier imperialists in the course of their propagandism for the colonial movement. The Dutch had already obtained the western portion of the island, while British influence was only represented by a land company to which its Government had granted a charter in November 1881.

The question of colonizing in New Guinea was again taken up seriously in Germany in 1880. In November of that year Herr A. von Hanseemann, a Berlin banker, acting on behalf of the German Maritime Trading Company (*Deutsche Seehandelsgesellschaft*), laid before Bismarck a memorial on the subject of colonial endeavours in the South Seas, but was informed (February 15, 1881) that the rejection of his Samoan proposals by the Reichstag (see p. 26) made impracticable "a vigorous initiative" in the direction proposed. In November of the following year the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* published an article, which was attributed to Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs, strongly advocating the seizure and colonization of New Guinea. A translation of this article appeared in the Australian newspapers, and created alarm.

Australian Interest.—There was a general demand that Great Britain should at once occupy the unappropriated portions of the island, though the *Sydney Morning Herald* stated that, "If the place is to be annexed by any other Power than England, we should be glad to see it in the hands of Germany." Responding to the pressure of colonial feeling, the Queensland Government in April 1883 annexed the eastern part of the island. Before deciding

upon its attitude towards this irregular measure, the Colonial Office (June 18), recalling the fact that the Australian colonies had long wished New Guinea to be annexed, invited the Foreign Office to say whether the Government could

"rely with full confidence on the absence of interference by any foreign Power in New Guinea, pending the declaration of the Queen's pleasure with respect of the prayer of the Australian Governments."

It is evident that the Foreign Office and its advisers in Germany thought as little of the proposal of Dr. Rohlfs as they had done of von Weber's proposals regarding South Africa; for Lord Granville replied (June 26) that he had no reason to believe that any foreign Power contemplated action in New Guinea. Thus assured, Lord Derby, in a despatch to the Queensland Government (July 11), declared its act to be not only *ultra vires*, and in consequence null and void, but also impolitic.

Nevertheless, the question was not allowed to fall into the background in Australia; and in December of the same year an inter-colonial convention, meeting at Sydney, adopted resolutions in favour of the annexation by Great Britain of all New Guinea except where the Dutch already had rights, and of the adjacent islands, and also declaring that the further acquisition by any other Power of territory in the Western Pacific south of the Equator would be highly detrimental to the security and well-being of the British possessions in Australasia, and that

"in the opinion of the convention, no purchases or pretended purchases of land made before the establishment of British jurisdiction or dominion in New Guinea or other islands of the Pacific, not having a recognised Government, should be acknowledged, excepting in respect of small areas of land actually occupied for missionary or trading purposes."

In Germany these resolutions were interpreted as tantamount to the declaration of another Monroe doctrine in favour of Great Britain in the Pacific; and they led to protests both there and amongst Germans

settled in the South Seas, who, remembering^{*} Fiji, promptly claimed the protection of their Government. In England, too, feeling ran high, public opinion on the whole warmly taking the colonial side. In January 1884 the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Julian Pauncefote, assured the German Ambassador in London that the Government had no intention to make further acquisitions of territory in the South Seas. Lord Derby, however, departed from this negative attitude in a despatch of May 9 to the Australian Governors, wherein he intimated that the Government would be willing to consider a proposal to give protection to the east coast of New Guinea after the colonies had decided how they would meet the cost; adding that the Government would agree to station a High Commissioner and staff there if the colonial Parliaments would undertake to contribute towards the cost.

At this time the Berlin bankers Herren Hanseemann and Bleichroder were again promoting a *consortium* for the purpose of acquiring territory in New Guinea. The New Guinea Company was formed accordingly (May 26), and Dr. Otto Finsch, of Bremen, who was well acquainted with the South Seas, was forthwith sent to Sydney with instructions to proceed thence to the north-east coast of the island and also to the New Britain group and acquire on behalf of the Company such territories as were to be had. Simultaneously (June 27) the Government was requested to give to the prospective possessions of the Company imperial protection. Hearing of this scheme, the Australian colonies at once promised the £15,000 required by the Home Government; and the British Colonial Office decided to send a Commissioner to New Guinea with a view to the early annexation of the South Coast.

Bismarck's Intervention.—On August 8, 1884 the German Ambassador called on Lord Granville in order to protest against the claims of the Australian colonies, particularly those advanced at the Sydney convention. He said that Germany admitted as natural the wish of the

colonies that the south of New Guinea should come under British rule, but contended that there were portions of the north side of the island which offered a legitimate sphere for German enterprise; and he suggested that the two Governments should come to an agreement as to their respective spheres of influence, intimating at the same time that a German expedition intended visiting the north coast. To these representations Lord Granville gave the conciliatory answer that, while an extension of British authority to the island was imminent, it should

“only embrace that part of the island which specially interests the Australian colonies (i.e., the south coast), without prejudice to any territorial questions beyond these limits.”

He also accepted the idea of a boundary conference, and expressed the opinion that the two Governments would find it easy to arrive at an understanding.

On the strength of this assurance Bismarck, on August 19, informed the German Consul-General at Sydney that it was intended to hoist the German flag on the north-east coast of the island and on the New Britain Islands, where German settlements already existed or were planned. On the following day Herren Hansemann and Bleichröder were promised imperial protection for their South Sea undertakings. The German Government also notified to the British Foreign Office the names of the Commissioners who would represent Germany in the proposed boundary negotiations. In the meantime, as a result of negotiations between the Home and Colonial Governments, the British annexation proposal had taken a more definite and more extended form; and on September 19 the German Government was informed that it was intended to proclaim British sovereignty over all the coast of New Guinea not occupied by the Netherlands (with the adjacent islands), except that portion of the northern coast comprised between 145° east longitude and the eastern Dutch boundary. There can be little doubt that this measure was decided upon under the direct pressure of colonial opinion, and that this

pressure had been greatly strengthened by the apprehension that a penal settlement might be established on the island.

British Concessions.—Since, however, the German Government took exception to the larger British proposal, as going beyond the limits laid down by Lord Granville on August 8, and suggested that the spheres of the two Powers in the north and north-east of the island should be the subject of a friendly understanding, the British Foreign Office (October 9) decided to restrict the protectorate to the south coast, with the contiguous islands, "without prejudice to any territorial question beyond these limits" A protectorate was accordingly proclaimed in this reduced form on November 6

The reservation with which Lord Granville hedged his undertaking to the German Government caused misunderstandings no less acute than those which had arisen over the Angra Pequena question Obviously the only reasonable interpretation of the words was that, while for the present only a restricted area of the island was to be annexed, the British Government understood that the extension of this area was to be a matter of negotiation; and that, until such negotiation had taken place, the *status quo* would be observed by both Powers in relation to the rest of the country Bismarck, however, professed to believe that the words "without prejudice to any territorial question beyond these limits" meant that Great Britain explicitly renounced in Germany's favour the idea of any further annexation¹—a view difficult to reconcile either with his perfect knowledge of diplomatic forms or his exceptional acquaintance with the English language.

While the two Foreign Offices were in correspondence, Dr Finsch had been active on behalf of the German New Guinea Company; and in November and December the north coast of the island, from the Dutch

¹ Interview with Sir Edward Malet, reported in despatch of January 24, 1895, to the British Foreign Office.

frontier to the Gulf of Huon, was annexed at various points, and after it the New Britain Islands, the Powers being notified to that effect on December 23. This countermove created great excitement in Australia; and public opinion there was also irritated at the restraint and moderation shown by the Home Government under what was regarded as a dangerous menace. Great Britain now hastened to seize the last stretches of territory still unappropriated. A vigorous exchange of despatches was the result, the German Government complaining of the action of Great Britain in thus anticipating the frontier negotiations; while the British Government contended that Germany herself should have made no acquisition of territory at all in the Western Pacific until these negotiations had taken place.

In a despatch of January 28 the Berlin Foreign Office even claimed that the German annexation of part of the north coast was intended to embrace the whole; and, as for the islands in the New Britain archipelago, it denied that the German Government had ever intended to make their occupation a matter of negotiation. It was true, Bismarck said, that Germany had anticipated British action in regard to these islands; but he recalled the fact that, as soon as there had been any thought of German annexations in Africa, Great Britain had hastened to annex the adjacent territories, as in the case of the Guinea coast, in order to prevent the possibility of her neighbour's expansion. It was, therefore, legitimate to assume that, if the German Government had not taken New Britain in good time, the British Government would once more have stepped in. In an interview with Sir Edward Malet on January 24, 1885, Bismarck anticipated the terminology of a later political controversy when he spoke of the policy of "enclosure" or "encirclement" (*Einschliessungssystem*) which Great Britain seemed bent on pursuing towards Germany.

Ill-feeling in England and Germany.—The New Guinea episode, following so closely upon the Angra

Pequena and Cameroon disputes, marked the climax of misunderstanding and ill-feeling between the two nations. No modern statesman was readier than Bismarck to fight for what he conceived to be his country's rights; and he was no doubt honestly persuaded at that time that Great Britain intended to pursue a dog-in-the-manger policy in relation to German colonization, and would carry that policy just so far as she thought she could do so with impunity. To a representative of the British Colonial Office who had an interview with him on December 24, 1884, he confessed keen disappointment that Great Britain should have sought to obstruct Germany in the Pacific as she had done in Africa.

"He said that we had immense possessions in that part of the world; that we had already more land than we could colonize for years to come; . . . and that it was not worthy of us to grudge Germany a settlement on the coast of New Guinea, separated from Australia by the islands and the south shore which we had taken. He added that up to two years ago he had done everything he could to facilitate British policy in Egypt and elsewhere, but for some time past he had been treated in a different manner by England, whose actions did not accord with her professions."¹

It was difficult for Bismarck to appreciate the position of British statesmen, habituated to rely solely on diplomatic sources of information, and therefore unacquainted with the nature and force of the German colonial movement, and now suddenly called upon to adapt themselves to the idea that Germany was as free to take unappropriated territories as any other State; and it was certainly embarrassing for these statesmen to strike a fair and safe compromise between the claims of the colonies, on the one hand, and, on the other, the need of remaining on amicable terms with a Great Power which at that time was able to make their path either rough or smooth in Egypt.

¹ Mr. R. H. Meade, in *Memoranda on Conversations at Berlin on Colonial Matters* (February 1885).

Even in the midst of the war of despatches, Bismarck never lost for long his characteristic sanity of judgment. In a speech made in the Diet in January 1885 he reproached Great Britain for her insularity of outlook, yet asserted his wish and intention to retain her friendship.

"We live on good terms with England," he said. "That England, in the consciousness that 'Britannia rules the waves,' should be somewhat astonished when her 'landlubber' cousins—for so we appear to her—suddenly go to sea, need not cause wonder. Nevertheless, we still stand in the traditional friendly relations to England, and both countries will do well to maintain these relations."

In spite of this, a few weeks later he brought a long series of accusations against the British Government and British policy on the colonial question, some entirely groundless and the rest trivial. The accusation which would have been most damaging, had it been justified, was the neglect of the Foreign Office to reply to the important despatch of the previous May, in which Germany had made deliberate approaches to Great Britain, with a view to amicable co-operation in Egypt—the despatch which, as has already been stated, was countermanded by Bismarck himself, and, in consequence, was never delivered. But the aggravation, incisive as was the expression of it at the moment, did not go deep; and a few days later Bismarck sent his eldest son to London on another special mission, charged with power to adjust the outstanding causes of friction. The British Cabinet was still divided on the question of no-surrender or compromise; and it was only the decided stand taken by Mr. Gladstone that turned the scale. For him the question of Egypt was paramount; and, assured that Germany would make no trouble on the Nile if Great Britain was accommodating in the Pacific, he threw his influence strongly on the side of concession. Writing to Lord Granville on March 6, 1885, he said:—

"I do hope that you are pressing forward the Papefote settlement of the north coast of New Guinea, which seems to me the main or only point remaining. It is really impossible

to exaggerate the importance of getting out of the way the bar to the Egyptian settlement. These words, strong as they are, are, in my opinion, words of truth and soberness, as if we cannot wind up at once these small colonial controversies, we shall, before we are many weeks older, find it to our cost."

An understanding favourable to German claims was arrived at; Bismarck was appeased; and, while he hastened to relieve the tension of public opinion in Germany, the British Foreign Secretary and Premier sealed the pact of peace by conciliatory speeches from their places in Parliament. On March 6 Lord Granville said:—

"There appears to be suspicion in Germany that we do not give full recognition of the present position of that great nation. I believe, on the contrary, that there is no country in which not only politicians but all classes of the population appreciate more and with greater pleasure the important position which Germany has taken in Europe since its unification."

Mr. Gladstone endorsed his colleague's utterances a few days later (March 12) in the House of Commons in the memorable words:—

"If Germany is to become a colonizing Power, all I say is, 'God speed her!' She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind."

Anglo-German Agreement of April 25-29, 1885.—

In its final form the agreement (April 25-29) secured to Germany the northern portion of the island between 141° of east longitude and 8° of south latitude, with half of the unexplored interior and all the islands lying off the north coast. She withdrew her claim to the long, narrow eastern end of the island, however, while Great Britain ceded the Gulf of Huon and Rook and Long Islands. The New Britain group of islands also remained to Germany. The northern part of New Guinea was now renamed Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, while Germany henceforth called the New Britain Islands the Bismarck

¹ Fitzmaurice, *Life of the Second Earl Granville*. vol. II. pp. 431, 432.

Archipelago. By a subsequent agreement (April 10, 1886) the two Powers delimited their respective spheres of interest in the Western Pacific generally. Germany gained by that agreement the Bougainville, Choiseul, and Isabel Islands, belonging to the Solomon group, though the two last named were subsequently (1899) ceded to Great Britain (see p. 85).

Outstanding points of dispute in other parts of Germany's newly-acquired empire were also adjusted early in 1885, and the Fiji Islands land disputes were settled at that time, the German claimants receiving compensation to the amount of £10,620, instead of £140,000 as originally demanded.

While in this way the early colonial disputes ended with smooth words on both sides, their influence upon the German colonial movement was unquestionably stimulative. More than anything else, it was the action of Great Britain, first on the question of Angra Pequena, and then on the Congo question, which determined Bismarck's future attitude towards that movement. From the first moment when he found himself confronted by British opposition, in a claim for what he believed to be Germany's just rights, there could be no doubt whatever that he would go through with the colonial programme at all costs. Opposition also drew together the colonial enthusiasts as never before, creating out of isolated groups, composed far more of theorists and visionaries than of practical men, a strong and determined party, and welding a mass of inchoate sentiment into a real national cultus.

vii. *The Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana Islands*

German Interests in the Pacific.—In their search for unappropriated territory in the South Seas, German vessels of war in 1885 claimed the Marshall Islands—so called after an English sea-captain who discovered them at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1878 Germany had secured the island of Jaluit as a coaling station, but she had made no claim to

sovereignty. That claim was now advanced; for the whole of the twenty-four little atolls were appropriated in October 1885 without protest.

Germany and Spain.—A claim to the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana (Ladrones) groups made about the same time was not equally successful; for Spain had claimed these islands since the fifteenth century.

Accordingly when, in the summer of 1885, Germany took possession of these islands, together with the Brown and Providence Islands, the Government of Madrid promptly protested, pointing out that in the spring of 1884 it had already caused the Spanish flag to be hoisted in the Carolines, and that it had nominated a Governor just before Germany stepped in. Bismarck offered to submit the question to arbitration; and, this proposal being supported by the British Government, the Spanish Government agreed, while stipulating that the Pope should be the arbitrator, a condition acceptable to Bismarck, who had but lately made his peace with Rome on the Church and State controversy.

Papal Award.—The award was to the effect that the title of Spain to the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana Islands was indisputable; but that, in order to support it, a regular administration must be introduced, and provision be made for the security of the subjects of other countries and of their property. Germans were to be given full rights to trade, establish plantations, and hold property in the islands, and Germany was also to be allowed to have a naval station. The two Powers accepted the Pope's decision, and on December 17 a treaty was signed accordingly.

Caroline Islands, &c., acquired.—The war, with the United States in 1898 deprived Spain of much of her colonial empire, and she was now willing to part with the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana Islands. Accordingly, in virtue of her right to pre-emption, Germany bought them in February 1899 for 16½ million marks (about £837,500). By an agreement dated November 8, 1899, Germany ceded Choiseul and Isabel, two of

the Solomon Islands, to Great Britain, retaining the northern islands of the group.

Germany and France.—On December 24, 1885, an agreement was concluded with France under which Germany renounced all claims to, or attempts to seize, the Windward Islands or the New Hebrides; while France undertook, in the event of her annexing these islands, to respect the rights of German traders settled therein. As part of the same agreement, the limits of the German and French spheres of influence in the Western Pacific were determined by an agreement concluded on April 6, 1886. Germany surrendered her small settlement on the Dembiah River, in West Africa, an enclave in a French sphere of influence; while France ceded to her Little Popo, and also abandoned her claims in respect of Porto Seguro. The boundaries of the possessions of the two States in the Bight of Biafra were also fixed.

viii. *The Samoan Islands*

German Interests.—It was at a much later date that Germany secured permanent proprietary rights in the Samoan group of islands. Her commercial interests there, however, went back to the 'sixties, when the Hamburg firm of Godeffroy, already named, acquired a large share in the trade of Samoa, and also important estates, which later passed into the hands of the German South Sea Trading Company. Great Britain, which from the beginning of the century had taken a foremost part in the civilising and Christianising of the islanders, had also, like the United States, large mercantile interests in the islands. In 1876 the German Government concluded a treaty of friendship with the Tonga Islands, and, in 1877-79 a similar treaty with the Samoan Islands, stipulating the neutrality of the islands, protection for the lives and property of Germans, and most-favoured-nation treatment. By the Tonga treaty Germany secured the right to use the island of Vavau as a coaling station;

and the Samoan treaty assigned to her the harbour of Saluafata, near Apia, in Upolu, for the same purpose.

It was only in 1899, however, after a long period of disorder and civil strife, that there was established in this island group the political status which gave to Germany her present territorial sovereignty in two of the larger islands. There is no more remarkable passage in the history of the German colonial movement than that which tells how Germany gradually overcame British claims in the Samoan islands, until in the end the country which had done most to bring the native population under civilising influences saw itself entirely supplanted. Only the briefest outline of a tangled story can be given here.

Troubles in Samoa.—Early in November 1884 the Samoan King, Malietoa, concluded with the German Consul at Apia, Dr. Strübel, a treaty which would virtually have placed all the affairs of the islands—administration, justice, finance, police, &c.—under German control. Later it became known that the fickle Sovereign had six days before petitioned the British and New Zealand Governments to take his realm under protection. The explanation which he gave of his equivocal attitude was that the German treaty was forced upon him, and that he was not even fully cognisant of its meaning. Nevertheless, at that time the British and German Governments exchanged pledges to respect the independence both of the Samoan and Tonga Islands; and Bismarck, in reply to remonstrances against the Consul's action which reached him from England and the United States, declared his intention to adhere to the *status quo*. When, however, Malietoa sought to disclaim his own contract, the German Consul (January 1885) occupied Apia with troops drawn from a German vessel of war in Samoan waters, and hoisted the imperial flag. The German Government volunteered news of this irregular act in London, and disowned it.

For four years the Samoans were involved in internecine strife over the rival claims of pretenders—

Mahietoa, Tamasese, and Matuafa—fomented by attempts on the part of the German Consul to assert a dominating influence in the islands for his country, attempts to which the British and American Consuls offered joint resistance. It cannot be said that these attempts were supported in Berlin; for, when the Consul (now Dr. Knappe) at the end of 1888 urged his Government to annex Samoa, in order to enforce a peace on German terms, Bismarck repudiated the idea by telegraph as "obviously impossible." Just before this, in authorising the Consul to employ German troops to enforce satisfaction for injury done to German subjects and property, the Chancellor had warned the Consul as follows:—"Injury to American or English property "in the event of measures against insurgents to be "carefully avoided."

Conversations were now taking place between the three Governments concerned, in which all agreed that it was high time that order should be restored in the islands. A climax was reached when, in January 1889, the German Consul declared war against the inhabitants of Samoa without distinction, and used open threats against his British and American colleagues. Bismarck, who never lost a due sense of proportion throughout the Samoan troubles, repudiated the irascible Knappe's proceedings as indiscreet and contrary to his instructions, and removed the Consul from office.

The Samoa Act.—At Bismarck's invitation, representatives of the three Powers now met in Berlin (April 29, 1889), in order to adjust difficulties; and the result was the Samoa Act of June 14. This stipulated that the islands should remain independent and neutral; that the citizens and subjects of the three Powers should have equal rights therein; and that none of the Powers should exercise any separate control over the islands or their government. Various administrative arrangements were also made.

Nevertheless, tribal feuds over the succession question continued to keep the islands in disorder, while the new administrative measures provided many occasions of friction amongst the Europeans. In 1899 the three Powers were agreed that a kingship was impossible where there were so many pretenders, and that the Samoa question could be settled only by drastic action. They therefore appointed a Commission to place the government of the islands on a new basis, and it met in Apia in May. As a result the kingdom was abolished, all administrative powers being transferred to the Consuls of the three Powers; and, what was more important, the natives were disarmed.

Final Settlement.—Even these measures, however, proved merely transitional, for it was soon seen that a *condominium* would not work, and that the islands must either pass into the hands of one of the Powers or be partitioned. Great Britain proposed that they should fall to her as the pioneer of civilisation in the South Seas, in consideration of territorial concessions to Germany in West Africa; but to this Germany refused to agree. In the end, by the Anglo-German Convention and Declaration of November 14, 1899, Great Britain withdrew altogether from the Samoan group, surrendering in favour of Germany all her rights over the islands of Upolu and Savaii, and in favour of the United States all her rights over the island of Tutuila and all the islands of the group east of 171° W. longitude; while Germany, in return, renounced in favour of Great Britain all her rights over the Tonga Islands and Savage Island, including the right of establishing a naval and coaling station, and her share of the Solomon Islands (including the Howe Islands) east and south-east of, but excluding, the island of Bougainville-Buka. Great Britain also made concessions in West Africa, and Germany reciprocated in East Africa. A tripartite Convention of December 2 brought into the settlement the United States, which

renounced her rights and claims in respect of Upolu and Savaii and other smaller islands of the Samoan group. The German islands were, as from January 1900, placed under a Governor in the person of Dr Solf, later Secretary of State for the Colonies.

ix. *Kiaochow*

The last of the protectorates, Kiaochow, was acquired in 1898. This was Germany's only Eastern acquisition; and it was the price of blood. In October of the preceding year the officers of a German vessel of war were attacked by Chinese; and a little later a German mission station shared the same fate, two missionaries being killed. In addition to requiring money compensation for these crimes, the German Government in November occupied the Bay of Kiaochow, in the province of Shantung, and in the following month obtained a ninety-nine years' lease, carrying full suzerain rights, of the bay and a strip of the adjacent mainland. To the concession was attached the right to build a railway into the interior. The acquisition was in general warmly approved in Germany. As the port was intended to be a naval depot, it was at once placed under the Admiralty. It is worthy of note that, more than a quarter of a century earlier, Kiaochow had been prominently marked on the German map of acquisitions desirable but not then expedient; it had been reported on to this effect by the scientific expedition of Baron von Richthofen, which was sent to China by the Prussian Government in 1860.

x. *French Congo*

The latest of Germany's colonial possessions came to her in 1911, and its acquisition was part of the final Morocco settlement. In that year Germany agreed to recognise the paramount influence of France in the Sultanate, while France ceded to Germany, by way of compensation, about 100,000 square

miles of her Congo empire; and agreed, in the event of the disruption of the Congo Free State, to waive her right of pre-emption regarding it in favour of the international regulation of the question, *i.e.*, regulation by the Powers which were parties to the Congo Act of 1885. France also renounced in Germany's favour her right of pre-emption in respect of the Corisco and Elobey Islands, belonging to Spain. By the acquisition of part of the French Congo the Cameroon colony was extended to the Congo and Ubanghi Rivers.

V

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERIOD

THE later history of the German colonies and a brief review of their administration may be conveniently divided into three periods, of which the first dates from 1886 to the resignation of Prince Bismarck in the spring of 1890; the second from that time to 1907; and the third from the creation of the Colonial Office in 1907 to the outbreak of the Great War.

(a) BISMARCK'S LAST YEARS, 1886-1890

1 *The First Years of Germany's Colonial Experience*

Trading Companies.—From the earliest years a large amount of enterprise was shown in the development of the colonies, many companies being formed at home—mostly in Berlin—with the help of banking institutions for the exploitation of their resources. Thus at the end of 1886 Dr. Peters and his friends formed the East African Plantation Company, and the parent East Africa Company ceded to it 50,000 acres of land in return for shares. Two years later the German Plantation Company was formed for operations in the same colony. Similarly, in the interest of the West African colonies, the German West African Company was established about the same time for general trading purposes. These companies were the forerunners of a large number of plantation, agricultural, land-investment, mining, timber-cutting, and general trading companies, which brought to the African colonies much capital and enterprise, though for a long time the rewards were far from encouraging.

First Impressions.—Unquestionably the first impressions created by a more intimate knowledge and a more sober appreciation of the colonies were discouraging. Many of the missions and expeditions of investigation returned home disenchanted. Every one of the colonies had been represented to the Government and the public as a potential El Dorado, only needing energy, enterprise, organization, capital, and the patronage of a solicitous Government to develop boundless resources. In no single case did experience justify these roseate forecasts. Large portions of the first of the colonies, South-West Africa, proved to be waterless desert; East Africa was found to be roadless and trackless, with a fever-breeding climate; and New Guinea was a raw, unexplored waste.

Further, almost everywhere, except in Togoland and the island groups of the Pacific, the native populations were sullen and unfriendly, if not openly hostile, resentful at the presence of intruders who, coming they knew not whence, brought with them a spirit of domination and proprietorship which was too often irritatingly aggressive, seldom tactful, and hardly ever suave and considerate. It was not long before dissatisfaction took serious forms in several of the colonies. This was particularly the case in South-West Africa, Cameroon, and East Africa. In the first-named colony the Herero tribe from the first disputed German sovereignty; and in 1889 a body of German troops had to be sent out, the Diet voting the necessary money reluctantly.

ii. *Government of the Colonies*

It has been shown that, when at last he allowed himself to be drawn into the colonial movement, Bismarck never entertained the idea that the Empire should take over and govern the territories to which it promised its protection. Accordingly, during the early years the Central Government endeavoured to restrict to the smallest possible

limits its interference in the actual work of local administration. The constitutional and judicial status of the colonies was determined by a law of April 16, 1886, afterwards amended several times, which authorised the Emperor to exercise the executive power in the protected territories in the name of the Empire. The effect of this arrangement was that the general principles of administration were prescribed by Ministerial decrees and orders, greatly to the dissatisfaction of those political parties at home which were ever on the look-out for the extension of the powers of the Imperial Parliament. Only when the calls upon the Diet for money began to multiply did it become easier for that body to assert its wish for a more direct share in the government of Greater Germany in the way of legislation and free discussion. Revenue for local purposes was levied in various ways, *e.g.*, in New Guinea, Cameroon, and Togo chiefly by import duties; in South-West Africa by export duties on cattle, ostrich feathers, ivory, and hides; in other colonies by trading and poll-taxes, &c.

To the last Bismarck adhered, in principle at least, to the system of "protective colonization"; *i.e.*, the Empire was to give protection to the traders in respect of their territories, but the traders were to administer these territories through chartered companies, formed for commercial purposes. His faith in chartered company government survived even the proof of its failure to promote Germany's oversea empire, since he had not allowed for several contingencies which went counter to his maxims and upset his calculations. One was the financial difficulties with which the early colonial companies, with hardly a single exception, had to struggle from the beginning.

Fiscal Policy.—From the first the fiscal policy followed in the colonies was based on the principle of equality for all nations. Bismarck repeatedly contrasted the liberal treatment shown to German trade in the British colonies with the more or less monopolistic methods applied in the French, Spanish and

Portuguese possessions; and the British policy of "the open door" adopted by him has been followed consistently ever since.

Maladministration.—The early colonial adventurers were impatient for results, hoping to reap without first sowing. Viewing the colonies only or chiefly from the commercial side, the merchant adventurers, the "Hanseatics" and financiers, organized in their companies and syndicates, showed little aptitude or desire for the delicate work of administration. Long before Bismarck gave place to a successor, therefore, it had become evident that the Empire would have to shoulder a large part of this burden.

Nor, for many years, did the record of imperial administration itself prove a successful one; for this was for Germany a new and untried domain. For a long time many of the men sent out were of the wrong type—wrong in training, character, and mode of life. Bismarck had once expressed the fear that to establish an imperial colonial bureaucracy might be to pack it with "questionable existences." Of doubtful characters the colonial service had far too many in the early years; and their immoral, cruel, and often revolting practices were a source of profound discontent and the direct occasion of many local insurrections.¹

Attitude of the Diet.—All through these early years the attitude of the Imperial Diet in general continued to be, if not actively hostile, at least apathetic: and only amongst the ranks of the avowed "colonial politicians" and the Pan-Germans—not yet organized into a militant league—was genuine enthusiasm shown for the new imperialistic movement. No one did more to keep back the colonial movement and create distrust in it than the Radical leader of those days, Eugen Richter. The picture which he drew of the colonies in a speech made on November 24, 1885, was not likely to stimulate enthusiasm or draw from the pockets of

¹ See, on this subject generally, the paper on *German Treatment of Natives*, No. 114 of this series.

Hamburg merchants or Berlin and Frankfort financiers the money so sorely needed for works of development.

"In East Africa," he said, "the natives are driven to work with the whip; in Cameroon they are poisoned with brandy; Angra Pequena is a bankrupt concern, and three Imperial officers squat there in a sea of sand watching the German flag; while in New Guinea no German yet lives, and there is no trade at all."

The public in general, which had seemed to welcome the first practical fruits of the movement with jubilation, soon showed signs of reaction; and it was evident that much of its enthusiasm had been due to the quick and dramatic march of events in 1884 and 1885, and had been less the reflection of a genuine imperialistic stirring than a response, half-patriotic, half-sentimental, to the Chancellor's appeal to the national pride for support in a diplomatic contest with an older colonial Power which appeared to resent rivalry in its special domain.

iii. *Colonial Troubles*

The year 1888 was dark with events which were a cause of much immediate anxiety, and foreshadowed still greater future ill. In September news reached Germany of a serious rebellion in East Africa, where Peters had already entered upon a course of brutality and crime which was to earn for him at a later date a sinister name. Following the example of the British East Africa Company, Peters obtained for the German East Africa Company the right to administer for fifty years a large part of the territory on the mainland (from the Umba southward to the Rovuma) over which the Sultan of Zanzibar claimed suzerainty. This country was to be administered "in His Highness's name and under his flag, and subject to his sovereign rights"; and the Sultan was to receive liberal yearly compensation out of the Customs revenue.

Peters' Company had no sooner taken over its new and delicate responsibilities than, owing to the indis-

cretions and provocations of its officials, the country was thrown into rebellion. Peters had summarily replaced the Sultan's officials by the Company's agents, and had ostentatiously hoisted the German flag in a country over which the Company exercised no sovereignty whatever. Called upon to send soldiers to quell the revolt of his subjects, the Sultan despatched a few troops, but they at once joined the rebels; and it fell to an ex-naval lieutenant of British birth, named Matthews, now a general in the Sultan's service, to take a relief force to the mainland and rescue the Germans from danger. In a despatch to the German Consul-General in Zanzibar (October 6) Bismarck condemned the hoisting of the flag as "neither called for nor advisable," and said that the disorders might have been avoided

"if the Company's agents had taken the precaution to restrict their action within the needful limits, which is the presupposition of the success of risky undertakings in an unknown territory."

No defence of the German East Africa Company was possible, but its follies threw upon the Home Government the responsibility for repairing them; and Bismarck had no difficulty in convincing the Diet that the best way to prevent the recurrence of similar untoward incidents was to keep the Company under restraint. He was still, he said, "no colony man" in the conventional sense; yet he was convinced of the wisdom of placing East Africa under the Empire's more direct control. The Diet approved his proposal on January 1, 1889, and Captain Hermann (later von) Wissmann, an experienced African explorer, was chosen to be the first Imperial Commissioner.

Wissmann in East Africa.—In accepting the offered position, Wissmann had to withdraw from another African enterprise for which his services had already been secured. This was an expedition for the relief of Emin Pasha, as a rival to that which H. M. Stanley had already undertaken by way of the Congo (January 1887). Before he was able to take over his new duties,

the situation in East Africa had become alarming; for the powerful chief Bushiri, of the Pangani country, jealous for the future of the slave trade, in which he had a profitable interest, had placed himself at the head of the rising, which was now general and had spread to the British sphere of influence. The impotence of the Sultan of Zanzibar in the territories over which he had claimed sovereignty was now plainly proved; and, on his failure to restore peace, the British and German Governments agreed to institute a joint blockade of the coast (December 2), with a view to suppressing the trade in munitions of war and slaves simultaneously.

Wissmann arrived in Zanzibar on March 31, 1889, and took over both the administration and the military command. With the force of Sudanese and Zulus which had been raised for his service, he gradually beat down Bushiri's opposition; and before the end of the year the arch-rebel had been captured and executed, though the disorders continued for a long time. The insurgents retaliated by the indiscriminate massacre of the white settlers—not sparing even the missionaries, of whom between thirty and forty lost their lives—and the destruction of their property.

Karl Peters.—Meanwhile, Peters had pressed forward the Emin Pasha relief scheme; and, though the Government refused to have a hand in it, he left Europe for Zanzibar in February 1889, and succeeded in crossing to Kwaihu Bay, in Witu, in June, passing his party as English. So far as the search for Emin Pasha was concerned, Peters was too late. It fell to Stanley to find the sequestered explorer, if, indeed, he was ever lost. In truth, Peters's solicitude for a fellow-craftsman was only a pretext for another buccaneering *coup*. His primary object had from the first been to secure more treaties and more territories. It had been his hope to establish a line of German settlements from the coast at Witu, following the Tana River, to Victoria Nyanza and Uganda, so securing for Germany a powerful influence in the basin of the Upper Nile. Peters did, indeed, conclude a number of new treaties, both on

the Tana and in Uganda, which, if enforced, would have greatly circumscribed British influence in the interior. Unfortunately for his plans, however, the German and British Governments had already begun to negotiate upon their position and claims in East Africa; and, when he reached the Victoria Nyanza in the autumn of 1890, he learned to his chagrin that during his absence the map of that disputed part of the continent had been redrawn, with the result that most of his treaties were worthless, and his efforts to that extent wasted. This arrangement was one of many territorial adjustments embodied in the Anglo-German African Convention of July 1, 1890

iv. *Caprivi becomes Chancellor*

Two months earlier Bismarck had ceased to be Imperial Chancellor; and the responsibility for the further prosecution of the colonial movement had fallen to Count von Caprivi. One of Bismarck's latest services to the colonial movement was the introduction of a subsidised steamship line to South and East Africa at a yearly cost to the Empire of £45,000. This addition brought the cost of the mail steamship services to £324,500 per annum

.. (b) THE COLONIES UNDER THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 1890-1907

i. *The Colonial Department and Council*

Caprivi was even less a colonial enthusiast than the first Chancellor; and one of his earliest utterances, for which the colonial party never forgave him, was to the effect that no greater misfortune could happen to Germany than that the whole of Africa should fall into her hands. One of the first measures of the new Government was to create a separate Colonial Department of the Foreign Office (April 1, 1890). Dr Krauel, who had hitherto proved an efficient *referent* (or reporter) on colonial affairs in that Ministry, was at first put at its head, but was

succeeded three months later by Dr. Kayser. The new Department continued to be under the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in so far as relations to other Powers were concerned; but otherwise it was subject to the immediate control of the Imperial Chancellor.

In October a Colonial Council, consisting of representatives of the companies engaged in the protected territories and of experts of various kinds, was formed, to serve as a board of reference and advice. The first members included bankers, merchants, shippers, and representatives of the Christian missions, besides ex-State officials (*e.g.*, ex-consuls); and the Council met for the first time on June 1, 1891. For some years it served a useful purpose, and it was only dissolved in order to give place to a cognate organization differently constituted

ii. *The Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890*

In the meantime, the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890, had been concluded, ushering in a new era in the colonial relationships of the two Powers, beclouded in the past by so many misunderstandings. This agreement, important in many ways for Great Britain, was the first great attempt to round off Germany's African possessions and to give some sort of finality to her position as a colonial Power. Both Powers freely made concessions in the interest of a genuine *concordat*.

East Africa.—In East Africa new boundaries were defined. In the north Germany ceded in favour of Great Britain all claims in respect of Witu and the Somaliland coast; and the immense region from the littoral to the Congo Free State was divided in such manner that Great Britain took the territory lying north, and Germany that lying south, of the Umba—Lake Jipé line across Lake Victoria to the frontier of the Congo Free State. Further, Germany agreed to acknowledge a British protectorate of Zanzibar with Pemba; while the British Government, in return

undertook to move the Sultan to cede to Germany his coast-territory in East Africa and the island of Mafia. By an exchange of declarations between the British and French Governments (August 5, 1890), the agreement of 1862, by which the two Powers affirmed the independence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, was modified, France recognising a British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, while Great Britain recognised a French protectorate in Madagascar.

West and South-West Africa.—In West Africa the boundary between Togo and the British Gold Coast Colony was again adjusted, and in Cameroon there was a rectification of the western boundary between the German and British possessions. In South-West Africa the boundary between that colony and British Bechuanaland was delimited, and Germany was given access from her protectorate to the Zambezi by the cession to her of a strip of territory known as "the Caprivi strip" (*Caprivi-Zipfel*).

Heligoland.—The most important concession made to Germany was the cession to her of Heligoland, a transaction upon which, as we have seen, Bismarck had twice sounded Lord Granville, on each occasion with discouraging results. Lord Salisbury allowed the island to go in the interest of an amicable and, as he hoped, a permanent all-round settlement. In notifying to the British Ambassador in Berlin (June 14, 1890) the decision of his Government, he wrote :—

"It (Heligoland) was probably retained by this country in 1814 because of its proximity to Hanover, the crown of which was then united to that of England. It has, however, never been treated by the British Government as having any military or defensive value, nor has any attempt or proposal been made to arm it as a fortress. Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would constitute a heavy addition to the responsibilities of the Empire in time of war without contributing to its security. There is no reason, therefore, for refusing to make it part of a territorial settlement, if the motives for doing so are adequate."

This comprehensive colonial agreement gave unalloyed satisfaction in neither country. In Germany

most unreasonable opposition came, as usual, from the Pan-Germans, who, with their habitual greed, not only wanted Heligoland, but grudged every one of the concessions which their Government had made in order to obtain it.

Government Explanation.—Petitions to the Diet against the treaty were organized on a large scale; and, in order to still the tumult, the Government thought it necessary to publish in the *Official Gazette* on July 30 an elaborate exposition of the treaty, with a statement of its motives in concluding it. Referring to Germany's relations with Great Britain, and the anticipated effect of the agreement upon them, this notable *exposé* said :—

“ The governing endeavour was still further to preserve and strengthen the friendly relations between the two States, as grounded in their common stock and in historical development, and in this way to serve our own interests, together with those of the peace of the world. . . . There should be no room for the idea of our being ultimately dragged into a quarrel with England on account of a colonial dispute. . . . We urgently wish to hand on to the future the long-standing good relations with England.”

The memorandum added that “ the period of treaty-making and flag-hoisting ” should now be regarded as at an end, and that the duty of the future must be to develop the territories acquired and their resources—a work estimated to need half-a-century of patient labour.

iii. *East Africa*

A little later an arrangement was, with Great Britain's good offices, concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar, by which that ruler ceded his suzerain claims on the coast of the mainland in return for a payment of £200,000. In the same month which saw the conclusion of this treaty, the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference adopted a series of far-reaching measures, at once repressive and remedial, for enforcement in Africa.

In the first year of the Caprivi régime important changes were introduced in the government of East Africa. It was clear that the country could not be handed over again to the East Africa Company, which had proved incapable of governing it, and, moreover, was heavily encumbered financially. Accordingly, an agreement was concluded (November 20, 1890) whereby the Empire took over, as from January 1, 1891, the administration of the coast, the interior, and the island of Mafia, and Customs revenue was henceforward collected on account of the Imperial Government. In order to enable the Company to meet the interest and instalments due in respect of a loan of about half-a-million pounds, £200,000 of which represented compensation to the Sultan of Zanzibar for the cession of his fiscal rights, as before stated, the Government undertook to pay to it, until the loan was liquidated, £30,000 a year from the revenue from the East Africa Customs duties. The Company, on the other hand, was to carry out certain harbour works.

Like the New Guinea Company, the East Africa Company now restricted itself to commercial operations. It retained the right to take possession of unappropriated land, to share equally with the finders in all mineral discoveries which might be made, and to receive a royalty on the output, also to have the first claim to railway concessions, and the right to establish a bank of issue. The Diet ratified this agreement in February 1891; and simultaneously a further vote was granted for the suppression of the slave trade and the carrying into effect of the new system of administration. Baron von Soden, hitherto in Cameroon, was appointed the first Governor.

Wissmann carried on the war against the insurgents until the beginning of 1891, when comparative tranquillity was restored. He had hoped to suppress the rebellion at a cost of £100,000. When more than seven times that sum had been voted, the bill was still far from being paid. One result of the campaign was that

the troops which Wissmann had gathered round him were converted into a standing force.

Activity of Peters.—Unfortunately for the colony, Baron von Soden had been given as coadjutor a man whose influence in the colony had already been evil, and was destined to become still more so. This was the notorious Dr. Peters. Bismarck had kept the colonial pioneers and "flag-hoisters" well in hand, and when they had transgressed the bounds of discretion and safety he had not hesitated, *more suo*, to call them to account with arbitrary promptitude, or even publicly to repudiate their doings. After his dismissal, these men and their nominees, had they had their way, would have monopolised the colonial service both at home and abroad. Peters, whose unruly conduct had drawn upon him Wissmann's severe censure, was one of the first thorns to pierce the side of the new Chancellor. Although his personal reputation was (to say the least) indifferent, Peters was more than ever *persona grata* amongst the imperialists; and, when the Pan-German League was formed in 1891, he became at once its special hero. Both in his own and his friends' opinion, no position in the colonial hierarchy was superior to Peters' talents or deserts; and in deference to pressure something had to be done for him. Accordingly, after Wissmann's return to Europe in February 1891, Dr. Kayser offered Peters the position of Imperial Commissioner in the interior of Africa, to act under von Soden, the new Governor of East Africa. The appointment soon turned out to be disastrous.

For a long time East Africa continued to be the scene of native unrest and disaffection, and military expeditions were frequent. Of the origin of these conflicts a German writer says:—

"The endless struggles were caused as often by accidental violations of the habits and customs of the natives, private disputes, and mutual misunderstandings, as by attacks by the bearers of the numerous caravans which were continually on the move in a country without waterways. These bearers

demanding food from natives who often had little for themselves, and did violence to the women. If the villages defended themselves, sanguinary conflicts and reprisals resulted."¹

It was only when the authorities had placed the caravan system under strict control, made the traders concerned responsible for the harm done, and established on the principal routes rest-houses, regularly provided with food supplies, that such occasions of conflict were gradually removed.

In 1892 the first serious reports of the brutalities of Peters reached Germany. The Government ignored them as long as possible; but the more attempts were made to discourage and silence discussion in the Diet, the more disquieting was the effect created in the country. In the autumn Colonel (Baron) von Schele was put in command of the colonial force; and in September 1893 he became Governor in place of Baron von Soden. Von Schele endeavoured to suppress insurrectionary movements by rigorous measures; but the more harshly the natives were treated, the more desperate they became; and murders of German traders and explorers were not infrequent, leading to further drastic reprisals. These constant punitive expeditions kept the colony in a condition of unrest and created a depressing effect at home.

Von Schele resigned the Governorship in February 1895, and the appointment of Major von Wissmann was welcomed as auguring a fresh start. During Wissmann's short administration either the natives were better behaved or the military force was better controlled, for his presence in the colony coincided with a marked decrease in expeditions. He returned to Germany in the summer of 1896; however; whereupon these enterprises began again, and, one chastisement leading to another, the country was thrown again into the old condition of disorder for another year. Together with an alteration of the

¹ Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik*, p. 197.

native labour contract, a house and hut tax was introduced in November 1897, and proved a new source of friction; for the object of the hut tax was not primarily to raise revenue, but to stimulate the natives to more industrious habits. It was intended that in the less developed districts of the interior, where metallic money was but little known, the natives should be allowed to pay their tax either in goods or labour. The danger of the tax was pointed out at the time, but the warning passed unheeded.

iv. *Slavery*

While the Powers, in conjunction, had endeavoured to root out the slave-traders in East and Central Africa, the German Government had begun to adopt measures with a view to discouraging and gradually suppressing all kinds of domestic slavery, both in the East African and West African colonies. Imperial ordinances were issued on September 1 and November 29, 1891, regulating the ransoming of slaves in East Africa; and a little later somewhat similar ordinances were issued in Cameroon and Togoland. The provisions of these ordinances speedily became known amongst the native populations; and, as soon as the slaves learned that they were able to buy their freedom by the payment of a comparatively small and easily-earned sum, the right was largely exercised. Simultaneously, the sentiment of independence was strengthened amongst the natives. A Foreign Office report on East Africa in 1894 stated:—

“ A few years ago no labourer would have dared to bring a civil or criminal action against his master. Now they can do so, not only before the Government tribunals, but before their own native Courts—a sure sign of the civilising influence exercised by the Government and the missions over native public opinion.”¹

¹ Foreign Office (1894) Miscellaneous Series, No. 346, *Report on the German Colonies in Africa and the South Pacific* (C. 7582-7).

v. South-West Africa

In the meantime, important changes had been made in the administration of South-West Africa. After several years of uphill work, the German South-West African Colonial Company, formed to acquire the Lüderitz contracts and companies, came to the end of its resources; and in 1899 there was serious talk of selling the entire undertaking to an Anglo-Dutch Company. The proposal came to the knowledge of the Government, which refused consent to its execution and took over the task of administration.

A brighter future seemed to open for the colony with the grant of concessions to mining companies, particularly a company formed for the working of the Otavi Mines, to which it undertook to build a railway from the coast. Large cattle-breeding farms were also established; an important grain trade was organized; and regular steamship communication between Swakopmund and Cape Town was instituted.

vi. Cameroon

Here, in spite of frequent collisions with the natives, there was steady material progress. In 1891 the Diet voted £71,000 for the construction of two trade roads. Harbour works were built on the Cameroon River, administrative buildings and a hospital were erected, schools were opened; telegraphic communication with the outer world was instituted; and plantation enterprise was encouraged by the establishment of a botanical garden.

In December 1893 more disorders occurred, following a mutiny amongst the Dahomey members of the native police force. Subsequent investigation established the fact that the causes of the mutiny were insufficient payment of the soldiers, frequent cruel beating of the Dahomey women, and other excesses against the natives. There was a sharp debate on the subject in the Diet, in

the course of which both the Colonial Director, Dr. Kayser, and the Chancellor von Caprivi, with insufficient knowledge of the facts, tried to justify the incriminated officials. Public opinion was not satisfied, however, and the Deputy-Governor was required to answer before the Disciplinary Court at Potsdam. The Court acquitted him of responsibility for the rising, but found him guilty of immoral acts and of exceeding his official power; and he was sentenced to be removed to another office at a reduced salary—a mild punishment which only increased the prevailing dissatisfaction. The result was that the affair found its way to the Imperial Supreme Court at Leipzig, which, on a re-trial, ordered the officer to be cashiered and to pay the costs of the proceedings, while the local judge was now likewise dismissed the service.

Development of Cameroon.—In the second half of the 'nineties more was done to develop Cameroon as a plantation colony, particular attention being given to the cocoa plant. A large trade in wild rubber also sprang up, and large concessions in respect of rubber-bearing land were assigned to several companies. In the Diet there was much criticism of one such concession (to an Anglo-German group), and bitter complaint that the Colonial Council had been ignored, though in the end the Government's action was supported, in the belief that it might prove a means of directing foreign capital to the colony. Nevertheless, the opinion was widely held and expressed that the system of concessions was being seriously abused, and that a too hasty surrender of Crown rights in this way could not prove to be to the permanent advantage of the colony.

During the years 1898-1901 there were more disorders, due largely to disputes between carriers and the inhabitants of the villages on the trade routes where they lodged, and to the inconsiderate treatment of the natives by the whites, the consequence being a series of expeditions, the only results of which were

great loss of life and deeper disaffection. Of these expeditions a German writer says:—

“ Apart from the loss of human life and the heavy expenditure incurred, these enterprises occasioned growing odium, as it became gradually known that the incautious and inconsiderate treatment of the natives by the whites was often the chief cause of the risings. It was also shown that often the ardent wish of young officers and officials to gain military distinctions disposed them to these warlike measures.”¹

vii. *West Africa: Anglo-German Agreement*

After long negotiations an agreement was concluded with the British Government in 1893 resettling the frontier between the protectorates of the two countries. Great Britain also abandoned Victoria, on Ambas Bay, to Germany, which paid £4,000 by way of compensation to the English Baptist Missionary Society. In the following year Germany secured a better boundary between Cameroon and the French Congo.

viii. *Togoland*

Unlike the larger African protectorates, Togoland, with several intermissions, has had a tolerably quiet and uneventful history; and this fact, together with its industrious population, the fertility of its soil, and its valuable tropical resources has been reflected in an almost unbroken, if inconspicuous, course of prosperity. The trade of the colony suffered for a long time from the lack of good landing-places on its narrow coast-line, the result of which was that traffic to and from the country chiefly passed by the River Volta through British territory at Kwitta, or by the River Mono through French territory at Grand Popo. In 1897 a satisfactory Franco-German boundary was secured in the east, and in 1899 a frontier adjustment was arranged with Great Britain by the exchange of contiguous territories.

¹ Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik*, p. 259.

The relations between the governing authorities and the native population in this colony have been less strained than in the other German colonies; and, with a few exceptions, the expeditions into the interior have been of a scientific and economic and not of a military character. The administrators have kept in touch with the natives through the chiefs—a course the more practicable owing to the small extent of the colony. The plan of calling the chiefs together periodically for the ascertainment of their wishes and the hearing of grievances was introduced early in the 'nineties with good results. At the same time, although no specially scandalous outrages have been brought to light, there is plenty of evidence of maladministration and oppression of natives. Forced labour and flogging in particular have been as common in Togoland as in any of the German colonies; and, so far as can be ascertained, there is a general and strong desire on the part of the chiefs that they should remain under the British flag and that their country should not be returned to Germany. White planters have not been attracted to the country in large numbers; but much has been done to train the population to regular labour, and to assist it, by means of agricultural schools, experimental stations, and other measures, to cultivate successfully cotton, coffee, and cocoa. In 1904 the building of a railway from Lome into the interior by way of Palime was begun, the estimated cost, £390,000, being advanced to the colony by the Empire as a loan.

ix. *New Guinea*

The history of the New Guinea colony, Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, and the Bismarck Archipelago has, on the whole, been uneventful. From 1885 until May 1889 the German New Guinea Company appointed and paid its own administrator on the chartered company principle. From the latter date until August 1892 the Home Government appointed an

Imperial Commissioner, though the Company still bore the cost. When the Company's resources had been exhausted, this colony, with the Bismarck Archipelago, passed (in April 1899) into the custody of the Empire, the effect being that the entire cost of administration became henceforth an imperial liability. The Company now devoted itself solely to plantation enterprises; but here, too, it had little success; and a run of ill-luck, due to bad harvests, labour difficulties, epidemics, and loss of vessels, further crippled it. The Government did its best to open up the country by the construction of roads, by the exploration of the interior, and by cultivating friendly relationships with the natives; yet development was slow. Occasional disorders led to punitive expeditions against the natives in the interior, but these only encouraged reprisals, from which the missionaries and the traders were the chief sufferers.

x. *Chancellorship of Prince Hohenlohe*

On the retirement of Caprivi, in 1894, Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe succeeded to the Chancellorship and the colonial burden. Without any marked enthusiasm for colonial enterprise, he had, nevertheless, a conscientious desire to face fairly the Empire's responsibilities toward its oversea dominions. His attitude on the colonial question was explained in a speech made in the Diet on December 11, 1894, wherein he said:—

"The maintenance of our colonial empire is a duty to our national honour and a sign of our national prestige. We shall not fail to defend that empire, but we must also so shape it that it may attain economic independence and not be left behind by the neighbouring territories, and so that the future of German colonial policy shall not be compromised. The German name would be belittled in the world if the German nation were unwilling to take part in the mission of culture by which the past cruelties of slavery will be abolished and the light of Christianity be carried into the Dark Continent."

This was the standpoint of the thinking section of the nation in general, excluding only the Radical and

Social Democratic parties, which still continued to oppose colonization on principle; and when, in a Parliamentary speech at that time, Herr Richter, whose estimate of the colonial policy never transcended the test of pounds, shillings, and pence, endeavoured to discredit the colonial movement with a laboured calculation proving that every German then in the colonies cost the Empire £500 a year, he failed to impress the Diet. Nevertheless, it was true that the Empire's financial burden was increasing. In that year the imperial subsidies amounted to £300,000, made up of £185,000 for East Africa, £85,000 for South-West Africa, and £30,000 for the Cameroons; Togo alone among the African colonies was able to pay its way.

The Military Authority.—It fell to Hohenlohe to strike the first blow at a subtle evil which, hitherto recognised insufficiently by the Government, and by the Diet and the nation hardly at all, was making the efficient administration of the colonies impossible. The military authorities, both at home and in the colonies, had long been gaining the upper hand, disputing power with the civil administration, and claiming an authority and functions which did not belong to them, and could not be exercised by them without throwing the entire system of administration into confusion. Even the position of the Colonial Director, Dr. Kayser, seemed to be threatened by the military power. The vicious system of government thus set up discredited the recognised colonial administrators, and told fatally against efficiency. Owing to the aggressive spirit shown by the officers in command, conflicts with the native populations became almost a normal condition; and in 1893 there were campaigns in East Africa, the Cameroons, and South-West Africa simultaneously. Of the effect of this system in East Africa in particular, Dr. Zimmermann says—

“Quite as much bad blood was caused by the over-government by the officers, who at last compelled the blacks, on pain of flogging, to make military salute to every white man, summarily expelled dogs from the streets in the coast towns, and made no effort to disguise the fact that they only regarded the

traders as a necessary evil. Since, however, the costs were always voted, and the Imperial Chancellor always succeeded in excusing his military colleagues, it would have been long before a change had occurred had it not become unavoidable owing to the ever-deepening differences of opinion between the colonial administration and the military government, which pursued its own course without regard to expense or to public opinion."¹

It was Hohenlohe who introduced the first practical checks upon military rule in the colonies. By an Imperial Order of December 12, 1894, the functions of the colonial administration at home were more clearly defined; and it was made plain beyond doubt that the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office was alone competent to deal with colonial questions other than those of a purely political character. A state of administrative ambiguity and obscurity was thus alleviated; but it still remained necessary to apply to the military power a corresponding measure of restraint in the colonial territories themselves. When, in April 1895, Major von Wissmann was appointed to succeed Baron von Schele as Governor of East Africa, the higher military command in Berlin refused to concede to him any authority over the troops, or even to allow him to act as deputy in the absence on leave of the officer in command. In order to put an end to this absurd conflict of jurisdiction, Hohenlohe now succeeded in placing the colonial troops immediately under the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office.

Colonial Council reorganized.—In May 1895 the organization of the Colonial Council was amended and its membership increased, with a view to bringing in more talent and giving to it a more representative character. The Council was supposed to meet twice a year at least, but oftener if needful, and one of its principal functions was to discuss the colonial budgets before their presentation to the Diet. Standing Committees were appointed to deal with special questions,

¹ Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik*, p. 201.

such as sea communication between Germany and the colonies, railway construction in the colonies, and the means of encouraging emigration thither.

At the end of 1894 the colonies had been going concerns for ten arduous years.¹

When Dr. Kayser ceased to be the Colonial Director, in the autumn of 1896, it was stated that during his term of office the white population had increased in Cameroon to 230, in Togo to 96, in South-West Africa to 2,025, and in East Africa to 1,250; while the trading companies, firms, and undertakings had increased in Cameroon from 11 to 16, in Togo from 11 to 18, in South-West Africa from 12 to 23, and in East Africa from 1 to 13; and the total number of plantations was 31. The aggregate trade turnover of the colonies now had a value of £1,500,000, of which one-third represented trade between the colonies and the German Customs territory (*i.e.*, the Empire and Luxemburg). Hospitals, with laboratories well equipped for research work in connection with tropical diseases, schools, regular postal and telegraph services, roads, and latterly railways, had also been freely provided.

Peters and Schröder.—In 1896 came the first open revelations of the excesses of Peters in the East African colony. They were made in the Diet by the Socialist deputy Herr Bebel, during the discussion of the colonial estimates in February and March, and were accompanied by an equally revolting charge against the German planter Friedrich Schröder. Public report, due to newspaper disclosures, had long occupied itself with the unsavoury subject, but the Colonial Director had not dared to defy the powerful influences which had thrown a screen round these notorious evil-livers. Compelled now to declare whether it would investigate the accusations or further persist in hushing them up, the Government chose the former alternative. Proceeded against in the Disciplinary Chamber at Potsdam, Peters was, on April 24, 1897, found guilty of the

¹ Foreign Office *Miscellaneous Series*, 1894, No. 346 (C. 7582-7), p. 54.

execution in 1891 of a native boy in circumstances which threw a lurid light upon his moral deterioration, and of having on many occasions been guilty of conduct disgraceful to his office. He was sentenced to dismissal from the colonial service without pension and to the payment of modified costs of proceedings. As a result of an appeal he was in the following November, ordered to pay the whole costs.¹

Schroder's brutalities had been so notorious that in 1892 the Governor had only been prevented by secret influence from expelling him from the colony; a brother of the incriminated trader was, in fact, a member of the Colonial Council. He withdrew from the colony for a time, but on his return renewed his cruelties, both to the natives and to the Chinese coolies under his control, showing barbarity to children and adults indiscriminately. He too was prosecuted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.

xi. *Baron Richthofen, Director*

Dr. Kayser was followed as Colonial Director by Baron von Richthofen, whose strongest qualifications for the position were a knowledge of the methods of British colonial administration, his freedom from bureaucratic narrowness, and his relations with the commercial and financial world. He saw that the healthy development of the colonies required that the military power should be further subordinated to the civil authority; that administration should proceed from certain definite principles, and not merely reflect the subjective ideas of an ever-changing officialdom; and that a serious attempt should be made to introduce order and settled ways into the colonies and to adjust outstanding disputes and possibilities of friction with other colonial Powers. There were also minor sources of mischief to be remedied. Many administrative officials had introduced the caste system

¹ See *German Treatment of Natives*. No. 114 of this series, p. 38.

which flourished at home, and it had proved a source of much mischief. To the remedying of these defects Richthofen addressed himself with good-will and not without effect.

Franco-German Agreement.—In the early years of his régime an arrangement was concluded with France regarding the West African territories. Germany had long wanted to secure an approach thence to the Niger, but all attempts had hitherto been obstructed by the rights or claims of France or Great Britain. The much-desired Niger highway still proved inaccessible; but France made other concessions, including the surrender of a strip of land extending from Klein Popo to the Mono River, giving the Togo colony a better frontier in the east towards Dahomey. The formal convention on the subject was signed on June 23, 1897.

South-West Africa.—Here, at this time, was relapse rather than progress; for in 1897 rinderpest had made its appearance, and had rapidly spread throughout the whole country, carrying off a large part of the cattle, then the mainstay of the native population. Climate and want of water proved from the first the principal drawbacks to the development of the agricultural resources of this colony. Nevertheless, all that was practicable was done by the Government to assist the farmers to make the best use of the land, as by well-sinking, irrigation, storage works, the establishment of agricultural stations and nursery gardens, and skilled advice by experts in South African agriculture.

xii. *Dr. von Buchka: Concessions*

In March 1898 Baron Richthofen was succeeded in the Colonial Department by Dr. von Buchka, who had not had much experience of colonial affairs, and proved less able than his predecessors to keep under control either the colonial officials at home or those in the protectorates. Giving way to bureaucratic influence, he repeatedly allowed important decisions to be taken without consulting the Colonial Council. Such were the grant

in 1898 of a valuable concession to a Hamburg company, formed under Anglo-German auspices, for the exploitation of forest rubber in South Cameroon, and the conclusion in the following year of an important contract with the New Guinea Company, a contract surrendered shortly afterwards.

Rhodes in Berlin.—At the beginning of 1899 Cecil Rhodes visited Berlin in pursuance of some of his African schemes, and was cordially received by the Emperor. Rhodes was at the time maturing his project of a telegraph line to run through the interior of Africa from north to south. The result of his negotiations was the conclusion of a contract between the African Trans-Continental Telegraph Company and the German Government (March 15, 1899), by which the line was to pass through German East Africa; and by another contract, concluded later in the year, the British South African Company undertook to come to an arrangement with the German Government in relation to the building of certain railways then contemplated.

Concessions in Cameroon.—In 1899 the success of the South Cameroon Company encouraged the promoters of that enterprise to form another syndicate for the exploitation of a still larger tract of territory in the northern part of the colony; and the Government agreed. The Governor of East Africa, Colonel Liebert (who had followed von Wissmann in 1896), also proposed about this time to give to a German adventurer named Deuss a concession to exploit timber and coal throughout a territory 4,620 square miles in extent in the Nyasa and Tanganyika regions. On this occasion the Colonial Council was consulted (June 1899); though, as the Imperial Chancellor took care to point out, as an act of grace; for he claimed the right to confirm all such arrangements unconditionally. The Council approved the North Cameroon concession, subject to certain modifications, but condemned the Deuss project and recommended its revision. Owing to the more sceptical spirit in which the public now regarded these

bargains, other concession projects, which had been maturing in the background, were either abandoned or postponed.

Prince Arenberg.—At the close of 1899 there were more disclosures of the brutal treatment of natives in South-West Africa. Prince Arenberg, a young officer attached to the colonial defence force, was found guilty of the violation and murder of native women, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in a fortress and to deprivation of officer's rank. The affair created great indignation in Germany; and public sentiment was further outraged when it became known that the criminal, owing to his birth, had been unjustly favoured by the Governor long after his excesses had become notorious. The whole episode created so much feeling that the Prince was tried by court-martial, as a result of which he was, in 1901, sentenced to death. He was promptly reprieved by the Emperor and sentenced instead to fifteen years' penal servitude, though shortly afterwards steps were taken to declare him insane, and so to secure his liberation. The nation was also disappointed at the alarming rate at which expenditure in the colonies, with the accompanying call upon the home taxpayers, continued to increase, and the absence of any prospect of relief. The deficits which had to be made up by the Empire now reached a total of £1,500,000.

xiii. *Bülow, Chancellor: Dr. Strübel, Director*

Dr. von Buchka had proved neither a strong nor a conciliatory administrator; and some time before his resignation in June 1900 the Diet had become impatient for a change. His successor was Dr. O. W. Strübel, whose appointment preceded by only a few months the promotion of Count von Bülow to the Chancellorship, in the place of Prince Hohenlohe (October 1900). During Strübel's term of office a modified system of self-government was introduced in the colonies by the formation of Legislative Councils, open,

of course, only to white men, on the British Crown Colony pattern.

Kiaochow.—Already good progress had been made with the development of the protectorate of Kiaochow. By agreement dated October 16, 1900, the British and German Governments undertook to abstain from obtaining for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and to direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the existing territorial status of the Chinese Empire. This agreement settled the permanent limits of the protectorate. In the course of a few years the harbour and town were entirely Europeanised, and a stagnant port was converted into a busy centre of shipping and industry. In June 1899 a company was formed in Berlin, with a capital of £2,700,000, of which £675,000 was at once subscribed, for the building of the Shantung Railway. Coal was found in the protectorate at an early date, and has been worked by mining concessions given on terms by the Government. Iron has also been found in large quantities (see *Kiaochow*, No. 71 of this series, p. 26). Much has been done by the Government for the afforesting of the hills behind Kiaochow.

The Herero Rebellion.—To Dr Strübel's time fell, in 1903, the most disastrous event in the history of the German colonial movement—the Herero insurrection in South-West Africa, the tragic result of an accumulation of grievances and aggravations spread over many years. The Hereros had never been happy under German rule, the whole spirit of which was contrary to their independent and freedom-loving instincts. So far back as 1893 a partial rising against the new rule took place. There had for some time been warfare between the Hereros and the Hottentots, the latter led by the well-known chief, Hendrik Witbooi; and, convinced that tranquillity would not be restored until Witbooi was reduced to submission, the Home Government in 1892 had made preparations for an expedition against him. While these were in progress

news came from the Imperial Commissioner in February 1893 that Witbooi had suddenly made peace with the enemy tribe with a view to joint action against the Germans. The military authorities do not appear to have attached great importance to the warning; for only a few hundred troops were despatched to the colony in consequence. While this force was on its way the commanding officer in the colony, Captain von Francois, had defeated the rebels; but Witbooi and the best of his followers escaped, and thenceforward became a terror to the colony. Convinced at last that the situation called for a serious effort, the Government early in 1894 despatched to the colony Major Leutwein to investigate and report on the actual condition of affairs. Leutwein himself took charge of the military measures. Trapping Witbooi in the hill country of the Rankluft, he made him sue for peace (September), which was granted; but the chief and his tribe were placed under close surveillance at Gibeon. In the following year Leutwein became Governor of the colony as well as military commander.

The losses caused by the epidemic of rinderpest in 1897 created great discontent, the more so since the idea became prevalent that the havoc was due less to disease than to the preventive inoculation enforced by the German authorities. Disorders occurred in that year, but Leutwein succeeded in quelling them without great difficulty; and it is noteworthy, in view of later developments, that on both occasions the Hottentot leader, Hendrik Witbooi, gave the Germans valuable help in the restoration of peace. In the summer of 1899 the Hereros were again restive, but once more Leutwein secured tranquillity with the aid of the chiefs of the tribe and without the use of force. At the end of that year more serious trouble was caused by the excesses of the officer Prince Arenberg, already mentioned, and the light view taken of them by the Governor's Court. From that time the spirit of revolt smouldered continuously, needing but a little gust to fan it into flame.

The German settlers added greatly to the combustible material by the callous manner in which they systematically defrauded the natives. The latter were dependent upon the merchants for all the goods they needed, even to the primary necessities of life; yet, though they were always paying, they were never out of debt. If money could not be wrested from the natives by pressure or menace, their cattle and stock-in-trade were carried away or their land confiscated. When the individual debtor had been exhausted, claims were enforced against his chief or the whole tribe.

The most serious grievance related to the land question, for the natives had gradually been dispossessed of the lands upon which they had been accustomed to herd their cattle without restraint; and this grievance grew and deepened as they saw the large ranches of the white settlers multiply from year to year.

"We notice with dismay," ran one of their petitions to Governor Leutwein, "that our lands pass one after another into the hands of the whites, and in consequence we humbly pray your Excellency not to authorise any sale of land here, and to transfer all the lands which have not yet been sold into a great reserve, for we should then be certain, we and our children, that we should have a territory where we could live and cultivate our farms."¹

Leutwein did, in fact, take the side of the natives on this question, setting aside for their use extensive reserves, and making all sales and transfers of land to white settlers dependent upon his sanction. In 1897 a territory of about 124,000 acres was assigned to the Witboois, and later one of 325,000 acres to the Herero tribe of Otjimbingue; but these measures did not compensate for the loss of the old freedom to feed their herds wherever they pleased.

By 1898 the usurious ways of the traders had become so notorious that the Governor issued regulations prohibiting the suing for old debts, and applying the Prussian statute of limitations, according to which

¹ Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, Berlin, 1906-9.

commercial debts are no longer actionable after the expiration of two years. He would have liked to destroy the credit system entirely, had so radical a remedy been possible; but it was not. When the traders protested against these and other remedial measures, the question was referred to the Colonial Council at home, and a revised code of regulations was issued. This code annulled the debts of natives to Europeans after the expiration of one year, if legal proceedings had not already been taken to enforce them; abolished the practice of instituting claims against the tribes for the debts of individuals; prohibited the distraint of draught oxen or of any articles necessary to a native's occupation; and reformed legal procedure generally.

Deprived of their lands, crippled in their liberties, cheated by the traders, the Hereros determined to crush their adversaries as they themselves had been crushed; and, when the opportunity of revenge came, they took it without thought of the consequences. This opportunity occurred at the end of 1903, when troops had been sent to the south of the colony to suppress disturbances there; for reports of Hottentot victories encouraged the Hereros to rise. At the outset many German settlers were murdered, while the property of all was destroyed indiscriminately; but no other whites, whether British or Dutch, were molested. By the end of January 1904 the rising in the south had been suppressed. Guerrilla warfare followed for some months, the advantage being, on the whole, with the natives, who, knowing their own country better than did the white men, inflicted upon their pursuers heavy losses. In June General von Trotha was sent out from Germany with a considerable force of troops; and before the summer was over he succeeded in inflicting upon the main body of the Hereros a severe defeat. The remnant fled across the frontier into British territory, where they were disarmed. Just when it was hoped that the danger had been overcome, news came that Hendrik Witbooi and his people had broken out in the south. Other tribes made common cause with Witbooi;

and for more than a year longer the colony was the scene of desperate fighting. Witbooi himself succumbed to a wound in the autumn of 1905; and General von Trotha was able to return to Germany in November. Considering the unequal odds against which the untrained and ill-armed Hereros had to contend, his campaign could not be regarded from the military standpoint as a brilliant performance. What had been lacking in skill, however, was made up for in severity. Conspicuous amongst his achievements in this respect was the notorious proclamation of October 20, 1904:—

“ The Herero people must now leave the country,” ran this document; “ if they do not I will compel them with the big tube. Within the German frontier every Herero, with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will not take over any more women and children, but I will either drive them back to your people or have them fired on.”

General Trotha endeavoured to justify himself later by the plea that he had only wished to terrify the insurgents, and had no intention of carrying out his threats literally. Against this statement must be placed the facts that the frequent shooting of women was attested by eye-witnesses, and that the Hereros were, in fact, driven over the frontier, and perished in large numbers in the Kalahari desert. The proclamation excited much disgust in Germany; and, though in the Diet the Government defended the general, the revolt of public opinion was too strong to be ignored, and the withdrawal of the obnoxious ultimatum was ordered.

It was not until March 1907 that the rebellion was entirely quelled, by which time all but an insignificant number of the Hereros had either been killed or had fled the country. Colonel Leutwein estimated the native population of South-West Africa as a whole in 1898 at 300,000; in 1912 it was estimated at only one-third of that number. The campaign cost Germany several thousand lives and £30,000,000. It also left to the colony a legacy of large deficits; for, even when the war was over, special measures of a military and remedial character cost the Empire many millions of pounds

during several succeeding years. A German verdict upon the desolating effects of the war upon the country was: "Nearly everything is destroyed; only the bare land remains, and even that has to be reconquered." Dr. Paul Rohrbach summed up the situation later in the words:—

"The land question is solved, for the Hereros have lost their land, which is now fiscal property and is settled by whites. The cattle question is also solved, for the whole of the live-stock of the Hereros has been destroyed; there are hardly any cattle left."

East Africa: Railways.—During the late 'nineties the inauguration of a system of railway construction in East Africa seemed to herald brighter prospects for that colony. The first project to be taken in hand was the Usambara railway from Tanga, on the coast, to Speke Bay, on Victoria Nyanza. It was a venture of the German East Africa Company, though behind it was a Government guarantee of interest; and the first section of the line was opened by the beginning of 1896. The railway was not a great success; and in 1899 the Empire bought the undertaking for £100,000, with a view to completing it and working it as a State undertaking. The more important scheme of a Midland railway, to run from Dar es-Salaam to Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria, had to encounter much opposition before it was successfully launched. The Imperial Government's demand for small votes, in aid of the necessary preliminary survey works, was repeatedly refused by the Diet, which held that the project was needlessly ambitious, and that, if carried out at all, it should be a private and not a State risk.

Risings in East Africa.—In 1895 an influential committee, upon which were represented the German East Africa Company and the Deutsche Bank, aided by a Government grant of £15,000, undertook to institute a preliminary survey. This having been made, a report was presented to the Imperial Chancellor in June 1896. The gist of the report was that a strong company would

be prepared to construct the line, provided the Government would agree to give a guarantee of interest and to concede to it certain other valuable privileges. The Diet for a long time refused to undertake any liability. Its hostile attitude was due, perhaps, less to opposition to the railway on principle than disappointment and irritation with the general mismanagement of affairs in the colony. The soldiers were again engaged in expeditions, for the tribes were restless owing to discontent, caused partly by dearth, but still more by the tactless way in which the hut tax had been introduced, and the severity with which opposition to it had been crushed. A German writer, Dr. Hans Weber, reported that the enforcement of the tax had cost no fewer than 2,000 native lives. The Government was unable to resist the outcry caused by the stories of cruelty which reached Germany; and in March 1901 Governor Liebert had to be relieved of his office. Under the influence of these events, the Diet refused to assent to the railway scheme for several years; but at length, in June 1904, it agreed to guarantee interest at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon a capital of £1,050,000, which was to be raised by a company for the construction of a narrow-gauge line as far as Tabora. In the meantime, considerable votes had been granted for the completion of the Usambara railway.

Count von Gotzen, who had travelled much in Africa and elsewhere, succeeded Liebert as Governor. He, too, was a military officer, but free from the domineering spirit of the German military caste; and his more tactful way of handling the natives restored quiet to the colony for a time. In July 1905, however, there was a further native rising, again caused, as was stated in the Diet, by the indiscreet attempts of local officials to enforce the hut tax by exacting forced labour in lieu of its payment. Many lives were lost, and a strong body of marines had to be landed before the insurrection could be quelled. Count Götzen resigned at the beginning of 1906, and was succeeded by Baron von Rechenberg, who had already served in an

administrative capacity in East Africa. At this time the trade of the colony had a value of £1,800,000, of which £1,250,000 represented imports and £550,000 exports, about one-half falling to Germany in each case.

xiv. *Prince Hohenlohe, Director*

In November 1905 Dr. Strübel was succeeded as Colonial Director by Prince von Hohenlohe-Langenburg. The time was untoward for the occupant of this unenviable office; for, not only was the Herero campaign still in full progress, but the Centre party in the Diet, led by Herr Erzberger, had begun the disclosure of a long sequence of colonial scandals, personal and financial, which threw back the colonial movement in national esteem, though in the end its effect was unquestionably wholesome.

The Akwa Chiefs.—An unfavourable light was thrown upon the relations between the colonial officials and the natives by an episode which took place in Cameroon. In September 1905 the Imperial Diet received a petition from a number of chiefs of that colony complaining of the behaviour of the German officials. Instead of submitting their grievances to an independent investigation, the Government called for a report upon them from the men incriminated. The answer of these men was the prompt institution of criminal proceedings against their accusers in Cameroon, with the result that by the beginning of December they had all been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment with hard labour. It appeared also that the petitioning chiefs had been arrested at once, in order to prevent their escape. The Colonial Department at home declined to confirm the sentences without further investigation; and in the end it quashed the whole proceedings and instituted a new enquiry by another and more impartial judge.

The matter came before the Diet, which took the side of the natives, condemned the refusal to them of even-handed justice, called for the revision of the entire

judicial status in the colony, the prohibition of the practice of putting to forced labour, keeping in chains, and even flogging natives who had been arrested pending trial, and calling for a new trial by an independent judge, the enquiry to include charges now made against the Governor. The result was that the Governor, Herr von Puttkamer, was called to Berlin to answer for himself. All kinds of unpleasant disclosures were now made; and the Diet freely occupied itself with the episode, while the Government did its best to discourage discussion and close the affair. As a result of disciplinary proceedings the Governor was found guilty of administrative laxity, and retired from the colonial service; while minor officers, both at home and in the colonies, had to be cashiered before the Diet was appeased. The Colonial Department of the Foreign Office was reorganized.

The Marshall Islands.—Early in 1906 a change was introduced in the administration of these islands. The contract between the Imperial Government and the Jaluit Company was annulled, and the government of the islands was transferred to the Empire, being carried on from New Guinea by the help of a district judge stationed in the islands. Henceforth the Jaluit Company devoted its attention exclusively to trading, like the New Guinea Company.

xv. Dr. Dernburg, Director

Before he had held his thankless office a year, Prince Hohenlohe was removed (September 1906). For years the cry of the Diet and the nation had been for the appointment to the position of Colonial Director of a practical business man. Such an appointment was now made in the person of Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who at the time of his call was the general manager of the Darmstädter Bank, one of the larger German banking corporations. He entered upon his task with complete understanding both of its character and its difficulty. It was his business, if

possible, to rehabilitate the colonies, put them on a new and sounder footing, bring efficiency into their administration and order into their finance, give to the development of their resources the serious and sustained stimulus for the lack of which most of the colonies had hitherto languished, and, by the employment of these and similar measures, to give back to the colonial movement the public confidence which had in so large a degree been forfeited.

He was prepared for obstacles and opposition, and these he encountered in more than one unexpected place. He had not long been in office before he made the discovery that the solicitude which the Centre party had been showing for the good government of the colonies was not entirely disinterested. After resisting in private continued interference and pressure from that quarter, Dr. Dernburg made a full disclosure to the Diet of the illegitimate influence which the Centre had for a long time been asserting and of the system of "co-government" which it had endeavoured to set up in this department of national affairs. In resentment at this ingratitude, the party, which was then not only the strongest single group in the Diet, but also held the balance of power, joined hands with the Social Democrats, and succeeded in withholding from the Government the funds needed for prosecuting the military measures in South-West Africa and for the construction of a railway from Lüderitz Bay to Kubub.

Defeated in the division lobby, the Government replied to the challenge by dissolving the Diet and appealing to the nation against the two parties which had thus sacrificed the public interest to political rancour. The result of Prince Bülow's appeal to the Radicals to make common cause with the Conservative and National Liberal groups in the ensuing electioneering campaign was the formation of the famous *bloc*, which so far carried the country that the elections gave the Government a substantial majority, by the aid of which the needed votes were promptly obtained.

(c) THE COLONIAL OFFICE PERIOD, 1907-1914

i. *Dernburg, Colonial Secretary*

One of the earliest consequences of the new prominence given to colonial enterprise was the conversion (May 1907) of the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office into a separate Imperial Office for colonial affairs, under the Chancellor. Dernburg, already Director, became the first Secretary of State for the Colonies. He had made the elections an occasion of a vigorous crusade in various parts of the country, in the course of which he expounded, at conferences and public meetings, different aspects of the colonial question. Like the practised financier that he was, he accomplished wonders by the use of imposing figures which no one could dispute because no one was in a position to test them. Instead of the colonial empire being the bankrupt enterprise which the nation had been led to believe it, he represented it as one of wonderful promise, needing only capital, labour, railways, and faith for its full development. He thus in a short time succeeded, as no preceding colonial administrator had done, in rekindling the early colonial ardour and in creating a confidence in colonial enterprise which had never existed before in an equal degree. And although, as he had held out hopes which events failed to substantiate, the inevitable reaction followed, colonial pessimism never again took possession of any large section of the nation; nor were the wisdom and duty of keeping the colonies and supporting them with energy and enterprise ever again questioned, even by Radicals or Social Democrats, though both continued to criticise colonial administration, not seldom for its good.

Dernburg made it his purpose to master colonial questions by personal contact; and, to that end, after spending some time in London for the purpose of learning what he could of British methods of colonial administration, he made long journeys of investigation in East and South-West Africa, as well as in the

adjoining British colonies. From Africa he brought home much useful experience, which he was not slow to use, together with the conviction that for past failures German administration, and still more the German traders, were largely to blame

In nothing did the "practical business man" more completely justify himself than in his prosecution of an energetic policy of railway construction. It was a hard task to persuade the Diet that more railways were an imperative need; but in the course of several years it was induced to vote large sums in grants and loans for this purpose. Still more effective for immediate purposes, however, was the discovery of diamonds in the sand dunes of Lüderitz Bay, and of gold and other precious minerals, in small quantities, in other parts of South-West Africa. In 1907 no diamond-prospecting company existed, but three years later there were over sixty such enterprises. Dernburg also succeeded in stimulating the zeal of the Hamburg merchants; and one of the most valuable results was the establishment there of a Colonial Institute for the training of candidates for the colonial service. The Hamburg institution, though the most important, is not however, the only agency of the kind; for increasing attention has long been given to the vocational training of colonial officials. Finally, it will remain to Dernburg's lasting credit that he championed the right of the native population to humane treatment, and endeavoured to enforce the claims of morality in trade and of justice in administration. In February 1908 the Colonial Council was abolished, and for a time no other organization was put in its place.

ii. *Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor: Later Secretaries*

The Imperial Chancellor and the Colonial Secretary laid down office within a year of one another—Prince Bülow being succeeded in July 1909

by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Dr. Dernburg in June of the following year by Dr. von Lindequist, the Colonial Under-Secretary. Von Lindequist held the office until November 1911 only, when he was succeeded by Dr. W. H. Solf, for twelve years Governor of Samoa, who retained the office until 1918. During Lindequist's brief tenure of office the Colonial Council was revived (July 1910) in the form of a Standing Commission of eleven members, whose purpose was likewise to advise the colonial administration on economic questions. In order that this Commission might keep in touch with the commercial needs of the country, the Chambers of Commerce of the larger towns were invited to appoint representatives upon it. Three years later (June 1913) its members were increased to twenty-five, with a view to the representation of a larger number of States and of branches of trade and industry.

iii. *Later Years*

During the years immediately preceding the Great War comparative quiet reigned in the colonies, and much useful development work was either completed or taken in hand. In the African colonies in particular, fertile territories were being more and more opened up to cultivation, the natural produce of the forest and jungle more systematically harvested, and mineral resources, where these existed, developed; while simultaneously the railway system was being extended, roads and waterways were being improved in the interest of transport, and much was being done for the welfare of the native populations by the extension of the hospital arrangements, sanitary measures, better housing, &c.

Railways.—Among these progressive measures the increase of the railways occupied a foremost place. In East Africa before the outbreak of war the Usambara (now called the North) Railway had been carried to its

terminus in the Kilimanjaro district, a distance of some 218 miles from the coast; while the Midland Railway from Dar es-Salaam had nearly reached Lake Tanganyika; it has since been completed, the entire length being about 777 miles. In Cameroon in 1914 the Northern Railway, 100 miles in length, had been completed, and the Midland Railway carried a distance of 93 miles. In Togo three lines into the interior, all running from Lome, with a total length of 203 miles, had been completed. In South-West Africa the State railway, from Swakopmund to Windhoek, a distance of 238 miles; the Otavi Railway, 428 miles; and the North—South and Southern Railways, 317 and 339 miles long respectively, were completed.¹

Nevertheless, it is admitted that even now, broadly speaking, only the coast districts and the immediate hinterlands have come under the hand of progress, while in the more distant interiors little has, as yet, been accomplished. Only when these vast regions have been opened up and their resources disclosed will the full value of the colonies be determined. To this end are necessary—besides a condition of peace, order, and security—capital, labour, and still more railways.

East Africa.—Considering the prospects of the several African colonies in the light of the knowledge and experience already gained, it seems safe to say that the future of East Africa, the largest and most valuable of them, will for a long time depend almost altogether upon its development as a plantation colony, and that its importance for the purpose of emigration is quite negligible. The same applies more or less in West Africa, except that in Cameroon there is valuable mineral wealth, which will attract white settlers so long as it lasts.

South-West Africa.—South-West Africa, on the other hand, has justified its reputation as an agricult-

¹ The above figures do not include certain lengths of local light railway and some private lines. The total mileage has been greatly increased since 1914.

tural and pastoral colony; and, for some time prior to the outbreak of war, the increase in its herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats was steadily augmenting the wealth of the country, the native population benefiting equally with the white farmers. It is true that the labour difficulty has never been successfully overcome; and, until stable conditions are created, this will continue to be a handicap. Nevertheless, it would appear that, in districts where for various reasons there is not a natural dearth of labour, employers who are prepared to offer their labourers tolerable conditions, and in general humane and considerate treatment, have in normal times little cause for complaint.

"As a rule," writes a British consul in a report upon German South-West Africa in 1913, "a farmer who knows how to manage his servants and understands their limitations has no difficulty in getting his work done. On some farms there are sufficient labourers for every emergency, while on others there are a few dissatisfied servants who take the first opportunity they can of changing their master."

These words merely attest the fact that black human nature does not in fundamentals greatly differ from white.

One of the great difficulties under which the farmers of this colony have hitherto laboured has been that of credit. Owing to a run of bad seasons and to inadequate facilities for disposing of their produce, they had fallen more and more into the hands of the traders, who were accustomed to make advances on their live-stock, which was often credited at below its value. In 1913 an endeavour was made to remedy this evil by the establishment of a land bank, with a capital of £500,000. Its object is to offer farmers credit on reasonable terms in the form of long-period loans, so relieving them from the anxiety attaching to dependence upon private credit institutions, able to call in their money at short notice. It will be an important part of the bank's work to make advances on favourable terms for the purpose of permanent works of amelioration.

As irrigation is extended and more accessible and

profitable markets are found, it is probable that the permanent prosperity of the colony will depend rather upon stockbreeding and agriculture than upon its mineral wealth. At the same time, there would appear to be little likelihood that the colony will offer a large field for settlers. The view generally held is that, from the agricultural standpoint, the country offers the best chance to the large cattle-breeder and rancher. Thus the farms bought or leased during a given year were found to average nearly 20,000 acres. On the other hand, the small settlers who have tried to establish themselves in the colony have generally failed. Endeavours have been made to settle peasant communities both of German and Boer families upon large areas of land; but these settlements do not appear to have prospered, and the Boer farmers in particular soon returned home.

At the present time, however, mining enterprise is on the increase; for, contrary to early expectations, South-West Africa has proved exceptionally rich in minerals. Copper has been found in considerable quantities; tin, lead, silver, gold, and also wolfram and galena have been traced; but as yet coal has not been found in quantity sufficient to be profitably worked. So far as immediate results are concerned, diamond mining has proved most remunerative, though it remains to be seen how long this enterprise will last.

Mining concessions were very numerous in the early days of prospecting, but now they have, in the main, found their way into the hands of six or seven large companies, of which the most important are the German Colonial Company and the Otavi Mining and Railway Company. The entire mining enterprise of the country is regulated by the Imperial Mining Ordinance of 1905; and mining concessions in general have been latterly granted by the Government with far greater care and discrimination than was formerly the case. The Government has from the first severely controlled the diamond-mining industry, and in recent years has gone so far as to regulate the production by a series of

ordinances. The whole of the output has to be disposed of by a *Régie*, in which the Government is interested equally with the producers. Its interest in the healthy development of the diamond industry is all the greater since a large part of the revenue of the colony is derived from this source.

In considering the future of South-West Africa in particular, the question of its future ownership is one of critical importance. Before the war it was evident that German colonial writers were by no means agreed as to the permanent tranquillity of the colony. Some writers even anticipated the outbreak, at no distant day, of a violent struggle between whites and blacks, in which one of the two would have to go under. Writing of the Ovahereros in particular, Dr. Carl Dove, a recognised authority upon German South-West Africa, says:¹—

“ The mass constitutes a permanent menace to security, because an ungovernable hatred of the whites lies in the hearts of these people, a hatred which no baptismal water will exorcise and no education eradicate so long as the rulers of the country continue to be whites ”

Accordingly, he calls for the application to the natives not of a clement, but a rigorous régime. Their white masters must “ go over to a method of treatment which the Boers have always applied to the Kaffirs,” for “ leniency towards the blacks is cruelty to the whites.”¹

iv. *White Population in the Colonies*

The following table shows the extent of the white population (Germans being given separately) and the strength of the military and police forces in the various colonies; the population figures relating to January 1, 1913, and the others being those of the colonial estimates for 1914:—

¹ *Deutsch-Südwestafrika*, p. 195.

	White Population.		No. of Colonial Troops.		Police Force	
	Total.	Of whom Germans.	German.	Native.	German.	Native.
East Africa ..	5,336	4,107	260	2,472	67	2,140
Cameroon ..	1,871	1,643	205	1,650	47	1,450
Togo ..	368	320	9	560
South-West Africa ..	14,830	12,292	1,967	589	516	370
New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago	968	746	32	932
Caroline, Pelew, Mariana, and Marshall Islands ..	459	259		
Samoa ..	544	329	2	52
Kiaochow ..	4,470	4,256	2,625	..	34	100
Totals ..	28,846	23,952	5,057	4,711	707	5,604

v. *Cost of the Colonies*

The increasing extent to which the German Imperial Government made itself responsible not merely for the administration but for the opening-up of the colonies, the development of their economic resources, the creation of improved means of locomotion and transport by land and water, and the health of the native populations, was reflected in a constant growth of expenditure, and consequently of the deficits, which had to be met, in large part, out of taxation in Germany. The ordinary expenditure of the colonies, including Kiaochow, their own revenue, and the resulting deficits, since the establishment of the Colonial Office in 1907, were as follows:—

	Total Expenditure.	Own Revenue of the Colonies.	Deficits.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
1907	78,130,000	23,580,000	49,550,000
1908	155,530,000	24,110,000	131,420,000
1909	68,110,000	42,530,000	25,580,000
1910	82,450,000	48,720,000	33,730,000
1911	96,690,000	53,180,000	43,510,000
1912	87,630,000	64,520,000	23,110,000
1913 ¹	105,810,000	67,930,000	37,880,000

Since 1908, however, a considerable amount of non-recurrent expenditure for colonial purposes, not always in the nature of capital investments, has been covered by loans. In the case of East Africa, Cameroon, and Togo these loans were taken over by the colonies themselves, the Empire meeting the interest and repayments—an arrangement no doubt devised in order to remind the colonies that the imperial subsidies, though for the time being inevitable, were given as an act of grace, and were not to be regarded as prejudicing the expectation of the Imperial Government that the colonial administrations would be prepared to bear their own burdens as soon as they should have reached a suitable stage of development. Such extraordinary expenditure, which does not appear in the annual budgets of the several colonies, was as follows:—

	Marks.
1908	37,370,000
1909	33,080,000
1910	35,950,000
1911	33,280,000
1912	31,490,000
1913	52,200,000

If we add to the ordinary expenditure the extraordinary, non-recurrent outlay which has been met by

¹ The figures for this year are those of the Colonial Estimates.

loans since 1908, the gross expenditure was as follows :—

			Marks.
1908	192,900,000
1909	101,190,000
1910	118,400,000
1911	129,970,000
1912	119,120,000
1913	158,010,000

. vi. *Taxation*

A word may be added as to the principal sources of taxation in the various colonies. Apart from Customs duties, these were in 1914 as follows :—

East Africa.—A house and hut tax and a trade tax; but revenue is also derived from gun, game, and timber-felling licences, a spirit tax, death duties, and harbour dues.

Cameroon.—A poll and house tax, spirit licences, a trade tax, and tribute levied in the Lake Chad region, with gun licences and harbour dues as minor sources.

Togo.—A poll tax, licences to trade in rubber and spirits, and a trade tax, with gun and dog taxes.

South-West Africa.—A brandy tax, spirit licences, trade, land, beer, and dog taxes, supplemented by road and carriage, gun, and game licences.

New Guinea and the Pacific Colonies.—Income, poll, plantation, and trade taxes, with shipping trade, arms, ammunition, and spirit licences.

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*HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty ; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference ; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense ; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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PART 1. NEUTRAL PERIOD. AUGUST 1914—APRIL 1916

AUGUST 5, 1914. MESSAGE TO THE BELLIGERENTS

As official head of one of the Powers signatory to the Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty, under Article 3 of that Convention, to say to you in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome the opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any other time that might be thought more suitable, as an occasion to serve you and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness.

AUGUST 18, 1914. APPEAL TO THE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY

The people of the United States may be divided into camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.

Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

DECEMBER 8, 1914. SECOND ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS

We are the champions of peace and of concord. And we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought to earn. Just now we should be particularly jealous of it, because it is our dearest present hope that

this character and reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations.

APRIL 20, 1915. SPEECH AT THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
LUNCHEON, NEW YORK

Is it not likely that the nations of the world will some day turn to us for the cooler assessment of the elements engaged? I am not now thinking so preposterous a thought as that we should sit in judgement upon them—no nation is fit to sit in judgement upon any other nation—but that we shall some day have to assist in reconstructing the processes of peace. . . .

We are the mediating nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarrelling. I mean the word in a broader sense. We are compounded of the nations of the world; we mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things. We are, therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating nation.

NOVEMBER 4, 1915. SPEECH AT THE MANHATTAN CLUB,
NEW YORK

We shall, I confidently believe, never again take another foot of territory by conquest. We shall never in any circumstances seek to make an independent people subject

to our dominion ; because we believe, we passionately believe, in the right of every people to choose their own allegiance and be free of masters altogether.

DECEMBER 7, 1915. THIRD ANNUAL ADDRESS TO
CONGRESS

We have stood apart, studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so. Not only did we have no part or interest in the policies which seem to have brought the conflict on ; it was necessary, if a universal catastrophe was to be avoided, that a limit should be set to the sweep of destructive war and that some part of the great family of nations should keep the processes of peace alive, if only to prevent collective economic ruin and the break-down throughout the world of the industries by which its populations are fed and sustained. It was manifestly the duty of the self-governed nations of this hemisphere to redress, if possible, the balance of economic loss and confusion in the other, if they could do nothing more. In the day of readjustment and recuperation we earnestly hope and believe that they can be of infinite service. . . .

I have spoken to you to-day, gentlemen, upon a single theme, the thorough preparation of the nation to care for its own security and to make sure of entire freedom to play the impartial rôle in this hemisphere and in the world which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to it. I have had in my mind no thought of any immediate or particular danger arising out of our relations with other nations. We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is reason to hope that no question in controversy between this and other Governments will lead to any serious breach of amicable relations, grave as some differences of attitude and policy have been and may yet turn out to be.

JANUARY 29, 1916. SPEECH AT CLEVELAND, OHIO

In the meantime we, the people of the United States, are the one great disengaged Power, the one neutral Power, finding it exceedingly difficult to be neutral, because, like men everywhere else, we are human ; we have the deep passions of mankind in us ; we have sympathies that are as easily stirred as the sympathies of any other people ; we have interests which we see being drawn slowly into the maelstrom of this tremendous upheaval.

FEBRUARY 24, 1916. LETTER TO SENATOR STONE

NOTE.—This letter was addressed to the question of the expediency of American citizens exercising the right to travel upon British passenger steamers, in view of the German submarine policy.

For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honour and self-respect of the Nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honour. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance.

PART 2. CRITICAL PERIOD. APRIL 1916—APRIL 1917**APRIL 19, 1916. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ON GERMAN
SUBMARINE POLICY**

I have deemed it my duty, therefore, to say to the Imperial German Government that if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, notwithstanding the now demonstrated impossibility of conducting that warfare in accordance with what the Government

of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue; and that unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether.

MAY 27, 1916. SPEECH TO AMERICAN LEAGUE TO ENFORCE
PEACE

Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the same high code of honour that we demand of individuals. . . .

The principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but there must be a common agreement for a common object, and at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind. . . .

We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which

they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended against that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have been honourable enough to admit ; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. . . .

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines : First, such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees. Second, an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

MAY 30, 1916. SPEECH ON MEMORIAL DAY, AT ARLINGTON

Some of the public prints have reminded me, as if I needed to be reminded, of what General Washington warned us against. He warned us against entangling alliances. I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but I would gladly assent to a disentangling

alliance—an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests and unite the people of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There is the achievement of the highest things for which the United States has declared its principle.

**JUNE 13, 1916. ADDRESS TO GRADUATING CLASS OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

I want to say a word to you young gentlemen about militarism. You are not militarists because you are military. Militarism does not consist in the existence of an army, not even in the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit. It is a point of view. It is a system. It is a purpose. The purpose of militarism is to use armies for aggression.

**SEPTEMBER 2, 1916. ADDRESS ON ACCEPTING
RE-NOMINATION**

Look first at what it will be necessary that the nations of the world should do to make the days to come tolerable and fit to live and work in ; and then look at our part in what is to follow and our own duty of preparation. For we must be prepared both in resources and in policy.

There must be a just and settled peace, and we here in America must contribute the full force of our enthusiasm and of our authority as a nation to the organization of that peace upon world-wide foundations that cannot easily be shaken. No nation should be forced to take sides in any quarrel in which its own honour and integrity and the fortunes of its own people are not involved ; but no nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. The effects of war can no longer be confined to the areas of battle. No

nation stands wholly apart in interest when the life and interests of all nations are thrown into confusion and peril. If hopeful and generous enterprise is to be renewed, if the healing and helpful arts of life are indeed to be revived when peace comes again, a new atmosphere of justice and friendship must be generated by means the world has never tried before. The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted.

DECEMBER 18, 1916. PEACE NOTE TO BELLIGERENTS, IN
REPLY TO GERMAN OVERTURES OF DEC. 12

He (the President) takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United

States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done to civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world which all desire, and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part.

JANUARY 22, 1917. ADDRESS TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several

interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgement upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late. . . .

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind. . . .

It must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon a quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the indi-

vidual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be ; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. . . .

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own. . . .

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy

between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace, and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind. . . .

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world : that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and

selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed ; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty ; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

FEBRUARY 3, 1917. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ANNOUNCING SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

NOTE.—On January 31, the German Ambassador had presented a note proclaiming Germany's intention to sink all ships without exception, after February 1, in a zone placed round the Entente countries. After announcing the severance of diplomatic relations, the President added :

I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them, and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded ; if American ships and American lives

should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral Governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it ; and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defence of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people which I sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war.

MARCH 5, 1917. SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS,
WASHINGTON

These, therefore, are the things we shall stand for, whether in war or in peace :

That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples, and equally responsible for their maintenance ;

That the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege ;

That peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power ;

That Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose, or power of the family of nations.

That the seas should be equally free and safe for the use of all peoples, under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that, so far as practicable, they should be accessible to all upon equal terms ;

That national armaments should be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety ;

That the community of interest and of power upon which peace must henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented.

APRIL 2, 1917. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS RECOMMENDING
DECLARATION OF WAR

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. . . .

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. . . .

We are now about to accept gage of battle with this

natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

PART 3. AFTER INTERVENTION.¹

APRIL 1917—DECEMBER 1918

APRIL 15, 1917. ADDRESS TO HIS FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN CONCERNING THE WAR

There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself. We must realize to the full how great the task is and how many things, how many kinds and elements of capacity and service and self-sacrifice, it involves.

¹ The United States Government declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917.

MAY 12, 1917. SPEECH AT THE DEDICATION OF THE RED
CROSS BUILDING, WASHINGTON

I say the heart of the country is in this war because it would not have gone into it if its heart had not been prepared for it. It would not have gone into it if it had not first believed that here was an opportunity to express the character of the United States.

We have gone in with no special grievance of our own, because we have always said that we were the friends and servants of mankind. We look for no profit. We look for no advantage. We will accept no advantage out of this war.

We go because we believe that the very principles upon which the American Republic was founded are now at stake and must be vindicated.

JUNE 9, 1917. COMMUNICATION TO PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA

In view of the approaching visit of the American delegation to Russia to express the deep friendship of the American people for the people of Russia and to discuss the best and most practical means of co-operation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation, it seems opportune and appropriate that I should state again, in the light of this new partnership, the objects the United States has had in mind in entering the war. Those objects have been very much beclouded during the past few weeks by mistaken and misleading statements, and the issues at stake are too momentous, too tremendous, too significant, for the whole human race to permit any misinterpretations or misunderstandings, however slight, to remain uncorrected for a moment.

The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to escape the inevitable ultimate defeat, those who are in authority in Germany are using every

possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just or fair, or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the undoing of the very men they are using.

The position of America in this war is so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force.

The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin to Baghdad and beyond. Government after Government has by their influence, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the *status quo ante*. It was the *status quo ante* out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and

the undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjustments will, and whatever readjustments are necessary must, be made.

But they must follow a principle; and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

JUNE 14, 1917. ADDRESS ON FLAG DAY, WASHINGTON

It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defence of our rights as a free people and of our honour as a sovereign Government. The

military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance,—and some of those agents were men connected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her,—and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbours with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonoured had we withheld our hand.

But that is only part of the story. We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate, or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because

the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under its mastery or fling itself free.

The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom Governments existed and in whom Governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller States, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their classrooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well-advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and make interest with her Government, developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Baghdad. They hoped those demands might arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms.

Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military

power and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia ; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else ! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force,—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, Turks, Armenians,—the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.

And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing plan into execution ! Look how things stand. Austria is at their mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation ever since the war began. Its people now desire peace, but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin. The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Rumania is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not them-

selves, and the guns of German warships lying in the harbour at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin. From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread.

Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? Peace, peace, peace has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the advantage. A little of the talk has been public, but most of it has been private. Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the German Government would be willing to accept. That Government has other valuable pawns in its hands besides those I have mentioned. It still holds a valuable part of France, though with slowly relaxing grasp, and practically the whole of Belgium. Its armies press close upon Russia and overrun Poland at their will. It cannot go farther; it dare not go back. It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand.

The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them. If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people: they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it: an

immense expansion of German power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside ; a Government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except Germany. If they succeed they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone ; if they fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression ; if they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union.

Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect their purpose, the deceit of the nations ? Their present particular aim is to deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the rights of peoples and the self-government of nations ; for they see what immense strength the forces of justice and of liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Germany and without, as their spokesmen whom they have hitherto despised and oppressed, using them for their own destruction—Socialists, the leaders of labour, the thinkers they have hitherto sought to silence. Let them once succeed and these men, now their tools, will be ground to powder beneath the weight of the great military empire they will have set up ; the revolutionists in Russia will be cut off from all succour or co-operation in western Europe and a counter-revolution fostered and supported ; Germany herself will lose her chance of freedom ; and all Europe will arm for the next, the final struggle.

The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted

in this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe to which the agents and dupes of the Imperial German Government can get access. That Government has many spokesmen here, in places high and low. They have learned discretion. They keep within the law. It is opinion they utter now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch America with no danger to either her lands or her institutions; set England at the centre of the stage and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the politics of the nations; and seek to undermine the Government with false professions of loyalty to its principles.

But they will make no headway. The false betray themselves always in every accent. It is only friends and partisans of the German Government whom we have already identified who utter these thinly disguised disloyalties. The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a Peoples' War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and the most irresistible armaments—a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

For us there is but one choice. We have made it. Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new lustre. Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes the great faith to which we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

AUGUST 27, 1917. REPLY TO THE POPE'S APPEAL FOR
PEACE DATED AUGUST 1

SECRETARY OF STATE LANSING TO HIS HOLINESS BENE-
DICTUS XV, POPE :

In acknowledgement of the communication of Your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply :

‘Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of His Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires ; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgement what will ensure us against it.

‘His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the *status quo ante bellum*, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration ; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established ; and that the territorial claims of

France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

‘It is manifest that no part of this programme can be successfully carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honour; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands baulked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

‘To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue,

the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation ?

‘ Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

‘ The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this : Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing Government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other ? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter ; and it is the test which must be applied.

‘ The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at

the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

‘We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.’

NOVEMBER 12, 1917. SPEECH TO THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOUR CONVENTION, BUFFALO

I think that in order to realize just what this moment of counsel is it is very desirable that we should remind ourselves just how this war came about and just what it is for. You can explain most wars very simply, but the explanation of this is not so simple. Its roots run deep into all the obscure soils of history, and in my view this is the last decisive issue between the old principle of power and the new principle of freedom.

The war was started by Germany. Her authorities deny that they started it, but I am willing to let the statement I have just made await the verdict of history. And the thing that needs to be explained is why Germany started the war. Remember what the position of Germany in the world was—as enviable a position as any nation has ever occupied. The whole world stood in admiration of her wonderful intellectual and material achievements. All the intellectual men of the world went to school to her. As a university man I have been surrounded by men trained in Germany, men who had resorted to Germany because nowhere else could they get such thorough and searching training, particularly in the principles of science and the principles that underlie modern material achievement. Her men of science had made her industries perhaps the most competent industries of the world, and the label ‘Made in Germany’ was a guarantee of good workmanship and of sound material. She had access to all the markets of the world, and every other nation who traded in those markets feared Germany because of her effective and almost irresistible competition. She had a ‘place in the sun’.

Why was she not satisfied? What more did she want? There was nothing in the world of peace that she did not already have and have in abundance. We boast of the extraordinary pace of American advancement. We show with pride the statistics of the increase of our industries and of the population of our cities. Well, those statistics did not match the recent statistics of Germany. Her old cities took on youth and grew faster than any American cities ever grew. Her old industries opened their eyes and saw a new world and went out for its conquest. And yet the authorities of Germany were not satisfied. You have one part of the answer to the question why she was not satisfied in her methods of competition. There is no important industry in Germany upon which the Govern-

ment has not laid its hands, to direct it and, when necessity arose, control it ; and you have only to ask any man whom you meet who is familiar with the conditions that prevailed before the war in the matter of national competition to find out the methods of competition which the German manufacturers and exporters used under the patronage and support of the Government of Germany. You will find that they were the same sort of competition that we have tried to prevent by law within our own borders. If they could not sell their goods cheaper than we could sell ours at a profit to themselves they could get a subsidy from the Government which made it possible to sell them cheaper anyhow, and the conditions of competition were thus controlled in large measure by the German Government itself.

But that did not satisfy the German Government. All the while there was lying behind its thought and in its dreams of the future a political control which would enable it in the long run to dominate the labour and the industry of the world. They were not content with success by superior achievement ; they wanted success by authority. I suppose very few of you have thought much about the Berlin to Baghdad Railway. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway was constructed in order to run the threat of force down the flank of the industrial undertakings of half a dozen other countries ; so that, when German competition came in, it would not be resisted too far, because there was always the possibility of getting German armies into the heart of that country quicker than any other armies could be got there.

Look at the map of Europe now ! Germany is thrusting upon us again and again the discussion of peace talks—about what ? Talks about Belgium ; talks about northern France ; talks about Alsace-Lorraine. Well, those are deeply interesting subjects to us and to them, but they are not the heart of the matter. Take the map and look at

it. Germany has absolute control of Austria-Hungary, practical control of the Balkan States, control of Turkey, control of Asia Minor. I saw a map in which the whole thing was printed in appropriate black the other day, and the black stretched all the way from Hamburg to Baghdad—the bulk of German power inserted into the heart of the world. If she can keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contemplated when the war began. If she can keep that, her power can disturb the world as long as she keeps it, always provided, for I feel bound to put this proviso in—always provided the present influences that control the German Government continue to control it. I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of Germans and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other hearts, but the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan-Germans. Power cannot be used with concentrated force against free peoples if it is used by free people.

You know how many intimations come to us from one of the Central Powers that it is more anxious for peace than the chief Central Power, and you know that it means that the people in that Central Power know that if the war ends as it stands they will in effect themselves be vassals of Germany, notwithstanding that their populations are compounded of all the peoples of that part of the world, and notwithstanding the fact that they do not wish in their pride and proper spirit of nationality to be so absorbed and dominated. Germany is determined that the political power of the world shall belong to her. There have been such ambitions before. They have been in part realized, but never before have those ambitions been based upon so exact and precise and scientific a plan of domination.

May I not say that it is amazing to me that any group of persons should be so ill-informed as to suppose, as some groups in Russia apparently suppose, that any reforms

planned in the interest of the people can live in the presence of a Germany powerful enough to undermine or overthrow them by intrigue or force? Any body of free men that compounds with the present German Government is compounding for its own destruction. But that is not the whole of the story. Any man in America or anywhere else that supposes that the free industry and enterprise of the world can continue if the Pan-German plan is achieved and German power fastened upon the world is as fatuous as the dreamers in Russia. What I am opposed to is not the feeling of the pacifists, but their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind has a contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it, and they do not.

You will notice that I sent a friend of mine, Col. House, to Europe, who is as great a lover of peace as any man in the world; but I didn't send him on a peace mission yet. I sent him to take part in a conference as to how the war was to be won, and he knows, as I know, that that is the way to get peace, if you want it for more than a few minutes.

All of this is a preface to the conference that I have referred to with regard to what we are going to do. If we are true friends of freedom, our own or anybody else's, we will see that the power of this country and the productivity of this country is raised to its absolute maximum, and that absolutely nobody is allowed to stand in the way of it. When I say that nobody is allowed to stand in the way I do not mean that they shall be prevented by the power of Government but by the power of the American spirit. Our duty, if we are to do this great thing and show America to be what we believe her to be—the greatest hope and energy of the world—is to stand together night and day until the job is finished.

NOVEMBER 17, 1917. TELEGRAM TO THE KING OF THE
BELGIANS

HIS MAJESTY ALBERT,
King of the Belgians, Havre.

I take pleasure in extending to Your Majesty greetings of friendship and goodwill on this your fête day.

For the people of the United States, I take this occasion to renew expressions of deep sympathy for the sufferings which Belgium has endured under the wilful, cruel, and barbaric force of a disappointed Prussian autocracy.

The people of the United States were never more in earnest than in their determination to prosecute to a successful conclusion this war against that Power and to secure, for the future, obedience to the laws of nations and respect for the rights of humanity.

DECEMBER 4, 1917. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS :

Eight months have elapsed since I last had the honour of addressing you. They have been months crowded with events of immense and grave significance for us. I shall not undertake to retail or even to summarize those events. The practical particulars of the part we have played in them will be laid before you in the reports of the Executive Departments. I shall discuss only our present outlook upon these vast affairs, our present duties, and the immediate means of accomplishing the objects we shall hold always in view.

I shall not go back to debate the causes of the war. The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed. But I shall ask you to consider again and with a very grave scrutiny our objectives and the measures

by which we mean to attain them ; for the purpose of discussion here in this place is action, and our action must move straight towards definite ends. Our object is, of course, to win the war ; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won ?

From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it. As a nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent—who does not ? I hear the criticism and the clamour of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten.

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people, and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise—deeply and indignantly impatient—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what

our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things : First, that this intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations ; and, second, that when this Thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgement of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends.

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind ; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula ' No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities '. Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgement as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray, and the people of every other country their agents could

reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.

But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peace-maker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or of materials, is being devoted, and will continue to be devoted, to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan

states, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enterprise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired; rather. She had built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of manufacture, science, and commerce that were involved for us in her success and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away, to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms, by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated. The peace we make must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the

German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defence against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candour as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are in fact fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbours or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of Governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that ; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they

cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all Governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusion will run with those tides.

All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs towards an

ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often.

From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose, to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude towards the settlement that must come when it is over. When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations, and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient.

What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success, and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that

this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you ? It is not. It is in fact the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us, but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others. . . .

We know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation ; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in ; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honour ; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people ; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honour for ever sullied and brought into contempt, were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are

banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we enter the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardour of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honour among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favour, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of His own justice and mercy.

**JANUARY 8, 1918. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ON CONDITIONS
OF PEACE (THE FOURTEEN POINTS)**

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS :

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible bases of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers, to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into

a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite programme of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific programme of practical terms was added. That programme proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to become their associates

in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the Resolutions of the German Reichstag of the nineteenth of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candour. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candour and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects

of the war, lies with Germany and her Allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what it is humane and honourable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret

understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by ; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in ; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme ; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this :

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording

mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the Governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved ; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident

principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honour, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

FEBRUARY 11, 1918. ADDRESS TO CONGRESS (FOUR PRINCIPLES) IN REPLY TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. (See Appendix 1)

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS :

On the eighth of January I had the honour of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the fifth of January. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the twenty-fourth and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of the eighth of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Govern-

ments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them : but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities, and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three states now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighbourhood. He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments.

That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the 'conditions' under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan states he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all round, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag Resolutions of the nineteenth of July, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state

and state. The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world ; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connexions, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgement on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world ? The Reichstag Resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected ; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ' Self-determination ' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful

states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgement whether it be right and fair, an act of justice rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany, against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful Governments which consider themselves most directly

affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also ? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded ; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve ; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less

embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these :

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent ;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the balance of power ; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states ; and

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance

is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I should not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words but a passion which, once set in action, must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

APRIL 6, 1918. SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE THIRD
LIBERTY LOAN CAMPAIGN, BALTIMORE

FELLOW-CITIZENS :

This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The Nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know, what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men and, if need be, all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reason for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of Justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow-countrymen, that at

no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen, and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgement, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgement. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonour our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said—in indefinite

and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favourable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build

upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That programme once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the World, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind !

The thing is preposterous and impossible ; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved ? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with unpitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do ? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed

—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honour and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us : Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

MAY 18, 1918. SPEECH AT THE NEW YORK
OPERA HOUSE

There are two duties with which we are face to face. The first duty is to win the war. And the second duty is that which goes hand in hand with it ; it is to win it greatly and worthily, showing not only the real quality of our power, but the real quality of our purpose and of ourselves. Of course the duty that we must keep in the foreground until it is accomplished is to win the war. I have heard gentlemen recently say that we must get five million men ready. Why limit it to five million ? I have asked the Congress of

the United States to name no limit, because Congress intends, I am sure, as we all intend, that every ship that can carry men or supplies shall go laden upon every voyage, with every man and every supply she can carry.

And we are not to be diverted from the grim purpose of winning the war by any insincere approaches upon the subject of peace. I can say with a clear conscience that I have tested those intimations and have found them insincere. I now recognize them for what they are, an opportunity to have a free hand, particularly in the East, to carry out the purposes of conquest and exploitation. Every proposal with regard to accommodation in the West involves a reservation with regard to the East.

Now, so far as I am concerned, I intend to stand by Russia as well as France. The helpless and friendless are the very ones that need friends and succour, and if any man in Germany thinks we are going to sacrifice anybody for our own sake I tell them now they are mistaken, for the glory of this war, my fellow-citizens, so far as we are concerned, is that it is, perhaps for the first time in history, an unselfish war; I could not be proud to fight for a selfish purpose, but I can be proud to fight for mankind. If they wish for peace, let them come forward through accredited representatives and lay their terms on the table. We have laid ours, and they know what they are.

Have you formed a picture in your imagination of what this war is doing for us and for the world? In my own mind I am convinced that not a hundred years of peace could have knitted this nation together as this single year of war has knitted it together, and, better even than that, if possible, it is knitting the world together. Look at the picture. In the centre of the scene four nations engaged against the world, and at every point of vantage showing that they are seeking selfish aggrandizement; and against them twenty-three Governments representing the greater part of the population of the world, drawn together into

a new sense of community of interest, a new sense of community of purpose, a new sense of unity of life.

Friendship is the only cement that will ever hold the world together, and this intimate contact of the great Red Cross of the peoples who are suffering the terrors and deprivations of this war is going to be one of the greatest instrumentalities of friendship that the world ever knew, and the centre of the heart of it all, if we sustain it properly, will be this land that we so dearly love. My friends, a great day of duty has come, and duty finds a man's soul as no kind of work can ever find it. May I say this? The duty that faces us all now is to serve one another, and no man can afford to make a fortune out of this war. There are men amongst us who have forgotten that, if they ever saw it.

And think what we have here! We call it the American Red Cross, but it is merely a branch of a great international organization, which is not only recognized by the statutes of each of the civilized Governments of the world, but it is recognized by international agreement and treaty as the recognized and accepted instrument of mercy and succour. And one of the deepest stains that rests upon the reputation of the German Army is that they have not respected the Red Cross. That goes to the root of the matter. They have not respected the instrumentality they themselves participated in setting up as the thing which no man was to touch, because it was the expression of common humanity.

If you could read some of the touching dispatches which come through official channels, for even through those channels there come voices of humanity that are infinitely pathetic; if you could catch some of those voices that speak of the utter longing of oppressed and helpless peoples all over the world, and hear something like the battle-hymn of the Republic, hear the feet of the great hosts of liberty going to set them free, to set their minds free, to set their lives free, to set their children free, then you would know

what comes into the heart of those who are trying to contribute all the brains and power that they have to this great enterprise of liberty.

JULY 4, 1918. SPEECH AT WASHINGTON'S TOMB (FOUR OBJECTS)

I am happy to draw apart with you to this quiet place of old counsel in order to speak a little of the meaning of this day of our nation's independence. The place seems very still and remote. It is as serene and untouched by the hurry of the world as it was in those great days long ago when General Washington was here and held leisurely conference with the men who were to be associated with him in the creation of a nation. From these gentle slopes they looked out upon the world and saw it whole, saw it with the light of the future upon it, saw it with modern eyes that turned away from a past which men of liberated spirits could no longer endure. It is for that reason that we cannot feel even here, in the immediate presence of this sacred tomb, that this is a place of death. It was a place of achievement. A great promise that was meant for all mankind was here given plan and reality. The associations by which we are here surrounded are the inspiring associations of that noble death which is only a glorious consummation.

From this green hillside we also ought to be able to see with comprehending eyes that world that lies about us, and should conceive anew the purposes that must set men free. It is significant of their own character and purpose and of the influences they were setting afoot—that Washington and his associates, like the Barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted not for a class, but a people. It has been left for us to see to it that it shall be understood that they spoke and acted not for a single people only but for all mankind. They were thinking not of themselves and of the material interests which centred in the little groups of landowners and merchants and men of affairs with whom they were

accustomed to act in Virginia and the colonies to the north and south of her, but of a people which wished to be done with classes and special interests and the authority of men whom they had not themselves chosen to rule over them.

They entertained no private purpose, desired no peculiar privilege. They were consciously planning that men of every class should be free, and America a place to which men out of every nation might resort who wished to share with them the rights and privileges of free men.

And we take our cue from them, do we not? We intend what they intended. We here in America believe our participation in this present war to be only the fruitage of what they planted. Our case differs from theirs only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what they would have done had they been in our place. There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw to-day.

This is surely a fitting place from which calmly to look out upon our task that we may fortify our spirits for its accomplishment. And this is the appropriate place from which to avow, alike to the friends who look on and to the friends with whom we have the happiness to be associated in action, the faith and purpose with which we act.

This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plain upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world—not only the peoples actually engaged but many others also who suffer under mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world—the people of stricken Russia still, among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized and helpless.

Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stands an isolated, friendless group of Governments who speak no common purpose but only selfish ambitions of their own, by which none can profit but themselves and whose people are fuel in their hands; Governments which fear their people and yet are for the time their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power—Governments clothed with the strange trappings and the primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own.

The past and the present are in deadly grapple, and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them. There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No half-way decision is conceivable.

These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace :

First, the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

Second, the settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

Third, the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized

society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States, and in their relations with one another to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

Fourth, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right, and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit, and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence: *What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.* These great ends cannot be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity.

I can fancy that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States. And I stand here now to speak—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself.

The blinded rulers of Prussia have aroused forces they

knew little of, forces which, once roused, can never be crushed to earth again, for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless, and of the very stuff of triumph.

SEPTEMBER 27, 1918. SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE
FOURTH LIBERTY LOAN CAMPAIGN, NEW YORK (THE
FIVE CONDITIONS)

. . . The war has lasted more than four years, and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement.

We came into it when its character had become fully defined, and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us; and we responded fiercely and of courage. The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them.

The issues are these :

Shall the military power of any nation, or group of nations, be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force ?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purposes and interest ?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force, or by their own will and choice ?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or shall the strong do as they will, and the weak suffer without redress ?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights ?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They are issues of it ; and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We all agree that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucarest. They have convinced us that they are without honour, and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot 'come to terms' with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any

kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the tactical implications that are involved in it.

If it be, in deed and in truth, the common object of the Governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it ; and ready and willing also to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honoured and fulfilled. That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed ; and of not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be inefficacious without such an instrumentality by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed. Peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace ; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have

proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connexion with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical programme. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace :

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities

have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely, and the well-known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest.

We still read Washington's immortal warning against 'entangling alliances' with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance, which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation, which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubting and mischievous perversions of counsel, and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigue and weakening *moral* and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be unceremoniously, aside, and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite as plainly, if in less varnished terms.

As I have said, neither I, nor any other man in Governmental authority, created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly, and with a resolution that has grown warm and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be wilfully. I am bound to fight for them, and fight for them as time and circumstances have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that, while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background; and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time that they came together, and are still demanding, that the

leaders of their Governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of their final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and discussions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of these deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the question asked because they did not know how searching these questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken, or can get some one to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the Governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak.

I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of these issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battlefield; and with perfect unity

of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way.

'Peace drives' can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples, and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed for ever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the 'terms' she will accept, and always finds that the world does not want terms of peace; it wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

OCTOBER 8, 1918. REPLY¹ TO GERMAN PEACE NOTE OF
OCTOBER 4. (See Appendix 2)

I have the honour to acknowledge, on behalf of the President, your Note of October 6, enclosing a communication from the German Government to the President; and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor:

Before making a reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that the reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the Note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8 last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application? The President feels bound to say, with regard to the suggestion of an armistice, that he would

¹ This reply was addressed to the Swiss Minister at Washington.

not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

ROBERT LANSING.

October 8, 1918.

OCTOBER 14, 1918. REPLY¹ TO GERMAN COMMUNICATION
OF OCTOBER 12. (See Appendix 3)

In reply to the communication of the German Government dated the twelfth instant which you handed me to-day I have the honour to request you to transmit the following answer :

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his addresses to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision in regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th² and 12th of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgement and advice of the military

¹ This reply was addressed to the Swiss Minister at Washington.

² Thus in original reply : the real date being the 4th, handed to the President on the 6th.

advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgement and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in. At the very time the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is

contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4 last. It is as follows :

‘ The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.’

The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President’s words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves.

The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgement, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

ROBERT LANSING.

October 14, 1918.

OCTOBER 23, 1918. REPLY¹ TO GERMAN COMMUNICATION
OF OCTOBER 20. (See Appendix 4)

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 22nd, transmitting a communication, under date of the 20th, from the German Government, and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows :

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to Congress of the United States on the 8th January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, parti-

¹ This reply was addressed to the Swiss Minister in Washington.

cularly the address of the 27th September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application ; and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people ; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it is his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has therefore transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence

of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his Note of the 20th October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent.

Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been, and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will, that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired, that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany.

Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that, in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people, who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.

If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

ROBERT LANSING.

October 23, 1918.

DECEMBER 2, 1918. ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS

The year that has elapsed since I last stood before you to fulfil my constitutional duty to give to Congress from time to time information on the state of the Union has been so crowded with great events, great processes, and great results that I cannot hope to give you an adequate picture of its transactions or of the far-reaching changes which have been brought about in the life of our nation and of the world. You have yourselves witnessed these things as I have. It is too soon to assess them, and we who stand in the midst of them and are part of them are less qualified than men of another generation will be to say what they mean or even what they have been. But some great outstanding facts are unmistakable, and constitute, in a sense, part of the public business with which it is our duty to deal. To state them is to set the stage for the legislative and executive action which must grow out of them, and which we have yet to shape and determine. A year ago we had sent 145,918 men overseas. Since then we have sent 1,950,513, an average of 162,542 each month, the number, in fact, rising in May last to 245,951, in June to 278,760, in July to 307,182, and continuing to reach similar figures in August and September—in August 289,570 and in September 257,438. No such movement of troops ever took place before across 3,000 miles of sea, followed by adequate equipment and supplies, and carried safely through extraordinary dangers which were alike strange

and infinitely difficult to guard against. In all this movement only 758 men were lost by enemy attack, 630 of whom were upon a single English transport which was sunk near the Orkney Islands.

I need not tell you what lay at the back of this great movement of men and material. It is not invidious to say that at the back of it lay a supporting organization of the industries of the country and of all of its productive activities more complete, more thorough in the method and effective in result, more spirited and unanimous in purpose and effort than any other great belligerent had been able to effect. We profited greatly by the experience of the nations which had already been engaged for nearly three years in exigent and exacting business, their every resource and every executive proficiency taxed to the utmost. We were their pupils. But we learned quickly, and acted with a promptness and readiness of co-operation that justify our great pride that we were able to serve the world with unparalleled energy and quick accomplishment.

But it is not the physical scale and executive efficiency of preparation, supply, equipment, and dispatch that I would dwell upon, but the mettle and quality of the officers and men we sent over, and of the sailors who kept the seas and the spirit of the nation that stood behind them. No soldiers or sailors ever proved themselves more quickly ready for the test of battle or acquitted themselves with more splendid courage and achievement when put to the test. Those of us who played some part in directing the great processes by which the war was pushed irresistibly forward to final triumph may now forget all that, and delight our thoughts with the story of what our men did. Their officers understood the grim and exacting task they had undertaken, and performed it with an audacity and efficiency and an unhesitating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with imperishable distinction at every turn, whether the enterprise were great or small, from their

great chiefs, Pershing and Sims, down to the youngest lieutenant; and their men were worthy of them, such men as hardly need be commanded and go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud to be a fellow-countryman of men of such stuff and valour.

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And now we are sure of the great triumph for which every sacrifice was made. It has come in its completeness, and, with the pride and inspiration of these days of achievement quick within us, we turn to the tasks of peace again—peace secure against the violence of irresponsible monarchs and ambitious military coteries—and made ready for a new order, for new foundations of justice and fair dealing. We are about to give order and organization to this peace, not only for ourselves, but for the other peoples of the world as well, as far as they will suffer us to serve them. It is international justice we seek, not domestic safety merely. Our thoughts have dwelt of late upon Europe, upon Asia, upon the Near and Far East, very little upon the acts of peace and accommodation that wait to be performed at our own doors.

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So far as our domestic affairs are concerned, the problem of our return to peace is a problem of economic and industrial readjustment. That problem is less serious for us than it may turn out to be for nations which have suffered the disarrangements and losses of war longer than we. Our people, moreover, do not wait to be coached and led. They know their own business, are quick and resourceful at every readjustment, definite in purpose, and self-reliant in action. Any leading strings we might seek to put them in would speedily become hopelessly tangled, because they would pay no attention to them and go their own way.

I have spoken of the control which must yet for a while—perhaps for a long while—be exercised over shipping, because of the priority of service to which our forces overseas are entitled; and which should also be accorded to the shipments which are to save the recently liberated peoples from starvation and many devastated regions from permanent ruin. May I not say a special word about the needs of Belgium and northern France? No sums of money paid by way of indemnity will serve of themselves to save them from hopeless disadvantage for years to come. Something more must be done than merely find the money. If they had the money and raw materials in abundance to-morrow they could not resume their place in the industry of the world to-morrow—the very important place they held before the flag of war swept across them. Many of their factories are razed to the ground. Much of their machinery is destroyed, or has been taken away. Their people are scattered, and many of their best workmen are dead. Their markets will be taken by others if they are not in some special way assisted to rebuild their factories and replace their lost instruments of manufacture. They should not be left to the vicissitudes of the sharp competition for materials and for industrial facilities which is now to set in. I hope, therefore, that Congress will not be unwilling, if it should become necessary to grant to some such agency as the War Trade Board the right to establish priorities of export and supply for the benefit of these people whom we have been so happy to assist in saving from the German terror, and whom we must not now thoughtlessly leave to shift for themselves in a pitiless competitive market.

I take it for granted that the Congress will carry out the naval programme which was undertaken before we entered the war. The Secretary of the Navy has submitted to your Committees for authorization that part of the programme

which covers the building plans of the next three years. These plans have been prepared along the lines and in accordance with the policy which the Congress established, not under the exceptional conditions of the war but with the intention of adhering to a definite method of development for the Navy. Earnestly I recommend the uninterrupted pursuit of this policy. It would clearly be unwise for us to attempt to adjust our programme to a future world-policy as yet undetermined.

I welcome this occasion to announce to Congress my purpose to join in Paris the representatives of the Governments with which we have been associated in the war against the Central Empires for the purpose of discussing with them the main features of the Treaty of Peace. I realize the great inconveniences that will attend my leaving the country, particularly at this time, but the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me by considerations which I hope will seem as conclusive to you as they have seemed to me. The Allied Governments have accepted the basis of peace which I outlined to Congress on January 8 last, as the Central Empires also have, and they very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable I should give it in order that the sincere desire of our Government to contribute without selfish purpose of any kind to the settlements that will be of common benefit to all nations concerned may be made fully manifest.

The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence over them. The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously fought for ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country ; I have sought to express these ideals ; they have been accepted by statesmen as the substance of their own

thoughts and purpose as the associated Governments have accepted them ; I owe it to them to see to it so far as in me lies that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their lives and blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcend this. I shall be in close touch with you and with affairs on this side of the water and you will know all that I do.

APPENDIX

1. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES OF COUNT HERTLING AND COUNT CZERNIN, JANUARY 24, 1918

(a) COUNT HERTLING

. . . And now, gentlemen, I come to President Wilson. Here also I admit that the tone has changed. It appears that the unanimous rejection at the time of the attempt of Mr. Wilson, in the reply to the Papal Note, to sow discord between the German Government and the German nation has done its work. It was possibly this unanimous rejection which led Mr. Wilson on to the right road, and perhaps a beginning has been made because now there is, at least, no longer any question of the suppression of the German nation by an autocratic Government, and the former attacks against the House of Hohenzollern are not repeated. I will not go into the distorted representations of German policy which are even yet to be found in Mr. Wilson's message, but I will discuss in detail the points which Mr. Wilson brings forward. There are no less than fourteen points in which he formulates his peace programme, and I beg you to have patience if I bring forward these fourteen points for discussion, as briefly as possible.

I.—*No secret international agreements.*

History records that we were the first to be able to declare ourselves in agreement with the most extensive publicity of diplomatic agreements. I remind you of the fact that our defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary has been known to all the world since the year 1889, whilst the offensive agreements of our enemies have had to be disclosed during the course of this war, chiefly by the publication of the Russian secret documents. The full publicity also given to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk proves that we were in a position to consent readily to this proposal, and to declare the publication of negotiations as a general political principle.

II.—*The freedom of the seas.*

Complete freedom of navigation on the seas in war and peace is also put forward by Germany as one of the first and most important demands for the future. Here, therefore, there is no difference of opinion whatever. The restriction mentioned by Mr. Wilson towards the end is incomprehensible and seems superfluous. It should therefore be suppressed. It would, however, be important in a high degree for the future freedom of the seas if claims to strongly fortified naval bases on important international shipping routes, such as England maintains at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong-kong, on the Falkland Islands, and at many other points, were renounced.

III.—*The abandonment of all economic restrictions which hinder commerce in an unnecessary manner.*

With this we wholly agree. We also condemn an economic war which would inevitably bring with it causes for future warlike complications.

IV.—*The limitation of armaments.*

As has already been declared by us on previous occasions, the subject of the limitation of armaments is a matter quite suitable for discussion. The financial situation of all the European States after the war should further its satisfactory solution in a most effective manner.

It will be seen that as to the first four points of the programme agreement could be reached without difficulty.

V.—*The amicable arrangement of all colonial claims.*

The practical carrying out of the principle laid down by Mr. Wilson will, in this world of realities, meet with some difficulties. In any case I believe that, for the time being, it may be left to the greatest colonial Empire—England—to determine as to how she will come to terms with her ally regarding this proposal. We shall have to talk about this point of the programme at the time of the reconstruction of the colonial possessions of the world, which has also been demanded unconditionally by us.

VI.—*The evacuation of Russian territory.*

The Entente States having refused to join in the negotiations within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Four Allied

Powers, I must decline, in the name of the latter, any subsequent interference. The question here involved is one which alone concerns Russia and the Four Allied Powers. I cherish the hope that, under the conditions of the recognition of the right of self-determination for the nations within the western boundaries of the former Russian Empire, it will be possible to be on good relations with these nations, as well as with the rest of Russia, for whom we urgently wish a return of guarantees which will secure a peaceful order of things and the welfare of the country.

VII.—*The Belgian question.*

As far as the Belgian question is concerned, it has been declared repeatedly by my predecessors in office that at no time during the war has the forcible annexation of Belgium by the German Empire formed a point in the programme of German politics. The Belgian question belongs to a complexity of questions, the details of which will have to be regulated during the peace negotiations. As long as our enemies do not unreservedly adopt the attitude that the integrity of the territory of the Allies offers the only possible foundation for peace negotiations, I must adhere to the standpoint which, up to the present, has always been taken, and must decline any discussion of the Belgian question until the general discussion takes place.

VIII.—*The liberation of French territory.*

The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands. Here also forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy. The conditions and mode of the evacuation, which must take into consideration the vital interests of Germany, must be agreed between Germany and France. I can only once again expressly emphasize that there can never be any question of the separation of the Imperial Provinces. We will never permit ourselves to be robbed of Alsace-Lorraine by our enemies under the pretext of any fine phrases—of Alsace-Lorraine, which, in the meantime, has become more and more closely allied internally with German life, which is developing more and more economically in a highly satisfactory manner, and where more than 87 per cent. of the people speak the German mother tongue.

IX, X, and XI.—*The Italian frontiers, the question of nationalities of the Danube Monarchy, and the Balkan States.*

As regards the questions dealt with by President Wilson under these clauses, they embrace questions of paramount importance to the political interests of our ally, Austria-Hungary. Where German interests are concerned, we will guard them to the utmost, but the reply to President Wilson's proposals in connexion with these points I would prefer to leave in the first instance to the Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. A close connexion with the allied Danube Monarchy is the vital point of our policy to-day and must be a guiding line for the future. The faithful comradeship in arms, which has proved itself so brilliantly during the war, must continue to have its effect also in peace, and we on our part will bring everything to bear in order to bring about for Austria-Hungary a peace which takes into account her justified claims.

XII.—*Turkey.*

Also in connexion with the point which concerns our brave and powerful ally Turkey, I would like in no way to forestall the attitude of Turkish statesmen. The integrity of Turkey and the security of her capital, which is closely connected with the questions of the Straits, are important and vital interests also of the German Empire. Our ally can in this respect always rely on our most explicit assistance.

XIII.—*Poland.*

It was not the Entente—who found nothing but meaningless words for Poland and before the war never mediated on her behalf with Russia—but the German Empire and Austria-Hungary who freed Poland from the Tsaristic régime which was oppressing her national individuality. Therefore, it must be left to Germany and Austria-Hungary and Poland to come to an agreement about the future organization of that country. We are, as has been proved by the negotiations and declarations of the last year, well under way with the task.

XIV.—*The League of Nations.*

In regard to this point I am sympathetic, as is shown by my previous political activity towards any thought which for the future excludes all possibility and probability of wars and tends

to promote a peaceful and harmonious co-operation between the nations. If the conception of the 'League of Nations' mentioned by President Wilson demonstrates, under further development and after trial, that it really was conceived in a spirit of complete justice to all, and with complete freedom from prejudice, the Imperial Government will be gladly prepared—after all the other questions in suspense have been settled—to investigate the principles of such a national union.

(b) COUNT CZERNIN

... When peace has been concluded with Russia, it will not be possible, in my opinion, to prevent for long the conclusion of a general peace, in spite of the efforts of Entente statesmen. Although I am under no delusion, and know that the fruit of peace cannot be matured in twenty-four hours, I am nevertheless convinced that it is now maturing, and that the question whether or not an honourable general peace can be secured is merely a question of resistance. President Wilson's peace offer confirms me in this opinion.

Naturally, an offer of this kind cannot be regarded as a matter acceptable in every detail, for that would obviously render any negotiations superfluous. I think there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that to some of them Austria-Hungary could joyfully give her approval, but I must first lay down this principle—that in so far as these propositions concern her Allies, whether in the case of Germany's possession of Belgium or in the case of Turkey, Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements to fight to the end in defence of her Allies, will defend the possessions of her war Allies as she would her own. That is the standpoint of the four Allies, in regard to which there is perfect reciprocity.

I have no objection to the suppression of secret diplomacy, although I doubt whether this method is in every case the most practical and rapid way to arrive at a result. The public discussion of diplomatic treaties might, for example, in the case of an economic agreement, make impossible the conclusion of such an agreement, which is nothing but a commercial transaction, and might increase the friction between the two States. It is the same in the case of political agreements.

If by the suppression of secret diplomacy it is meant that there should no longer be any secret treaties, I have no objection to make to the realization of this idea, although I do not know how one can execute and control this realization ; but these are supplementary details which could be discussed.

As to the second point, the liberty of the seas, President Wilson has responded to the views of all, and I absolutely and entirely support this paragraph.

Article III of President Wilson's declaration, which pronounces in a formal manner against a future economic war, is so just and reasonable, and its application has so often been urged by us, that we have nothing to add to it.

Article IV, which demands general disarmament, expresses in a particularly clear and just manner the necessity of bringing the rivalry in armaments to the limit already indicated in the President's profession of faith, and therefore I greet with gratitude any voice which makes itself heard in the sense of my previous statements.

We have already shown by acts that we desire to establish good neighbourly relations with Russia. [Article VI.]

On the subject of Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania [Articles IX and XI], I repeat what I have already said to the Hungarian Delegation : ' I refuse to place a premium on the military adventures of our enemies. I refuse to make our enemies, who obstinately persist in wishing to wage war until final victory, one-sided concessions by which the Monarchy would permanently suffer and which would give them the infinite advantage of being able to drag on the war, relatively without risk. . . . '

We are also supporters of the creation of an independent Polish State [Article XIII], which should include all the territories the populations of which are indisputably Polish. On this point, also, we believe we should quickly come to an understanding with President Wilson.

Finally, in his idea of a League of Peoples [Article XIV], the President would very probably meet with no opposition in the Monarchy.

We are, therefore, in agreement in the main. Our views are identical not only in the broad principles regarding the new organization of the world after the war, but also in several concrete questions ; and the differences which still exist do not

appear to me to be so great that a conversation regarding them would not lead to enlightenment and a *rapprochement*. This situation, which doubtless arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary, on the one side, and the United States, on the other, are composed of States whose interests are least at variance with one another, tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas could not be the point of departure for a personal conversation between all the States which have not yet joined in the peace negotiations ?

2. GERMAN PEACE NOTE, OCTOBER 4, 1918

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all belligerents with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. The German Government accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations. With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air.

MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN,
Imperial Chancellor.

3. GERMAN REPLY TO AMERICAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 8, 1918

In reply to the questions of the President of the United States of America, the German Government hereby declares :

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his Address of January 8 and in his subsequent Addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently, its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the Governments of the Powers associated with the Government of the United States also adopt the position taken by President Wilson in his Address.

The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed Commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German People.

(Signed) SOLF,

State Secretary of Foreign Office.

BERLIN, *October 12, 1918.*

4. GERMAN REPLY TO AMERICAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 14, 1918

In complying with the proposal to evacuate occupied territories the German Government started from the standpoint that the procedure in this evacuation and the conditions of armistice are to be left to the judgement of military advisers, and that the present relative strength on the fronts must be made the basis of arrangements that will safeguard and guarantee it. The German Government leaves it to the President to create an opportunity to settle the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve no demand that would be irreconcilable with the honour of the German people and with paving the way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the charge of illegal and inhuman practices that is made against the German land and sea forces, and thereby against the German People. Destructions (*Zerstörungen*) will always be necessary to cover a retreat, and are in so far permitted under international law. The German troops have the strictest instructions to respect private property and to care for the population according to their ability. Where, notwithstanding this, excesses occur, the guilty are punished.

The German Government also denies that in sinking ships the German Navy has purposely destroyed lifeboats with their

occupants. The German Government suggests that in all these points the facts shall be cleared up by neutral commissions.

In order to avoid everything that might render peace work more difficult, orders have, at the direction of the German Government, been sent out to all U-boat commanders that will exclude a torpedoing of passenger ships. However, for technical reasons, no guarantee can be undertaken that this order will reach every submarine at sea before its return.

President Wilson describes as a fundamental condition for peace the removal of every arbitrary power that can separately, uncontrolled, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the Parliament of the German Empire has had no influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for the co-operation of Parliament in decisions on war and peace. A fundamental change has come about in this state of affairs. A new Government has been formed in complete accord with the desires of a Parliament that has issued from equal, general, secret, and direct suffrage. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are amongst its members.

In the future, too, no Government can enter upon or carry on its office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor towards Parliament is being legally extended and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government was to submit a Bill to the Reichstag so amending the Constitution of the Empire that the approval of Parliament is requisite for a decision on war and peace. A guarantee for the duration of the new system, however, does not rest only on legal guarantees, but also on the unshakable will of the German People, the great majority of which is behind these reforms, and demands energetic persistence in them.

The President's question as to whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing with is therefore clearly and unequivocally answered, to the effect that the peace and armistice offer issues from a Government which is free from all arbitrariness and irresponsible influence, and is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German People.

(Signed) SOLE

Sécretary of State of the Foreign Ministry

BERLIN, October 20.



